Tweet
REAL OPPOSITION STILL TO BE CREATED
Lilit Poghosyan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on May 28, 2008
Armenia
The activists of the pan-national movement, in the person Levon
Zourobyan - L. Ter-Petrosyan's former spokesman, have recently
rejected the authorities' proposal on taking part in the process of the
formation of a public chamber under the President. The excuses are the
same: no dialogue will be possible unless the "political prisoners"
are released. How to promote a "dialogue" between the authorities
and the opposition?
In response to our question, political scientist ALEXANDER ISKANDARYAN
touches upon this issue.
"I believe the opposition's attitude is quite logical, considering that
the goal of the 'big confrontation' which started before the elections
and continued at least till March 1 was to win. In this case, mutual
concession and a dialogue with the authorities will actually mean to
admit one's own defeat. If you intend to continue the struggle, you are
logically required not to recognize the victory of the opposite party.
The opposition announces that the elections were thoroughly falsified
and their candidate has de facto held victory. That's to say, they
do not admit the legitimacy of Serge Sargsyan. The authorities in
turn insist that due to Mr. Ter-Petrosyan and his proponents, we are
dealing with a marginal minority whose activeness is conditioned by
the shadow effect of some foreign forces and the United States or
just by the desire of someone.
In both cases, one of the parties refuses to admit the other as
a political subject. So what negotiations, dialogue and mutual
concessions are possible if, by responding to the call for a dialogue
and starting negotiations with the opposite party, L. Ter-Petrosyan
will de facto confirm his own defeat, recognizing the legitimacy of
the current regime? That's why he refused to make that step.
Correspondingly, when the authorities propose that L. Ter-Petrosyan
speak and have a dialogue with their representative, they thus say
to him, 'recognize us, and we will recognize you as the opposition
leader'."
"What solution to the conflict between the authorities and the
opposition and what scenario of possible developments do you see in
such conditions?"
"L. Ter-Petrosyan receives support by people some of whom stand by
him with purely ideological considerations. But in comparison with
the majority, it was a union of some part of the electorate, a kind
of battering ram created with the purpose of crushing the existing
political system. That tool did not serve its purpose; the political
system weakened but it wasn't crushed.
Two scenarios of developments are possible in this case. The tool
sooner or later rusts, goes out of order or diminishes, losing its
influence and becoming restricted to relatively small circles of
radical activists who are not widely supported by the public. Secondly,
the tool designed for one-time use is converted into a "club" envisaged
for a long-term use.
This is, of course, a very complicated issue which, in our reality,
is practically unfeasible. However, it's quite possible that something
may come out of it, i.e. we may have a normal opposition which will
be capable of exercising its functions as a true opposition. As to
which scenario the developments will follow, it's difficult to say
anything in this connection at the moment because the situation has
not yet been resolved, i.e. the process is not over yet. I believe a
serious conversation around the issue will be possible only in autumn.
L. Ter-Petrosyan is to make his speech in the near future and then,
the summer season will follow. Judging by all, one more attempt of
raising a new wave of protest will be initiated in autumn; it will
either succeed or a fail.
The inertia of pre-electoral and post-electoral confrontations is now
in process, and in this context, the attitude of L. Ter-Petrosyan
and his proponents is logical. That is, a dialogue may take place
only in case you release my proponents; thereafter, we will be able
to have a dialogue around extraordinary elections. This is the logic
of confrontations rather than consensus, and such logic has worked
in our reality since 1995."
"But agree with me that what happened after February 19 was impossible
to imagine even in the worst nightmares."
"Tragic as they were in terms of their consequences, the March 1
events do not essentially differ from the previous post-electoral
developments in political terms. In this case too, the defeated party
did not recognize the election results, and there were quite a lot
of people who appeared in the street, and the authorities resorted
to violence, having felt their weakness. The use of force by the
authorities is a sign of weakness; if the authorities had felt they
were strong enough they wouldn't have had to resort to violence.
This, actually, is becoming a specific kind of political
tradition which has been accompanying elections since the times of
L. Ter-Petrosyan's rule.
In our reality, the appearance of an X person (Vazgen Manoukyan, Arkadi
Vardanyan or Levon Ter-Petrosyan) prior to the elections results in an
'explosion'; thereafter, everything returns to the same spot.
Society again finds itself in the 'swamp' where the authorities are
weak because they are not controlled by the opposition; and acting
on behalf of the opposition are groups of individuals who shout that
everything is bad, terrible, the criminal regime is undermining the
state and the like.
This is an obstacle to normal criticism and the accomplishment of
the same political system.
This is Armenia's number 1 problem, and in order to solve it, is
necessary to create a normal opposition. How to do that? It should be
achieved through everyday painstaking work and permanent activeness vs.
severe criticism of the opponent and the rejection of the possibility
of a dialogue. What you do after the elections is much more important
than what you do before them. The important thing is the goal for the
sake which you come to power and not the fact of seizing power. Not
the individual, but rather, the program and ideology uniting his
co-thinkers are important.
There is such a party in Armenia. It is Dashnaktsutyun. Not having
outstanding leaders, the party has traditions, ideological principles
and hence - a relatively steady electorate which votes for the sake
of something and not against certain things; it supports certain
programs and ideas and not separate individuals.
As far as the Republican is concerned, by casting their vote in
favor of the party, the people vote in favor of the stability
and sustainability of the situation and against revolutionary
manifestations. If Armenia had 10 parties like Dashnaktsutyun it
would be possible to speak about a political system enabling society
to express its desires to a certain extent."
Lilit Poghosyan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on May 28, 2008
Armenia
The activists of the pan-national movement, in the person Levon
Zourobyan - L. Ter-Petrosyan's former spokesman, have recently
rejected the authorities' proposal on taking part in the process of the
formation of a public chamber under the President. The excuses are the
same: no dialogue will be possible unless the "political prisoners"
are released. How to promote a "dialogue" between the authorities
and the opposition?
In response to our question, political scientist ALEXANDER ISKANDARYAN
touches upon this issue.
"I believe the opposition's attitude is quite logical, considering that
the goal of the 'big confrontation' which started before the elections
and continued at least till March 1 was to win. In this case, mutual
concession and a dialogue with the authorities will actually mean to
admit one's own defeat. If you intend to continue the struggle, you are
logically required not to recognize the victory of the opposite party.
The opposition announces that the elections were thoroughly falsified
and their candidate has de facto held victory. That's to say, they
do not admit the legitimacy of Serge Sargsyan. The authorities in
turn insist that due to Mr. Ter-Petrosyan and his proponents, we are
dealing with a marginal minority whose activeness is conditioned by
the shadow effect of some foreign forces and the United States or
just by the desire of someone.
In both cases, one of the parties refuses to admit the other as
a political subject. So what negotiations, dialogue and mutual
concessions are possible if, by responding to the call for a dialogue
and starting negotiations with the opposite party, L. Ter-Petrosyan
will de facto confirm his own defeat, recognizing the legitimacy of
the current regime? That's why he refused to make that step.
Correspondingly, when the authorities propose that L. Ter-Petrosyan
speak and have a dialogue with their representative, they thus say
to him, 'recognize us, and we will recognize you as the opposition
leader'."
"What solution to the conflict between the authorities and the
opposition and what scenario of possible developments do you see in
such conditions?"
"L. Ter-Petrosyan receives support by people some of whom stand by
him with purely ideological considerations. But in comparison with
the majority, it was a union of some part of the electorate, a kind
of battering ram created with the purpose of crushing the existing
political system. That tool did not serve its purpose; the political
system weakened but it wasn't crushed.
Two scenarios of developments are possible in this case. The tool
sooner or later rusts, goes out of order or diminishes, losing its
influence and becoming restricted to relatively small circles of
radical activists who are not widely supported by the public. Secondly,
the tool designed for one-time use is converted into a "club" envisaged
for a long-term use.
This is, of course, a very complicated issue which, in our reality,
is practically unfeasible. However, it's quite possible that something
may come out of it, i.e. we may have a normal opposition which will
be capable of exercising its functions as a true opposition. As to
which scenario the developments will follow, it's difficult to say
anything in this connection at the moment because the situation has
not yet been resolved, i.e. the process is not over yet. I believe a
serious conversation around the issue will be possible only in autumn.
L. Ter-Petrosyan is to make his speech in the near future and then,
the summer season will follow. Judging by all, one more attempt of
raising a new wave of protest will be initiated in autumn; it will
either succeed or a fail.
The inertia of pre-electoral and post-electoral confrontations is now
in process, and in this context, the attitude of L. Ter-Petrosyan
and his proponents is logical. That is, a dialogue may take place
only in case you release my proponents; thereafter, we will be able
to have a dialogue around extraordinary elections. This is the logic
of confrontations rather than consensus, and such logic has worked
in our reality since 1995."
"But agree with me that what happened after February 19 was impossible
to imagine even in the worst nightmares."
"Tragic as they were in terms of their consequences, the March 1
events do not essentially differ from the previous post-electoral
developments in political terms. In this case too, the defeated party
did not recognize the election results, and there were quite a lot
of people who appeared in the street, and the authorities resorted
to violence, having felt their weakness. The use of force by the
authorities is a sign of weakness; if the authorities had felt they
were strong enough they wouldn't have had to resort to violence.
This, actually, is becoming a specific kind of political
tradition which has been accompanying elections since the times of
L. Ter-Petrosyan's rule.
In our reality, the appearance of an X person (Vazgen Manoukyan, Arkadi
Vardanyan or Levon Ter-Petrosyan) prior to the elections results in an
'explosion'; thereafter, everything returns to the same spot.
Society again finds itself in the 'swamp' where the authorities are
weak because they are not controlled by the opposition; and acting
on behalf of the opposition are groups of individuals who shout that
everything is bad, terrible, the criminal regime is undermining the
state and the like.
This is an obstacle to normal criticism and the accomplishment of
the same political system.
This is Armenia's number 1 problem, and in order to solve it, is
necessary to create a normal opposition. How to do that? It should be
achieved through everyday painstaking work and permanent activeness vs.
severe criticism of the opponent and the rejection of the possibility
of a dialogue. What you do after the elections is much more important
than what you do before them. The important thing is the goal for the
sake which you come to power and not the fact of seizing power. Not
the individual, but rather, the program and ideology uniting his
co-thinkers are important.
There is such a party in Armenia. It is Dashnaktsutyun. Not having
outstanding leaders, the party has traditions, ideological principles
and hence - a relatively steady electorate which votes for the sake
of something and not against certain things; it supports certain
programs and ideas and not separate individuals.
As far as the Republican is concerned, by casting their vote in
favor of the party, the people vote in favor of the stability
and sustainability of the situation and against revolutionary
manifestations. If Armenia had 10 parties like Dashnaktsutyun it
would be possible to speak about a political system enabling society
to express its desires to a certain extent."