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STABILITY IN THE CAUCASUS AFTER THE "5-DAY WAR": RUSSIA, IRAN AND TURKEY
Andrei Areshev
en.fondsk.ru
11.11.2008
The article was written based on the "round table" session "New
Architecture of Security in the Southern Caucasus after August 8,
2008 (Ankara, October 31, 2008).
Despite the halting of hostilities around South Ossetia, the
situation in South Caucasus remains explosive and fraught with
further aggravation.
Eu's involvement in the conflict in the Caucasus and the conclusion
of the "Medvedev - Sarkozy plan" helped solve a number of short-term
problems but that of creation of mechanisms to prevent hostilities
from being renewed in future, remains.
There is more and more ground to support the growing impression that
Europeans view the "Medvedev - Sarkozy plan" as a tool to reinstall the
status quo that existed before August 8, 2008. This approach is totally
wrong given that it does not take into account the new geopolitical
configuration that was shaped after August hostilities were stopped,
especially so after Russia's recognition of independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
The withdrawal of Russian peace-keeping force and the beginning of
activities of EU observers coincided with the growth of sabotage in the
"buffer zones." But this coincidence is hardly a chance one. Current
EU activities are chiefly targeted at curtailing Russia's role as
a peace-keeper, objectively bringing about de-conservation of the
conflict.
If the proposals made by the Russian Federation in regard of Georgia's
demilitarization and putting a cap on its military potential are
blocked (or not heard) Moscow will get a clear unambiguous signal
that it would not take too long before hostilities are renewed.
Based on the experience gained in 2004 and 2008, Russia would hardly
wait for a third attack on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Now that
both republics and Russia are bound by relevant agreements including
defence preconditioning direct involvement of Russian armed forces
in operations needed to protect their independence, responding to
aggression, etc.
Russia's strategy of ensuring its security on its southern borders
envisages identification of potential threats. These may include
independent states or their blocs and other entities of international
law acting as a tool for securing interests of outer forces. Methods
of countering such threats Moscow will use will primarily lean on
international law and the national law of the Russian Federation
(the normative law base could be Russia's Federal laws "On Countering
Terror",, "On the Federal Security Service", etc.)
------------------------------------------- ------------------------------
-------
The practice of relying on national jurisdiction at the territory
of a foreign state for the forced withdrawal from the territory of
such a state of terrorists based there and carrying out different
operations has of late begun to be wide-spread and is based by the
use of law on the right of individual or collective self-defence in
line with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The United States, Israel, Turkey, Peru and a number of other states
has been resorted to for the destruction of terrorists and their
bases on the territory of foreign states (as a prevention and/or
retaliation measure) as well as a means of execution of in absentia
court sentences.
-------------------------------------- -----------------------------------
-------
In conditions of the absence of efficient dialogue on the issues
of regional security with the EU and especially the United States,
installing of an efficient collective security system capable of
responding to new crises and of timely prevention of their development
is becoming more and more important. Such a system can hardly be built
"from scratch." Many times over Russian leaders spoke about crises
and ineffective activities of the UN, OSCE and so forth, suggesting
that equal dialogue begins. Until now it has not begun.
Local and regional levels are getting more and more important when
responses to the new challenges are in question. In the conditions
of growing deficit of trust coordinated moves of the leading regional
powers are especially needed based on the highest degree of trust and
confidence in the predictability of partners' moves in the event of
a critical situation.
An ongoing dialogue is currently maintained between Russia and Turkey,
whose quality is presupposed by the volumes of trade and economic
cooperation and ties in the areas of science, culture, education,
etc. Major milestones of this dialogue are Russian president's visit
to Ankara in December of 2004 and the return visit paid by Turkey's
president to Russia in June of 2006. There were also other meetings
at different levels that had the character of bilateral consultations
on a wide range of issues. A regular visit of Turkish president A.Gyul
to Moscow is slated for December of 2008.
As for the economic cooperation Turkey imports 70% of natural gas it
consumes from Russia.
Moves undertaken by Russia and Turkey could not fail to be mutually
conditioned. The wish to achieve their strategic goals without
launching military conflicts objectively brings the approaches of
both countries together. Turkey keeps its status of a member of NATO,
the military and political bloc that the United States regards as
its basic tool of "containment" of Russia, and as often as not, as
the one to be used in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. It is
not easy to be engaged in a dialogue with both Moscow and Washington
at one and the same time.
Turkey is involved in many regional peace initiatives. "The 5-Day
War" in the Caucasus indicated the vulnerability of the schemes
oriented at forced solution of problems of the past and the block
standoff. Aside from that, Georgia's transit role as a key element of
"the Caspian-Caucasian communication corridor" is now doubted, thus
directly affecting the interests of Turkey that positions itself as
a transit link for Central Asian and Caucasian energy resources en
route to Europe.
As early as August 10, 2008 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov spoke over the telephone with his Turkish counterpart
A. Babadjan. Several days later Turkish prime minister made a blitz
visit to Moscow when the initiative of establishing in the Caucasus of
"a security platform".
The initiative was highly appreciated by the Russian leadership1.
On the whole, previously Turkey was satisfied with the status quo in
the Caucasus, but when the situation changed, against the background
of the positive dynamics of its relations with Russia Turkey makes
steps aimed at finding new ways and formats of solving its present-day
problems.
Debates on the essence of "The Platform" are already underway, but it
still needs to be made an efficient tool of regional politics. First
and foremost, the line-up of the participants of the Platform should
be clarified, which is impossible without a clear delineation of the
geographic borders of the region in want of new security architecture.
Concepts of global security schemes (for example within the framework
of the Euro-Atlantic region) appear to be remote from reality. Any
global blueprints suggest a very high level of integration of
interests and trust among its parties. Can it be said, for example,
having in mind the present-day level of political dialogue between
Russia and the EU, or Russia and the United States? At the same time
the interests of Russia and Turkey, Russia and Iran are to a great
degree interrelated. Obligations of an ally can only be assumed by
the country aware that an aggression against its ally can be fraught
with catastrophic consequences for itself.
To continue, no Caucasian state (irrespective of its status of a
recognised or unrecognised state) should not feel deprived where its
security is concerned. Linking the South Caucasus to "the European
space" is in many respects artificial, as the EU does not see
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as its members in the near future,
whereas EU activities in the Caucasus appear to be too ambiguous
experiments. Russia is rather more than less a Caucasian country than
Turkey, to say nothing of European states.
The Turkish initiative of creating "the security platform" in the
Caucasus has good chances to be implemented thanks to good complex work
done by Turkish diplomacy (in recent months we witnessed considerable
improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations , not being the only
example). But still there are problems that need to be addressed again.
First. Turkish diplomats emphasised that their country's initiative
embraced only the OSCE member states. But without Iran Russia's
and Turkey's attempts to maintain stability in the Caucasus would
definitely be incomplete. The rapprochement of Russia and Iran is a
stabilising factor that can stipulate a more constructive position
of a number of EU member-states, diminishing their attempts to assist
US activities that cause destabilisation in the region.
There already are signs that many EU member states pursue their own
independent politics with regard to Teheran. Quite recently Germany
and Iran formed a working group to deal with the Caucasus. To e clued
Iran from the pending discussions of the outlines of the system of
collective security in the Caucasus would at least be irrational. To
take the lead of the US politics that aims at isolation of Iran can
reduce all good wishes to nil.
Second. The planned granting NATO membership to Georgia (with a
perspective of further deployment in that country of a number of
US Air Force and navy) as well as restoration of that republic's
military infrastructure would considerably hinder realisation of any
peace-making initiatives in the Caucasus as the standoff of blocs
would get a new impetus.
Russia would correspondingly respond to NATO's consolidation in the
Caucasus. Transformation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is
possible in the direction of a full-sized military and political union
with the adoption of more member-states (in particular Iran). The
best solution could be a complete embargo on arms supplies to
Georgia. Statements of some of NATO representatives instil hope2,
but more detailed information about that is needed.
Third. Any peace-making initiatives should be proposed taking into
account the fact of existence of independent Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Building a collective security system in this region
disregarding interests of unrecognised or semi-recognised states
would mean hindering the emergence of such a system if not making it
impossible at all.
Fourth. Writing about the new Turkish initiative some commentators show
the trend of interpreting it as a distinctively anti-Russian. Their
comments show "the security platform" in the Caucasus as an analogue
of the Stability Pact for the Balkans. Interpretations of the kind
can hardly satisfy Russia. The Balkans Stability Pact concluded in
1999 has failed to solve the many problems arising after the break-up
of Yugoslavia. (The West keeps solving these problems on account of
Serbia as well as the interests of major Russian companies in their
projects developed in the Balkans).
* * * It appears expedient to take the following steps in the current
situation:
- gradual movement towards a neutral status of all the states in the
Caucasian region;
- conclusion of legally binding agreements on non-use of force in
solving local conflicts;
- conclusion of a system of treaties and unions with the participation
of regional powers that are to minimize the possibility of a break-up
of large-scale war with the participation of outside players;
- devising projects to promote gradual economic integration of states
in the region;
- devising guarantees of non-stop functioning of the enacted
communications corridors with simultaneous optimisations of would-be
routes, as the decision about the creation of a prototype of " the
natural gas OPEC" with prospective intensification of cooperation
among Russia, Turkey and Iran in the area or energy3.
- reduction of military and political risks while implementing economic
projects; with demilitarisation of the region becoming really possible
as well as minimization of the military presence in the offshore area
of Caspian Sea anda number of other measures.
Guarantees against renewals of hostilities can be devised with the
hands-on participation of the regional states that are not interested
in the outbreak of hostilities in the region.
1 for example, Sergei Lavrov's interview to "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" ,
October 7, 2008.
2 James Appaturai's "NATO Does Not Intend to Suppoly Arms to Georgia"
http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=h ome&newsid=12650
3 "Memorandum of Intent" envisaging transport of Iranian and
Turkmenian gas to Europe via Turkey was signed in 2007; the "Blue
Stream" project is underway, etc.
Andrei Areshev
en.fondsk.ru
11.11.2008
The article was written based on the "round table" session "New
Architecture of Security in the Southern Caucasus after August 8,
2008 (Ankara, October 31, 2008).
Despite the halting of hostilities around South Ossetia, the
situation in South Caucasus remains explosive and fraught with
further aggravation.
Eu's involvement in the conflict in the Caucasus and the conclusion
of the "Medvedev - Sarkozy plan" helped solve a number of short-term
problems but that of creation of mechanisms to prevent hostilities
from being renewed in future, remains.
There is more and more ground to support the growing impression that
Europeans view the "Medvedev - Sarkozy plan" as a tool to reinstall the
status quo that existed before August 8, 2008. This approach is totally
wrong given that it does not take into account the new geopolitical
configuration that was shaped after August hostilities were stopped,
especially so after Russia's recognition of independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
The withdrawal of Russian peace-keeping force and the beginning of
activities of EU observers coincided with the growth of sabotage in the
"buffer zones." But this coincidence is hardly a chance one. Current
EU activities are chiefly targeted at curtailing Russia's role as
a peace-keeper, objectively bringing about de-conservation of the
conflict.
If the proposals made by the Russian Federation in regard of Georgia's
demilitarization and putting a cap on its military potential are
blocked (or not heard) Moscow will get a clear unambiguous signal
that it would not take too long before hostilities are renewed.
Based on the experience gained in 2004 and 2008, Russia would hardly
wait for a third attack on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Now that
both republics and Russia are bound by relevant agreements including
defence preconditioning direct involvement of Russian armed forces
in operations needed to protect their independence, responding to
aggression, etc.
Russia's strategy of ensuring its security on its southern borders
envisages identification of potential threats. These may include
independent states or their blocs and other entities of international
law acting as a tool for securing interests of outer forces. Methods
of countering such threats Moscow will use will primarily lean on
international law and the national law of the Russian Federation
(the normative law base could be Russia's Federal laws "On Countering
Terror",, "On the Federal Security Service", etc.)
------------------------------------------- ------------------------------
-------
The practice of relying on national jurisdiction at the territory
of a foreign state for the forced withdrawal from the territory of
such a state of terrorists based there and carrying out different
operations has of late begun to be wide-spread and is based by the
use of law on the right of individual or collective self-defence in
line with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The United States, Israel, Turkey, Peru and a number of other states
has been resorted to for the destruction of terrorists and their
bases on the territory of foreign states (as a prevention and/or
retaliation measure) as well as a means of execution of in absentia
court sentences.
-------------------------------------- -----------------------------------
-------
In conditions of the absence of efficient dialogue on the issues
of regional security with the EU and especially the United States,
installing of an efficient collective security system capable of
responding to new crises and of timely prevention of their development
is becoming more and more important. Such a system can hardly be built
"from scratch." Many times over Russian leaders spoke about crises
and ineffective activities of the UN, OSCE and so forth, suggesting
that equal dialogue begins. Until now it has not begun.
Local and regional levels are getting more and more important when
responses to the new challenges are in question. In the conditions
of growing deficit of trust coordinated moves of the leading regional
powers are especially needed based on the highest degree of trust and
confidence in the predictability of partners' moves in the event of
a critical situation.
An ongoing dialogue is currently maintained between Russia and Turkey,
whose quality is presupposed by the volumes of trade and economic
cooperation and ties in the areas of science, culture, education,
etc. Major milestones of this dialogue are Russian president's visit
to Ankara in December of 2004 and the return visit paid by Turkey's
president to Russia in June of 2006. There were also other meetings
at different levels that had the character of bilateral consultations
on a wide range of issues. A regular visit of Turkish president A.Gyul
to Moscow is slated for December of 2008.
As for the economic cooperation Turkey imports 70% of natural gas it
consumes from Russia.
Moves undertaken by Russia and Turkey could not fail to be mutually
conditioned. The wish to achieve their strategic goals without
launching military conflicts objectively brings the approaches of
both countries together. Turkey keeps its status of a member of NATO,
the military and political bloc that the United States regards as
its basic tool of "containment" of Russia, and as often as not, as
the one to be used in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. It is
not easy to be engaged in a dialogue with both Moscow and Washington
at one and the same time.
Turkey is involved in many regional peace initiatives. "The 5-Day
War" in the Caucasus indicated the vulnerability of the schemes
oriented at forced solution of problems of the past and the block
standoff. Aside from that, Georgia's transit role as a key element of
"the Caspian-Caucasian communication corridor" is now doubted, thus
directly affecting the interests of Turkey that positions itself as
a transit link for Central Asian and Caucasian energy resources en
route to Europe.
As early as August 10, 2008 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov spoke over the telephone with his Turkish counterpart
A. Babadjan. Several days later Turkish prime minister made a blitz
visit to Moscow when the initiative of establishing in the Caucasus of
"a security platform".
The initiative was highly appreciated by the Russian leadership1.
On the whole, previously Turkey was satisfied with the status quo in
the Caucasus, but when the situation changed, against the background
of the positive dynamics of its relations with Russia Turkey makes
steps aimed at finding new ways and formats of solving its present-day
problems.
Debates on the essence of "The Platform" are already underway, but it
still needs to be made an efficient tool of regional politics. First
and foremost, the line-up of the participants of the Platform should
be clarified, which is impossible without a clear delineation of the
geographic borders of the region in want of new security architecture.
Concepts of global security schemes (for example within the framework
of the Euro-Atlantic region) appear to be remote from reality. Any
global blueprints suggest a very high level of integration of
interests and trust among its parties. Can it be said, for example,
having in mind the present-day level of political dialogue between
Russia and the EU, or Russia and the United States? At the same time
the interests of Russia and Turkey, Russia and Iran are to a great
degree interrelated. Obligations of an ally can only be assumed by
the country aware that an aggression against its ally can be fraught
with catastrophic consequences for itself.
To continue, no Caucasian state (irrespective of its status of a
recognised or unrecognised state) should not feel deprived where its
security is concerned. Linking the South Caucasus to "the European
space" is in many respects artificial, as the EU does not see
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan as its members in the near future,
whereas EU activities in the Caucasus appear to be too ambiguous
experiments. Russia is rather more than less a Caucasian country than
Turkey, to say nothing of European states.
The Turkish initiative of creating "the security platform" in the
Caucasus has good chances to be implemented thanks to good complex work
done by Turkish diplomacy (in recent months we witnessed considerable
improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations , not being the only
example). But still there are problems that need to be addressed again.
First. Turkish diplomats emphasised that their country's initiative
embraced only the OSCE member states. But without Iran Russia's
and Turkey's attempts to maintain stability in the Caucasus would
definitely be incomplete. The rapprochement of Russia and Iran is a
stabilising factor that can stipulate a more constructive position
of a number of EU member-states, diminishing their attempts to assist
US activities that cause destabilisation in the region.
There already are signs that many EU member states pursue their own
independent politics with regard to Teheran. Quite recently Germany
and Iran formed a working group to deal with the Caucasus. To e clued
Iran from the pending discussions of the outlines of the system of
collective security in the Caucasus would at least be irrational. To
take the lead of the US politics that aims at isolation of Iran can
reduce all good wishes to nil.
Second. The planned granting NATO membership to Georgia (with a
perspective of further deployment in that country of a number of
US Air Force and navy) as well as restoration of that republic's
military infrastructure would considerably hinder realisation of any
peace-making initiatives in the Caucasus as the standoff of blocs
would get a new impetus.
Russia would correspondingly respond to NATO's consolidation in the
Caucasus. Transformation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is
possible in the direction of a full-sized military and political union
with the adoption of more member-states (in particular Iran). The
best solution could be a complete embargo on arms supplies to
Georgia. Statements of some of NATO representatives instil hope2,
but more detailed information about that is needed.
Third. Any peace-making initiatives should be proposed taking into
account the fact of existence of independent Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Building a collective security system in this region
disregarding interests of unrecognised or semi-recognised states
would mean hindering the emergence of such a system if not making it
impossible at all.
Fourth. Writing about the new Turkish initiative some commentators show
the trend of interpreting it as a distinctively anti-Russian. Their
comments show "the security platform" in the Caucasus as an analogue
of the Stability Pact for the Balkans. Interpretations of the kind
can hardly satisfy Russia. The Balkans Stability Pact concluded in
1999 has failed to solve the many problems arising after the break-up
of Yugoslavia. (The West keeps solving these problems on account of
Serbia as well as the interests of major Russian companies in their
projects developed in the Balkans).
* * * It appears expedient to take the following steps in the current
situation:
- gradual movement towards a neutral status of all the states in the
Caucasian region;
- conclusion of legally binding agreements on non-use of force in
solving local conflicts;
- conclusion of a system of treaties and unions with the participation
of regional powers that are to minimize the possibility of a break-up
of large-scale war with the participation of outside players;
- devising projects to promote gradual economic integration of states
in the region;
- devising guarantees of non-stop functioning of the enacted
communications corridors with simultaneous optimisations of would-be
routes, as the decision about the creation of a prototype of " the
natural gas OPEC" with prospective intensification of cooperation
among Russia, Turkey and Iran in the area or energy3.
- reduction of military and political risks while implementing economic
projects; with demilitarisation of the region becoming really possible
as well as minimization of the military presence in the offshore area
of Caspian Sea anda number of other measures.
Guarantees against renewals of hostilities can be devised with the
hands-on participation of the regional states that are not interested
in the outbreak of hostilities in the region.
1 for example, Sergei Lavrov's interview to "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" ,
October 7, 2008.
2 James Appaturai's "NATO Does Not Intend to Suppoly Arms to Georgia"
http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=h ome&newsid=12650
3 "Memorandum of Intent" envisaging transport of Iranian and
Turkmenian gas to Europe via Turkey was signed in 2007; the "Blue
Stream" project is underway, etc.