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TURKEY AND THE CAUCASUS: CAN THEY BE FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS?
Samvel Martirosyan (Armenia)
en.fondsk.ru
03.11.2008
Turkey took advantage of the radical changes that took place in the
Caucasus as the result of the Five-Day War to implement a reorientation
of its international policy.
While the fighting was raging it was already clear that Ankara was
going to start playing a bigger role in the Caucasus. During the active
phase of the conflict, Turkey made political maneuvers between the
countries involved concerning the passage of the NATO Navy via the
Black Sea straits (1).
Immediately upon the end of the hostilities Ankara floated the
initiative of creating a platform for security and stability in
the Caucasus inviting Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to
participate. Despite being the most controversial participants of
the project, Moscow and Yerevan unexpectedly expressed support for
the platform (2).
Imperialism: the Turkish Disease For Turkey, the South Caucasus is
important not only from the standpoint of geopolitics, but also as the
region relevant to the future of the country's political elites which
are currently plagued by ideological strife. The conflict between the
ruling Islamist party and the secular army has disoriented the country:
it is uncertain whether Turkey is going to opt for Europeization with
an admixture of nationalism or for radical Islamization.
Turkey is a country with profoundly imperialist traditions, but had to
remain confined to its borders for a protracted period of time. The
contradiction has led to a serious identity crisis. An empire that
is not expanding is bound to sink into chaos, which is exactly what
is currently taking place in Turkey.
The situation in the Middle East has changed fundamentally due to
the end of the Cold War and the two Gulf Wars. The US troops gained
strongholds in the region and Washington no longer needs a strong
Turkey which used to help it implement its polices. Consequently, the
space for maneuvers available to Ankara is shrinking, and Washington
makes efforts to sideline it as an undesirable competitor.
For the Turkish elite, the activity in the Caucasian direction can
serve as a unifying factor. At the moment, Transcaucasia is the region
where Ankara can adhere to an independent national course equally free
from the pressure of the West and the politicized Islam. Ankara can
rely on Azerbaijan which is its obedient ally in the region, and can
interact with Georgia which - due to the crisis of its own statehood -
has sought maximal rapprochement with Turkey. All that Ankara had to
do was to choose the right moment to drag the "problematic" Armenia
and Russia - Turkey's traditional rival in the Caucasus - into the
orbit of its policy.
A Turkish Breakthrough?
Is it fair to say that, having found the intelligent decision and
taken advantage of the chaos in the region, Ankara managed to make
inroads into the South Caucasus? More precisely, Turkey used the recent
complications to start implementing its old plan of penetrating the
region which remained out of its reach for a long time. Turkey's
relations with Armenia - the neighbor country with which it had
particularly strained relations - highlight the above.
A survey of the relations between Turkey and Armenia shows that
Turkey's snap advent to the Caucasus has been carefully planned
ahead. An unprecedented political development had taken place in
September, 2008 - Turkish President Abdullah Gul attended a soccer
game in Yerevan at the invitation of Serzh Sargsyan. Considering
that there are no diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia and
the relations between them are burdened with the legacy of a bloody
conflict, the casual meeting of the two leaders was an extraordinary
event which triggered discussions of a "breakthrough" and a possible
normalization.
Armenia was involved in talks behind closed doors about the
normalization of the relations with Turkey at least months before Gul's
visit to Yerevan. On the surface, it appeared that the rapprochement
was induced by the Five-Day War, but in reality the conflict between
Georgia and South Ossetia merely catalyzed the process that had to
commence anyhow.
The condition of the relations between Turkey and Armenia started
to evolve incredibly fast. On the one hand, it is an unexpected
breakthrough. On the other, it is unlikely that the new trend is
explained solely by a sudden drive for better relations in Ankara
and Yerevan. Probably, the prompt rapprochement scenario had been
prepared already under President R. Kocharyan and awaited for the
right moment to be put into practice.
Otherwise it would be hard to explain how it became possible to
reach the deal to supply electric power from Armenia to Turkey,
to convince Armenia to drop its objections to Turkey's membership
in the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and Turkey -
to lift the air blockade of Armenia so quickly, etc.
It should be remembered that Sargsyan went public with his offer to
improve the relations between Armenia and Turkey in June, 2008 when
his presidency was in the initial phase and his domestic political
positions were fairly insecure. He took serious risks floating the
initiative which the Armenian society was going to frown upon. No
preliminary efforts were made to prepare the public opinion to
accept it, which is another indication that the snap rapprochement
was planned much earlier, and the hostilities in South Ossetia merely
signaled the right moment to move on.
Can Turkey Be an Ally?
Clearly, Yerevan had to act under serious Western pressure. From
the perspective of Washington and Brussels, lifting the blockade at
the border between Armenia and Turkey is a prologue to a shift in
the balance of forces in the region as in this case Russia would no
longer be Armenia's only link to the outside world and Armenia would
thus get decoupled from Russia.
As a result Russia would see its potential to influence Armenia
considerably reduced.
Yet, the recent strengthening of Russia's positions in the Caucasus
affected the US plan of weakening its hold on Yerevan. Under the
circumstances, Ankara started to play a game of its own. By launching
the process of rapprochement with Russia, Turkey has generally
neutralized the influence of the West. At the same time, Russia is
entrained by Turkey since the latter has the potential to influence
the situation in the South Caucasus with the help of Azerbaijan and -
to an extent - Georgia.
At the moment, Ankara is successfully maneuvering between Moscow,
Washington, and Brussels, probing into the opportunities to expand
its presence in the region.
It should be realized that Turkey regards the rapprochement with
Russia as a tactical move. It would be naïve to expect that the
conflict with Georgia is going to make a geopolitical alliance with
Turkey or even a Russia-Turkey axis possible. The Turkish elite are
fully aware that Russia is its number one rival in the Caucasus and
the Black Sea region.
It appears that not everybody in Armenia welcomes the dubious plans
of a snap recovery in the relations with Turkey either. Though
Armenia's political elite has spent the entire September praising
the corresponding achievements, already in mid-October the Armenian
Prime Minister indicated in a rather harsh form that in his view the
essence of Ankara's policy had remained unchanged.
Currently the process is stagnating notably, and no profound changes
in the South Caucasus direction loom on the horizon. There exist such
key problems that any rapid changes in the region are going to have
an adverse impact on all sides unless they are resolved. One of the
main key problems is, of course, that of Karabakh. Having no leverage
in the conflict, Turkey is nevertheless actively seeking a role in
the negotiation process. Moscow is trying to gain control over the
process as well. In all likelihood, in the nearest time neither of
the parties involved will be able to monopolize control over the
developments around Karabakh.
There is one more significant circumstance that has to be taken into
account. Some of the serious regional forces have not even joined
the game so far. For example, Iran is taking its time as much as it
appears possible and only occasionally reminds others that it is also
a country to reckon with. No doubt, in a while Tehran will attempt
to impede the emergence of any new alliances in the South Caucasus
that will pose a threat to Iran.
Currently Iran is interested in maintaining the status quo. In
particular, the strengthening of Turkey's positions - and even more so
its rapid rapprochement with Russia and Armenia - would be undesirable
for Iran.
Therefore Tehran will try to impede the political developments in
the South Caucasus leading to the emergence of any new trends. The
country certainly has the instruments to do so.
_________
1. Turkey Did Not Admit the US Navy to Georgia. Rosbalt, August 16,
2008, http://www.rosbalt.ru/2008/08/16/514262.html
2. Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov. Russia Hails the Turkish
Initiative to Create a Caucasus Platform. PanARMENIAN.Net, 03.10.2008,
http://www.panarmenian.net/news/rus/?n id=27246
--Boundary_(ID_95qPr9hMNsMN9W6MNt/NyQ)--
Samvel Martirosyan (Armenia)
en.fondsk.ru
03.11.2008
Turkey took advantage of the radical changes that took place in the
Caucasus as the result of the Five-Day War to implement a reorientation
of its international policy.
While the fighting was raging it was already clear that Ankara was
going to start playing a bigger role in the Caucasus. During the active
phase of the conflict, Turkey made political maneuvers between the
countries involved concerning the passage of the NATO Navy via the
Black Sea straits (1).
Immediately upon the end of the hostilities Ankara floated the
initiative of creating a platform for security and stability in
the Caucasus inviting Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to
participate. Despite being the most controversial participants of
the project, Moscow and Yerevan unexpectedly expressed support for
the platform (2).
Imperialism: the Turkish Disease For Turkey, the South Caucasus is
important not only from the standpoint of geopolitics, but also as the
region relevant to the future of the country's political elites which
are currently plagued by ideological strife. The conflict between the
ruling Islamist party and the secular army has disoriented the country:
it is uncertain whether Turkey is going to opt for Europeization with
an admixture of nationalism or for radical Islamization.
Turkey is a country with profoundly imperialist traditions, but had to
remain confined to its borders for a protracted period of time. The
contradiction has led to a serious identity crisis. An empire that
is not expanding is bound to sink into chaos, which is exactly what
is currently taking place in Turkey.
The situation in the Middle East has changed fundamentally due to
the end of the Cold War and the two Gulf Wars. The US troops gained
strongholds in the region and Washington no longer needs a strong
Turkey which used to help it implement its polices. Consequently, the
space for maneuvers available to Ankara is shrinking, and Washington
makes efforts to sideline it as an undesirable competitor.
For the Turkish elite, the activity in the Caucasian direction can
serve as a unifying factor. At the moment, Transcaucasia is the region
where Ankara can adhere to an independent national course equally free
from the pressure of the West and the politicized Islam. Ankara can
rely on Azerbaijan which is its obedient ally in the region, and can
interact with Georgia which - due to the crisis of its own statehood -
has sought maximal rapprochement with Turkey. All that Ankara had to
do was to choose the right moment to drag the "problematic" Armenia
and Russia - Turkey's traditional rival in the Caucasus - into the
orbit of its policy.
A Turkish Breakthrough?
Is it fair to say that, having found the intelligent decision and
taken advantage of the chaos in the region, Ankara managed to make
inroads into the South Caucasus? More precisely, Turkey used the recent
complications to start implementing its old plan of penetrating the
region which remained out of its reach for a long time. Turkey's
relations with Armenia - the neighbor country with which it had
particularly strained relations - highlight the above.
A survey of the relations between Turkey and Armenia shows that
Turkey's snap advent to the Caucasus has been carefully planned
ahead. An unprecedented political development had taken place in
September, 2008 - Turkish President Abdullah Gul attended a soccer
game in Yerevan at the invitation of Serzh Sargsyan. Considering
that there are no diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia and
the relations between them are burdened with the legacy of a bloody
conflict, the casual meeting of the two leaders was an extraordinary
event which triggered discussions of a "breakthrough" and a possible
normalization.
Armenia was involved in talks behind closed doors about the
normalization of the relations with Turkey at least months before Gul's
visit to Yerevan. On the surface, it appeared that the rapprochement
was induced by the Five-Day War, but in reality the conflict between
Georgia and South Ossetia merely catalyzed the process that had to
commence anyhow.
The condition of the relations between Turkey and Armenia started
to evolve incredibly fast. On the one hand, it is an unexpected
breakthrough. On the other, it is unlikely that the new trend is
explained solely by a sudden drive for better relations in Ankara
and Yerevan. Probably, the prompt rapprochement scenario had been
prepared already under President R. Kocharyan and awaited for the
right moment to be put into practice.
Otherwise it would be hard to explain how it became possible to
reach the deal to supply electric power from Armenia to Turkey,
to convince Armenia to drop its objections to Turkey's membership
in the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and Turkey -
to lift the air blockade of Armenia so quickly, etc.
It should be remembered that Sargsyan went public with his offer to
improve the relations between Armenia and Turkey in June, 2008 when
his presidency was in the initial phase and his domestic political
positions were fairly insecure. He took serious risks floating the
initiative which the Armenian society was going to frown upon. No
preliminary efforts were made to prepare the public opinion to
accept it, which is another indication that the snap rapprochement
was planned much earlier, and the hostilities in South Ossetia merely
signaled the right moment to move on.
Can Turkey Be an Ally?
Clearly, Yerevan had to act under serious Western pressure. From
the perspective of Washington and Brussels, lifting the blockade at
the border between Armenia and Turkey is a prologue to a shift in
the balance of forces in the region as in this case Russia would no
longer be Armenia's only link to the outside world and Armenia would
thus get decoupled from Russia.
As a result Russia would see its potential to influence Armenia
considerably reduced.
Yet, the recent strengthening of Russia's positions in the Caucasus
affected the US plan of weakening its hold on Yerevan. Under the
circumstances, Ankara started to play a game of its own. By launching
the process of rapprochement with Russia, Turkey has generally
neutralized the influence of the West. At the same time, Russia is
entrained by Turkey since the latter has the potential to influence
the situation in the South Caucasus with the help of Azerbaijan and -
to an extent - Georgia.
At the moment, Ankara is successfully maneuvering between Moscow,
Washington, and Brussels, probing into the opportunities to expand
its presence in the region.
It should be realized that Turkey regards the rapprochement with
Russia as a tactical move. It would be naïve to expect that the
conflict with Georgia is going to make a geopolitical alliance with
Turkey or even a Russia-Turkey axis possible. The Turkish elite are
fully aware that Russia is its number one rival in the Caucasus and
the Black Sea region.
It appears that not everybody in Armenia welcomes the dubious plans
of a snap recovery in the relations with Turkey either. Though
Armenia's political elite has spent the entire September praising
the corresponding achievements, already in mid-October the Armenian
Prime Minister indicated in a rather harsh form that in his view the
essence of Ankara's policy had remained unchanged.
Currently the process is stagnating notably, and no profound changes
in the South Caucasus direction loom on the horizon. There exist such
key problems that any rapid changes in the region are going to have
an adverse impact on all sides unless they are resolved. One of the
main key problems is, of course, that of Karabakh. Having no leverage
in the conflict, Turkey is nevertheless actively seeking a role in
the negotiation process. Moscow is trying to gain control over the
process as well. In all likelihood, in the nearest time neither of
the parties involved will be able to monopolize control over the
developments around Karabakh.
There is one more significant circumstance that has to be taken into
account. Some of the serious regional forces have not even joined
the game so far. For example, Iran is taking its time as much as it
appears possible and only occasionally reminds others that it is also
a country to reckon with. No doubt, in a while Tehran will attempt
to impede the emergence of any new alliances in the South Caucasus
that will pose a threat to Iran.
Currently Iran is interested in maintaining the status quo. In
particular, the strengthening of Turkey's positions - and even more so
its rapid rapprochement with Russia and Armenia - would be undesirable
for Iran.
Therefore Tehran will try to impede the political developments in
the South Caucasus leading to the emergence of any new trends. The
country certainly has the instruments to do so.
_________
1. Turkey Did Not Admit the US Navy to Georgia. Rosbalt, August 16,
2008, http://www.rosbalt.ru/2008/08/16/514262.html
2. Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov. Russia Hails the Turkish
Initiative to Create a Caucasus Platform. PanARMENIAN.Net, 03.10.2008,
http://www.panarmenian.net/news/rus/?n id=27246
--Boundary_(ID_95qPr9hMNsMN9W6MNt/NyQ)--