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Armenia's Choice: The Inalienable Diaspora
By Aram Adamyan MSc, MBA, ACCA, Toronto,
http://www.keghart.com/op134.htm
31 October 2008
Since the soccer match between the Armenian and Turkish teams in
Yerevan on September 6, 2008, diplomatic talks are conducted with an
unprecedented pace about a resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Following his return to Ankara, President Gul announced that he was
under the impression that President Sargsyan was ready to return
territories around Nagorno-Karabakh - areas that are currently under
the control of Armenian forces. Armenian authorities did not refute the
Turkish claim.
Sergey Lavrov - the Minister of Foreign affairs of Russia - after
returning from his recent visit to Yerevan, provided an interview to
the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta. He stated that the Armenian
economy greatly suffered from the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
because the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan were closed. He went on
saying that it was very important for Armenia to find a solution to the
conflict. Lavrov, being the top diplomat of one of the three co-chair
countries of Minsk Group, also told that the document for the
resolution of the conflict is almost ready - only minor issues remain
to reach an agreement.
It is worth mentioning Russia's prior stance of always maintaining its
acceptance of any resolution that was agreeable to all conflicting
parties. However, after recognizing the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, Russian authorities announced that they would acknowledge
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Another co-chair of the Minsk
group, representative of USA Matthew Bryza also mentioned that the
solution of the conflict is possible based on the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan. In addition to above announcements by various diplomats,
Turkey actively participated in negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Furthermore, it was one of the players during the
tripartite meeting in New York to discuss matters of common concern.
This was in contrast to previous tripartite talks in which Artsakh,
Armenia and Azerbaijan were involved. Nagorno-Karabakh, then, was
officially recognized as a party in its own right. Currently, however,
instead of Nagorno-Karabakh Turkey appears to be holding `the third
seat' in negotiations. This trend is supported by both the West and
Russia; and within this context it makes sense why the Council of
Europe is so slow in its assessments of democratic principles and their
implementation by the Armenian Government - an issue that was initiated
after the brutal March events following the presidential election in
Armenia.
Russia had always harbored intransigence towards development of any
kind of cooperation between Armenia and its neighbors in the past.
Whereas, today, Russia is interested in opening the Armenian-Turkish
border. There are two interrelated reasons. First, after the recent war
the border with Georgia was closed. That effectively curtailed
Russia's access to its Army base in Gyumri, Armenia. The alternatives
are through Iran, Azerbaijan or Turkey. The Iranian route is possible,
but it is costly; furthermore it is not reliable because of the
potential of USA striking Iran for its nuclear program. Thus, Russia is
seriously interested in the other two options which may even
materialize together. Incidentally, the Armenian railway network is run
by the Russians and Armenia has railway access both to Turkey and
Azerbaijan.
The second, and probably the overriding reason of Russia's interest in
opening Armenian-Turkish border is the possibility of developing
pro-Russian stand in South Caucasus from Turkey and Azerbaijan. In
return, Russia will agree to Azerbaijani-Turkish approach in resolving
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Prior to the Russo-Georgian war Armenia
having a good neighbourly relations with Turkey was viewed as an
impediment to Russia's influence in South Caucasus; and stability in
the region could lead to an alternative route for transiting resources
to Europe. Following the war Russia found a window of opportunity of
expanding its influence at the expense of Armenia.
What are Armenia's options while dark clouds are gathering? If
Armenians return the territories surrounding Karabakh then the security
of Artsakh as well as its contacts with Armenia will be seriously
damaged. It is rumored that international peacekeeping forces may be
deployed instead of Armenian forces in the area; that does not preclude
presence of Turkish Army units. What would Armenian's reaction be?
Armenian lives were sacrificed to achieve a security zone sandwiched
between Armenia and Artsakh. Expecting Armenia to return those lands,
is asking almost the impossible. Is it illogical to counter such
expectations by the demand of implementing the Sevres treaty when
Azeris are expecting the return of territories through only diplomatic
measures? Will the Armenian authorities muster the courage and resolve
to oppose the grand players who are concocting a plan for capitulation?
Turkey has assumed the role of an `assistant' and has inserted itself
into the fray. If the resolution supposes the return of Azerbaijani
refugees to their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh, why the same right is not
afforded to millions of Armenians to return to their ancestral lands in
Turkey? Why Armenia doesn't widen the scope of the diplomatic
discourse, take advantage of a seemingly frustrating situation, and
turn the tables against forces that are squeezing Armenia into a
corner? After all, what is there to lose more than what already has
been sacrificed? Why are the Armenian authorities reacting to a
situation, instead of forging long-term policies of their own?
Why Armenians have to agree to the return of only several thousand
Azeri refugees back to Nagorno-Karabakh when there is no mention of
three hundred thousand Armenians driven out of Baku, Gandzak or
Sumgait? Why Armenians have to return any land to Azerbaijan while the
Shahumyan district of Nagorno-Karabakh, the villages Getashen and
Martunashen just north of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the enclave
village Artsvashen belonging to Armenia remain under Azerbaijani
control? If Russia, Turkey and the West insist on the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan even after the events of Kosovo, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, why Armenia does not recognize the independence of
Artsakh?
Armenians all over the world are asking these questions and rightly so.
The Diaspora is the only reliable partner that Armenia has. With its
widespread contacts and untapped soft-power it will show its active
unity with the Homeland and will be able to save Karabakh. Armenia has
a unique opportunity today to bring in the Diaspora into play to
counter the enormous pressure that it faces. All attempts to undermine
that unity will fail.
By Aram Adamyan MSc, MBA, ACCA, Toronto,
http://www.keghart.com/op134.htm
31 October 2008
Since the soccer match between the Armenian and Turkish teams in
Yerevan on September 6, 2008, diplomatic talks are conducted with an
unprecedented pace about a resolution over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Following his return to Ankara, President Gul announced that he was
under the impression that President Sargsyan was ready to return
territories around Nagorno-Karabakh - areas that are currently under
the control of Armenian forces. Armenian authorities did not refute the
Turkish claim.
Sergey Lavrov - the Minister of Foreign affairs of Russia - after
returning from his recent visit to Yerevan, provided an interview to
the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta. He stated that the Armenian
economy greatly suffered from the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
because the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan were closed. He went on
saying that it was very important for Armenia to find a solution to the
conflict. Lavrov, being the top diplomat of one of the three co-chair
countries of Minsk Group, also told that the document for the
resolution of the conflict is almost ready - only minor issues remain
to reach an agreement.
It is worth mentioning Russia's prior stance of always maintaining its
acceptance of any resolution that was agreeable to all conflicting
parties. However, after recognizing the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, Russian authorities announced that they would acknowledge
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Another co-chair of the Minsk
group, representative of USA Matthew Bryza also mentioned that the
solution of the conflict is possible based on the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan. In addition to above announcements by various diplomats,
Turkey actively participated in negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Furthermore, it was one of the players during the
tripartite meeting in New York to discuss matters of common concern.
This was in contrast to previous tripartite talks in which Artsakh,
Armenia and Azerbaijan were involved. Nagorno-Karabakh, then, was
officially recognized as a party in its own right. Currently, however,
instead of Nagorno-Karabakh Turkey appears to be holding `the third
seat' in negotiations. This trend is supported by both the West and
Russia; and within this context it makes sense why the Council of
Europe is so slow in its assessments of democratic principles and their
implementation by the Armenian Government - an issue that was initiated
after the brutal March events following the presidential election in
Armenia.
Russia had always harbored intransigence towards development of any
kind of cooperation between Armenia and its neighbors in the past.
Whereas, today, Russia is interested in opening the Armenian-Turkish
border. There are two interrelated reasons. First, after the recent war
the border with Georgia was closed. That effectively curtailed
Russia's access to its Army base in Gyumri, Armenia. The alternatives
are through Iran, Azerbaijan or Turkey. The Iranian route is possible,
but it is costly; furthermore it is not reliable because of the
potential of USA striking Iran for its nuclear program. Thus, Russia is
seriously interested in the other two options which may even
materialize together. Incidentally, the Armenian railway network is run
by the Russians and Armenia has railway access both to Turkey and
Azerbaijan.
The second, and probably the overriding reason of Russia's interest in
opening Armenian-Turkish border is the possibility of developing
pro-Russian stand in South Caucasus from Turkey and Azerbaijan. In
return, Russia will agree to Azerbaijani-Turkish approach in resolving
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Prior to the Russo-Georgian war Armenia
having a good neighbourly relations with Turkey was viewed as an
impediment to Russia's influence in South Caucasus; and stability in
the region could lead to an alternative route for transiting resources
to Europe. Following the war Russia found a window of opportunity of
expanding its influence at the expense of Armenia.
What are Armenia's options while dark clouds are gathering? If
Armenians return the territories surrounding Karabakh then the security
of Artsakh as well as its contacts with Armenia will be seriously
damaged. It is rumored that international peacekeeping forces may be
deployed instead of Armenian forces in the area; that does not preclude
presence of Turkish Army units. What would Armenian's reaction be?
Armenian lives were sacrificed to achieve a security zone sandwiched
between Armenia and Artsakh. Expecting Armenia to return those lands,
is asking almost the impossible. Is it illogical to counter such
expectations by the demand of implementing the Sevres treaty when
Azeris are expecting the return of territories through only diplomatic
measures? Will the Armenian authorities muster the courage and resolve
to oppose the grand players who are concocting a plan for capitulation?
Turkey has assumed the role of an `assistant' and has inserted itself
into the fray. If the resolution supposes the return of Azerbaijani
refugees to their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh, why the same right is not
afforded to millions of Armenians to return to their ancestral lands in
Turkey? Why Armenia doesn't widen the scope of the diplomatic
discourse, take advantage of a seemingly frustrating situation, and
turn the tables against forces that are squeezing Armenia into a
corner? After all, what is there to lose more than what already has
been sacrificed? Why are the Armenian authorities reacting to a
situation, instead of forging long-term policies of their own?
Why Armenians have to agree to the return of only several thousand
Azeri refugees back to Nagorno-Karabakh when there is no mention of
three hundred thousand Armenians driven out of Baku, Gandzak or
Sumgait? Why Armenians have to return any land to Azerbaijan while the
Shahumyan district of Nagorno-Karabakh, the villages Getashen and
Martunashen just north of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the enclave
village Artsvashen belonging to Armenia remain under Azerbaijani
control? If Russia, Turkey and the West insist on the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan even after the events of Kosovo, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, why Armenia does not recognize the independence of
Artsakh?
Armenians all over the world are asking these questions and rightly so.
The Diaspora is the only reliable partner that Armenia has. With its
widespread contacts and untapped soft-power it will show its active
unity with the Homeland and will be able to save Karabakh. Armenia has
a unique opportunity today to bring in the Diaspora into play to
counter the enormous pressure that it faces. All attempts to undermine
that unity will fail.