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THE SUFFERINGS OF THE OPPOSITION'S DEFEATISM
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
07 Nov 08
Armenia
After L. Ter-Petrosyan's recent interview on the Moscow Declaration
signed by the Armenian, Azeri and Russian Presidents, a strange
liveliness is being observed in the pro-opposition camp.
Conducting meetings, discussions and interviews, different
representatives of the leader of the Armenian National Congress advance
three fundamental theses standing in stark contrast to one another.
1. They claim that the "final stage of the NKR conflict settlement"
is close; it is inevitable and irrefutable. And they support their
argument by L. Ter-Petrosyan's prediction that the United States will
"very probably" achieve the solution of the issue in December.
2. The Moscow Declaration is being subjected to harsh criticism.
"Embellishing" the theses proposed by L. Ter-Petrosyan in his recent
interview, his allies are searching in the Declaration the non-existent
"traces" of the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and other anti-Armenian
documents concerning the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
3. They advance the thesis on the necessity of signing the document
which is allegedly going to be imposed on us by the superpowers.
After reiterating the above mentioned, the National Congress arrives
at the following false conclusions.
1. There is no possibility for delaying the discussion of the issue
since Russia, the European Union and the United States, which are
in fierce rivalry with one another in the South Caucasus, are making
haste to impose upon the parties the settlement principles introduced
in Madrid on November 29, 2007.
At this point, there is one factor that is being ignored. The given
principles also imply the deployment of international peacekeeping
forces in the Karabakh conflict zone. And this is equivalent to the
establishment of political-military control in the entire territory of
Transcaucasus. The following question comes up: if the mediators are
having an acute and unyielding rivalry over the issue of determining
the role of the superpower in the region rather than clarifying the
principles of the settlement, to what extent is it proper to rule out
the possibility of delaying the solution of the issue and who is it
advantageous to?
Moreover, if the struggle of the superpowers bears such an acute and
unyielding character, maybe this should drive us to the conclusion
that there is "no possibility for not delaying the settlement"?
1. We lose the game. That's to say, they impose on us a document
which contradicts the interests of the Armenian people.
Let's imagine for a moment that it's really true. What goal,
in that case, will the consolidation of the pro-opposition forces
(the so-called Armenian National Congress) pursue? Such goal seemed
to consist in arousing anxiety among the Armenian people, raising
the spirit of their resistibility, ruling out the possibilities of
defeat and forming national consensus that would enable us to resist
the possible pressures. Whereas such pessimistic assessments are
followed by a defeatist conclusion.
2. Adopting an obviously defeatist attitude, the radicals are convinced
that "there is no alternative to solving the problem".
That's to say, persisting in their statements that the game is lost,
and the anti-Armenian solution of the problem cannot be delayed,
they simultaneously insist that it is necessary to put up with those
realities.
Vahan Papazyan, who was a Foreign Minister during the tenure of L.
Ter-Petrosyan, also tried to support the same idea in an interview
entitled "Whose Self-Determination is Being Discussed?" "In comparison
with other documents, I see that Armenia has considerably weakened
its positions. We have made more concessions now than we did 10 years
ago," the Ex-Foreign Ministers says. Mr. Papazyan also adds that
"It's better to have some document than not to have anything at all."
That's to say, the settlement rather than its content is deemed
important.
Let's now compare the entire chain of such strange questions with the
theses proposed by Armenian President Serge Sargsyan in an interview
to the French "Le Monde" newspaper (the interview was given in Paris
on the same day).
a) Armenia is ready not to hamper the process of the negotiations;
however, it is not ready to make considerable concessions.
b) Armenia's attitude continues to be based upon the three principles:
the NKR's right to self-determination, a land border with the Republic
of Armenia and international guarantees for security.
c) The Moscow Declaration is not a clearly defined plan; however,
it reiterates the necessity of a "political solution" (i.e. ruling
out the possibility of war) and an "international guarantee"
(i.e. ensuring security).
Thus, it is obvious that the official Yerevan does not agree to any of
the three theses proposed by the defeatist pro-opposition activists,
so admitting the necessity of proceeding with the Karabakh settlement
talks, it at the same time refuses to make any concessions with regard
to any of the fundamental issues.
So, what's the reason that L. Ter-Petrosyan and his co-thinkers arouse
so much panic and disseminate unfounded malicious joy? They realize
that in case the authorities, the people and the whole statehood
suffer a failure in the Karabakh settlement process, they will have
the opportunity of re-raffling the game lost in the February 2008
presidential campaign.
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
07 Nov 08
Armenia
After L. Ter-Petrosyan's recent interview on the Moscow Declaration
signed by the Armenian, Azeri and Russian Presidents, a strange
liveliness is being observed in the pro-opposition camp.
Conducting meetings, discussions and interviews, different
representatives of the leader of the Armenian National Congress advance
three fundamental theses standing in stark contrast to one another.
1. They claim that the "final stage of the NKR conflict settlement"
is close; it is inevitable and irrefutable. And they support their
argument by L. Ter-Petrosyan's prediction that the United States will
"very probably" achieve the solution of the issue in December.
2. The Moscow Declaration is being subjected to harsh criticism.
"Embellishing" the theses proposed by L. Ter-Petrosyan in his recent
interview, his allies are searching in the Declaration the non-existent
"traces" of the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and other anti-Armenian
documents concerning the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
3. They advance the thesis on the necessity of signing the document
which is allegedly going to be imposed on us by the superpowers.
After reiterating the above mentioned, the National Congress arrives
at the following false conclusions.
1. There is no possibility for delaying the discussion of the issue
since Russia, the European Union and the United States, which are
in fierce rivalry with one another in the South Caucasus, are making
haste to impose upon the parties the settlement principles introduced
in Madrid on November 29, 2007.
At this point, there is one factor that is being ignored. The given
principles also imply the deployment of international peacekeeping
forces in the Karabakh conflict zone. And this is equivalent to the
establishment of political-military control in the entire territory of
Transcaucasus. The following question comes up: if the mediators are
having an acute and unyielding rivalry over the issue of determining
the role of the superpower in the region rather than clarifying the
principles of the settlement, to what extent is it proper to rule out
the possibility of delaying the solution of the issue and who is it
advantageous to?
Moreover, if the struggle of the superpowers bears such an acute and
unyielding character, maybe this should drive us to the conclusion
that there is "no possibility for not delaying the settlement"?
1. We lose the game. That's to say, they impose on us a document
which contradicts the interests of the Armenian people.
Let's imagine for a moment that it's really true. What goal,
in that case, will the consolidation of the pro-opposition forces
(the so-called Armenian National Congress) pursue? Such goal seemed
to consist in arousing anxiety among the Armenian people, raising
the spirit of their resistibility, ruling out the possibilities of
defeat and forming national consensus that would enable us to resist
the possible pressures. Whereas such pessimistic assessments are
followed by a defeatist conclusion.
2. Adopting an obviously defeatist attitude, the radicals are convinced
that "there is no alternative to solving the problem".
That's to say, persisting in their statements that the game is lost,
and the anti-Armenian solution of the problem cannot be delayed,
they simultaneously insist that it is necessary to put up with those
realities.
Vahan Papazyan, who was a Foreign Minister during the tenure of L.
Ter-Petrosyan, also tried to support the same idea in an interview
entitled "Whose Self-Determination is Being Discussed?" "In comparison
with other documents, I see that Armenia has considerably weakened
its positions. We have made more concessions now than we did 10 years
ago," the Ex-Foreign Ministers says. Mr. Papazyan also adds that
"It's better to have some document than not to have anything at all."
That's to say, the settlement rather than its content is deemed
important.
Let's now compare the entire chain of such strange questions with the
theses proposed by Armenian President Serge Sargsyan in an interview
to the French "Le Monde" newspaper (the interview was given in Paris
on the same day).
a) Armenia is ready not to hamper the process of the negotiations;
however, it is not ready to make considerable concessions.
b) Armenia's attitude continues to be based upon the three principles:
the NKR's right to self-determination, a land border with the Republic
of Armenia and international guarantees for security.
c) The Moscow Declaration is not a clearly defined plan; however,
it reiterates the necessity of a "political solution" (i.e. ruling
out the possibility of war) and an "international guarantee"
(i.e. ensuring security).
Thus, it is obvious that the official Yerevan does not agree to any of
the three theses proposed by the defeatist pro-opposition activists,
so admitting the necessity of proceeding with the Karabakh settlement
talks, it at the same time refuses to make any concessions with regard
to any of the fundamental issues.
So, what's the reason that L. Ter-Petrosyan and his co-thinkers arouse
so much panic and disseminate unfounded malicious joy? They realize
that in case the authorities, the people and the whole statehood
suffer a failure in the Karabakh settlement process, they will have
the opportunity of re-raffling the game lost in the February 2008
presidential campaign.