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MOSCOW DISBELIEVES RESULTS
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir
13:16:06 - 03/11/2008
The meeting of the presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan in
Moscow actually did not produce any results, if we do not take into
account the joint declaration which the presidents signed committing
to a settlement of the conflict based on the international law. The
purpose of this statement, however, was most probably an attempt to
save the reputation of the meeting.
The meeting or Russia. For Russia, it would be rather undesirable
if the three-party meeting did not differ from the previous
Armenian-Azerbaijani meetings. In order to underline this difference,
the declaration was invented for the mediation effort to produce an
impression of effectiveness.
There will be political scientists, politicians, people who will
discern serious geopolitical nuances, contexts of returning or saving
territories, what not, high or low spirits of the presidents, heroism,
diplomatic skills or lack of skills behind this document. However,
all this will only bring about Russia's estimates. That is, to at
least supply a document which at least the diplomats and experts would
discuss, deterring attention from the meeting, failing to notice its
casualty and void, and thereby ignoring the great diplomatic failure
of Russia.
And the failure is really great, for the simple reason that
the Russians actually lose their last chance to eternalize in the
Caucasus through Karabakh. The problem is not that Russia, encouraged
by its successful military campaign in the Georgian conflict area,
decided that it can solve the Karabakh issue on the run, like it
solved the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is perhaps
the analyses that the West told Russians that since they solved the
issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they should allow the West to
solve the issue of Karabakh, are a little far from the reality. It is
more probable that the Russians realized that they did not solve the
issue of Abkhazia and Ossetia, the West solved it, more exactly the
United States, by involving the Russians in a war in Georgia. And
this understanding pushed Moscow to think that if the West solved
the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even though through the
Russians and Georgians, at least they should solve the Karabakh issue.
The point is not that only Karabakh was left. The point is that
Karabakh could have compensated for the strategic defeat of the
Russians in the north of Georgia. However, their situation got more
complicated because the West, namely the United States had very little
to do - to hinder the Russians.
In other words, the struggle was not about who was going to solve the
conflict and whose peacekeeping forces were going to stand between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, but over not allowing the Russians to have any,
at least general achievement. Judging by the Medvedev-Sargsyan-Aliyev
meeting, judging by the ascetic attitude of the Russian TV channels
towards the meeting, ostensibly the Americans have solved the problem
perfectly.
In fact, as it usually happens with the settlement of such conflicts,
very often the agreements are outlined, expressed days, even
weeks or months after the meeting because they are usually shadow
agreements and are not revealed to guarantee that they are brought
into being. However, the point is that the calculations of Russia
were obviously based on a short-term effect. Apparently, Moscow
was likely to use the opportunity that the presidential election in
the United States is coming up, that Iran is rather passive, that
Turkey is interested in at least short-term partnership, that the
president of Armenia is facing a legitimacy deadlock, and to corner
the region. In other words, the short-term effect had a significant
role in the calculation of the Russians, and the long-term success
was going to be determined by the "unpleasant" surprise that Russia
would give its opponents for a short period, through an agreement
with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Hence, perhaps it is time that the opposition becomes active because
most probably a pause in the Karabakh conflict is expected. Before that
the process may resist, through visits or statements of co-chairs,
however the fact is that the Russian diplomatic blitzkrieg failed,
and there seems to be nobody else to have such a wish. At least,
the situation is such that since we are living in the era of football
diplomacy, victory favored the Russians only, and the others will be
happy with a draw, at least for the time being.
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir
13:16:06 - 03/11/2008
The meeting of the presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan in
Moscow actually did not produce any results, if we do not take into
account the joint declaration which the presidents signed committing
to a settlement of the conflict based on the international law. The
purpose of this statement, however, was most probably an attempt to
save the reputation of the meeting.
The meeting or Russia. For Russia, it would be rather undesirable
if the three-party meeting did not differ from the previous
Armenian-Azerbaijani meetings. In order to underline this difference,
the declaration was invented for the mediation effort to produce an
impression of effectiveness.
There will be political scientists, politicians, people who will
discern serious geopolitical nuances, contexts of returning or saving
territories, what not, high or low spirits of the presidents, heroism,
diplomatic skills or lack of skills behind this document. However,
all this will only bring about Russia's estimates. That is, to at
least supply a document which at least the diplomats and experts would
discuss, deterring attention from the meeting, failing to notice its
casualty and void, and thereby ignoring the great diplomatic failure
of Russia.
And the failure is really great, for the simple reason that
the Russians actually lose their last chance to eternalize in the
Caucasus through Karabakh. The problem is not that Russia, encouraged
by its successful military campaign in the Georgian conflict area,
decided that it can solve the Karabakh issue on the run, like it
solved the conflicts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is perhaps
the analyses that the West told Russians that since they solved the
issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they should allow the West to
solve the issue of Karabakh, are a little far from the reality. It is
more probable that the Russians realized that they did not solve the
issue of Abkhazia and Ossetia, the West solved it, more exactly the
United States, by involving the Russians in a war in Georgia. And
this understanding pushed Moscow to think that if the West solved
the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, even though through the
Russians and Georgians, at least they should solve the Karabakh issue.
The point is not that only Karabakh was left. The point is that
Karabakh could have compensated for the strategic defeat of the
Russians in the north of Georgia. However, their situation got more
complicated because the West, namely the United States had very little
to do - to hinder the Russians.
In other words, the struggle was not about who was going to solve the
conflict and whose peacekeeping forces were going to stand between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, but over not allowing the Russians to have any,
at least general achievement. Judging by the Medvedev-Sargsyan-Aliyev
meeting, judging by the ascetic attitude of the Russian TV channels
towards the meeting, ostensibly the Americans have solved the problem
perfectly.
In fact, as it usually happens with the settlement of such conflicts,
very often the agreements are outlined, expressed days, even
weeks or months after the meeting because they are usually shadow
agreements and are not revealed to guarantee that they are brought
into being. However, the point is that the calculations of Russia
were obviously based on a short-term effect. Apparently, Moscow
was likely to use the opportunity that the presidential election in
the United States is coming up, that Iran is rather passive, that
Turkey is interested in at least short-term partnership, that the
president of Armenia is facing a legitimacy deadlock, and to corner
the region. In other words, the short-term effect had a significant
role in the calculation of the Russians, and the long-term success
was going to be determined by the "unpleasant" surprise that Russia
would give its opponents for a short period, through an agreement
with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Hence, perhaps it is time that the opposition becomes active because
most probably a pause in the Karabakh conflict is expected. Before that
the process may resist, through visits or statements of co-chairs,
however the fact is that the Russian diplomatic blitzkrieg failed,
and there seems to be nobody else to have such a wish. At least,
the situation is such that since we are living in the era of football
diplomacy, victory favored the Russians only, and the others will be
happy with a draw, at least for the time being.