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Back to the future in the Caspian corridor
Russia's attempts to re-establish its Soviet-era spheres of influence
seem to have caught the US on the hop
Simon Tisdall
guardian.co.uk,
Thursday October 30 2008 16.30 GMT
Russia's efforts to control oil and gas supplies to Europe from the
Caspian basin and central Asia could advance significantly at the
weekend when the Kremlin hosts a summit meeting of the leaders of
long-time south Caucasus rivals Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The talks, convened by President Dmitri Medvedev, are primarily aimed
at settling the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the region's
so-called frozen conflicts. In the early 1990s the two neighbours went
to war over the enclave, which Azerbaijan regards as sovereign
territory and which is currently controlled by ethnic Armenian forces.
Russia's altruism should obviously be applauded. But Moscow's
peacemakers are probably more concerned with increasing their political
and economic influence in the crucial energy corridor connecting Baku,
Azerbaijan's capital, with Georgia, Turkey and the west. This effort is
seen by some regional experts as part of Russia's broader attempt to
re-establish Soviet era spheres of influence beyond its borders.
The Kremlin has been tirelessly wooing Azerbaijan's Moscow-educated
president, Ilham Aliyev. Earlier this year Gazprom, the Russian gas
monopoly, informed Azerbaijan as well as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan that it was ready to pay higher European market prices for
their gas.
The offer stripped away much of the economic rationale for the proposed
US and EU-backed Nabucco pipeline that, if built, would transport gas
direct to Europe from the Caspian. It would also reduce producer
countries' transit costs.
"Some experts in Baku believe the Gazprom gambit will be successful in
achieving its main aim - to frustrate American and EU efforts to
establish an alternative export network that would circumvent Russia,"
said industry writer Khadija Ismayilova on Eurasianet.org.
Russia's summer conflict with Georgia, though which key oil and gas
pipelines to Turkey pass, and Europe's vacillating response have also
left Azerbaijan reconsidering its westward-leaning stance. After the
Soviet Union's collapse, Baku pursued links with the EU, encouraged
investment by companies such as BP, and built ties to Nato.
But resentment about recent western neglect, particularly by the US,
coupled with concerns about its reassertive northern neighbour and the
impasse over Nagorno-Karabakh, is enticing Azerbaijan towards a
Russian-dominated "Eurasian" sphere, said regional experts Borut Grgic
and Alexandros Petersen in the Wall Street Journal.
"Azerbaijanis were disappointed by the west's reaction to events in
Georgia and the growing inclination in many European capitals to
capitulate to Russia in the broader Black Sea region," they said. "Now
Moscow, a long-time friend of Armenia in the Karabakh conflict, has
begun quietly supporting Azerbaijan's position in the hopes of securing
a deal for all of [its] available natural gas exports.
"In the absence of incentives or even attention from the west, Baku is
seriously considering a major foreign policy reversal." And if the
shift into Russia's camp came about, Grgic and Petersen warned, a
"strategic chunk" of central Asia would likely follow suit.
Russia is working hard to keep Armenia on board, too. Medvedev went to
Yerevan earlier this month and signed a sheaf of cooperation
agreements. After meeting President Serge Sarkisian, the Russian leader
said talks on settling Nagorno-Karabakh were at "an advanced stage".
Russia's diplomatic and economic offensive in the south Caucasus has
not gone wholly unanswered. Turkey, with its own energy and security
interests at stake, is in effect leading western mediation efforts over
Nagorno-Karabakh - though getting little credit for it. President
Abdullah Gul made a landmark visit to Armenia earlier this year in a
bid to mend fences with an historic enemy. US envoys have also joined
the fray.
But western attempts to stay in the game are hampered by factors
ranging from the absence of common EU policies on Caspian energy, the
south Caucasus conflicts and Turkey to the US Congress's lopsided
grandstanding on the Armenian genocide and the political transition in
Washington. Criticism of Azerbaijan over human rights and this month's
presidential election, won by Aliyev by a suspiciously large margin
amid an opposition boycott, is also something Baku does not have to put
up with from Moscow.
Alarmed that the regional balance is shifting, the US vice-president
and former oilman Dick Cheney dashed to Baku in September after
visiting Georgia. He did not stay long and it is unclear what, if
anything, he achieved. No sooner had Aliyev bidden Cheney goodbye than
he flew to Moscow for consultations. It was a good indicator of where
the power lies.
Cheney's sudden appearance prompted wry questions in Baku about why it
took him eight years to make the trip. It also left some observers
suggesting the Bush administration has already "lost the Caspian" - and
only just realised.
Russia's attempts to re-establish its Soviet-era spheres of influence
seem to have caught the US on the hop
Simon Tisdall
guardian.co.uk,
Thursday October 30 2008 16.30 GMT
Russia's efforts to control oil and gas supplies to Europe from the
Caspian basin and central Asia could advance significantly at the
weekend when the Kremlin hosts a summit meeting of the leaders of
long-time south Caucasus rivals Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The talks, convened by President Dmitri Medvedev, are primarily aimed
at settling the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the region's
so-called frozen conflicts. In the early 1990s the two neighbours went
to war over the enclave, which Azerbaijan regards as sovereign
territory and which is currently controlled by ethnic Armenian forces.
Russia's altruism should obviously be applauded. But Moscow's
peacemakers are probably more concerned with increasing their political
and economic influence in the crucial energy corridor connecting Baku,
Azerbaijan's capital, with Georgia, Turkey and the west. This effort is
seen by some regional experts as part of Russia's broader attempt to
re-establish Soviet era spheres of influence beyond its borders.
The Kremlin has been tirelessly wooing Azerbaijan's Moscow-educated
president, Ilham Aliyev. Earlier this year Gazprom, the Russian gas
monopoly, informed Azerbaijan as well as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan that it was ready to pay higher European market prices for
their gas.
The offer stripped away much of the economic rationale for the proposed
US and EU-backed Nabucco pipeline that, if built, would transport gas
direct to Europe from the Caspian. It would also reduce producer
countries' transit costs.
"Some experts in Baku believe the Gazprom gambit will be successful in
achieving its main aim - to frustrate American and EU efforts to
establish an alternative export network that would circumvent Russia,"
said industry writer Khadija Ismayilova on Eurasianet.org.
Russia's summer conflict with Georgia, though which key oil and gas
pipelines to Turkey pass, and Europe's vacillating response have also
left Azerbaijan reconsidering its westward-leaning stance. After the
Soviet Union's collapse, Baku pursued links with the EU, encouraged
investment by companies such as BP, and built ties to Nato.
But resentment about recent western neglect, particularly by the US,
coupled with concerns about its reassertive northern neighbour and the
impasse over Nagorno-Karabakh, is enticing Azerbaijan towards a
Russian-dominated "Eurasian" sphere, said regional experts Borut Grgic
and Alexandros Petersen in the Wall Street Journal.
"Azerbaijanis were disappointed by the west's reaction to events in
Georgia and the growing inclination in many European capitals to
capitulate to Russia in the broader Black Sea region," they said. "Now
Moscow, a long-time friend of Armenia in the Karabakh conflict, has
begun quietly supporting Azerbaijan's position in the hopes of securing
a deal for all of [its] available natural gas exports.
"In the absence of incentives or even attention from the west, Baku is
seriously considering a major foreign policy reversal." And if the
shift into Russia's camp came about, Grgic and Petersen warned, a
"strategic chunk" of central Asia would likely follow suit.
Russia is working hard to keep Armenia on board, too. Medvedev went to
Yerevan earlier this month and signed a sheaf of cooperation
agreements. After meeting President Serge Sarkisian, the Russian leader
said talks on settling Nagorno-Karabakh were at "an advanced stage".
Russia's diplomatic and economic offensive in the south Caucasus has
not gone wholly unanswered. Turkey, with its own energy and security
interests at stake, is in effect leading western mediation efforts over
Nagorno-Karabakh - though getting little credit for it. President
Abdullah Gul made a landmark visit to Armenia earlier this year in a
bid to mend fences with an historic enemy. US envoys have also joined
the fray.
But western attempts to stay in the game are hampered by factors
ranging from the absence of common EU policies on Caspian energy, the
south Caucasus conflicts and Turkey to the US Congress's lopsided
grandstanding on the Armenian genocide and the political transition in
Washington. Criticism of Azerbaijan over human rights and this month's
presidential election, won by Aliyev by a suspiciously large margin
amid an opposition boycott, is also something Baku does not have to put
up with from Moscow.
Alarmed that the regional balance is shifting, the US vice-president
and former oilman Dick Cheney dashed to Baku in September after
visiting Georgia. He did not stay long and it is unclear what, if
anything, he achieved. No sooner had Aliyev bidden Cheney goodbye than
he flew to Moscow for consultations. It was a good indicator of where
the power lies.
Cheney's sudden appearance prompted wry questions in Baku about why it
took him eight years to make the trip. It also left some observers
suggesting the Bush administration has already "lost the Caspian" - and
only just realised.