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INSIDE A MISUNDERSTOOD CONFLICT ZONE: SCOTT TAYLOR IN THE CAUCASUS
by Christopher Deliso
Antiwar.com
http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/ ?articleid=13733
Nov 7 2008
CA
In this eye-opening interview, Canadian war reporter Scott Taylor
reflects on his recent visit to the Caucasus, where he got an inside
look at the scene of this summer's Georgian-Russian conflict from its
very epicenter - the breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia -
while also visiting Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave
and 1990's hotspot claimed by Azerbaijan.
On his two-week trip, Taylor, editor of Canadian military magazine
Esprit de Corps, discovered that the real situation on the ground
is hardly as simple or straightforward as the US and other Western
governments have claimed it to be.
Getting In
Christopher Deliso: Scott, you have reported over the years multiple
times from rough spots in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. How did
this trip compare to previous ones in terms of access?
Scott Taylor: The complexity of the current situation made even basic
travel planning much more challenging than is usually the case. Even
though the places I wanted to see are all relatively close, political
frictions mean they have to be accessed indirectly. For example, I
started my trip in Ankara, Turkey, but to reach Yerevan, the Armenian
capital, I had to fly via Germany, because the Turkish-Armenian border
has been closed for years.
>From Armenia, I set out for the self-declared, but unrecognized state
of Nagorno-Karabakh; since this Armenian enclave is claimed by the
Azeris, simply having their visa in my passport caused problems for me
when I later got to Baku, Azerbaijan. From there, I flew to Stavropol
in Russia and then drove 12 hours to reach South Ossetia. Because
of the closed Russian-Georgian border, I had to retrace my steps to
Yerevan in order to get to Tbilisi, Georgia, via bus.
CD: What was the toughest place to reach? Tskhinvali?
ST: Correct. Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, was no doubt
one of the toughest places I've ever tried to get to. The city is just
over the internal border of Georgia proper, but access routes from the
latter remain blocked by the security services. And on the northern
(Russian Federation) side, South Ossetia is linked to North Ossetia
by one winding mountain pass.
Before setting out from Stavropol, I had been assured by the Russian
authorities that we would have no problems getting there - though
they apparently forgot to tell the border guards at the South Ossetia
crossing, who stated that foreign journalists weren't allowed into
the recent conflict zone. Figuring I had come this far already, I
waited it out for three days there at the Russian military mountain
checkpoint. Fortunately, we were finally allowed to go - though it
took a personal phone call from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's
press secretary to convince the police commander that we were harmless.
CD: Really! How did you manage to get their interest?
ST: The Russian Embassy in Ottawa had been very supportive of my
trip from the outset. They had basically called in a few favors,
and convinced Moscow that I would at least be objective in my
reporting. Once we were stuck at the border, there was a flurry of
frantic phone calls well into the wee hours to try and broker my entry.
CD: That said, given the problems with physical access, did you
encounter any problems making contact with sources? Were you prevented
from speaking with any people you wanted to interview?
ST: Not at all. I had a guide/translator supplied from the news agency
RIA Novosti, but it was his first visit into the area as well. We
were allowed to go everywhere on our own, and we spent hours eating,
and drinking, with the locals.
Background: Little-known Ossetia
CD: As we all know, the Caucasus is both a complex and strategic
region, though one relatively ignored and misunderstood by the
Western media. When the Georgian offensive in South Ossetia began on
August 7, just as the Beijing Olympics were beginning, it seemed to
me that there was this momentary confusion or inability to pinpoint
this conflict, as reflected in the ambivalence of early reports -
though the official State Department line about Russian aggression
and Georgian victimhood soon settled down comfortably enough in the
media. So do you think there was some lack of a precedent or prototype
for packaging this conflict, and that this accounted for this media
ambivalence to some extent?
ST: Indeed. The Western media doesn't have much of an "institutional
memory" when it comes to these obscure conflict regions in the
Caucasus. Nevertheless, since 1989, ethnic Ossetians and Georgians have
fought on four separate occasions for control of this tiny region,
only about 75 kilometers in length. Ossetians are, like Russians
and Georgians, Orthodox Christians, though they ultimately descend
from the now-vanished nation of the Alans, prominent in the medieval
period. They consider themselves closer to the Russian side than the
Georgian. There are about 25,000 ethnic Ossetians in South Ossetia now,
down from a total of 70,000 in 1989.
When the USSR was falling apart and Moscow's control over
its hinterlands dissipated, between 1989 and 1991, the three
Caucasus republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia all sought
independence. Yet as with Tito's Yugoslavia, the Soviet administrative
boundaries did not correspond precisely with the ethnic ones. Ossetia
ended up divided between the newly independent Georgia and the Russian
Federation. And this led to a violent dispute over territory, with
widespread atrocities and ethnic cleansing resulting.
CD: This is the story that's been told selectively about the former
Yugoslavia, of course.
ST: Well, yes, but for the Western media, the recent wars in the
Caucasus hardly register. From 1992-1994, the entire region became
engulfed in near-simultaneous local conflicts that made the Balkan
wars then going on seem almost simplistic in comparison. Nevertheless,
the latter held the attention of the West - despite that the casualties
and sheer destruction in the Caucasus were relatively greater.
Saakashvili's Fateful Gambit
CD: The Georgian offensive was unleashed in August, but must have
been planned in advance. Is there any evidence in your view for this
offensive being somewhat of a flamboyant reaction to the April NATO
Summit, on the part of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili?
ST: America has steadily been increasing its influence over the past
few years in the Caucasus. There's no question that American-educated
Georgian President Saakashvili, installed following the 2004 "Rose
Revolution," has been keen on maximizing the benefits of that
relationship.
At last April's NATO summit in Bucharest, the US and Canada forwarded
a motion by which Georgia and Ukraine, both bordering on Russia,
would be invited to join the alliance as full members. European
nations killed the initiative, however, prudently realizing it would
antagonize the Russians.
Since Saakashvili seemed assured of US support, he apparently felt
he could count on American backing when he sought to reconquer South
Ossetia; if it worked, the other Russian-leaning breakaway region,
Abkhazia, would possibly be next. Both were administratively autonomous
in Soviet times, and have violently resisted Georgian control since
1992. However, this gamble proved to be incorrect - even the hawkish
Bush administration was not willing to risk a world war with Russia
for the sake of a tiny patch of contested Georgian territory.
CD: Did you get any sense from any of your interviews as to whether
Saakashvili's misjudgment owed to either his own incapability, or
rather being misinformed by outside parties? If the latter, are there
any opinions as to who and why being floated?
ST: Everybody on both sides of the conflict line - in fact in the
entire region - questioned the sanity of Saakashvili. However there is
a general consensus that he was essentially a puppet of the US State
Department, and that his military offensive was a test of Russian
resolve. It is now clear to everybody that the Russian Federation
has drawn a line in the sand, and they are prepared to forcefully
respond to any challenge.
CD: I have been following the US-Georgian military training issue
for the last 7 years. There's no question that the Georgian army
has benefited tremendously from that troops training and especially
American military hardware. Did you find any hard evidence of how
the American training and provisions affected the Georgian fighting
strategies, capacities or execution?
ST: Given the fact that the Georgians collapsed into a panicked mob
almost as soon as the Russians appeared, I would say that the US
training was woefully inept. The equipment used by both the Russians
and Georgians is essentially from the same arsenal, so the difference
in this battle was the leadership and experience of the troops. In
fact, even though they possessed a tremendous numerical superiority
over the South Ossetians, the Georgian tanks were taking a pounding in
the militia's hit-and-run attacks in the narrow streets of Tskhinvali.
Combat damage and arson in the center of Tskhinvali
The Invasion Revisited
CD: During your trip, were you able to reconstruct anything about
the early days of the Georgian offensive, and what really happened?
ST: Very little has been reported about the initial Georgian attack;
investigating this was the primary focus of my research. When the
Georgian tanks rolled in, there were no independent monitors in South
Ossetia. Initial media reports were sketchy and confused. Ossetian
officials told me that they knew an attack was feared around August 1,
when the Georgian military began massing armored formations along the
border. The small South Ossetian militia was mobilized, and Tskhinvali
hospital added supplies.
However, President Saakashvili went on the radio on the evening of
August 7, assuring citizens that no attack was coming. Nevertheless,
only a few hours later, the Georgians unleashed a sneak attack -
a barrage of Grom missiles that destroyed the Russian peacekeeping
force's building, killing 150 personnel.
CD: Certainly the Georgians would have known that Russia would
understand this as a declaration of war? How did they follow on this
act of genius?
ST: The Georgian military entered the city with T-72 tanks, in the
process putting down token resistance by the Ossetians. More troops
were deployed to sweep up the outlying villages, and then they took
the ridgeline north of the city. From this vantage point the Georgians
targeted fleeing Ossetian civilians, and were able to provide fire
support for their troops in Tskhinvali. Soon after, ethnic Georgian
villagers north of the city, along the road into Russia, attacked
these Ossetians trying to escape.
However, the Georgian military did fail to blow up a key bridge on the
main road, and did not even try to block the vital seven-kilometer
tunnel linking South Ossetia to Russia. Ossetian commanders told me
that if the Georgians had sealed the tunnel, it would have prevented
Russian reinforcements from arriving and guaranteed a Georgian
victory. And they were never able to completely secure Tskhinvali
itself, as the local militia used its superior knowledge of urban
surroundings to confuse the Georgians.
CD: That's a strange detail, about the tunnel. Did anyone give
you an explanation as to why the Georgians did not try to bomb or
close it? Could this be one of the "mistakes" President Saakashvili
was referring to when he announced the firing of the country's top
military commander recently?
ST: Everyone I spoke to, from top commanders to the waitress in
the café was puzzled by the failure of the Georgians to target the
tunnel. And every Ossetian knew that if they had sealed that entry
port, Georgian victory would have been inevitable.
Russian Barracks hit by Grom missiles on the night of August 7
Victims of War
CD: During the fighting, what were the conditions like in the
city? What kind of civilian casualties were incurred?
ST: Numbers are not exact, though it is clear that casualties mounted
quickly - not helped by the fact that the Georgian army kept shelling
the city hospital. I spoke with the head Ossetian surgeon there,
Dr. Nikolai Zagoyev, who told me how he and his staff had to move
the operating room into the basement, where they performed hundreds
of operations, by candlelight, during the first 72 hours.
The basement shelter in the hospital where surgeons performed 700
operations by candlelight
In fact, some 25 of these medics fell victim to the attack. The very
poor conditions and lack of blood supplies meant that doctors had to
donate their own blood to patients before performing surgery. Since
they lacked time even to test for blood types, Dr. Zagoyev told me
it was "a miracle" that so many of his patients actually survived.
CD: Incredible. We also heard reports of civilians attacking other
civilians, is this correct?
ST: Yes, first the ethnic Georgian villagers in South Ossetia targeted
their Ossetian neighbors, after the Georgian army had entered - but
later, after the Russians arrived, many local Georgians fled along
with their army, as the furious Ossetians targeted their erstwhile
persecutors. It was all too typical of such a situation.
CD: Tell us more about the Russian involvement - when it began,
and whether they were in fact the "aggressors" in this instance,
as the Bush administration would have us believe?
ST: On the morning of August 10, Russian armored units, supported
by helicopter gunships, poured in through the tunnel connecting
Tskhinvali with North Ossetia. Simultaneously, Russian troops also
entered Abkhazia, on the Black Sea coast, to forestall any similar
Georgian military adventures. The Georgian soldiers put up only a
minimal fight against the Russians, and quickly withdrew. It was a
moment of total humiliation for Saakashvili, though the result was
not hard to predict.
All in all, the Russian forces drove the Georgian army more than 20
kilometers back into Georgia proper, an alarming turn of events for
the West. And then the State Department and its allies began voicing
support for President Saakashvili, and criticizing the so-called
"Russian aggression."
CD: What does the near future hold for civilians in the affected
parts of Georgia and South Ossetia, in your view?
ST: Well, a massive Russian-sponsored reconstruction program has begun,
but it has a long way to go. Winter is coming, utilities have yet to
be restored, infrastructure is devastated and outside of Tskhinvali
there are very few habitable buildings remaining. Despite the Russian
government's hopes for the Ossetians to remain in their homes, it
was clear that people were seeking to relocate north to Russia as
soon as they could do so.
Georgian tanks destroyed during their retreat out of South Ossetia
CD: Following the August crisis, Russia recognized the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia - clear retaliation for the Western-backed
independence of Kosovo, which Russia had opposed. Did people you
spoke with articulate this relationship?
ST: It certainly came up in conversation. However it is one of those
conundrums wherein traditional allies find themselves on opposite sides
of this equation. For instance, Russia is one of Serbia's strongest
supporters in denying Kosovo independent status. However much Serbia
would want to recognize South Ossetia's declaration of independence,
they cannot do so without undermining their own claim over Kosovo. It
is the same for the Azeris, who one would think would be supportive
of their fellow Muslims in Kosovo, but they refuse to recognize it
as independent for fear of weakening their own claim to the region
of Nagorno-Karabakh.
CD: Scott, speaking of the Azeris, you reported last year from
Azerbaijan, and noted that booming oil wealth there has been reflected
in major increases in military spending - with possible room for
application in attempting to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. What is the story
now? Did you get any information on whether a new conflict is looming?
ST: What was very interesting is that I was told Russian military
intelligence actually expected the Azeris to attack Nagorno-Karabakh,
before any move by Georgia against South Ossetia. However once Russia
demonstrated their willingness to intervene militarily, the Azeris
realized that retaking Nagorno Karabakh by force is no longer a
viable option.
CD: On the other hand, Russia has now come forward with an initiative
to help broker peace between the Armenians and Azeris. Obviously such a
move, if it succeeded, would help the Russians refute the 'aggressors'
image cast on them by the West. Did you hear anything about this?
ST: This was something I found out about while I was still in
Turkey. Of course Ankara has a strong position in all of this as well,
and the first movements were made when President Abdullah Gul visited
Yerevan last September. This was ostensibly to watch a football match,
but it clearly marked a dramatic shift in relations between Armenia
and Turkey. I was advised by a senior diplomatic source that President
Medvedev would be holding a summit meeting shortly after Ilham Aliyev
got reelected in Azerbaijan.
Those South Ossetians who remain, live among the battle damage
CD: What is the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, from an on the ground
point of view? Do people believe a conflict is coming, or do they
generally go about their daily lives and have normal services?
ST: Many Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are real hard-liners. You
do not refer to the captured regions as 'occupied,' they insist
on calling them 'liberated,' even though that liberation involved
the expulsion of more than one million Azeris from their homes. In
the seven occupied provinces, the abandoned villages are completely
destroyed, and this entire territory is like a giant, empty, military
buffer zone around Nagorno-Karabakh proper.
This is referred to as the Security Zone by the locals, and they have
vowed to never return it to the Azeris. For the Armenians living in
Nagorno-Karabakh, it is indeed business as usual. There has been
a tremendous amount of money pumped in through donations from the
Diaspora, which has created a sort of false economy. However, they
offer cash incentives for couples to marry, and even larger cash
bonuses for these newlyweds to create offspring. So basically there
is a major effort underway to create babies.
CD: Armenia represents Nagorno-Karabakh's interests at the diplomatic
discussion tables. Are the interests of Yerevan always in lockstep
with Stepanakert's?
ST: That is a great question, and of course the answer is no. Yerevan
has its own interests, and is anxious to begin normalizing relations
with both Ankara and Baku. At present, landlocked Armenia has only
two unclosed borders - with Georgia and Iran.
After the crisis between Russia and Georgia last August, Armenia's
close ties and dependency on Russia served to illustrate just how
isolated they are in the region. It is estimated that financially
Armenia suffered the biggest setback in the wake of that five-day
war. All in all, this is a very complex and dangerous powder keg. The
Caucasus is like ten gangsters in an elevator each holding a gun to
someone else's head. All it will take is for one to sneeze to set off
a violent chain reaction. On August 7th President Saakashvili started
to sneeze, but the Russians quickly put a finger under his nose.
CD: Scott, many thanks for your time, and hope to hear more from
exclusive info from you again soon on the Caucasus.
ST: Thank you, Chris.
--Boundary_(ID_5jhh7ptSVYoXKlSceArcwQ)--
by Christopher Deliso
Antiwar.com
http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/ ?articleid=13733
Nov 7 2008
CA
In this eye-opening interview, Canadian war reporter Scott Taylor
reflects on his recent visit to the Caucasus, where he got an inside
look at the scene of this summer's Georgian-Russian conflict from its
very epicenter - the breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia -
while also visiting Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave
and 1990's hotspot claimed by Azerbaijan.
On his two-week trip, Taylor, editor of Canadian military magazine
Esprit de Corps, discovered that the real situation on the ground
is hardly as simple or straightforward as the US and other Western
governments have claimed it to be.
Getting In
Christopher Deliso: Scott, you have reported over the years multiple
times from rough spots in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. How did
this trip compare to previous ones in terms of access?
Scott Taylor: The complexity of the current situation made even basic
travel planning much more challenging than is usually the case. Even
though the places I wanted to see are all relatively close, political
frictions mean they have to be accessed indirectly. For example, I
started my trip in Ankara, Turkey, but to reach Yerevan, the Armenian
capital, I had to fly via Germany, because the Turkish-Armenian border
has been closed for years.
>From Armenia, I set out for the self-declared, but unrecognized state
of Nagorno-Karabakh; since this Armenian enclave is claimed by the
Azeris, simply having their visa in my passport caused problems for me
when I later got to Baku, Azerbaijan. From there, I flew to Stavropol
in Russia and then drove 12 hours to reach South Ossetia. Because
of the closed Russian-Georgian border, I had to retrace my steps to
Yerevan in order to get to Tbilisi, Georgia, via bus.
CD: What was the toughest place to reach? Tskhinvali?
ST: Correct. Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, was no doubt
one of the toughest places I've ever tried to get to. The city is just
over the internal border of Georgia proper, but access routes from the
latter remain blocked by the security services. And on the northern
(Russian Federation) side, South Ossetia is linked to North Ossetia
by one winding mountain pass.
Before setting out from Stavropol, I had been assured by the Russian
authorities that we would have no problems getting there - though
they apparently forgot to tell the border guards at the South Ossetia
crossing, who stated that foreign journalists weren't allowed into
the recent conflict zone. Figuring I had come this far already, I
waited it out for three days there at the Russian military mountain
checkpoint. Fortunately, we were finally allowed to go - though it
took a personal phone call from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's
press secretary to convince the police commander that we were harmless.
CD: Really! How did you manage to get their interest?
ST: The Russian Embassy in Ottawa had been very supportive of my
trip from the outset. They had basically called in a few favors,
and convinced Moscow that I would at least be objective in my
reporting. Once we were stuck at the border, there was a flurry of
frantic phone calls well into the wee hours to try and broker my entry.
CD: That said, given the problems with physical access, did you
encounter any problems making contact with sources? Were you prevented
from speaking with any people you wanted to interview?
ST: Not at all. I had a guide/translator supplied from the news agency
RIA Novosti, but it was his first visit into the area as well. We
were allowed to go everywhere on our own, and we spent hours eating,
and drinking, with the locals.
Background: Little-known Ossetia
CD: As we all know, the Caucasus is both a complex and strategic
region, though one relatively ignored and misunderstood by the
Western media. When the Georgian offensive in South Ossetia began on
August 7, just as the Beijing Olympics were beginning, it seemed to
me that there was this momentary confusion or inability to pinpoint
this conflict, as reflected in the ambivalence of early reports -
though the official State Department line about Russian aggression
and Georgian victimhood soon settled down comfortably enough in the
media. So do you think there was some lack of a precedent or prototype
for packaging this conflict, and that this accounted for this media
ambivalence to some extent?
ST: Indeed. The Western media doesn't have much of an "institutional
memory" when it comes to these obscure conflict regions in the
Caucasus. Nevertheless, since 1989, ethnic Ossetians and Georgians have
fought on four separate occasions for control of this tiny region,
only about 75 kilometers in length. Ossetians are, like Russians
and Georgians, Orthodox Christians, though they ultimately descend
from the now-vanished nation of the Alans, prominent in the medieval
period. They consider themselves closer to the Russian side than the
Georgian. There are about 25,000 ethnic Ossetians in South Ossetia now,
down from a total of 70,000 in 1989.
When the USSR was falling apart and Moscow's control over
its hinterlands dissipated, between 1989 and 1991, the three
Caucasus republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia all sought
independence. Yet as with Tito's Yugoslavia, the Soviet administrative
boundaries did not correspond precisely with the ethnic ones. Ossetia
ended up divided between the newly independent Georgia and the Russian
Federation. And this led to a violent dispute over territory, with
widespread atrocities and ethnic cleansing resulting.
CD: This is the story that's been told selectively about the former
Yugoslavia, of course.
ST: Well, yes, but for the Western media, the recent wars in the
Caucasus hardly register. From 1992-1994, the entire region became
engulfed in near-simultaneous local conflicts that made the Balkan
wars then going on seem almost simplistic in comparison. Nevertheless,
the latter held the attention of the West - despite that the casualties
and sheer destruction in the Caucasus were relatively greater.
Saakashvili's Fateful Gambit
CD: The Georgian offensive was unleashed in August, but must have
been planned in advance. Is there any evidence in your view for this
offensive being somewhat of a flamboyant reaction to the April NATO
Summit, on the part of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili?
ST: America has steadily been increasing its influence over the past
few years in the Caucasus. There's no question that American-educated
Georgian President Saakashvili, installed following the 2004 "Rose
Revolution," has been keen on maximizing the benefits of that
relationship.
At last April's NATO summit in Bucharest, the US and Canada forwarded
a motion by which Georgia and Ukraine, both bordering on Russia,
would be invited to join the alliance as full members. European
nations killed the initiative, however, prudently realizing it would
antagonize the Russians.
Since Saakashvili seemed assured of US support, he apparently felt
he could count on American backing when he sought to reconquer South
Ossetia; if it worked, the other Russian-leaning breakaway region,
Abkhazia, would possibly be next. Both were administratively autonomous
in Soviet times, and have violently resisted Georgian control since
1992. However, this gamble proved to be incorrect - even the hawkish
Bush administration was not willing to risk a world war with Russia
for the sake of a tiny patch of contested Georgian territory.
CD: Did you get any sense from any of your interviews as to whether
Saakashvili's misjudgment owed to either his own incapability, or
rather being misinformed by outside parties? If the latter, are there
any opinions as to who and why being floated?
ST: Everybody on both sides of the conflict line - in fact in the
entire region - questioned the sanity of Saakashvili. However there is
a general consensus that he was essentially a puppet of the US State
Department, and that his military offensive was a test of Russian
resolve. It is now clear to everybody that the Russian Federation
has drawn a line in the sand, and they are prepared to forcefully
respond to any challenge.
CD: I have been following the US-Georgian military training issue
for the last 7 years. There's no question that the Georgian army
has benefited tremendously from that troops training and especially
American military hardware. Did you find any hard evidence of how
the American training and provisions affected the Georgian fighting
strategies, capacities or execution?
ST: Given the fact that the Georgians collapsed into a panicked mob
almost as soon as the Russians appeared, I would say that the US
training was woefully inept. The equipment used by both the Russians
and Georgians is essentially from the same arsenal, so the difference
in this battle was the leadership and experience of the troops. In
fact, even though they possessed a tremendous numerical superiority
over the South Ossetians, the Georgian tanks were taking a pounding in
the militia's hit-and-run attacks in the narrow streets of Tskhinvali.
Combat damage and arson in the center of Tskhinvali
The Invasion Revisited
CD: During your trip, were you able to reconstruct anything about
the early days of the Georgian offensive, and what really happened?
ST: Very little has been reported about the initial Georgian attack;
investigating this was the primary focus of my research. When the
Georgian tanks rolled in, there were no independent monitors in South
Ossetia. Initial media reports were sketchy and confused. Ossetian
officials told me that they knew an attack was feared around August 1,
when the Georgian military began massing armored formations along the
border. The small South Ossetian militia was mobilized, and Tskhinvali
hospital added supplies.
However, President Saakashvili went on the radio on the evening of
August 7, assuring citizens that no attack was coming. Nevertheless,
only a few hours later, the Georgians unleashed a sneak attack -
a barrage of Grom missiles that destroyed the Russian peacekeeping
force's building, killing 150 personnel.
CD: Certainly the Georgians would have known that Russia would
understand this as a declaration of war? How did they follow on this
act of genius?
ST: The Georgian military entered the city with T-72 tanks, in the
process putting down token resistance by the Ossetians. More troops
were deployed to sweep up the outlying villages, and then they took
the ridgeline north of the city. From this vantage point the Georgians
targeted fleeing Ossetian civilians, and were able to provide fire
support for their troops in Tskhinvali. Soon after, ethnic Georgian
villagers north of the city, along the road into Russia, attacked
these Ossetians trying to escape.
However, the Georgian military did fail to blow up a key bridge on the
main road, and did not even try to block the vital seven-kilometer
tunnel linking South Ossetia to Russia. Ossetian commanders told me
that if the Georgians had sealed the tunnel, it would have prevented
Russian reinforcements from arriving and guaranteed a Georgian
victory. And they were never able to completely secure Tskhinvali
itself, as the local militia used its superior knowledge of urban
surroundings to confuse the Georgians.
CD: That's a strange detail, about the tunnel. Did anyone give
you an explanation as to why the Georgians did not try to bomb or
close it? Could this be one of the "mistakes" President Saakashvili
was referring to when he announced the firing of the country's top
military commander recently?
ST: Everyone I spoke to, from top commanders to the waitress in
the café was puzzled by the failure of the Georgians to target the
tunnel. And every Ossetian knew that if they had sealed that entry
port, Georgian victory would have been inevitable.
Russian Barracks hit by Grom missiles on the night of August 7
Victims of War
CD: During the fighting, what were the conditions like in the
city? What kind of civilian casualties were incurred?
ST: Numbers are not exact, though it is clear that casualties mounted
quickly - not helped by the fact that the Georgian army kept shelling
the city hospital. I spoke with the head Ossetian surgeon there,
Dr. Nikolai Zagoyev, who told me how he and his staff had to move
the operating room into the basement, where they performed hundreds
of operations, by candlelight, during the first 72 hours.
The basement shelter in the hospital where surgeons performed 700
operations by candlelight
In fact, some 25 of these medics fell victim to the attack. The very
poor conditions and lack of blood supplies meant that doctors had to
donate their own blood to patients before performing surgery. Since
they lacked time even to test for blood types, Dr. Zagoyev told me
it was "a miracle" that so many of his patients actually survived.
CD: Incredible. We also heard reports of civilians attacking other
civilians, is this correct?
ST: Yes, first the ethnic Georgian villagers in South Ossetia targeted
their Ossetian neighbors, after the Georgian army had entered - but
later, after the Russians arrived, many local Georgians fled along
with their army, as the furious Ossetians targeted their erstwhile
persecutors. It was all too typical of such a situation.
CD: Tell us more about the Russian involvement - when it began,
and whether they were in fact the "aggressors" in this instance,
as the Bush administration would have us believe?
ST: On the morning of August 10, Russian armored units, supported
by helicopter gunships, poured in through the tunnel connecting
Tskhinvali with North Ossetia. Simultaneously, Russian troops also
entered Abkhazia, on the Black Sea coast, to forestall any similar
Georgian military adventures. The Georgian soldiers put up only a
minimal fight against the Russians, and quickly withdrew. It was a
moment of total humiliation for Saakashvili, though the result was
not hard to predict.
All in all, the Russian forces drove the Georgian army more than 20
kilometers back into Georgia proper, an alarming turn of events for
the West. And then the State Department and its allies began voicing
support for President Saakashvili, and criticizing the so-called
"Russian aggression."
CD: What does the near future hold for civilians in the affected
parts of Georgia and South Ossetia, in your view?
ST: Well, a massive Russian-sponsored reconstruction program has begun,
but it has a long way to go. Winter is coming, utilities have yet to
be restored, infrastructure is devastated and outside of Tskhinvali
there are very few habitable buildings remaining. Despite the Russian
government's hopes for the Ossetians to remain in their homes, it
was clear that people were seeking to relocate north to Russia as
soon as they could do so.
Georgian tanks destroyed during their retreat out of South Ossetia
CD: Following the August crisis, Russia recognized the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia - clear retaliation for the Western-backed
independence of Kosovo, which Russia had opposed. Did people you
spoke with articulate this relationship?
ST: It certainly came up in conversation. However it is one of those
conundrums wherein traditional allies find themselves on opposite sides
of this equation. For instance, Russia is one of Serbia's strongest
supporters in denying Kosovo independent status. However much Serbia
would want to recognize South Ossetia's declaration of independence,
they cannot do so without undermining their own claim over Kosovo. It
is the same for the Azeris, who one would think would be supportive
of their fellow Muslims in Kosovo, but they refuse to recognize it
as independent for fear of weakening their own claim to the region
of Nagorno-Karabakh.
CD: Scott, speaking of the Azeris, you reported last year from
Azerbaijan, and noted that booming oil wealth there has been reflected
in major increases in military spending - with possible room for
application in attempting to retake Nagorno-Karabakh. What is the story
now? Did you get any information on whether a new conflict is looming?
ST: What was very interesting is that I was told Russian military
intelligence actually expected the Azeris to attack Nagorno-Karabakh,
before any move by Georgia against South Ossetia. However once Russia
demonstrated their willingness to intervene militarily, the Azeris
realized that retaking Nagorno Karabakh by force is no longer a
viable option.
CD: On the other hand, Russia has now come forward with an initiative
to help broker peace between the Armenians and Azeris. Obviously such a
move, if it succeeded, would help the Russians refute the 'aggressors'
image cast on them by the West. Did you hear anything about this?
ST: This was something I found out about while I was still in
Turkey. Of course Ankara has a strong position in all of this as well,
and the first movements were made when President Abdullah Gul visited
Yerevan last September. This was ostensibly to watch a football match,
but it clearly marked a dramatic shift in relations between Armenia
and Turkey. I was advised by a senior diplomatic source that President
Medvedev would be holding a summit meeting shortly after Ilham Aliyev
got reelected in Azerbaijan.
Those South Ossetians who remain, live among the battle damage
CD: What is the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, from an on the ground
point of view? Do people believe a conflict is coming, or do they
generally go about their daily lives and have normal services?
ST: Many Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh are real hard-liners. You
do not refer to the captured regions as 'occupied,' they insist
on calling them 'liberated,' even though that liberation involved
the expulsion of more than one million Azeris from their homes. In
the seven occupied provinces, the abandoned villages are completely
destroyed, and this entire territory is like a giant, empty, military
buffer zone around Nagorno-Karabakh proper.
This is referred to as the Security Zone by the locals, and they have
vowed to never return it to the Azeris. For the Armenians living in
Nagorno-Karabakh, it is indeed business as usual. There has been
a tremendous amount of money pumped in through donations from the
Diaspora, which has created a sort of false economy. However, they
offer cash incentives for couples to marry, and even larger cash
bonuses for these newlyweds to create offspring. So basically there
is a major effort underway to create babies.
CD: Armenia represents Nagorno-Karabakh's interests at the diplomatic
discussion tables. Are the interests of Yerevan always in lockstep
with Stepanakert's?
ST: That is a great question, and of course the answer is no. Yerevan
has its own interests, and is anxious to begin normalizing relations
with both Ankara and Baku. At present, landlocked Armenia has only
two unclosed borders - with Georgia and Iran.
After the crisis between Russia and Georgia last August, Armenia's
close ties and dependency on Russia served to illustrate just how
isolated they are in the region. It is estimated that financially
Armenia suffered the biggest setback in the wake of that five-day
war. All in all, this is a very complex and dangerous powder keg. The
Caucasus is like ten gangsters in an elevator each holding a gun to
someone else's head. All it will take is for one to sneeze to set off
a violent chain reaction. On August 7th President Saakashvili started
to sneeze, but the Russians quickly put a finger under his nose.
CD: Scott, many thanks for your time, and hope to hear more from
exclusive info from you again soon on the Caucasus.
ST: Thank you, Chris.
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