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MUDROS HAS A CENTRAL PLACE IN BRITAIN'S DISHONOURABLE BEHAVIOUR FROM 1915 TO 1923
http://blog.ararat-center.org/?p=123
Oct 31, 2008
(A brief account based on: Britain and the Armenian Question,
1915-1923, Akaby Nassibian, Palgrave Macmillan, 1984).
1. Britain used the genocide of Armenians and Assyrians for war
propaganda After the genocide began in 1915 the government made use of
this to stimulate the war effort. It was Lord Bryce who brought the
genocide to public notice. During the war the Armenian question had
served a purpose for the government-to show the people that they were
fighting for justice and against evil, and to encourage the war effort,
and also to encourage American help in the war. Asquith and Baldwin
stated in 1924 that the Blue Book "was used for Allied propaganda in
1916-17 and had an influence upon the ultimate decision of President
Wilson to enter the war" By 1918 the Armenian question had fulfilled
its function and would be of no more use.
The Armenian genocide was also used by the British government
to counter charges that Britain was fighting an imperialistic
war with a view to annexations. Britain had to devise war aims
which would show that British policy was not completely based on
imperialist greed 2. Promise of the Allies: The declaration of 24th
may 1915 "The governments of Britain France and Russia will hold the
members of the Ottoman government personally responsible for these
new crimes against humanity and civilisation," 3. Rejection by the
British government of requests for Relief: There was a request by the
Russian Ambassador for a half share of one million francs for relief
of Armenian Refugees presently in Syria and Mesopotamia. The source of
the fund should be kept secret to avoid the danger of fresh violence
against Armenians. The minutes written in the Foreign Office reveal:
"The whole object of making such a donation would be the effect in
the USA etc and it would be valueless if kept secret". A more senior
official added "I should be disinclined to make any donation for the
benefit of Armenians in Turkey without publicly stating that we are
doing it" The reply to the Ambassador was that it did not affect
"British National interests" in such a way as to justify a grant
from public funds. The treasury had before in august September 1915
refused to contribute towards Armenian relief.
4. British war Pledges Pledge by Asquith in the Guildhall in 1916
Asquith stated that the British government was "resolved" that after
the war there would be an era of "liberty" for the Armenians.
In 1917 Balfour began mentioning the freedom of Armenia as a war
aim. Lloyd George had mentioned this on 29th June 1917 in Glasgow and
in the House of Commons in December 1917."Mesopotamia and Armenia
would never be restored to the tyranny of the Turk" In bringing in
the liberation of Armenia, a land where Britain had no territorial
interests, and tying it in to the liberation of a strategically
important, oil rich Mesopotamia, the British leaders could confuse the
issues, silence critics who accused them of fighting an imperialist
war, and could give notions of idealism and humanity to their war
aims. At the same time, in the winter of 1917-18 Britain secretly
considered making a separate peace with Turkey. Lloyd George was
quite willing to abandon the Caucasus, including Armenia, in order
to achieve peace with Turkey.
In July 1918, Balfour in the Commons, Lloyd George replying to
Manchester Armenians and Lord Cecil writing to Bryce all pledged
a future liberated Armenia. A Pledge by Balfour in a telegram to
Aneurin Williams, referred to Lord Cecil's letter published in the
press on 3 October 1918 which "reaffirmed" the "government's intention
to liberate Armenia" These pledges were according to Lloyd George
"intended to have a propaganda effect". During a supreme war Council
meeting he said "nobody was bound by a speech" A few weeks before
his death, Lord Bryce wrote about the threat of extinction of the
Armenians:" of the nation which the Allies caused to fight for them
and have now deserted" In the nineteenth century Britain had strongly
resented Russian presence in Armenia as a threat to her position in the
Persian Gulf. Once Britain had gained control of Lower Mesopotamia,
the importance of Armenia would become superfluous Contribution of
Armenians to the war Lord Cecil recognised that Armenian forces took
over from the Russians for five months, February till June 1918 on the
Caucasian Front, and delayed the advance of the Turks, thus rendering
an important service to the British Army in Mesopotamia. In fact few
Russians were fighting on the Turkish Eastern Front after the spring of
1917, and the Armenians fought alone, sustained only by the "Pledges"
of British Politicians for a future free Armenia 5. The betrayal of
the Mudros Armistice (30th October 1918) did not contain conditions
on Armenia. It left the 6 Armenian villayets under the sovereignty
of Turkey and no provision was made for the repatriation of Armenian
refugees and deportees to their homes. There was no occupation of
strategic points by the Allies and no provision for the release of
women and children. There was no disarming of the Turkish army. It
would have been possible to gain concessions surely from the Turks,
as 3 out of 4 proposals for peace from Turkish sources included
concessions on Armenia. The armistice was hastily signed in order to
ensure that the victorious fleet sailing into Constantinople would
be commanded by a British rather than a French admiral! In order to
secure the Dardanelle straits, Palestine and Mesopotamia for Britain,
concessions were given to the Turks over Armenia.
The draft terms of the armistice were discussed in six war cabinet
meetings.
The British priorities were set: there was no mention of Armenia
at all.
Almost all the concessions made at Mudros were at the expense of the
Armenians. The conditions were set which eventually enabled the Turks
to gain complete control of Armenia and even gain part of "Russian"
Armenia.
Balfour wrote the Supreme Council's reply to the Turkish delegation in
July 1919. He characterised the "calculated atrocity" of the wartime
Turkish massacres as equalling or exceeding "anything in recorded
history". Lord Curzon, his successor as foreign secretary agreed that
Turkish rule over the subject races should no longer be allowed.
6. The Paris Peace Conference Britain behaved shamefully towards
the Assyrians, preventing two of their delegations from attending
the conference.
7. After Independence, Britain did not recognise Armenia because of
her support for the White Russian armies who planned to integrate the
Caucasus into Russia. Non recognition meant that Armenia could not
raise the loans they desperately needed. The British General commanding
Baku (Thomson) disregarded the independence of the Caucasus As the
British were taking large quantities of oil from Baku the British
favoured Azeri territorial aspirations in Karabagh and sent large
quantities of arms to Baku not to Erevan. General Thomson appointed
a Pro-Turk and Armenophobe as governor of the disputed Karabagh region.
8. The military abandonment of Armenia. Withdrawal from the Caucasus
after only three months for financial reasons. The declared policy
of evacuation encouraged the Turks. General Milne, who commanded the
Army of the Black sea, was of the opinion that evacuation would lead
to massacres of Armenians. The military representative of the British
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference asked the War Office (under
public pressure) it would be possible for British troops to leave
behind a portion of their ammunition for the Armenians. The Army
Council opposed this request. The British withdrawal presented an
opportunity for the Kurds, Tatars and Turks to sabotage any agreement
which might favour Armenia.
9. The Army Council abdicates all responsibility for Armenia Blame for
this outcome must rest with Sir Henry Wilson. Under his responsibility,
the General Staff did not deal effectively with the disarmament of
Turkey. In addition, the Army Council, under his guidance, persistently
refused to provide the necessary arms and ammunition to the Republic
of Armenia. The military authorities in Batum even held up for some
time two aeroplanes purchased privately by the Republic. Yet later Sir
Henry Wilson victoriously argued that the republic was not capable of
taking possession of the ancient homelands of Armenia as earmarked by
the Foreign Office experts of the British delegation in Paris "How
do you expect Armenia to hold her own against a fully armed Turkey
and a rearmed Azerbaijan, herself being unarmed" he asked, when he
himself was more than anyone responsible for these conditions. Turkey
was allowed to be "fully armed" even before Peace was made, when she
should have been disarmed. Having made up his mind that Turkey should
be a major power in the Near East after the collapse of the white
Russians, he continued to press his views resolutely. When President
Woodrow Wilson asked him how many troops America would require for
the mandate over Armenia, Sir Henry replied "up to five divisions"
and this "terrified" the president. It seems he persistently tried
to frustrate any encouragement given to Armenian independence.
10. The government attempts to abdicate responsibility In the Paris
Peace Conference it was felt that Britain had secured the richest
and the strategically important parts of the Ottoman Empire for
herself. Likewise the Americans felt that the withdrawal from the
Caucasus was an attempt to "force" the hands of the US government
and to see that only the poorest parts were eventually assigned to
the mandatory.
During the war British leaders made many statements promising
liberation and protection, and were seen now to pass the responsibility
onto the US. They reminded the British of Lloyd George's speech in the
guildhall in 1916 "Britain is resolved to liberate the Armenians from
the Turkish yoke and to restore them to the religious and political
freedom they deserve and of which they have been so long deprived"
In the end The Treaty of Sevres (10th august 1920) a Treaty which
Britain had no intention to enforce, allowed Britain to wash her
hands of Armenia.
Lloyd George devised a scheme that the Allies should find equipment
for the Armenians who should be given a chance to fight their
own battles. If they were not in a position to defend their own
frontiers, then he thought that "there was no use for a nation like
that in the world" 11. The allies (particularly Britain) did nothing
to show the Turks that they meant to implement the provisions of
the Treaty of Sevres regarding Armenia. The Armenian representative
Avetis Aharonian came to London on the 12th November 1920. Sir John
Tilley of the Foreign Office told him armed intervention was "entirely
out of the question". His suggestion for an Armenian volunteer force
concentrating at a base on some Greek island was dismissed as "wholly
impracticable". He then suggested an army of peace with volunteers
from all parts of the world. Tilley rejected that idea too. Aharonian
asked how the powers contemplated executing the Turkish Treaty. Tilley
told him that the powers could execute immediately that which related
to Constantinople and the straits. Then they would organise Turkish
forces with which they hoped it would be possible gradually "to
pacify Anatolia". So the Treaty of Sevres, regarding the Armenian
clauses and the Eastern provinces would only be carried out through
pacifying Anatolia by "Turkish forces"! Referring to Aharonian's
numerous letters asking for effective help, Lord Curzon had expressed
the view that "no reply need be returned" 12. The Complete abandonment
of Armenia In desperation Armenians tried to mobilise the League of
Nations. Tilley at the Foreign office instructed the British delegate
to discourage any attempt to raise the Armenian Question there. "
I do not feel that it is a matter we want to hear very much about:
and whatever may have been expected of us originally we intend to
do as little as we can for Armenia either in men or money" Curzon
initialled the minute and did not argue against it.
In a similar mood a Conference of British ministers agreed, on the
advice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Britain should not offer
to participate in any financial guarantee to be given to Armenia by
the members of the League of Nations. The Conference agreed to oppose
admission of Armenia into the League of Nations.
M. Hymans, President of the Council of the League of Nations cabled
the British government asking whether they would be disposed to
undertake, on behalf of the League, the humanitarian mission of
stopping the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists. The
response was negative. On 19th November the Army Council wrote to
the Foreign Office that it would serve no useful purpose to forward
munitions to Armenia. Thus the abandonment of Armenia was complete
and total in respect of help.
13. On the 12th November 1920 Gevorg the 5th, Catholicos of all
the Armenians made this appeal from Yerevan :"Weakened, famished,
suffering, the Armenian people sees itself abandoned at the present
hour to the enemy which desires their total destruction.... In the
name of the Saviour I appeal to Christian Humanity to save the rest
of my people in Armenia. The British government pays no heed to this.
14. Even before the collapse of Armenia, Bonar Law wanted to revise
the Treaty of Sevres in favour of the Turks. It would please
the Mohamedan world. Also war exports to Turkey exceeded £8.5
million. Annexing territory to Armenia was now viewed in the Foreign
office as undesirable: "Giving them the Wilson frontier would merely
bring Russian influence nearer Constantinople-which neither we nor
the Turks want."
15. In 1922 Noel Buxton MP for Suffolk North proposed that the
government confer with the Powers at Lausanne with a view to cession of
territory to Turkey in Northern Mesopotamia in return for territory
to the Armenian republic. The government chose to hold on to the
oil-rights of Mosul rather than carrying out pledges to the Armenians.
16. Britain France and Russia sign away historic Armenia for good in
the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). In this Treaty which fixed the present
day border of Turkey, there was no mention of Armenia! The idea of a
national home for Turkish-Armenian refugees was dropped to the ground.
17. Activist Emily Robinson maintained that armistice terms had
provided for the return of all prisoners of war. Yet only male
prisoners were released and "about 100,000 Armenian women and children
remained captives still". As a result of her efforts, the League of
Nations had appointed in 1920 three commissioners to enquire into
the conditions of these detainees. In 1923 however in reply to her
enquiries, the Foreign Office had written that the Turks at Lausanne
"refused to allow the work of the commission to continue". She was
outraged. This meant, she wrote to Canon J. A. Douglas that the
Turks have flouted the decision of the League and that they had been
upheld by the victorious powers Grieved that the Allies would go to
any length to secure concessions to themselves instead of carrying
out pledges to liberate Turkish Armenia, she wrote: "By betraying
Armenia the Allies have destroyed not only faith in themselves but
in other things as well".
18. On 26th November 1924, the leaders of the two main opposition
parties in Britain, H. H. Asquith and Stanley Baldwin presented a
memorandum to Ramsey MacDonald, the Prime Minister. They said that
Britain should respond to the letter from the Secretary-General of
the League of Nations, dated 24th march 1924, and supporting the
assistance of the Armenian people for the following reasons.
1- because the Armenians were encouraged by promises of freedom to
support the allied cause during the war, and suffered tragically for
this cause.
2-; because during the war and since the armistice, repeated pledges
were given by statesmen to secure the liberation and independence of
the Armenian nation.
3- because Great Britain is responsible for the final dispersion of
the Ottoman Armenians after the sack of Smyrna in 1922 4- because
the sum of £5,000,000 in Turkish gold was deposited by the Turkish
Government in Berlin in 1916, and taken over by the Allies after the
armistice, was Armenian money confiscated from deported and massacred
Armenians. This sum was distributed among Allied nationals having
claims on Turkey. The Armenian Community are not permitted to claim
compensation for their losses!
The leaders of the Conservative and Liberal Parties recognised
this. They said the "government should forthwith make an important
grant" Shortly afterwards, the minority Labour government fell from
power. Baldwin became Prime Minister commanding 419 seats out of 615
in the Commons. No grants were made for resettlement of Armenian
refugees in Armenia or in Syria 19. A Labour Party Resolution on
Armenia In February 1920 the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on
International Questions passed a "Resolution on Armenia" protesting
"against the treatment of Armenia by the Allied Powers" During the
war, the resolution claimed, the Ottoman government had once and for
all forfeited any right to rule the Armenian provinces of Turkey by
the "deliberately organised" attempt "to exterminate the Armenian
population" The evidence was abundant and conclusive" and the British
government had published it in a Blue Boook Yet in negotiating the
armistice the Allied governments had left the Armenian provinces
under the Turkish authorities, while Turkish rule was immediately
terminated in the Arab provinces.
The resolution claimed that: .... "the policy of the Allied Governments
since the armistice.... intends to detach from Turkey and attach to
themselves under the form of mandates conferred by the League of
Nations all those provinces of the Ottoman Empire where they have
financial, economic or strategic interests, while no provision is
being made for Armenia, the one region of Turkey which unquestionably
ought to be released from Turkish sovereignty" (Labour Party, London,
Advisory Committee on International Questions, Minutes and Memoranda
1918-234 (LP/IAC/1/91 and ibid. no 170) In a draft memorandum, the same
Committee argued that the case for a mandate in Armenia was immensely
stronger than in any other part of the Turkish Empire, though, just
because it would be "onerous and not lucrative" it seemed unlikely to
be accepted by any Great Power. Written in 1919, it proved to be an
accurate prediction In 1921, the Committee strongly blamed the Allies
for having sacrificed the Armenians to their own interests. Had they
followed a "wise foreign policy," "if they had been prepared to give
up their own policy of plunder-they could have obtained all that could
reasonably be demanded including that freedom for Armenia which they
had promised to secure. They have sacrificed the Armenians to their
own self-aggrandisement." It has to be said however that the Labour
Party did not bring pressure on the government for effective help
to Armenia 20. Oliver Baldwin (Prime Minister Baldwin's son) also
believed that the desertion of Armenia by Britain would not have
happened had there been oil wells in Armenia. This view was shared
by many humanitarians. These advocates for Armenia like Aneurin
Williams thought that recognising "majorities made by massacre"
was absolutely intolerable.
21. The final nail in Armenia's coffin happened at the end of the
Second World War when the Soviets attempted to regain Kars and Ardahan
for Armenia.
Churchill opposed this for fear of extending Soviet Power. In 1946 when
debating this issue, Bevin replied for the government that "there is
no longer any nationality problem in the region"(i.e. Turkish occupied
Armenia), in a sense agreeing that by the success of the genocide of
the Armenian population, Turkey had a right to these territories.
22. Today's denial of the Armenian Genocide for selfish financial,
economic and strategic reasons by Britain is a continuation of
Britain's pro-Turkish policy since Disraeli
--Boundary_(ID_Htn/j3s5fa/9/pVDgkqJZw)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://blog.ararat-center.org/?p=123
Oct 31, 2008
(A brief account based on: Britain and the Armenian Question,
1915-1923, Akaby Nassibian, Palgrave Macmillan, 1984).
1. Britain used the genocide of Armenians and Assyrians for war
propaganda After the genocide began in 1915 the government made use of
this to stimulate the war effort. It was Lord Bryce who brought the
genocide to public notice. During the war the Armenian question had
served a purpose for the government-to show the people that they were
fighting for justice and against evil, and to encourage the war effort,
and also to encourage American help in the war. Asquith and Baldwin
stated in 1924 that the Blue Book "was used for Allied propaganda in
1916-17 and had an influence upon the ultimate decision of President
Wilson to enter the war" By 1918 the Armenian question had fulfilled
its function and would be of no more use.
The Armenian genocide was also used by the British government
to counter charges that Britain was fighting an imperialistic
war with a view to annexations. Britain had to devise war aims
which would show that British policy was not completely based on
imperialist greed 2. Promise of the Allies: The declaration of 24th
may 1915 "The governments of Britain France and Russia will hold the
members of the Ottoman government personally responsible for these
new crimes against humanity and civilisation," 3. Rejection by the
British government of requests for Relief: There was a request by the
Russian Ambassador for a half share of one million francs for relief
of Armenian Refugees presently in Syria and Mesopotamia. The source of
the fund should be kept secret to avoid the danger of fresh violence
against Armenians. The minutes written in the Foreign Office reveal:
"The whole object of making such a donation would be the effect in
the USA etc and it would be valueless if kept secret". A more senior
official added "I should be disinclined to make any donation for the
benefit of Armenians in Turkey without publicly stating that we are
doing it" The reply to the Ambassador was that it did not affect
"British National interests" in such a way as to justify a grant
from public funds. The treasury had before in august September 1915
refused to contribute towards Armenian relief.
4. British war Pledges Pledge by Asquith in the Guildhall in 1916
Asquith stated that the British government was "resolved" that after
the war there would be an era of "liberty" for the Armenians.
In 1917 Balfour began mentioning the freedom of Armenia as a war
aim. Lloyd George had mentioned this on 29th June 1917 in Glasgow and
in the House of Commons in December 1917."Mesopotamia and Armenia
would never be restored to the tyranny of the Turk" In bringing in
the liberation of Armenia, a land where Britain had no territorial
interests, and tying it in to the liberation of a strategically
important, oil rich Mesopotamia, the British leaders could confuse the
issues, silence critics who accused them of fighting an imperialist
war, and could give notions of idealism and humanity to their war
aims. At the same time, in the winter of 1917-18 Britain secretly
considered making a separate peace with Turkey. Lloyd George was
quite willing to abandon the Caucasus, including Armenia, in order
to achieve peace with Turkey.
In July 1918, Balfour in the Commons, Lloyd George replying to
Manchester Armenians and Lord Cecil writing to Bryce all pledged
a future liberated Armenia. A Pledge by Balfour in a telegram to
Aneurin Williams, referred to Lord Cecil's letter published in the
press on 3 October 1918 which "reaffirmed" the "government's intention
to liberate Armenia" These pledges were according to Lloyd George
"intended to have a propaganda effect". During a supreme war Council
meeting he said "nobody was bound by a speech" A few weeks before
his death, Lord Bryce wrote about the threat of extinction of the
Armenians:" of the nation which the Allies caused to fight for them
and have now deserted" In the nineteenth century Britain had strongly
resented Russian presence in Armenia as a threat to her position in the
Persian Gulf. Once Britain had gained control of Lower Mesopotamia,
the importance of Armenia would become superfluous Contribution of
Armenians to the war Lord Cecil recognised that Armenian forces took
over from the Russians for five months, February till June 1918 on the
Caucasian Front, and delayed the advance of the Turks, thus rendering
an important service to the British Army in Mesopotamia. In fact few
Russians were fighting on the Turkish Eastern Front after the spring of
1917, and the Armenians fought alone, sustained only by the "Pledges"
of British Politicians for a future free Armenia 5. The betrayal of
the Mudros Armistice (30th October 1918) did not contain conditions
on Armenia. It left the 6 Armenian villayets under the sovereignty
of Turkey and no provision was made for the repatriation of Armenian
refugees and deportees to their homes. There was no occupation of
strategic points by the Allies and no provision for the release of
women and children. There was no disarming of the Turkish army. It
would have been possible to gain concessions surely from the Turks,
as 3 out of 4 proposals for peace from Turkish sources included
concessions on Armenia. The armistice was hastily signed in order to
ensure that the victorious fleet sailing into Constantinople would
be commanded by a British rather than a French admiral! In order to
secure the Dardanelle straits, Palestine and Mesopotamia for Britain,
concessions were given to the Turks over Armenia.
The draft terms of the armistice were discussed in six war cabinet
meetings.
The British priorities were set: there was no mention of Armenia
at all.
Almost all the concessions made at Mudros were at the expense of the
Armenians. The conditions were set which eventually enabled the Turks
to gain complete control of Armenia and even gain part of "Russian"
Armenia.
Balfour wrote the Supreme Council's reply to the Turkish delegation in
July 1919. He characterised the "calculated atrocity" of the wartime
Turkish massacres as equalling or exceeding "anything in recorded
history". Lord Curzon, his successor as foreign secretary agreed that
Turkish rule over the subject races should no longer be allowed.
6. The Paris Peace Conference Britain behaved shamefully towards
the Assyrians, preventing two of their delegations from attending
the conference.
7. After Independence, Britain did not recognise Armenia because of
her support for the White Russian armies who planned to integrate the
Caucasus into Russia. Non recognition meant that Armenia could not
raise the loans they desperately needed. The British General commanding
Baku (Thomson) disregarded the independence of the Caucasus As the
British were taking large quantities of oil from Baku the British
favoured Azeri territorial aspirations in Karabagh and sent large
quantities of arms to Baku not to Erevan. General Thomson appointed
a Pro-Turk and Armenophobe as governor of the disputed Karabagh region.
8. The military abandonment of Armenia. Withdrawal from the Caucasus
after only three months for financial reasons. The declared policy
of evacuation encouraged the Turks. General Milne, who commanded the
Army of the Black sea, was of the opinion that evacuation would lead
to massacres of Armenians. The military representative of the British
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference asked the War Office (under
public pressure) it would be possible for British troops to leave
behind a portion of their ammunition for the Armenians. The Army
Council opposed this request. The British withdrawal presented an
opportunity for the Kurds, Tatars and Turks to sabotage any agreement
which might favour Armenia.
9. The Army Council abdicates all responsibility for Armenia Blame for
this outcome must rest with Sir Henry Wilson. Under his responsibility,
the General Staff did not deal effectively with the disarmament of
Turkey. In addition, the Army Council, under his guidance, persistently
refused to provide the necessary arms and ammunition to the Republic
of Armenia. The military authorities in Batum even held up for some
time two aeroplanes purchased privately by the Republic. Yet later Sir
Henry Wilson victoriously argued that the republic was not capable of
taking possession of the ancient homelands of Armenia as earmarked by
the Foreign Office experts of the British delegation in Paris "How
do you expect Armenia to hold her own against a fully armed Turkey
and a rearmed Azerbaijan, herself being unarmed" he asked, when he
himself was more than anyone responsible for these conditions. Turkey
was allowed to be "fully armed" even before Peace was made, when she
should have been disarmed. Having made up his mind that Turkey should
be a major power in the Near East after the collapse of the white
Russians, he continued to press his views resolutely. When President
Woodrow Wilson asked him how many troops America would require for
the mandate over Armenia, Sir Henry replied "up to five divisions"
and this "terrified" the president. It seems he persistently tried
to frustrate any encouragement given to Armenian independence.
10. The government attempts to abdicate responsibility In the Paris
Peace Conference it was felt that Britain had secured the richest
and the strategically important parts of the Ottoman Empire for
herself. Likewise the Americans felt that the withdrawal from the
Caucasus was an attempt to "force" the hands of the US government
and to see that only the poorest parts were eventually assigned to
the mandatory.
During the war British leaders made many statements promising
liberation and protection, and were seen now to pass the responsibility
onto the US. They reminded the British of Lloyd George's speech in the
guildhall in 1916 "Britain is resolved to liberate the Armenians from
the Turkish yoke and to restore them to the religious and political
freedom they deserve and of which they have been so long deprived"
In the end The Treaty of Sevres (10th august 1920) a Treaty which
Britain had no intention to enforce, allowed Britain to wash her
hands of Armenia.
Lloyd George devised a scheme that the Allies should find equipment
for the Armenians who should be given a chance to fight their
own battles. If they were not in a position to defend their own
frontiers, then he thought that "there was no use for a nation like
that in the world" 11. The allies (particularly Britain) did nothing
to show the Turks that they meant to implement the provisions of
the Treaty of Sevres regarding Armenia. The Armenian representative
Avetis Aharonian came to London on the 12th November 1920. Sir John
Tilley of the Foreign Office told him armed intervention was "entirely
out of the question". His suggestion for an Armenian volunteer force
concentrating at a base on some Greek island was dismissed as "wholly
impracticable". He then suggested an army of peace with volunteers
from all parts of the world. Tilley rejected that idea too. Aharonian
asked how the powers contemplated executing the Turkish Treaty. Tilley
told him that the powers could execute immediately that which related
to Constantinople and the straits. Then they would organise Turkish
forces with which they hoped it would be possible gradually "to
pacify Anatolia". So the Treaty of Sevres, regarding the Armenian
clauses and the Eastern provinces would only be carried out through
pacifying Anatolia by "Turkish forces"! Referring to Aharonian's
numerous letters asking for effective help, Lord Curzon had expressed
the view that "no reply need be returned" 12. The Complete abandonment
of Armenia In desperation Armenians tried to mobilise the League of
Nations. Tilley at the Foreign office instructed the British delegate
to discourage any attempt to raise the Armenian Question there. "
I do not feel that it is a matter we want to hear very much about:
and whatever may have been expected of us originally we intend to
do as little as we can for Armenia either in men or money" Curzon
initialled the minute and did not argue against it.
In a similar mood a Conference of British ministers agreed, on the
advice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that Britain should not offer
to participate in any financial guarantee to be given to Armenia by
the members of the League of Nations. The Conference agreed to oppose
admission of Armenia into the League of Nations.
M. Hymans, President of the Council of the League of Nations cabled
the British government asking whether they would be disposed to
undertake, on behalf of the League, the humanitarian mission of
stopping the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists. The
response was negative. On 19th November the Army Council wrote to
the Foreign Office that it would serve no useful purpose to forward
munitions to Armenia. Thus the abandonment of Armenia was complete
and total in respect of help.
13. On the 12th November 1920 Gevorg the 5th, Catholicos of all
the Armenians made this appeal from Yerevan :"Weakened, famished,
suffering, the Armenian people sees itself abandoned at the present
hour to the enemy which desires their total destruction.... In the
name of the Saviour I appeal to Christian Humanity to save the rest
of my people in Armenia. The British government pays no heed to this.
14. Even before the collapse of Armenia, Bonar Law wanted to revise
the Treaty of Sevres in favour of the Turks. It would please
the Mohamedan world. Also war exports to Turkey exceeded £8.5
million. Annexing territory to Armenia was now viewed in the Foreign
office as undesirable: "Giving them the Wilson frontier would merely
bring Russian influence nearer Constantinople-which neither we nor
the Turks want."
15. In 1922 Noel Buxton MP for Suffolk North proposed that the
government confer with the Powers at Lausanne with a view to cession of
territory to Turkey in Northern Mesopotamia in return for territory
to the Armenian republic. The government chose to hold on to the
oil-rights of Mosul rather than carrying out pledges to the Armenians.
16. Britain France and Russia sign away historic Armenia for good in
the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). In this Treaty which fixed the present
day border of Turkey, there was no mention of Armenia! The idea of a
national home for Turkish-Armenian refugees was dropped to the ground.
17. Activist Emily Robinson maintained that armistice terms had
provided for the return of all prisoners of war. Yet only male
prisoners were released and "about 100,000 Armenian women and children
remained captives still". As a result of her efforts, the League of
Nations had appointed in 1920 three commissioners to enquire into
the conditions of these detainees. In 1923 however in reply to her
enquiries, the Foreign Office had written that the Turks at Lausanne
"refused to allow the work of the commission to continue". She was
outraged. This meant, she wrote to Canon J. A. Douglas that the
Turks have flouted the decision of the League and that they had been
upheld by the victorious powers Grieved that the Allies would go to
any length to secure concessions to themselves instead of carrying
out pledges to liberate Turkish Armenia, she wrote: "By betraying
Armenia the Allies have destroyed not only faith in themselves but
in other things as well".
18. On 26th November 1924, the leaders of the two main opposition
parties in Britain, H. H. Asquith and Stanley Baldwin presented a
memorandum to Ramsey MacDonald, the Prime Minister. They said that
Britain should respond to the letter from the Secretary-General of
the League of Nations, dated 24th march 1924, and supporting the
assistance of the Armenian people for the following reasons.
1- because the Armenians were encouraged by promises of freedom to
support the allied cause during the war, and suffered tragically for
this cause.
2-; because during the war and since the armistice, repeated pledges
were given by statesmen to secure the liberation and independence of
the Armenian nation.
3- because Great Britain is responsible for the final dispersion of
the Ottoman Armenians after the sack of Smyrna in 1922 4- because
the sum of £5,000,000 in Turkish gold was deposited by the Turkish
Government in Berlin in 1916, and taken over by the Allies after the
armistice, was Armenian money confiscated from deported and massacred
Armenians. This sum was distributed among Allied nationals having
claims on Turkey. The Armenian Community are not permitted to claim
compensation for their losses!
The leaders of the Conservative and Liberal Parties recognised
this. They said the "government should forthwith make an important
grant" Shortly afterwards, the minority Labour government fell from
power. Baldwin became Prime Minister commanding 419 seats out of 615
in the Commons. No grants were made for resettlement of Armenian
refugees in Armenia or in Syria 19. A Labour Party Resolution on
Armenia In February 1920 the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on
International Questions passed a "Resolution on Armenia" protesting
"against the treatment of Armenia by the Allied Powers" During the
war, the resolution claimed, the Ottoman government had once and for
all forfeited any right to rule the Armenian provinces of Turkey by
the "deliberately organised" attempt "to exterminate the Armenian
population" The evidence was abundant and conclusive" and the British
government had published it in a Blue Boook Yet in negotiating the
armistice the Allied governments had left the Armenian provinces
under the Turkish authorities, while Turkish rule was immediately
terminated in the Arab provinces.
The resolution claimed that: .... "the policy of the Allied Governments
since the armistice.... intends to detach from Turkey and attach to
themselves under the form of mandates conferred by the League of
Nations all those provinces of the Ottoman Empire where they have
financial, economic or strategic interests, while no provision is
being made for Armenia, the one region of Turkey which unquestionably
ought to be released from Turkish sovereignty" (Labour Party, London,
Advisory Committee on International Questions, Minutes and Memoranda
1918-234 (LP/IAC/1/91 and ibid. no 170) In a draft memorandum, the same
Committee argued that the case for a mandate in Armenia was immensely
stronger than in any other part of the Turkish Empire, though, just
because it would be "onerous and not lucrative" it seemed unlikely to
be accepted by any Great Power. Written in 1919, it proved to be an
accurate prediction In 1921, the Committee strongly blamed the Allies
for having sacrificed the Armenians to their own interests. Had they
followed a "wise foreign policy," "if they had been prepared to give
up their own policy of plunder-they could have obtained all that could
reasonably be demanded including that freedom for Armenia which they
had promised to secure. They have sacrificed the Armenians to their
own self-aggrandisement." It has to be said however that the Labour
Party did not bring pressure on the government for effective help
to Armenia 20. Oliver Baldwin (Prime Minister Baldwin's son) also
believed that the desertion of Armenia by Britain would not have
happened had there been oil wells in Armenia. This view was shared
by many humanitarians. These advocates for Armenia like Aneurin
Williams thought that recognising "majorities made by massacre"
was absolutely intolerable.
21. The final nail in Armenia's coffin happened at the end of the
Second World War when the Soviets attempted to regain Kars and Ardahan
for Armenia.
Churchill opposed this for fear of extending Soviet Power. In 1946 when
debating this issue, Bevin replied for the government that "there is
no longer any nationality problem in the region"(i.e. Turkish occupied
Armenia), in a sense agreeing that by the success of the genocide of
the Armenian population, Turkey had a right to these territories.
22. Today's denial of the Armenian Genocide for selfish financial,
economic and strategic reasons by Britain is a continuation of
Britain's pro-Turkish policy since Disraeli
--Boundary_(ID_Htn/j3s5fa/9/pVDgkqJZw)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress