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SOMETHING RADICALLY NEW AFTER DOHA
By Michael Young
Daily Star - Lebanon
May 22 2008
Whatever else is said about the agreement between Lebanon's leaders
reached in Qatar on Wednesday, it will likely transform the country's
political landscape. With the election of a president, alliances will
change and with that we may see growing intricacy and reversals in
the relationships between March 14 groups and opposition groups.
One thing that will not change, however, is the attitude of a majority
of Lebanese when it comes to Hizbullah's behavior. Party officials have
recklessly downplayed their armed occupation of Beirut two weeks ago,
but no one, least of all the Sunnis, will soon forget what happened. So
even if genuine politics return, those of compromise and shifting
calculations, the structural inability of Hizbullah to coexist with a
sovereign Lebanese state will not disappear. This may push domestic
parties to acquire weapons for when Hizbullah again uses bullets to
overcome its political shortcomings.
Like most compromises, the Doha agreement has created winners
and losers on all sides - but remains nebulous enough so that the
losers still feel they might gain from it. But it's difficult not to
interpret what happened in Qatar as a definitive sign that Syria's
return to Lebanon is no longer possible. No doubt the Syrians were
in on the arrangement, and the suspicious delay in establishing the
Hariri tribunal until early 2009 makes one wonder whether a quid pro
quo is taking shape behind the scenes. Reports of a breakthrough on
the Syrian-Israeli track, the Iraqi Army's entry into Sadr City,
certainly with an Iranian green light, and signs that a truce may
soon be agreed in Gaza, suggest a regional package deal may have
oiled the Lebanese deal.
If there was one message emerging from the recent fighting, it was
that Syria could not conceivably return its army to Lebanon without
reconquering the country. Hizbullah committed several mistakes, of
which two were especially egregious for Syria: The Sunni community,
like the Druze and many Christians, are mobilized and will fight any
Syrian comeback; and the Lebanese file is more than ever an Iranian
one, because Hizbullah's destiny is at stake. Syria's allies, other
than Hizbullah, were ineffective in Beirut and the mountains, in some
cases even siding with the majority. This confirmed that Damascus
has less leverage than ever when it comes to employing those smaller
armed groups it completely controls.
The election of a president, even if he is the troubling Michel
Suleiman, opens a new phase in Lebanon, one in which it is possible
to imagine consolidating a state gradually breaking free from Syria's
grip. That's the priority today, and has been the priority since
April 2005 when the Syrian Army withdrew from the country. Whether
Suleiman likes it or not, from now on he is a president, not a
candidate maneuvering to become a president, which will require
him to take a strong position on defending the sovereignty of the
state both vis-Ë~F-vis Syria and Hizbullah. That could either push
him closer to the position favored by March 14 and most Lebanese,
or it could damage him if he proves to be indecisive.
Will March 14 survive after this? It probably will in the face of an
armed Hizbullah and Syria's foreseeable efforts to regain a foothold
in Beirut. But the parliamentary majority may transform itself into
a looser alignment, united on the large issues but with its leaders
behaving parochially when it comes to elections and patronage. Once
Suleiman is elected, he becomes an arbiter, an axial figure, in the
political game. Politicians will have to position themselves either
for or against him, as the president strives to build up a power
base for himself in the state, particularly in Parliament. Expect
Suleiman to use the army as his bludgeon, which would be regrettable,
and expect tension between the officers and traditional politicians.
One unanswered question is who will be prime minister. If it is Saad
Hariri, and it is difficult to imagine it won't be, the relationship
between him and Suleiman will determine the face of Lebanon in
the coming year before parliamentary elections. Neither of the two
would relish a return to the discord between Emile Lahoud and Rafik
Hariri. On top of that, if Saad becomes head of the government,
he would benefit from using that position as a foundation to create
networks of alliances transcending those of March 14. An electoral
compact with the Armenians, particularly the Tashnag Party, would be
a smart move, and could shift the balance in Beirut decisively away
from Hizbullah, Amal and Syrian peons.
Another question is what happens to Walid Jumblatt? The Druze leader
has placed himself at the center of March 14 - a key mediator and
usually prime initiator of the coalition's policies. With a new
president in place, Jumblatt's role will be largely determined by the
relationship between Suleiman and his prime minister. If the prime
minister is Hariri and Hariri and Suleiman work well together, Jumblatt
could find himself isolated. In that case, and if history provides
any lessons, he will soon be contesting Suleiman and the officers
the president relies upon. Jumblatt also will have to keep Suleiman
away from his Christian electorate in Aley and the Chouf. Expect him,
in that case, to move closer to Christians as unenthusiastic about
Suleiman: Samir Geagea and Michel Aoun.
Aoun is the great loser from a presidential election. It's not like
the old general wasn't warned. He could have used his parliamentary
bloc to be presidential kingmaker; instead he decided to obstruct
everything in order to be elected himself. Now he has only dust to
feed on, and in his final years he may find himself trying to protect
his shriveling flock from the overtures of Suleiman, who, if he is
clever, will pick up a large share of the disoriented Christians. One
can already imagine most of Aoun's parliamentarians in the Metn
gravitating toward Suleiman, knowing that their re-election depends
on the goodwill of Michel Murr, who will be instrumental in moving
the district the president's way.
Samir Geagea is in a better position than Aoun, both because of his
close ties to Hariri and the Christian community's propensity to create
counterweights to its presidents. However, his power in the Cabinet
is uncertain and he too will have to fight off Suleiman's poaching
among his voters. That's why his rapport with Aoun is bound to improve.
The matter of Hizbullah's weapons will be the first test for Suleiman
once he is elected. The president risks losing the Sunnis if he comes
out with a limp formula that sidelines any serious discussion of the
topic. Now is the time to put the question of weapons on the table
seriously, and Suleiman, as a former commander of the army, is in an
ideal position to propose a sensible compromise. A second test for
the president will be the choice of a new army commander. The head
of military intelligence, George Khoury, is pining for the post,
but given the army's indolence during the fighting in Beirut and
Hariri's deep doubts about what happened, Suleiman may need all his
dexterity to propose a successor who satisfies all sides.
Can Hizbullah be pleased with the result? It will now be able to say
that it received veto power in the government and that the matter of
its weapons was not discussed in Doha. It will also be able to convince
its supporters that this was its latest victory after the government's
decision to withdraw the two decisions last week that Hizbullah found
offensive. But that may be only half the story. By so foolishly taking
over Beirut militarily, the party only scared the other communities
into sustained hostility. The two decisions the government went back
on were decisions it could never have implemented anyway, so Hizbullah
effectively revealed its coup plan at an inopportune time and for
little gain. The party also has lost two cards: It has dismantled its
downtown protest camp and won't be able to close the airport road for
some time. Its weapons have become a subject of legitimate national
discussion. And what kind of war can Hizbullah hope to wage against
Israel in South Lebanon when most Lebanese, and quite a few Shiites,
have no desire for war? Most importantly, Hizbullah has been about the
negation of the state. If the post-Doha process is about the building
of a state, then the party and that state will eventually clash.
Much will depend on Michel Suleiman. That the president will get only
three ministers in a new Cabinet affirms he has serious credibility
problems on all sides. Suleiman is an unknown quantity. Will he be
a faithful partner of Syria, as when he was army commander? Or will
he realize that he can be more than that? In many ways Suleiman is a
peculiar creation as president, someone never destined to inherit the
office. Now he has a chance to become the long-awaited patron of a
new and consensual Lebanese political order. Let's hope he's up to it.
--Boundary_(ID_x2zSXRWdn9R8cdIz8VcQNQ)--
By Michael Young
Daily Star - Lebanon
May 22 2008
Whatever else is said about the agreement between Lebanon's leaders
reached in Qatar on Wednesday, it will likely transform the country's
political landscape. With the election of a president, alliances will
change and with that we may see growing intricacy and reversals in
the relationships between March 14 groups and opposition groups.
One thing that will not change, however, is the attitude of a majority
of Lebanese when it comes to Hizbullah's behavior. Party officials have
recklessly downplayed their armed occupation of Beirut two weeks ago,
but no one, least of all the Sunnis, will soon forget what happened. So
even if genuine politics return, those of compromise and shifting
calculations, the structural inability of Hizbullah to coexist with a
sovereign Lebanese state will not disappear. This may push domestic
parties to acquire weapons for when Hizbullah again uses bullets to
overcome its political shortcomings.
Like most compromises, the Doha agreement has created winners
and losers on all sides - but remains nebulous enough so that the
losers still feel they might gain from it. But it's difficult not to
interpret what happened in Qatar as a definitive sign that Syria's
return to Lebanon is no longer possible. No doubt the Syrians were
in on the arrangement, and the suspicious delay in establishing the
Hariri tribunal until early 2009 makes one wonder whether a quid pro
quo is taking shape behind the scenes. Reports of a breakthrough on
the Syrian-Israeli track, the Iraqi Army's entry into Sadr City,
certainly with an Iranian green light, and signs that a truce may
soon be agreed in Gaza, suggest a regional package deal may have
oiled the Lebanese deal.
If there was one message emerging from the recent fighting, it was
that Syria could not conceivably return its army to Lebanon without
reconquering the country. Hizbullah committed several mistakes, of
which two were especially egregious for Syria: The Sunni community,
like the Druze and many Christians, are mobilized and will fight any
Syrian comeback; and the Lebanese file is more than ever an Iranian
one, because Hizbullah's destiny is at stake. Syria's allies, other
than Hizbullah, were ineffective in Beirut and the mountains, in some
cases even siding with the majority. This confirmed that Damascus
has less leverage than ever when it comes to employing those smaller
armed groups it completely controls.
The election of a president, even if he is the troubling Michel
Suleiman, opens a new phase in Lebanon, one in which it is possible
to imagine consolidating a state gradually breaking free from Syria's
grip. That's the priority today, and has been the priority since
April 2005 when the Syrian Army withdrew from the country. Whether
Suleiman likes it or not, from now on he is a president, not a
candidate maneuvering to become a president, which will require
him to take a strong position on defending the sovereignty of the
state both vis-Ë~F-vis Syria and Hizbullah. That could either push
him closer to the position favored by March 14 and most Lebanese,
or it could damage him if he proves to be indecisive.
Will March 14 survive after this? It probably will in the face of an
armed Hizbullah and Syria's foreseeable efforts to regain a foothold
in Beirut. But the parliamentary majority may transform itself into
a looser alignment, united on the large issues but with its leaders
behaving parochially when it comes to elections and patronage. Once
Suleiman is elected, he becomes an arbiter, an axial figure, in the
political game. Politicians will have to position themselves either
for or against him, as the president strives to build up a power
base for himself in the state, particularly in Parliament. Expect
Suleiman to use the army as his bludgeon, which would be regrettable,
and expect tension between the officers and traditional politicians.
One unanswered question is who will be prime minister. If it is Saad
Hariri, and it is difficult to imagine it won't be, the relationship
between him and Suleiman will determine the face of Lebanon in
the coming year before parliamentary elections. Neither of the two
would relish a return to the discord between Emile Lahoud and Rafik
Hariri. On top of that, if Saad becomes head of the government,
he would benefit from using that position as a foundation to create
networks of alliances transcending those of March 14. An electoral
compact with the Armenians, particularly the Tashnag Party, would be
a smart move, and could shift the balance in Beirut decisively away
from Hizbullah, Amal and Syrian peons.
Another question is what happens to Walid Jumblatt? The Druze leader
has placed himself at the center of March 14 - a key mediator and
usually prime initiator of the coalition's policies. With a new
president in place, Jumblatt's role will be largely determined by the
relationship between Suleiman and his prime minister. If the prime
minister is Hariri and Hariri and Suleiman work well together, Jumblatt
could find himself isolated. In that case, and if history provides
any lessons, he will soon be contesting Suleiman and the officers
the president relies upon. Jumblatt also will have to keep Suleiman
away from his Christian electorate in Aley and the Chouf. Expect him,
in that case, to move closer to Christians as unenthusiastic about
Suleiman: Samir Geagea and Michel Aoun.
Aoun is the great loser from a presidential election. It's not like
the old general wasn't warned. He could have used his parliamentary
bloc to be presidential kingmaker; instead he decided to obstruct
everything in order to be elected himself. Now he has only dust to
feed on, and in his final years he may find himself trying to protect
his shriveling flock from the overtures of Suleiman, who, if he is
clever, will pick up a large share of the disoriented Christians. One
can already imagine most of Aoun's parliamentarians in the Metn
gravitating toward Suleiman, knowing that their re-election depends
on the goodwill of Michel Murr, who will be instrumental in moving
the district the president's way.
Samir Geagea is in a better position than Aoun, both because of his
close ties to Hariri and the Christian community's propensity to create
counterweights to its presidents. However, his power in the Cabinet
is uncertain and he too will have to fight off Suleiman's poaching
among his voters. That's why his rapport with Aoun is bound to improve.
The matter of Hizbullah's weapons will be the first test for Suleiman
once he is elected. The president risks losing the Sunnis if he comes
out with a limp formula that sidelines any serious discussion of the
topic. Now is the time to put the question of weapons on the table
seriously, and Suleiman, as a former commander of the army, is in an
ideal position to propose a sensible compromise. A second test for
the president will be the choice of a new army commander. The head
of military intelligence, George Khoury, is pining for the post,
but given the army's indolence during the fighting in Beirut and
Hariri's deep doubts about what happened, Suleiman may need all his
dexterity to propose a successor who satisfies all sides.
Can Hizbullah be pleased with the result? It will now be able to say
that it received veto power in the government and that the matter of
its weapons was not discussed in Doha. It will also be able to convince
its supporters that this was its latest victory after the government's
decision to withdraw the two decisions last week that Hizbullah found
offensive. But that may be only half the story. By so foolishly taking
over Beirut militarily, the party only scared the other communities
into sustained hostility. The two decisions the government went back
on were decisions it could never have implemented anyway, so Hizbullah
effectively revealed its coup plan at an inopportune time and for
little gain. The party also has lost two cards: It has dismantled its
downtown protest camp and won't be able to close the airport road for
some time. Its weapons have become a subject of legitimate national
discussion. And what kind of war can Hizbullah hope to wage against
Israel in South Lebanon when most Lebanese, and quite a few Shiites,
have no desire for war? Most importantly, Hizbullah has been about the
negation of the state. If the post-Doha process is about the building
of a state, then the party and that state will eventually clash.
Much will depend on Michel Suleiman. That the president will get only
three ministers in a new Cabinet affirms he has serious credibility
problems on all sides. Suleiman is an unknown quantity. Will he be
a faithful partner of Syria, as when he was army commander? Or will
he realize that he can be more than that? In many ways Suleiman is a
peculiar creation as president, someone never destined to inherit the
office. Now he has a chance to become the long-awaited patron of a
new and consensual Lebanese political order. Let's hope he's up to it.
--Boundary_(ID_x2zSXRWdn9R8cdIz8VcQNQ)--