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THE FORMULA OF FRAGILE BALANCE
Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
04 Nov 08
Armenia
The Moscow Declaration is a transitional document
The November 2 Declaration signed by the Armenian, Azeri and Russian
Presidents is not only the exact and realistic picture of the new
situation in the South Caucasus but also the mirror reflecting the
regional and global potentials of the superpowers competing with one
another around the region.
In our opinion The Russian diplomacy, the principal stimulus for this
declaration resulting from the recent months' negotiations, meetings
and discussions, has arrived at the following preliminary conclusions:
a) at the current stage, it is desirable but not possible to achieve
a final settlement in the Karabakh peace process;
b) however, in case of leaving the process to the Co-Chairs of the OSCE
Minsk Group, Moscow may be deprived of the real tactical advantages
gained after the recent regional developments;
c) therefore, it is necessary to maintain the format of the OSCE
Minsk Group, at least for the time being, but at the same time,
gradually assume the role of "the first fiddle";
d) Russia considers that the decisive condition for assuming the
above-mentioned role consists in becoming the guarantor of the
political settlement of the Karabakh conflict and thus robbing the
West of its peacekeeping functions.
In the given context of global and regional developments and the
strategic and tactical priorities deriving thereof, the Moscow
Declaration is, all in all, conceivable. But certainly, it is a
transitional document both for the direct parties to the Karabakh
conflict and all the mediators.
This significantly supports the Armenian party's arguments on the
impossibility of the military solution to the Karabakh conflict,
because in the very first clause of the Declaration, the three
countries declare that they will "contribute to the amelioration of
the situation in the South Caucasus and ensure the establishment of
an atmosphere of stability and security in the region by way of the
political settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict..."
Continuing the same idea, the Declaration also establishes that
the settlement should be "based on the norms and principles of
international law and the decisions and documents adopted within
their frameworks".
It is noteworthy that the signatories to the Moscow Declaration
"Reiterate the importance of continuing the intermediary efforts of
the OSCE Minsk Group, taking into consideration their meeting with
the parties organized in Madrid on November 29, 2007." This means
that the Russian President D. Medvedev's recent initiative is not
an attempt of replacing the OSCE Minsk Group, but just a method of
raising Russia's role in its frameworks.
The latter fact is strictly important considering the fact that
after the recent Russian-Georgian armed conflict some diplomats and
political analysts believed that the official Moscow and Washington
were unlikely to sit around the same table as Co-Chairing countries
of the OSCE Minsk Group. Whereas on November 1, just a day before the
meeting of the Armenian, Azeri and Russian leaders, American Co-Chair
of the Minsk Group Matthew Bryza was in Moscow, and he was taking part
not only in the meeting of the Armenian, Russian and Azeri Foreign
Ministers and the Co-Chairs, but also in the negotiation with Russian
State Secretary Grigory Karassin.
The third clause of the Declaration which says that "the peaceful
settlement should be achieved by adhering to all its aspects and the
legally binding international guarantees" is strictly important and
definitely advantageous to the Armenian party because it is actually
substantiates the package settlement of the Karabakh conflict. In case
of the accurate implementation of such resolution, the possibilities of
any disagreements between the parties over the contents and procedures
of holding the "delayed referendum" may be ruled out.
The fourth clause, which substantiates the necessity of proceeding
with the negotiation process, reiterates the well-known and
somewhat commonplace obligation imposed on Armenia and Azerbaijan,
so we find the fifth clause to be more interesting as it touches
upon the necessity of "promoting the strengthening of the tools of
confidence in the context of the efforts towards the settlement of the
conflict". Let's confess that similar ideas were also expressed in the
negotiations organized by the mediator countries and their Presidents,
as well as in the communiqués adopted and the oral statements made.
However, we should bear in mind that we are dealing with the first
document "adopted on the level of the Armenian and Azeri Presidents"
after 1994 (as mentioned by the Yuri Merzlyakov, the Russian Co-Chair
of the OSCE Minsk Group). That means that the Russian side may, in
the near future, translate its words into deeds and propose various
initiatives towards opening a dialogue between the two countries and
their societies.
The trilateral declaration adopted on November 2 opens new "starting
opportunities" for Moscow which continues its efforts towards
strengthening its political-military presence in the region by
way of speeding up the Karabakh settlement process. Furthermore,
the activeness of Moscow has clear-cut "time-limits" because the
prospects of the victory of the Democrats in the United States and
the shift of Government expected on January 20 gives the Russian side
"freedom of hands".
--Boundary_(ID_OlbewfeozkMNSLHOiJVdm w)--
Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
04 Nov 08
Armenia
The Moscow Declaration is a transitional document
The November 2 Declaration signed by the Armenian, Azeri and Russian
Presidents is not only the exact and realistic picture of the new
situation in the South Caucasus but also the mirror reflecting the
regional and global potentials of the superpowers competing with one
another around the region.
In our opinion The Russian diplomacy, the principal stimulus for this
declaration resulting from the recent months' negotiations, meetings
and discussions, has arrived at the following preliminary conclusions:
a) at the current stage, it is desirable but not possible to achieve
a final settlement in the Karabakh peace process;
b) however, in case of leaving the process to the Co-Chairs of the OSCE
Minsk Group, Moscow may be deprived of the real tactical advantages
gained after the recent regional developments;
c) therefore, it is necessary to maintain the format of the OSCE
Minsk Group, at least for the time being, but at the same time,
gradually assume the role of "the first fiddle";
d) Russia considers that the decisive condition for assuming the
above-mentioned role consists in becoming the guarantor of the
political settlement of the Karabakh conflict and thus robbing the
West of its peacekeeping functions.
In the given context of global and regional developments and the
strategic and tactical priorities deriving thereof, the Moscow
Declaration is, all in all, conceivable. But certainly, it is a
transitional document both for the direct parties to the Karabakh
conflict and all the mediators.
This significantly supports the Armenian party's arguments on the
impossibility of the military solution to the Karabakh conflict,
because in the very first clause of the Declaration, the three
countries declare that they will "contribute to the amelioration of
the situation in the South Caucasus and ensure the establishment of
an atmosphere of stability and security in the region by way of the
political settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict..."
Continuing the same idea, the Declaration also establishes that
the settlement should be "based on the norms and principles of
international law and the decisions and documents adopted within
their frameworks".
It is noteworthy that the signatories to the Moscow Declaration
"Reiterate the importance of continuing the intermediary efforts of
the OSCE Minsk Group, taking into consideration their meeting with
the parties organized in Madrid on November 29, 2007." This means
that the Russian President D. Medvedev's recent initiative is not
an attempt of replacing the OSCE Minsk Group, but just a method of
raising Russia's role in its frameworks.
The latter fact is strictly important considering the fact that
after the recent Russian-Georgian armed conflict some diplomats and
political analysts believed that the official Moscow and Washington
were unlikely to sit around the same table as Co-Chairing countries
of the OSCE Minsk Group. Whereas on November 1, just a day before the
meeting of the Armenian, Azeri and Russian leaders, American Co-Chair
of the Minsk Group Matthew Bryza was in Moscow, and he was taking part
not only in the meeting of the Armenian, Russian and Azeri Foreign
Ministers and the Co-Chairs, but also in the negotiation with Russian
State Secretary Grigory Karassin.
The third clause of the Declaration which says that "the peaceful
settlement should be achieved by adhering to all its aspects and the
legally binding international guarantees" is strictly important and
definitely advantageous to the Armenian party because it is actually
substantiates the package settlement of the Karabakh conflict. In case
of the accurate implementation of such resolution, the possibilities of
any disagreements between the parties over the contents and procedures
of holding the "delayed referendum" may be ruled out.
The fourth clause, which substantiates the necessity of proceeding
with the negotiation process, reiterates the well-known and
somewhat commonplace obligation imposed on Armenia and Azerbaijan,
so we find the fifth clause to be more interesting as it touches
upon the necessity of "promoting the strengthening of the tools of
confidence in the context of the efforts towards the settlement of the
conflict". Let's confess that similar ideas were also expressed in the
negotiations organized by the mediator countries and their Presidents,
as well as in the communiqués adopted and the oral statements made.
However, we should bear in mind that we are dealing with the first
document "adopted on the level of the Armenian and Azeri Presidents"
after 1994 (as mentioned by the Yuri Merzlyakov, the Russian Co-Chair
of the OSCE Minsk Group). That means that the Russian side may, in
the near future, translate its words into deeds and propose various
initiatives towards opening a dialogue between the two countries and
their societies.
The trilateral declaration adopted on November 2 opens new "starting
opportunities" for Moscow which continues its efforts towards
strengthening its political-military presence in the region by
way of speeding up the Karabakh settlement process. Furthermore,
the activeness of Moscow has clear-cut "time-limits" because the
prospects of the victory of the Democrats in the United States and
the shift of Government expected on January 20 gives the Russian side
"freedom of hands".
--Boundary_(ID_OlbewfeozkMNSLHOiJVdm w)--