Tweet
The Biased Mediator
November 1, 2008
By Ilgar Velizade
Special to Russia Profile
Georgia's Exodus from the CIS Left the Caucasus with Little Common Ground
At a time of escalating tensions in the region, Turkey is offering its
services in organizing negotiations.
In the disarray that overwhelmed the international community following
the August events in Georgia, few noticed an inconspicuous but
potentially dangerous moment: after Georgia left the CIS, the countries
of the Southern Caucasus no longer have an organization in which they
could discuss common problems in a `close circle.'
The situation is that Armenia is a member of the CIS and the
Russia-centered Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but is
not included in GUAM, named after the first letters in the names of its
four members'Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, all interested
in laying pipelines that circumvent Russian territory. Azerbaijan plays
a key role in GUAM and is a member of the CIS who holds regular
meetings of the heads of state and governments. Georgia, however,
stayed in GUAM and withdrew from the CIS, shutting the door behind
itself: the decision was made at a meeting of the parliament and the
Georgian authorities viewed it as a gesture of protest against Russia.
As a result, a deficit of negotiating platforms has suddenly arisen.
Even though the prospect of Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS became
apparent after the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, the fact that the
withdrawal would happen in such dramatic circumstances as the war in
South Ossetia was hard to predict.
However, Georgia's statement on its withdrawal from the CIS only
reminded of the permanent political paralysis that this organization
has found itself in for many years. After all, it is simply impossible
to take an organization seriously when its members engage in not just
diplomatic conflicts, but also in full-scale war (as was, for example,
the case between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991 to 1994).
In principle, European structures such as the OSCE and the Council of
Europe could be of some help, but these are major international
organizations whose humanitarian bias could interfere with real
politics, and these organizations include countries that are far from
the Caucasus region and its problems. Additionally, Iran is not
represented in the OSCE or in the Council of Europe, and it would be
quite problematic to ensure the security and prosperity of the Caucasus
without taking this country into account. So who will give these bygone
`fraternal republics' of the former Soviet Union an arena to address
common problems?
The proposal to create a new forum for communication between the South
Caucasian countries and their neighbors came from an unexpected
source'from Turkey. Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict
between Georgia and Russia, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
visited Moscow and Tbilisi, and soon thereafter followed up with a
visit to Baku, where he unveiled his initiative for the establishment
of an Alliance for Cooperation and Security in the Caucasus or the
Stability Pact for the Caucasus. The essence of this initiative is that
problems in the region must be tackled by all three states of the
Caucasus, with the support of the bordering Turkey and Russia. Soon
after Erdogan voiced his idea, Iran proposed the `three plus three'
formula: within the framework of the pact, stability in the region will
not only be secured by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but by all
their neighbors (Russia, Turkey and Iran) as well.
None of the six potential participants rejected Erdogan's idea, and
Turkey is pushing it forward with commendable zeal. For example, the
summit of the heads of Turkic-speaking states that was scheduled for
September in Baku has been postponed for the second time, while in one
month's time, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has visited not only the
friendly Azerbaijan, but also completed a historic visit to Armenia,
attending a football match between the Turkish and Armenian teams.
Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations because of the
Armenian-Turkish conflict dating back to the beginning of the twentieth
century, exacerbated by the conflict over the separatist region of
Karabakh in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan's fight against the
separatists. Moreover, also in September, Abdullah Gul hosted the
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Ankara, and the Turkish
Foreign Minister Ali Babacan hosted his Russian counterpart Sergei
Lavrov, who supported what he called the `Turkish initiative on the
platform of stability and cooperation in the Caucasus.'
Perhaps Ankara had decided that given the escalating tension in the
region due to the conflict in South Ossetia, a summit of Turkic
countries in Baku would simply not be appropriate. The situation
arising from Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
presently of much greater concern for the Turkic states than the
prospect of building a `Turkic home.' However, in addition to
Azerbaijan, there are several other Turkic speaking nations in the
Caucasus, a factor that could help Turkey play the role of a mediator
and a peacemaker. Still, even though the `Turkic home' project has been
the subject of serious discussion for 16 years, the `general
contractor' of the project, Ankara, is now preoccupied with the
stability and sustainability of an adjacent building'the Greater
Caucasus, which has in recent years developed dangerous cracks.
The Caucasus today is a bustling cauldron of passions where complex
processes have ethnic overtones, and thus consensus is difficult to
achieve. For instance, asking the residents of Moscow, Tbilisi,
Yerevan, and Baku `how many states are there in the South Caucasus
today?' garners a minimum of three different responses: `three,'
`five,' and `not sure.' All three of these responses are formally
correct.
This alone proves how difficult it will be to implement the Stability
Pact for the Caucasus. One of the main obstacles is the controversy
over the very recognition of separatist entities. The Karabakh
conflict, related to the separation of the unrecognized
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from Azerbaijan, has hung like the Sword of
Damocles over Baku for over 20 years. In these circumstances, the
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia
is viewed in Azerbaijan as a very undesirable precedent. Russia, for
its part, was disappointed that Turkey recognized Kosovo shortly after
the announcement of its independence by this separatist region of
former Yugoslavia. Some analysts even rushed to declare that this
discontent was the cause of Russia's tightening customs regulations on
Turkish goods, which ended up costing Turkish businesses quite a bit in
August and September.
Another fact that prevented greater rapport from being established was
Turkey (as a NATO member) allowing the U.S. Navy and its allies to
enter the Black Sea via the Turkish-controlled Bosporus and Dardanelles
straits. However, sober politicians in Moscow are not making excessive
demands of Turkey, conscious of the commitments thrust upon it by
membership in NATO and by its own economic interests.
There is some hope in the conciliatory tone of the statements made by
Lavrov during his visit to Turkey on September 2. `Turkey never puts
commitments to NATO above other international commitments, but rather
follows through on all its obligations. This is a very important trait,
one that is not characteristic of all countries. We appreciate this and
try to approach our relations likewise.' Lavrov stressed this fact
while never giving the Turkish journalists a logical answer to
questions about the reasons for the severity of Russian customs
officials. Commenting on Turkey's recognition of Kosovo, Lavrov added:
`In relations between Russia and Turkey, such differences do not cause
any hysterics or mutual threats, and are simply accepted as a fact of
life.'
It is also known that in Armenia, and to a lesser extent in Russia, the
large-scale economic projects between Turkey and Azerbaijan related to
energy and infrastructure are met with mixed attitudes. For example,
Armenia feels `marginalized' by the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which will connect Azerbaijan with Turkey
while bypassing Armenian territory. Russia, for its part, is not
delighted by the `Nabucco Pipeline' project, which will deliver Caspian
natural gas to Europe through Turkey while bypassing Russia.
It is no secret that a large part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway will
be on Georgian territory, where the Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki section will
require fundamental reconstruction. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that was
lobbied for by the United States and circumvents Russian territory, had
to temporarily suspend operations during the Russia-Georgia conflict.
All of this prompted the Azerbaijani leadership to make greater use of
the Russian Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline to transport oil to Europe. This
fact was happily commemorated at the summit of presidents Dmitry
Medvedev and Ilham Aliyev on September 16. With both goodwill and
responsibility and with the creation of a real, not virtual, Stability
Pact for the Caucasus, there is enough Caspian oil to go around for
everyone.
Ilgar Velizade is an independent Azerbaijani political scientist. He
oversaw the RIA Novosti Baku bureau until 2008.
November 1, 2008
By Ilgar Velizade
Special to Russia Profile
Georgia's Exodus from the CIS Left the Caucasus with Little Common Ground
At a time of escalating tensions in the region, Turkey is offering its
services in organizing negotiations.
In the disarray that overwhelmed the international community following
the August events in Georgia, few noticed an inconspicuous but
potentially dangerous moment: after Georgia left the CIS, the countries
of the Southern Caucasus no longer have an organization in which they
could discuss common problems in a `close circle.'
The situation is that Armenia is a member of the CIS and the
Russia-centered Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but is
not included in GUAM, named after the first letters in the names of its
four members'Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, all interested
in laying pipelines that circumvent Russian territory. Azerbaijan plays
a key role in GUAM and is a member of the CIS who holds regular
meetings of the heads of state and governments. Georgia, however,
stayed in GUAM and withdrew from the CIS, shutting the door behind
itself: the decision was made at a meeting of the parliament and the
Georgian authorities viewed it as a gesture of protest against Russia.
As a result, a deficit of negotiating platforms has suddenly arisen.
Even though the prospect of Georgia's withdrawal from the CIS became
apparent after the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, the fact that the
withdrawal would happen in such dramatic circumstances as the war in
South Ossetia was hard to predict.
However, Georgia's statement on its withdrawal from the CIS only
reminded of the permanent political paralysis that this organization
has found itself in for many years. After all, it is simply impossible
to take an organization seriously when its members engage in not just
diplomatic conflicts, but also in full-scale war (as was, for example,
the case between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991 to 1994).
In principle, European structures such as the OSCE and the Council of
Europe could be of some help, but these are major international
organizations whose humanitarian bias could interfere with real
politics, and these organizations include countries that are far from
the Caucasus region and its problems. Additionally, Iran is not
represented in the OSCE or in the Council of Europe, and it would be
quite problematic to ensure the security and prosperity of the Caucasus
without taking this country into account. So who will give these bygone
`fraternal republics' of the former Soviet Union an arena to address
common problems?
The proposal to create a new forum for communication between the South
Caucasian countries and their neighbors came from an unexpected
source'from Turkey. Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict
between Georgia and Russia, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
visited Moscow and Tbilisi, and soon thereafter followed up with a
visit to Baku, where he unveiled his initiative for the establishment
of an Alliance for Cooperation and Security in the Caucasus or the
Stability Pact for the Caucasus. The essence of this initiative is that
problems in the region must be tackled by all three states of the
Caucasus, with the support of the bordering Turkey and Russia. Soon
after Erdogan voiced his idea, Iran proposed the `three plus three'
formula: within the framework of the pact, stability in the region will
not only be secured by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but by all
their neighbors (Russia, Turkey and Iran) as well.
None of the six potential participants rejected Erdogan's idea, and
Turkey is pushing it forward with commendable zeal. For example, the
summit of the heads of Turkic-speaking states that was scheduled for
September in Baku has been postponed for the second time, while in one
month's time, Turkish President Abdullah Gul has visited not only the
friendly Azerbaijan, but also completed a historic visit to Armenia,
attending a football match between the Turkish and Armenian teams.
Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations because of the
Armenian-Turkish conflict dating back to the beginning of the twentieth
century, exacerbated by the conflict over the separatist region of
Karabakh in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan's fight against the
separatists. Moreover, also in September, Abdullah Gul hosted the
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Ankara, and the Turkish
Foreign Minister Ali Babacan hosted his Russian counterpart Sergei
Lavrov, who supported what he called the `Turkish initiative on the
platform of stability and cooperation in the Caucasus.'
Perhaps Ankara had decided that given the escalating tension in the
region due to the conflict in South Ossetia, a summit of Turkic
countries in Baku would simply not be appropriate. The situation
arising from Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
presently of much greater concern for the Turkic states than the
prospect of building a `Turkic home.' However, in addition to
Azerbaijan, there are several other Turkic speaking nations in the
Caucasus, a factor that could help Turkey play the role of a mediator
and a peacemaker. Still, even though the `Turkic home' project has been
the subject of serious discussion for 16 years, the `general
contractor' of the project, Ankara, is now preoccupied with the
stability and sustainability of an adjacent building'the Greater
Caucasus, which has in recent years developed dangerous cracks.
The Caucasus today is a bustling cauldron of passions where complex
processes have ethnic overtones, and thus consensus is difficult to
achieve. For instance, asking the residents of Moscow, Tbilisi,
Yerevan, and Baku `how many states are there in the South Caucasus
today?' garners a minimum of three different responses: `three,'
`five,' and `not sure.' All three of these responses are formally
correct.
This alone proves how difficult it will be to implement the Stability
Pact for the Caucasus. One of the main obstacles is the controversy
over the very recognition of separatist entities. The Karabakh
conflict, related to the separation of the unrecognized
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from Azerbaijan, has hung like the Sword of
Damocles over Baku for over 20 years. In these circumstances, the
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia
is viewed in Azerbaijan as a very undesirable precedent. Russia, for
its part, was disappointed that Turkey recognized Kosovo shortly after
the announcement of its independence by this separatist region of
former Yugoslavia. Some analysts even rushed to declare that this
discontent was the cause of Russia's tightening customs regulations on
Turkish goods, which ended up costing Turkish businesses quite a bit in
August and September.
Another fact that prevented greater rapport from being established was
Turkey (as a NATO member) allowing the U.S. Navy and its allies to
enter the Black Sea via the Turkish-controlled Bosporus and Dardanelles
straits. However, sober politicians in Moscow are not making excessive
demands of Turkey, conscious of the commitments thrust upon it by
membership in NATO and by its own economic interests.
There is some hope in the conciliatory tone of the statements made by
Lavrov during his visit to Turkey on September 2. `Turkey never puts
commitments to NATO above other international commitments, but rather
follows through on all its obligations. This is a very important trait,
one that is not characteristic of all countries. We appreciate this and
try to approach our relations likewise.' Lavrov stressed this fact
while never giving the Turkish journalists a logical answer to
questions about the reasons for the severity of Russian customs
officials. Commenting on Turkey's recognition of Kosovo, Lavrov added:
`In relations between Russia and Turkey, such differences do not cause
any hysterics or mutual threats, and are simply accepted as a fact of
life.'
It is also known that in Armenia, and to a lesser extent in Russia, the
large-scale economic projects between Turkey and Azerbaijan related to
energy and infrastructure are met with mixed attitudes. For example,
Armenia feels `marginalized' by the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which will connect Azerbaijan with Turkey
while bypassing Armenian territory. Russia, for its part, is not
delighted by the `Nabucco Pipeline' project, which will deliver Caspian
natural gas to Europe through Turkey while bypassing Russia.
It is no secret that a large part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway will
be on Georgian territory, where the Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki section will
require fundamental reconstruction. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that was
lobbied for by the United States and circumvents Russian territory, had
to temporarily suspend operations during the Russia-Georgia conflict.
All of this prompted the Azerbaijani leadership to make greater use of
the Russian Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline to transport oil to Europe. This
fact was happily commemorated at the summit of presidents Dmitry
Medvedev and Ilham Aliyev on September 16. With both goodwill and
responsibility and with the creation of a real, not virtual, Stability
Pact for the Caucasus, there is enough Caspian oil to go around for
everyone.
Ilgar Velizade is an independent Azerbaijani political scientist. He
oversaw the RIA Novosti Baku bureau until 2008.