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AZERBAIJAN: MOSCOW BRINGS PRESSURE TO BEAR ON BAKU
Stephen Blank
EurasiaNet
Nov 4 2008
NY
Aiming to build on its military success in Georgia, Russia is bringing
pressure to bear on Azerbaijan. Moscow's intent is to coerce Baku
into going along with the Kremlin's grand plan to remake the Caucasus'
security and energy framework.
Moscow's chief desire is to keep US and NATO influence in the region to
a minimum, and even eliminate it altogether. With Georgia corralled and
Armenia effectively in Moscow's pocket, it would seem that Azerbaijan
now holds the key to the realization of the Kremlin's ambitions. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Baku's most sensitive pressure point is clearly the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue, and, not surprisingly, that is where Russia is exerting the
most force. As the November 2 talks in Moscow on the Karabakh issue
underscored, the Kremlin has made it known that it will not tolerate
any effort to settle the territorial dispute by force. [For background
see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russia's mediation efforts are
clearly designed to be seen in Baku as an offer that Azerbaijani
leaders cannot refuse.
Moscow's insistence on the renunciation of possible use of force --
a concept endorsed in a declaration signed by both Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev on November
2 -- has the effect of severely limiting Baku's options. Of course,
Moscow's opposition to the use of force can be justified for many
reasons, but it also is probably the only way Baku could ever stand
a realistic chance of recovering its lost lands. All of this means
that Russia has imposed limits on Azerbaijan's negotiating position,
leaving Baku in an extremely disadvantageous position.
Since key issues in the Karabakh peace process have yet to be resolved
-- namely the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, possession of the Lachin
corridor and the deployment of peacekeeping forces -- the results
of the Moscow summit could cause other issues that were agreed upon
earlier to be reopened. Ultimately, it probably does not matter much
to Russia how the outstanding issues are decided, as an open-ended
peace process serves Moscow's purpose, giving the Kremlin a lever
with which it can exert influence on both Yerevan and Baku.
Moscow's pressure on Baku does not end with the Karabakh issue. Reports
have circulated that Moscow wants a military base in Azerbaijan
-- i.e. an expanded presence for a longer duration at the Qabala
air defense base -- and also a stronger position in Azerbaijan's
economy. In particular, Russia is eager to integrate Azerbaijan into
the Kremlin's Caspian energy framework. This objective has taken
on an added sense of urgency because Russia, Iran, and Qatar are
now seriously exploring the creation of a natural gas cartel, and
because Turkmenistan's gas fields have been shown to be of world-class
size. Azerbaijan, another major gas producer in the Caspian Basin,
is the only holdout that is preventing Russia from monopolizing
trans-Caspian energy flows to Europe.
Moscow apparently will not be satisfied unless it can achieve a
controlling interest over Baku's security orientation. This would
involve arms sales, the training of officers, close participation
in the drafting of Azerbaijan's national security concept, and the
reformulation of military doctrine all in a way that would promote
Baku's closer cooperation with the Moscow-dominated Collective
Security Treaty Organization, as well as with the newly proposed
Caspian Economic Cooperation. Obviously, the key prize here is
the redirecting of Azeri energy flows through Russian pipelines to
effectively render the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline strategically
meaningless. During the Russian-Georgian war, Baku, acting prudently,
redirected some of its energy flows from the BTC route to Russian
installations. Moscow now wants to make this shift permanent.
It is clear that the sum total of all these Russian initiatives
is to circumscribe Azerbaijan's sovereignty and bring Baku fully
under Moscow's sphere of influence, as envisioned by President
Dmitry Medvedev on August 31. Such policies fit well with Moscow's
long-standing efforts to integrate CIS states into the various
organizations that the Kremlin controls, and which seek to exclude
Westerns states from the Caucasus and Central Asia.
What should be of particular concern to policymakers in Washington
and in European capitals, especially Berlin, is the Kremlin's naked
desire to undermine the foundations of Azerbaijan's sovereignty and,
indeed, the sovereignty of every other government in the CIS. Russian
pressure will undoubtedly continue, and likely grow more intense, in
the absence of a coherent Western response. It is imperative in the
coming weeks and months for the United States and the European Union
to adopt a united position that shows leaders in Baku and elsewhere
in the Caspian Basin that when it comes to relations with Russia,
they are not on their own.
Editor's Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War
College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent
the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.
Stephen Blank
EurasiaNet
Nov 4 2008
NY
Aiming to build on its military success in Georgia, Russia is bringing
pressure to bear on Azerbaijan. Moscow's intent is to coerce Baku
into going along with the Kremlin's grand plan to remake the Caucasus'
security and energy framework.
Moscow's chief desire is to keep US and NATO influence in the region to
a minimum, and even eliminate it altogether. With Georgia corralled and
Armenia effectively in Moscow's pocket, it would seem that Azerbaijan
now holds the key to the realization of the Kremlin's ambitions. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Baku's most sensitive pressure point is clearly the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue, and, not surprisingly, that is where Russia is exerting the
most force. As the November 2 talks in Moscow on the Karabakh issue
underscored, the Kremlin has made it known that it will not tolerate
any effort to settle the territorial dispute by force. [For background
see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Russia's mediation efforts are
clearly designed to be seen in Baku as an offer that Azerbaijani
leaders cannot refuse.
Moscow's insistence on the renunciation of possible use of force --
a concept endorsed in a declaration signed by both Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev on November
2 -- has the effect of severely limiting Baku's options. Of course,
Moscow's opposition to the use of force can be justified for many
reasons, but it also is probably the only way Baku could ever stand
a realistic chance of recovering its lost lands. All of this means
that Russia has imposed limits on Azerbaijan's negotiating position,
leaving Baku in an extremely disadvantageous position.
Since key issues in the Karabakh peace process have yet to be resolved
-- namely the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, possession of the Lachin
corridor and the deployment of peacekeeping forces -- the results
of the Moscow summit could cause other issues that were agreed upon
earlier to be reopened. Ultimately, it probably does not matter much
to Russia how the outstanding issues are decided, as an open-ended
peace process serves Moscow's purpose, giving the Kremlin a lever
with which it can exert influence on both Yerevan and Baku.
Moscow's pressure on Baku does not end with the Karabakh issue. Reports
have circulated that Moscow wants a military base in Azerbaijan
-- i.e. an expanded presence for a longer duration at the Qabala
air defense base -- and also a stronger position in Azerbaijan's
economy. In particular, Russia is eager to integrate Azerbaijan into
the Kremlin's Caspian energy framework. This objective has taken
on an added sense of urgency because Russia, Iran, and Qatar are
now seriously exploring the creation of a natural gas cartel, and
because Turkmenistan's gas fields have been shown to be of world-class
size. Azerbaijan, another major gas producer in the Caspian Basin,
is the only holdout that is preventing Russia from monopolizing
trans-Caspian energy flows to Europe.
Moscow apparently will not be satisfied unless it can achieve a
controlling interest over Baku's security orientation. This would
involve arms sales, the training of officers, close participation
in the drafting of Azerbaijan's national security concept, and the
reformulation of military doctrine all in a way that would promote
Baku's closer cooperation with the Moscow-dominated Collective
Security Treaty Organization, as well as with the newly proposed
Caspian Economic Cooperation. Obviously, the key prize here is
the redirecting of Azeri energy flows through Russian pipelines to
effectively render the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline strategically
meaningless. During the Russian-Georgian war, Baku, acting prudently,
redirected some of its energy flows from the BTC route to Russian
installations. Moscow now wants to make this shift permanent.
It is clear that the sum total of all these Russian initiatives
is to circumscribe Azerbaijan's sovereignty and bring Baku fully
under Moscow's sphere of influence, as envisioned by President
Dmitry Medvedev on August 31. Such policies fit well with Moscow's
long-standing efforts to integrate CIS states into the various
organizations that the Kremlin controls, and which seek to exclude
Westerns states from the Caucasus and Central Asia.
What should be of particular concern to policymakers in Washington
and in European capitals, especially Berlin, is the Kremlin's naked
desire to undermine the foundations of Azerbaijan's sovereignty and,
indeed, the sovereignty of every other government in the CIS. Russian
pressure will undoubtedly continue, and likely grow more intense, in
the absence of a coherent Western response. It is imperative in the
coming weeks and months for the United States and the European Union
to adopt a united position that shows leaders in Baku and elsewhere
in the Caspian Basin that when it comes to relations with Russia,
they are not on their own.
Editor's Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War
College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent
the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.