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EURASIA: LOOKING FOR AREAS OF POSSIBLE US-RUSSIAN ARMS-CONTROL COOPERATION
Richard Weitz
EurasiaNet
Nov 3 2008
NY
Despite the recent deterioration in the West's relations with
Russia following the August war in Georgia, two scholars at a recent
panel discussion in Washington, DC, urged the next US presidential
administration to engage the Kremlin and explore possibilities for
new arms control agreements in Eurasia.
Rose Gottemoeller, one of the participants at the October 29
round-table sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, foresaw a period of unpredictability in Russian-American
relations due to the presidential transitions in both countries. She
therefore advised that in coming months both sides should strive to
"hang on to the superstructure of our relationship, as it has existed
in the many treaties and agreements that we have put together over
the years."
Responding to Defense Secretary Robert Gates' call for fresh efforts
to bolster the US nuclear deterrent, outlined in a speech given at
the Carnegie Endowment on October 28, another round-table speaker,
George Perkovich, reaffirmed his support for abolishing nuclear
weapons as an "idea we can actually take seriously." [For additional
information, click here]. Perkovich, the Carnegie Endowment's vice
president for studies, acknowledged that "we can't do it alone,"
and urged the United States to promote this aim in collaboration
with other countries. "The first condition that would have to be met,
obviously, is US-Russian leadership."
Neither speaker was optimistic about achieving reductions in the
large stockpile of Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in
Eurasia. Perkovich pointed out that Moscow would require major
concessions since this is one of few areas in which Russia enjoys
numerical superiority over NATO.
While supportive of the status quo over the near term, Gottemoeller
suggested that modifications to existing arrangements should ultimately
be explored. "I am not in anyway advocating preserving agreements
as they have existed in the past and simply leaving them alone,"
she said, adding that Moscow and Washington ought to view "these
[existing] treaties and agreements as building blocks for our further
relationship."
For example, Gottemoeller said that, even though "we are now casting
around for a vaunted new security system in Europe" following the
war in Georgia, Washington and Moscow should try to revitalize the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. She went on to claim
that "the data exchanges, the notifications, the verification and
inspection measures that were at the core of the CFE treaty" have
helped dampen Russian concerns about NATO enlargement. While Moscow
may have acquiesced to the incorporation of the Baltic States into
the Atlantic alliance, the Kremlin, it deserves mentioning, remains
adamantly opposed to the admission of either Georgia or Ukraine. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Referring obliquely to the ongoing situation in Georgia, Gottemoeller
asserted that "we need to review and again embrace key CFE principles,"
especially "the principle of host nation consent to the presence of
foreign troops on their territories," a norm that also underpins the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Gottemoeller, a Carnegie Endowment expert on non-proliferation issues,
argued that a distinct advantage of using the CFE process rather than
other European security institutions is that "it gets everybody to
the table, not only the NATO countries, new and old, and not only
Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, but also countries we have been very
concerned about because of instability between them, like Armenia
and Azerbaijan."
In response to a question from EurasiaNet about the effects of
the Georgian War on WMD proliferation through the South Caucasus,
Gottemoeller agreed "that this whole area of what has loosely been
called threat reduction cooperation is a very good area not only"
in order to reduce nuclear threats (the original purpose of the
Nunn-Lugar program), "but also to help us to address the agenda that
was raised by Russia's invasion of Georgia." [For background see the
Eurasia Insight archive].
Gottemoeller urged the next US administration to work with Moscow in
curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions. "There are certain ways that I think
we should look again at what are some Russian proposals" to give Iran
alternatives to developing the means to manufacture indigenous nuclear
fuel though uranium enrichment, since the same technologies could
enable Tehran to produce nuclear weapons. She specifically urged
renewing support for Moscow's offer to allow Iran to participate
in the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk, a joint
venture between Russia's Tekhsnabeksport and Kazakhstan's Kazatomprom
that is open to tightly controlled third-party involvement regarding
non-weapons related nuclear technologies.
Editor's Note: Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute
in Washington, DC.
Richard Weitz
EurasiaNet
Nov 3 2008
NY
Despite the recent deterioration in the West's relations with
Russia following the August war in Georgia, two scholars at a recent
panel discussion in Washington, DC, urged the next US presidential
administration to engage the Kremlin and explore possibilities for
new arms control agreements in Eurasia.
Rose Gottemoeller, one of the participants at the October 29
round-table sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, foresaw a period of unpredictability in Russian-American
relations due to the presidential transitions in both countries. She
therefore advised that in coming months both sides should strive to
"hang on to the superstructure of our relationship, as it has existed
in the many treaties and agreements that we have put together over
the years."
Responding to Defense Secretary Robert Gates' call for fresh efforts
to bolster the US nuclear deterrent, outlined in a speech given at
the Carnegie Endowment on October 28, another round-table speaker,
George Perkovich, reaffirmed his support for abolishing nuclear
weapons as an "idea we can actually take seriously." [For additional
information, click here]. Perkovich, the Carnegie Endowment's vice
president for studies, acknowledged that "we can't do it alone,"
and urged the United States to promote this aim in collaboration
with other countries. "The first condition that would have to be met,
obviously, is US-Russian leadership."
Neither speaker was optimistic about achieving reductions in the
large stockpile of Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in
Eurasia. Perkovich pointed out that Moscow would require major
concessions since this is one of few areas in which Russia enjoys
numerical superiority over NATO.
While supportive of the status quo over the near term, Gottemoeller
suggested that modifications to existing arrangements should ultimately
be explored. "I am not in anyway advocating preserving agreements
as they have existed in the past and simply leaving them alone,"
she said, adding that Moscow and Washington ought to view "these
[existing] treaties and agreements as building blocks for our further
relationship."
For example, Gottemoeller said that, even though "we are now casting
around for a vaunted new security system in Europe" following the
war in Georgia, Washington and Moscow should try to revitalize the
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. She went on to claim
that "the data exchanges, the notifications, the verification and
inspection measures that were at the core of the CFE treaty" have
helped dampen Russian concerns about NATO enlargement. While Moscow
may have acquiesced to the incorporation of the Baltic States into
the Atlantic alliance, the Kremlin, it deserves mentioning, remains
adamantly opposed to the admission of either Georgia or Ukraine. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Referring obliquely to the ongoing situation in Georgia, Gottemoeller
asserted that "we need to review and again embrace key CFE principles,"
especially "the principle of host nation consent to the presence of
foreign troops on their territories," a norm that also underpins the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Gottemoeller, a Carnegie Endowment expert on non-proliferation issues,
argued that a distinct advantage of using the CFE process rather than
other European security institutions is that "it gets everybody to
the table, not only the NATO countries, new and old, and not only
Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, but also countries we have been very
concerned about because of instability between them, like Armenia
and Azerbaijan."
In response to a question from EurasiaNet about the effects of
the Georgian War on WMD proliferation through the South Caucasus,
Gottemoeller agreed "that this whole area of what has loosely been
called threat reduction cooperation is a very good area not only"
in order to reduce nuclear threats (the original purpose of the
Nunn-Lugar program), "but also to help us to address the agenda that
was raised by Russia's invasion of Georgia." [For background see the
Eurasia Insight archive].
Gottemoeller urged the next US administration to work with Moscow in
curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions. "There are certain ways that I think
we should look again at what are some Russian proposals" to give Iran
alternatives to developing the means to manufacture indigenous nuclear
fuel though uranium enrichment, since the same technologies could
enable Tehran to produce nuclear weapons. She specifically urged
renewing support for Moscow's offer to allow Iran to participate
in the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk, a joint
venture between Russia's Tekhsnabeksport and Kazakhstan's Kazatomprom
that is open to tightly controlled third-party involvement regarding
non-weapons related nuclear technologies.
Editor's Note: Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute
in Washington, DC.