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ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH BARTHOLOMEW TARGET OF ASSASSINATION PLOT
Order of St. Andrew, Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
Nov 3 2008
NY
IN THE NEWS - A court case reveals 86 members, ranging from the
Turkish police, army, business, politics, and the mass media,
who are alleged in a plan to assassinate the Ecumenical Patriarch,
along with the murder of two Turkish Christians. The case points
to a secret, ultra-nationalist organization (Ergenekon) in the
upper levels of Turkish government as a driving force in religious
oppression. This is addressed in this originally published article,
"Turkish nationalism, Ergenekon, and denial of religious freedom",
by Forum 18's, Dr. Otmar Oehring of the Human Rights Office at Missio,
the Pontifical Mission Society.
TURKEY: Turkish nationalism, Ergenekon, and denial of religious freedom
By Dr. Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio
Article published October 21, 2008
A trial has begun in Turkey of influential people alleged to be part
of an ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon. Otmar Oehring of the German
Catholic charity Missio notes, in a commentary for Forum 18 News
Service, that opposition to religious freedom is widespread. Ergenekon
members are alleged to have maintained deathlists of people, including
Christians with a missionary background. The Malatya murder trial is
revealing plausible links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and the
murders. But local officials -- who are almost certainly not in an
Ergenekon-type group -- are also hostile to religious freedom. The
Ergenekon case is part of a power-struggle between the "deep state"
and the AKP government, but it is unclear whether the current trials
will advance freedom of religion and belief. Given the threats to the
day-to-day security and religious freedom of non-nationalist Turks,
whether the government effectively addresses the roots of these
threats will be crucial.
A court case in Turkey has pointed to the existence of a secretive
underground ultra-nationalist organisation Ergenekon, though this
might merely be another name for the "deep state". The trial began
near Istanbul on 20 October of 86 alleged members -- from the police,
army, business, politics and the mass media - on charges that they
were plotting to overthrow the current Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government by 2009.
The "deep state" is the term used in Turkey for nationalist circles
in the army, police, National Intelligence Organisation (MIT)
secret police and state administration, which regard themselves as
the custodians of the secularist legacy of the Republic's founder,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (see F18News 28 June 2007). The MIT closely
monitors religious minorities, and some MIT officers do indeed
believe in protecting religious minorities. But other MIT officers
are staunch nationalists and fully part of the "deep state" (see
F18News 10 July 2007).
Opposition to religious freedom is widespread among the "deep state"
and wider sections of political life and the general public. This
hostility has resulted in deaths and violent attacks, and has not been
effectively addressed by the government (see F18News 15 April 2008).
The anti-religious minority views of ultra-nationalist circles and the
"deep state" were no secret, especially to the religious minorities
themselves. But reports in the Turkish media about Ergenekon have,
perhaps for the first time, given the wider Turkish public the details
of the conspiracies. Many Turkish analysts think that the allegations
made so far will turn out to be true.
Members of Ergenekon are alleged to have maintained lists of people
-- including Christians with a missionary background - targeted
for killing. The involvement of Ergenekon has been alleged in the
murders of Catholic priest Fr Andrea Santoro in Trabzon in February
2006 and three Protestants - Necati Aydin, Tillman Geske and Ugur
Yuksel - in Malatya in April 2007. The MIT secret police is known
to have maintained observation of the places where all four of these
Christians were killed (see F18News 10 July 2007).
The trial of those accused of the Malatya murders is revealing
that there may be links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and
the murders. As Christian news service Compass Direct reported on
21 October, the lawyer Orhan Kemal Cengiz, who leads the legal team
representing the victims' families, states that there is a "very dark,
complex, sophisticated web of relations behind the scenes."
Indeed, the Ergenekon people not only seem to be the masterminds of
the Santoro and Malatya murders (and of the murder of ethnic Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink), they even had a plan to kill the Ecumenical
Patriarch -- or at least to incite his murder in a way that could
not be traced back to them.
Among those arrested in the investigation against Ergenekon
was ultranationalist lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz. As well as filing
complaints against numerous writers for "insulting Turkishness"
under the notorious Article 301 of the Penal Code, he also brought a
high-profile case of "insulting Islam" under the same Article against
Hakan Tastan and Turan Topal, Turks who joined a Protestant church.
Even the so-called Turkish Orthodox Church -- which has almost no
followers and was apparently designed by its founders as an irritant
to the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate -- is revealed to have
been closely linked with such circles. This "church" has been publicly
supportive of Kerincsiz's claims that Turkish Christians "insult
Turkishness". Ergenekon is said to have used "Turkish Orthodox Church"
buildings, and to be closely liked with those who run this "church".
Ergenekon-style nationalists are certain that almost everyone is
against the Turks and Turkishness. Particular enemies of Turkey are
thought by these circles to be all of Turkey's ethnic minorities,
particularly Kurds (some of whom are Alevi Muslims), as well as
non-Muslim minorities. These views have long been widespread even
outside Ergenekon-type circles (see F18News 29 November 2007).
Ergenekon-type circles collected information on groups within these
populations -- it helped that they had close ties to authorities with
access to the personal data registry which records individuals' ethnic
and religious affiliation. It is not known if Ergenekon itself --
if it existed in the form that is claimed - sent spies into religious
minority communities.
However, all religious minorities -- especially Christians -- have
long had unknown people visiting their services. Sometimes these
visitors say they are there from the MIT secret police to "protect"
them, though more often they refuse to explain who they are (see
F18News 26 July 2006).
Religious minorities doubt whether the police or MIT secret police
would really attend their places of worship to protect them: they
are more likely to believe they are there to listen, watch and take
notes. Even this year in 2008, believers leaving services are asked
who they are and why they have attended. The authorities want to
know whether those attending Christian churches are foreigners, local
"foreigners" or possible converts. Ergenekon could have played a part
in such enquiries.
Many religious leaders have long been under surveillance by the MIT
secret police. "Walls have ears," is the constant refrain in religious
minority headquarters. Particularly close tabs were kept on Armenian
Patriarch Mesrop Mutafyan, who had two "bodyguards" from the secret
police with him constantly.
Again it remains unclear if this surveillance is to protect them
or to keep tabs on all their activity. That a grenade could have
been thrown into Patriarch Bartholomew's office from a small street
outside the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul's Fener district -
which is under full and very visible police surveillance - shows that
any "protection" is at best ineffectual. Those charged with protecting
religious leaders have not managed to stop threats against them.
Religious minority leaders live with threats constantly, whether
through the media or directly. Patriarch Mesrop would receive about
300 emailed threats each day -- whether from one individual or many
is unknown. Unknown people watch religious minority buildings, making
sure they are seen and noticed by the religious minorities.
Perhaps the biggest impact so far of this constant atmosphere of
threats is on the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate, Turkey's biggest
Christian denomination. Mesrop Mutafyan, who was elected Patriarch
in 1998 against the express wishes of the Turkish authorities, has
been forced to retreat into health-related seclusion. Many believe
the severe health problems he is suffering -- which have affected
him both physically and mentally - are akin to post-traumatic stress
disorder. They believe these have been brought on by years of pressure
from the media, the public and from the Armenian diaspora, some of
which has dubbed him a traitor. As well as opposing his original
election, the Turkish authorities also made trouble for him over the
restoration of the Patriarchate several years ago.
Should Patriarch Mesrop not recover and be in a position to take up
his functions again, this could threaten the future of the Armenian
Church in Turkey. The Turkish authorities are likely to insist -- as
they have done up to now -- that the head of the Armenian (as well as
the Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate must be a Turkish citizen resident
in Turkey. The Armenian Church may struggle to find a candidate with
the diplomatic and linguistic skills and the international experience
for such a crucial role in such a delicate and exposed position. This
problem is of importance not just for the Church but for the Armenian
community as a whole.
However, it is clear that Ergenekon and the "deep state" are not the
only obstacle for freedom of religion or belief. Local officials --
who are almost certainly not in an Ergenekon-type organisation --
continue to obstruct the work of non-Muslim communities. This can
clearly be seen when it comes to property disputes.
Roman Catholics, for example, face several difficult property battles,
most notably in the southern coastal city of Mersin, where they have
a large compound which they have used since Ottoman times. The only
document the Catholics have confirming their ownership is a firman
(decree) issued by the Ottoman sultan, which the local authorities do
not consider is valid. Successive court cases brought by the local
authorities in the 1980s finally reached Turkey's Supreme Court in
Ankara in the 1990s, which ruled in favour of the Catholics.
Such ownership problems are faced by all the minorities, despite their
widely differing legal status. As is the case with all non-Muslim
minority groups, Catholics do not legally exist. Furthermore,
as their properties are not organised as "community foundations",
their properties have no legal personality on their own. And as the
Catholics do not legally exist, the government at times argues that
they therefore also cannot have property. This shows that despite
government claims, these property problems have not been resolved by
the latest Foundations Law (see F18News 13 March 2008).
In the case of the Catholics of Mersin, the local authorities
re-started the dispute through the courts, in a case that is now
pending at the High Court. Catholics fear a negative ruling, which
would force them to take their case to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. This would be extremely expensive and
time-consuming, even though this may turn out to be the only effective
way for religious minorities to secure freedom of religion or belief
(see F18News 18 January 2007).
The authorities in Mersin argue that the Ottoman firman only allows
Catholic people to construct a specific building (a church) and did
not grant them ownership of the land on which it was built. Similar
court cases were brought in the past over the Assumptionist Church
in Kadikoy, Istanbul (ECHR case No. 26308/95).
The Mersin authorities' desire to confiscate Catholic property would
leave the community with nowhere to worship, though it remains unclear
how far the authorities would go. They could take away legal ownership,
while allowing the Catholics to continue to use the church. In the
past, authorities elsewhere have used such methods to confiscate
religious property "legally".
Another example is in Adana. The town's Jesuit-run Catholic church has
long faced harassment from local people attending a nearby wedding
hall, which was built close to it in defiance of regulations. The
mayor's office has said that the wedding hall should be closed but
has taken no action to enforce this.
Ancient cemeteries where Christians are buried -- such as in Samsun
-- or Christian sections of bigger cemeteries -- as in Ankara -
are also not being protected from vandalism, despite requests from
the Christian Churches. In the Black Sea port of Trabzon -- where
Fr Santoro was murdered - the Christian cemetery is threatened with
confiscation. Muslim cemeteries face no such problems.
By contrast, spokespersons for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate have
pointed to two positive developments. They welcomed the January 2008
statement in parliament by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
that the issue of whether its Patriarch, Bartholomew, is "Ecumenical"
or not is an "internal" matter for the Patriarchate and that the
state should not interfere. Previously the authorities have responded
ferociously to any claims that Bartholomew's religious role extends
beyond Istanbul's tiny surviving Greek Orthodox community.
Greek Orthodox spokespersons also welcome the July 2008 ruling by
the ECHR in Strasbourg over the Buyukada orphanage, particularly
the finding that not only does the property belong to the Orthodox
Patriarchate but that the Patriarchate is an existing legal person
(application no. 14340/05).
Erdogan's statement about the title "Ecumenical" is likely to have
little immediate impact on the general public, which continues to
regard the Patriarchate with suspicion or hostility. The ECHR ruling
should have an impact on other religious communities which have so
far struggled to assert their right to a legal existence.
Meanwhile a new party, the Law and Equality Party (Hak ve Esitlik
Partisi), was created on 4 September to promote a nationalist
agenda. The party, founded by a former general prominent in the
war against the PKK Kurdish rebels, is also aimed at getting rid of
Christians and ending Christian proselytism. The first sentence of
the call to found the party -- published as a full-page advertisement
in many newspapers - attacks what it calls the "colonisation" of
Turkey by missionaries, presumably Christian. "Turkish nation -- we
know that you are fed up that your democracy is treated like a child,
that foreign representatives and missionaries run around on our soil
and boss you around," it reads.
Although the party seems to be well-organised in Turkey's provinces,
it remains unclear how serious it is and how many votes it might
be able to gather in an election. Nevertheless, the party reflects
more widely-held chauvinist views, which see no place in Turkey for
non-Muslim minorities (see F18News 29 November 2007).
Public opinion in Turkey is becoming more hostile to freedom of
religion or belief, and increasingly favours extreme nationalism of
the Ergenekon kind. The government's actions are favourable to these
kinds of views -- even if not to the Ergenekon group itself -- and it
does not seem to want to act effectively to protect non-nationalist
Turkish citizens. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is
not itself an extreme nationalist party, but it could do much more
to make it unambiguously clear that religious and ethnic minorities
are Turkish citizens with equal rights.
The AKP itself is under threat from Ergenekon-style views; indeed,
those associated with the "deep state" recently tried to have the AKP
banned. A fight is underway between the Army and the old Kemalist
"deep state" on one side and the AKP on the other. But it is not
at all clear that the AKP is necessarily in this fight to advance
democratic values, including freedom of religion and belief.
It also remains unclear whether the AKP will prevail. Visits by members
of the General Staff to Ergenekon prisoners ahead of the trial have
been interpreted as a warning to the AKP not to go too far.
The court case against alleged key leaders and members of Ergenekon is
merely the latest step in the power-struggle between the "deep state"
(of which Ergenekon appears to have been a part) and the AKP. That
the judiciary -- quite obviously pushed by the government -- has
initiated the court case can be seen as proof that the AKP government
is fighting back against those groups in society and state that are
striving to drive the AKP from power.
Whether the Ergenekon court case will prove to be a step towards
real democracy in Turkey -- leading to improvements in the area of
freedom of religion and belief -- is quite another question. It is
not only the court cases on Ergenekon and the Malatya murders which
will decide this. Given the undeniable threats to the day-to-day
security and religious freedom of Turks who are not nationalists,
whether the AKP government effectively addresses the roots of these
threats will be crucial in deciding this question.
Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio,
a Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to
Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not
necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18
Order of St. Andrew, Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
Nov 3 2008
NY
IN THE NEWS - A court case reveals 86 members, ranging from the
Turkish police, army, business, politics, and the mass media,
who are alleged in a plan to assassinate the Ecumenical Patriarch,
along with the murder of two Turkish Christians. The case points
to a secret, ultra-nationalist organization (Ergenekon) in the
upper levels of Turkish government as a driving force in religious
oppression. This is addressed in this originally published article,
"Turkish nationalism, Ergenekon, and denial of religious freedom",
by Forum 18's, Dr. Otmar Oehring of the Human Rights Office at Missio,
the Pontifical Mission Society.
TURKEY: Turkish nationalism, Ergenekon, and denial of religious freedom
By Dr. Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio
Article published October 21, 2008
A trial has begun in Turkey of influential people alleged to be part
of an ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon. Otmar Oehring of the German
Catholic charity Missio notes, in a commentary for Forum 18 News
Service, that opposition to religious freedom is widespread. Ergenekon
members are alleged to have maintained deathlists of people, including
Christians with a missionary background. The Malatya murder trial is
revealing plausible links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and the
murders. But local officials -- who are almost certainly not in an
Ergenekon-type group -- are also hostile to religious freedom. The
Ergenekon case is part of a power-struggle between the "deep state"
and the AKP government, but it is unclear whether the current trials
will advance freedom of religion and belief. Given the threats to the
day-to-day security and religious freedom of non-nationalist Turks,
whether the government effectively addresses the roots of these
threats will be crucial.
A court case in Turkey has pointed to the existence of a secretive
underground ultra-nationalist organisation Ergenekon, though this
might merely be another name for the "deep state". The trial began
near Istanbul on 20 October of 86 alleged members -- from the police,
army, business, politics and the mass media - on charges that they
were plotting to overthrow the current Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government by 2009.
The "deep state" is the term used in Turkey for nationalist circles
in the army, police, National Intelligence Organisation (MIT)
secret police and state administration, which regard themselves as
the custodians of the secularist legacy of the Republic's founder,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (see F18News 28 June 2007). The MIT closely
monitors religious minorities, and some MIT officers do indeed
believe in protecting religious minorities. But other MIT officers
are staunch nationalists and fully part of the "deep state" (see
F18News 10 July 2007).
Opposition to religious freedom is widespread among the "deep state"
and wider sections of political life and the general public. This
hostility has resulted in deaths and violent attacks, and has not been
effectively addressed by the government (see F18News 15 April 2008).
The anti-religious minority views of ultra-nationalist circles and the
"deep state" were no secret, especially to the religious minorities
themselves. But reports in the Turkish media about Ergenekon have,
perhaps for the first time, given the wider Turkish public the details
of the conspiracies. Many Turkish analysts think that the allegations
made so far will turn out to be true.
Members of Ergenekon are alleged to have maintained lists of people
-- including Christians with a missionary background - targeted
for killing. The involvement of Ergenekon has been alleged in the
murders of Catholic priest Fr Andrea Santoro in Trabzon in February
2006 and three Protestants - Necati Aydin, Tillman Geske and Ugur
Yuksel - in Malatya in April 2007. The MIT secret police is known
to have maintained observation of the places where all four of these
Christians were killed (see F18News 10 July 2007).
The trial of those accused of the Malatya murders is revealing
that there may be links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and
the murders. As Christian news service Compass Direct reported on
21 October, the lawyer Orhan Kemal Cengiz, who leads the legal team
representing the victims' families, states that there is a "very dark,
complex, sophisticated web of relations behind the scenes."
Indeed, the Ergenekon people not only seem to be the masterminds of
the Santoro and Malatya murders (and of the murder of ethnic Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink), they even had a plan to kill the Ecumenical
Patriarch -- or at least to incite his murder in a way that could
not be traced back to them.
Among those arrested in the investigation against Ergenekon
was ultranationalist lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz. As well as filing
complaints against numerous writers for "insulting Turkishness"
under the notorious Article 301 of the Penal Code, he also brought a
high-profile case of "insulting Islam" under the same Article against
Hakan Tastan and Turan Topal, Turks who joined a Protestant church.
Even the so-called Turkish Orthodox Church -- which has almost no
followers and was apparently designed by its founders as an irritant
to the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate -- is revealed to have
been closely linked with such circles. This "church" has been publicly
supportive of Kerincsiz's claims that Turkish Christians "insult
Turkishness". Ergenekon is said to have used "Turkish Orthodox Church"
buildings, and to be closely liked with those who run this "church".
Ergenekon-style nationalists are certain that almost everyone is
against the Turks and Turkishness. Particular enemies of Turkey are
thought by these circles to be all of Turkey's ethnic minorities,
particularly Kurds (some of whom are Alevi Muslims), as well as
non-Muslim minorities. These views have long been widespread even
outside Ergenekon-type circles (see F18News 29 November 2007).
Ergenekon-type circles collected information on groups within these
populations -- it helped that they had close ties to authorities with
access to the personal data registry which records individuals' ethnic
and religious affiliation. It is not known if Ergenekon itself --
if it existed in the form that is claimed - sent spies into religious
minority communities.
However, all religious minorities -- especially Christians -- have
long had unknown people visiting their services. Sometimes these
visitors say they are there from the MIT secret police to "protect"
them, though more often they refuse to explain who they are (see
F18News 26 July 2006).
Religious minorities doubt whether the police or MIT secret police
would really attend their places of worship to protect them: they
are more likely to believe they are there to listen, watch and take
notes. Even this year in 2008, believers leaving services are asked
who they are and why they have attended. The authorities want to
know whether those attending Christian churches are foreigners, local
"foreigners" or possible converts. Ergenekon could have played a part
in such enquiries.
Many religious leaders have long been under surveillance by the MIT
secret police. "Walls have ears," is the constant refrain in religious
minority headquarters. Particularly close tabs were kept on Armenian
Patriarch Mesrop Mutafyan, who had two "bodyguards" from the secret
police with him constantly.
Again it remains unclear if this surveillance is to protect them
or to keep tabs on all their activity. That a grenade could have
been thrown into Patriarch Bartholomew's office from a small street
outside the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul's Fener district -
which is under full and very visible police surveillance - shows that
any "protection" is at best ineffectual. Those charged with protecting
religious leaders have not managed to stop threats against them.
Religious minority leaders live with threats constantly, whether
through the media or directly. Patriarch Mesrop would receive about
300 emailed threats each day -- whether from one individual or many
is unknown. Unknown people watch religious minority buildings, making
sure they are seen and noticed by the religious minorities.
Perhaps the biggest impact so far of this constant atmosphere of
threats is on the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate, Turkey's biggest
Christian denomination. Mesrop Mutafyan, who was elected Patriarch
in 1998 against the express wishes of the Turkish authorities, has
been forced to retreat into health-related seclusion. Many believe
the severe health problems he is suffering -- which have affected
him both physically and mentally - are akin to post-traumatic stress
disorder. They believe these have been brought on by years of pressure
from the media, the public and from the Armenian diaspora, some of
which has dubbed him a traitor. As well as opposing his original
election, the Turkish authorities also made trouble for him over the
restoration of the Patriarchate several years ago.
Should Patriarch Mesrop not recover and be in a position to take up
his functions again, this could threaten the future of the Armenian
Church in Turkey. The Turkish authorities are likely to insist -- as
they have done up to now -- that the head of the Armenian (as well as
the Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate must be a Turkish citizen resident
in Turkey. The Armenian Church may struggle to find a candidate with
the diplomatic and linguistic skills and the international experience
for such a crucial role in such a delicate and exposed position. This
problem is of importance not just for the Church but for the Armenian
community as a whole.
However, it is clear that Ergenekon and the "deep state" are not the
only obstacle for freedom of religion or belief. Local officials --
who are almost certainly not in an Ergenekon-type organisation --
continue to obstruct the work of non-Muslim communities. This can
clearly be seen when it comes to property disputes.
Roman Catholics, for example, face several difficult property battles,
most notably in the southern coastal city of Mersin, where they have
a large compound which they have used since Ottoman times. The only
document the Catholics have confirming their ownership is a firman
(decree) issued by the Ottoman sultan, which the local authorities do
not consider is valid. Successive court cases brought by the local
authorities in the 1980s finally reached Turkey's Supreme Court in
Ankara in the 1990s, which ruled in favour of the Catholics.
Such ownership problems are faced by all the minorities, despite their
widely differing legal status. As is the case with all non-Muslim
minority groups, Catholics do not legally exist. Furthermore,
as their properties are not organised as "community foundations",
their properties have no legal personality on their own. And as the
Catholics do not legally exist, the government at times argues that
they therefore also cannot have property. This shows that despite
government claims, these property problems have not been resolved by
the latest Foundations Law (see F18News 13 March 2008).
In the case of the Catholics of Mersin, the local authorities
re-started the dispute through the courts, in a case that is now
pending at the High Court. Catholics fear a negative ruling, which
would force them to take their case to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. This would be extremely expensive and
time-consuming, even though this may turn out to be the only effective
way for religious minorities to secure freedom of religion or belief
(see F18News 18 January 2007).
The authorities in Mersin argue that the Ottoman firman only allows
Catholic people to construct a specific building (a church) and did
not grant them ownership of the land on which it was built. Similar
court cases were brought in the past over the Assumptionist Church
in Kadikoy, Istanbul (ECHR case No. 26308/95).
The Mersin authorities' desire to confiscate Catholic property would
leave the community with nowhere to worship, though it remains unclear
how far the authorities would go. They could take away legal ownership,
while allowing the Catholics to continue to use the church. In the
past, authorities elsewhere have used such methods to confiscate
religious property "legally".
Another example is in Adana. The town's Jesuit-run Catholic church has
long faced harassment from local people attending a nearby wedding
hall, which was built close to it in defiance of regulations. The
mayor's office has said that the wedding hall should be closed but
has taken no action to enforce this.
Ancient cemeteries where Christians are buried -- such as in Samsun
-- or Christian sections of bigger cemeteries -- as in Ankara -
are also not being protected from vandalism, despite requests from
the Christian Churches. In the Black Sea port of Trabzon -- where
Fr Santoro was murdered - the Christian cemetery is threatened with
confiscation. Muslim cemeteries face no such problems.
By contrast, spokespersons for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate have
pointed to two positive developments. They welcomed the January 2008
statement in parliament by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
that the issue of whether its Patriarch, Bartholomew, is "Ecumenical"
or not is an "internal" matter for the Patriarchate and that the
state should not interfere. Previously the authorities have responded
ferociously to any claims that Bartholomew's religious role extends
beyond Istanbul's tiny surviving Greek Orthodox community.
Greek Orthodox spokespersons also welcome the July 2008 ruling by
the ECHR in Strasbourg over the Buyukada orphanage, particularly
the finding that not only does the property belong to the Orthodox
Patriarchate but that the Patriarchate is an existing legal person
(application no. 14340/05).
Erdogan's statement about the title "Ecumenical" is likely to have
little immediate impact on the general public, which continues to
regard the Patriarchate with suspicion or hostility. The ECHR ruling
should have an impact on other religious communities which have so
far struggled to assert their right to a legal existence.
Meanwhile a new party, the Law and Equality Party (Hak ve Esitlik
Partisi), was created on 4 September to promote a nationalist
agenda. The party, founded by a former general prominent in the
war against the PKK Kurdish rebels, is also aimed at getting rid of
Christians and ending Christian proselytism. The first sentence of
the call to found the party -- published as a full-page advertisement
in many newspapers - attacks what it calls the "colonisation" of
Turkey by missionaries, presumably Christian. "Turkish nation -- we
know that you are fed up that your democracy is treated like a child,
that foreign representatives and missionaries run around on our soil
and boss you around," it reads.
Although the party seems to be well-organised in Turkey's provinces,
it remains unclear how serious it is and how many votes it might
be able to gather in an election. Nevertheless, the party reflects
more widely-held chauvinist views, which see no place in Turkey for
non-Muslim minorities (see F18News 29 November 2007).
Public opinion in Turkey is becoming more hostile to freedom of
religion or belief, and increasingly favours extreme nationalism of
the Ergenekon kind. The government's actions are favourable to these
kinds of views -- even if not to the Ergenekon group itself -- and it
does not seem to want to act effectively to protect non-nationalist
Turkish citizens. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is
not itself an extreme nationalist party, but it could do much more
to make it unambiguously clear that religious and ethnic minorities
are Turkish citizens with equal rights.
The AKP itself is under threat from Ergenekon-style views; indeed,
those associated with the "deep state" recently tried to have the AKP
banned. A fight is underway between the Army and the old Kemalist
"deep state" on one side and the AKP on the other. But it is not
at all clear that the AKP is necessarily in this fight to advance
democratic values, including freedom of religion and belief.
It also remains unclear whether the AKP will prevail. Visits by members
of the General Staff to Ergenekon prisoners ahead of the trial have
been interpreted as a warning to the AKP not to go too far.
The court case against alleged key leaders and members of Ergenekon is
merely the latest step in the power-struggle between the "deep state"
(of which Ergenekon appears to have been a part) and the AKP. That
the judiciary -- quite obviously pushed by the government -- has
initiated the court case can be seen as proof that the AKP government
is fighting back against those groups in society and state that are
striving to drive the AKP from power.
Whether the Ergenekon court case will prove to be a step towards
real democracy in Turkey -- leading to improvements in the area of
freedom of religion and belief -- is quite another question. It is
not only the court cases on Ergenekon and the Malatya murders which
will decide this. Given the undeniable threats to the day-to-day
security and religious freedom of Turks who are not nationalists,
whether the AKP government effectively addresses the roots of these
threats will be crucial in deciding this question.
Dr. Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio,
a Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to
Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not
necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18