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TURKEY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Ragan Updegraff
Foreign Policy In Focus
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5660
Nov 11 2008
Turkey has long aligned itself with Western powers, dating back
to Ottoman participation in the Concert of Europe. It's currently
a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Many Turks view accession to the European Union (EU) as the
capstone to its longstanding ambition to be recognized as a modern
European power. Others in Turkey, however, are leery of EU-inspired
democratization schemes and wonder if admission is indeed worth the
cost of the ticket.
If the accession partnership between the EU and Turkey ultimately
falters, Turkey could well end adrift, isolated, and more sympathetic
toward Russia, Iran, and possibly China. Long the most eastward player
among Western powers, Turkey could well reposition itself as the most
western power among a loose bloc of Eastern players.
Turkey -- like Spain, Greece, and the Balkan states before it --
must democratize further to successfully emerge from accession
negotiations with a membership offer, but internal politics and
frustrated relations with Europe threaten to imperil the process. In
early November, the European Commission released its annual report
on Turkey's progress toward accession. The report criticizes the
slow pace of Turkish reforms and problems with their implementation,
while highlighting the lack of compromise and political dialogue
among Turkey's political parties.
When Turkey became an official candidate for membership at the Helsinki
summit in December 1999, an avalanche of reforms soon followed in
order to meet criteria required for accession talks to begin. Reform
continued unabated following the Justice and Development Party's (AKP)
landslide victory in the 2002 elections, and in October 2005, Turkey
officially commenced accession negotiations. Following the Helsinki
summit, however, the steam driving the reform revolution dissipated,
causing the accession process to sputter.
Although such reform fatigue is perhaps inevitable -- much like the
exhaustion that sets in after the first third of a marathon race --
the slow pace has seemed to take Turkey off the accession track and
imperil Turkey-EU relations. Growing resentment of European demands,
returning problems with Cyprus and the Kurds, and a revamped Turkish
nationalism have all contributed to muting the hopeful ebullience
of the early years of the reform process. While the AKP's recently
proposed third national program to accelerate accession is designed
to reignite the process, many within and outside the party still seem
largely ambivalent. Turkey's relations with Europe and the United
States -- and by extension Turkey's future as a stable democracy
allied with the West -- thus remain largely up in the air.
Significance of the Accession Process Turkey is lured by the prospects
of EU membership for both historical and economic reasons. Its
founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who modernized the country along
European lines, aspired to see it recognized as a European power. The
Europe that transfixed Ataturk is no longer an imperial collection
of states but rather a thriving economic market. But the pending
relationship between the EU and Turkey isn't simply economic. Amidst
the wreckage of World War II, Europe radically transformed itself
into a post-national union, with an overwhelming commitment to
participatory democratic institutions and the strongest human
rights regime in modern history. Through accession, aspiring member
countries must not only adopt EU political norms but, in doing so,
undergo political transformation parallel to that taken by Europe
after the Second World War. Thus, EU accession is as much a major
domestic process as it is a cementing of external relations.
As Turkey undertakes the reforms needed to meet criteria needed for
EU accession eligibility, its citizens face heady questions about the
direction in which to take their country. At one end of the spectrum
are Europhiles, who wish to see Turkey enter the EU and move closer
to international norms of human rights and democratic governance. At
the other end are Euroskeptics, who are less keen to see their country
make the sacrifices to sovereignty that EU membership requires. Most
Turks fall somewhere in between these two extremes. The Euroskeptics
oppose reforms they see as diminishing the state's police power in
dealing with ethnic and religious minorities, political dissenters,
and other elements that "threaten the solidarity" of the Turkish
nation-state. Euroskeptics are also leery of reducing the power of
the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the judiciary, both bastions of
the old elite. Whereas Europhile Turks largely support continued and
improved relations with Western powers, many Euroskeptics, sometimes
called Asianists, are starting to look to emerging powers in the East
with which to build future relations. Hurt feelings over a failed
accession process could push Turkey closer to these non-Western powers,
something that neither Europe nor the United States desires.
Building Positive Relations Yet some European leaders seem determined
to push Turkey further eastward. Both French President Nicolas Sarkozy
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have expressed support for a
"privileged partnership" for Turkey in lieu of full membership. From
similar arrangements the EU has made with other Mediterranean
countries, it is clear that such an offer would in no way carry
as much diplomatic leverage as full membership. At this point,
such second-class membership represents backtracking from earlier
European pledges.
Turkey-EU relations have been further soured by Turkey's failure to
abide by its commitment to open its ports to Cyprus. As a result, in
2006, the European Council suspended eight of the 35 policy chapters to
be successfully negotiated if Turkey is to become a member, and ruled
that no chapter can be closed until Turkey reverses its position on
Cyprus. Negotiations focus on the candidate's adoption, implementation,
and enforcement of EU policies. After unanimously closing a chapter,
the European Council decides that an acceding country's policies are
adequately in line with those of the EU. Only upon closure of all
35 chapters will a treaty be executed to finalize Turkey's accession
into the EU. So far only one chapter, science and technology, has been
closed. The EU's suspension of chapters has no effect in preventing
Turkey from moving forward with legislation, especially in those
policy areas where negotiations are expected to be difficult. However,
the suspension has deeply offended many Turks and remains a source
of political ill will on which Turkish politicians frequently harp.
In the meantime, EU politicians should remain positively consistent
in their positions on Turkish membership, assuring full accession
if it successfully meets the accession criteria. In recent months,
Europe's position on this point has improved. In June, the French
Senate rejected a law that would have required Turkish membership to be
submitted to referendum. Also, France's turn with the EU presidency has
resulted in the opening of two more chapters of EU policy -- company
law and intellectual property law -- and an expressed hope that two
more, information society and media and free movement of capital,
will be opened at the European Summit in December. France also created
goodwill in November, when its Senate struck down a bill to make it
illegal to deny claims of Armenian genocide. Much can also be said of
gestures like Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's
celebration of iftar -- the breaking of the Ramadan fast -- with
Turkish politicians in Istanbul this September. Another encouraging
factor in EU-Turkey relations is that Turkish attitudes toward Europe
seem to have improved following the attempt by anti-democratic forces
to close the AKP this past March. Right now, support for EU membership
is at its highest level since 2005.
Turkish politicians need to stay focused on the accession process
and eschew verbal confrontations with EU politicians. Sadly, this
is something neither Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan nor Foreign
Minister/EU Chief Negotiator Ali Babacan has succeeded in doing. At
a meeting of the EU troika in Brussels this past September, Erdogan
lambasted the EU for double standards and intimated that Turkish
membership was solely up to the Europeans. In fact, Turkey has much to
do if it is to meet the political and economic criteria for membership,
and such claims do little to assuage very real concerns in Europe about
Turkey's lackluster human rights regime. Many EU citizens are also
skeptical of the EU's already stretched economic capacity to absorb
less affluent member states, and a smaller group has reservations
about Turkey's Muslim identity.
While the xenophobia of the latter is difficult to address, Turkish
politicians can certainly do more to alleviate the concerns of
reluctant Europeans. To begin, Turkey could send a powerful message
to assuage reservations about its treatment of religious minorities by
re-opening the Halki Greek Orthodox seminary the state has kept closed
for some time. Both Greece and Cyprus would approve of such a simple
gesture. In Cyprus, Turkey should strengthen fledging alliances with
Greek Cypriots to build support for a bicommunal solution, as well
as look for and publicize foreign policy positions it shares with
Europe, such as criticism of ally Uzbekistan for the Andijan massacre
in 2004. Turkey would do well to work with Europe to devise mutually
beneficial energy solutions, in particular the construction of the
Nabucco pipeline, to supply Europe with natural gas from Central
Asia. The Nabucco pipeline is vital for European energy independence
from Russia. The Turkish government should also bolster support for
Europe within Turkey, highlighting the rewards of membership while
debunking baseless rumors about the costs of membership that have
ranged from mandates to remove images of Ataturk from public buildings
to outlawing the selling of kokorec (Turkish tripe) on the streets.
U.S. Interests in Turkey Turkey's AKP-led government, having survived
a recent court case attempting to close it down for anti-secular
activities, will be expected to move forward with its newly drafted
third national program. However, as the only political party in
power with a pro-EU position, the AKP has little incentive to push
for reforms with which it disagrees or put it at political risk. At
the moment, opposition political parties protest even the smallest,
most cosmetic of reforms, and too often the accession process is used
as a pawn in internal political gamesmanship.
The AKP, for its part, has lost the support of many liberal reformers
who have come to doubt its sincerity and/or competence in moving
Turkey toward liberal democracy and eventual EU membership. Thus,
implementation of the party's third national program will be a test
for the party, as well as the Turkish public, although significant
progress will not likely be made on the reform package until after
local elections in March 2009.
As Turkey struggles to position itself somewhere between Europhilia
and Euroskepticism, the United States must continue to support Turkish
accession into the EU. For its part, it should ignore neoconservative
efforts to undermine the AKP, meanwhile doing all it can to improve
its own relations with Turkey, mainly through encouraging dialogue
between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) The more
the Turkish government works directly with the KRG, the less likely
the United States will be caught in disputes between the two. Any
convergence of interests arrived at through talks between Turkey
and the KRG is to the benefit of the United States. Further welcome
is Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's recent praise of Turkey's
efforts to build a regional alliance in Central Asia, after a period
of initial resistance to the initiative resulting from its exclusion of
the United States and the EU. Turkey as an EU member would be valuably
cemented to the West, serving as an important bridge to Central Asia
as well as a potential peacemaking force in the Middle East.
Barack Obama's presidential win offers further opportunity to
strengthen relations with Turkey. As a function of his opposition
to the Iraq War and his message of "change," the president-elect
enjoys popularity in Turkey akin to the popularity with which former
President Bill Clinton was met on his visit following the 1999
earthquakes. Obama's promise to restore good relations with Turkey
is eagerly received by many Turks, though not without caveats. Many
Turks are leery of Obama's position on the Armenian massacres of 1915,
and his recognition of them as genocide would badly damage U.S.-Turkey
relations. Also feared are Vice President-Elect Joe Biden's previously
expressed plans for a tripartite division of Iraq, which Turkey
believes would empower the KRG and possibly foment calls for a united
and independent Kurdistan. However, if Obama treads carefully on the
Armenian issue, and supports a regional solution to terrorist efforts
of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), which involves Turkey and
the KRG as well as Baghdad, the next administration has a tremendous
possibility to rebuild relations that the Iraq War badly damaged.
Ragan Updegraff is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, a
freelance writer and observer of Turkish politics. You can find more
of his work in his blog, Turkish Politics in Action.
--Boundary_(ID_WsULQOYwsO7nyVDPelCLlA)--
Ragan Updegraff
Foreign Policy In Focus
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5660
Nov 11 2008
Turkey has long aligned itself with Western powers, dating back
to Ottoman participation in the Concert of Europe. It's currently
a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Many Turks view accession to the European Union (EU) as the
capstone to its longstanding ambition to be recognized as a modern
European power. Others in Turkey, however, are leery of EU-inspired
democratization schemes and wonder if admission is indeed worth the
cost of the ticket.
If the accession partnership between the EU and Turkey ultimately
falters, Turkey could well end adrift, isolated, and more sympathetic
toward Russia, Iran, and possibly China. Long the most eastward player
among Western powers, Turkey could well reposition itself as the most
western power among a loose bloc of Eastern players.
Turkey -- like Spain, Greece, and the Balkan states before it --
must democratize further to successfully emerge from accession
negotiations with a membership offer, but internal politics and
frustrated relations with Europe threaten to imperil the process. In
early November, the European Commission released its annual report
on Turkey's progress toward accession. The report criticizes the
slow pace of Turkish reforms and problems with their implementation,
while highlighting the lack of compromise and political dialogue
among Turkey's political parties.
When Turkey became an official candidate for membership at the Helsinki
summit in December 1999, an avalanche of reforms soon followed in
order to meet criteria required for accession talks to begin. Reform
continued unabated following the Justice and Development Party's (AKP)
landslide victory in the 2002 elections, and in October 2005, Turkey
officially commenced accession negotiations. Following the Helsinki
summit, however, the steam driving the reform revolution dissipated,
causing the accession process to sputter.
Although such reform fatigue is perhaps inevitable -- much like the
exhaustion that sets in after the first third of a marathon race --
the slow pace has seemed to take Turkey off the accession track and
imperil Turkey-EU relations. Growing resentment of European demands,
returning problems with Cyprus and the Kurds, and a revamped Turkish
nationalism have all contributed to muting the hopeful ebullience
of the early years of the reform process. While the AKP's recently
proposed third national program to accelerate accession is designed
to reignite the process, many within and outside the party still seem
largely ambivalent. Turkey's relations with Europe and the United
States -- and by extension Turkey's future as a stable democracy
allied with the West -- thus remain largely up in the air.
Significance of the Accession Process Turkey is lured by the prospects
of EU membership for both historical and economic reasons. Its
founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who modernized the country along
European lines, aspired to see it recognized as a European power. The
Europe that transfixed Ataturk is no longer an imperial collection
of states but rather a thriving economic market. But the pending
relationship between the EU and Turkey isn't simply economic. Amidst
the wreckage of World War II, Europe radically transformed itself
into a post-national union, with an overwhelming commitment to
participatory democratic institutions and the strongest human
rights regime in modern history. Through accession, aspiring member
countries must not only adopt EU political norms but, in doing so,
undergo political transformation parallel to that taken by Europe
after the Second World War. Thus, EU accession is as much a major
domestic process as it is a cementing of external relations.
As Turkey undertakes the reforms needed to meet criteria needed for
EU accession eligibility, its citizens face heady questions about the
direction in which to take their country. At one end of the spectrum
are Europhiles, who wish to see Turkey enter the EU and move closer
to international norms of human rights and democratic governance. At
the other end are Euroskeptics, who are less keen to see their country
make the sacrifices to sovereignty that EU membership requires. Most
Turks fall somewhere in between these two extremes. The Euroskeptics
oppose reforms they see as diminishing the state's police power in
dealing with ethnic and religious minorities, political dissenters,
and other elements that "threaten the solidarity" of the Turkish
nation-state. Euroskeptics are also leery of reducing the power of
the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the judiciary, both bastions of
the old elite. Whereas Europhile Turks largely support continued and
improved relations with Western powers, many Euroskeptics, sometimes
called Asianists, are starting to look to emerging powers in the East
with which to build future relations. Hurt feelings over a failed
accession process could push Turkey closer to these non-Western powers,
something that neither Europe nor the United States desires.
Building Positive Relations Yet some European leaders seem determined
to push Turkey further eastward. Both French President Nicolas Sarkozy
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have expressed support for a
"privileged partnership" for Turkey in lieu of full membership. From
similar arrangements the EU has made with other Mediterranean
countries, it is clear that such an offer would in no way carry
as much diplomatic leverage as full membership. At this point,
such second-class membership represents backtracking from earlier
European pledges.
Turkey-EU relations have been further soured by Turkey's failure to
abide by its commitment to open its ports to Cyprus. As a result, in
2006, the European Council suspended eight of the 35 policy chapters to
be successfully negotiated if Turkey is to become a member, and ruled
that no chapter can be closed until Turkey reverses its position on
Cyprus. Negotiations focus on the candidate's adoption, implementation,
and enforcement of EU policies. After unanimously closing a chapter,
the European Council decides that an acceding country's policies are
adequately in line with those of the EU. Only upon closure of all
35 chapters will a treaty be executed to finalize Turkey's accession
into the EU. So far only one chapter, science and technology, has been
closed. The EU's suspension of chapters has no effect in preventing
Turkey from moving forward with legislation, especially in those
policy areas where negotiations are expected to be difficult. However,
the suspension has deeply offended many Turks and remains a source
of political ill will on which Turkish politicians frequently harp.
In the meantime, EU politicians should remain positively consistent
in their positions on Turkish membership, assuring full accession
if it successfully meets the accession criteria. In recent months,
Europe's position on this point has improved. In June, the French
Senate rejected a law that would have required Turkish membership to be
submitted to referendum. Also, France's turn with the EU presidency has
resulted in the opening of two more chapters of EU policy -- company
law and intellectual property law -- and an expressed hope that two
more, information society and media and free movement of capital,
will be opened at the European Summit in December. France also created
goodwill in November, when its Senate struck down a bill to make it
illegal to deny claims of Armenian genocide. Much can also be said of
gestures like Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's
celebration of iftar -- the breaking of the Ramadan fast -- with
Turkish politicians in Istanbul this September. Another encouraging
factor in EU-Turkey relations is that Turkish attitudes toward Europe
seem to have improved following the attempt by anti-democratic forces
to close the AKP this past March. Right now, support for EU membership
is at its highest level since 2005.
Turkish politicians need to stay focused on the accession process
and eschew verbal confrontations with EU politicians. Sadly, this
is something neither Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan nor Foreign
Minister/EU Chief Negotiator Ali Babacan has succeeded in doing. At
a meeting of the EU troika in Brussels this past September, Erdogan
lambasted the EU for double standards and intimated that Turkish
membership was solely up to the Europeans. In fact, Turkey has much to
do if it is to meet the political and economic criteria for membership,
and such claims do little to assuage very real concerns in Europe about
Turkey's lackluster human rights regime. Many EU citizens are also
skeptical of the EU's already stretched economic capacity to absorb
less affluent member states, and a smaller group has reservations
about Turkey's Muslim identity.
While the xenophobia of the latter is difficult to address, Turkish
politicians can certainly do more to alleviate the concerns of
reluctant Europeans. To begin, Turkey could send a powerful message
to assuage reservations about its treatment of religious minorities by
re-opening the Halki Greek Orthodox seminary the state has kept closed
for some time. Both Greece and Cyprus would approve of such a simple
gesture. In Cyprus, Turkey should strengthen fledging alliances with
Greek Cypriots to build support for a bicommunal solution, as well
as look for and publicize foreign policy positions it shares with
Europe, such as criticism of ally Uzbekistan for the Andijan massacre
in 2004. Turkey would do well to work with Europe to devise mutually
beneficial energy solutions, in particular the construction of the
Nabucco pipeline, to supply Europe with natural gas from Central
Asia. The Nabucco pipeline is vital for European energy independence
from Russia. The Turkish government should also bolster support for
Europe within Turkey, highlighting the rewards of membership while
debunking baseless rumors about the costs of membership that have
ranged from mandates to remove images of Ataturk from public buildings
to outlawing the selling of kokorec (Turkish tripe) on the streets.
U.S. Interests in Turkey Turkey's AKP-led government, having survived
a recent court case attempting to close it down for anti-secular
activities, will be expected to move forward with its newly drafted
third national program. However, as the only political party in
power with a pro-EU position, the AKP has little incentive to push
for reforms with which it disagrees or put it at political risk. At
the moment, opposition political parties protest even the smallest,
most cosmetic of reforms, and too often the accession process is used
as a pawn in internal political gamesmanship.
The AKP, for its part, has lost the support of many liberal reformers
who have come to doubt its sincerity and/or competence in moving
Turkey toward liberal democracy and eventual EU membership. Thus,
implementation of the party's third national program will be a test
for the party, as well as the Turkish public, although significant
progress will not likely be made on the reform package until after
local elections in March 2009.
As Turkey struggles to position itself somewhere between Europhilia
and Euroskepticism, the United States must continue to support Turkish
accession into the EU. For its part, it should ignore neoconservative
efforts to undermine the AKP, meanwhile doing all it can to improve
its own relations with Turkey, mainly through encouraging dialogue
between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) The more
the Turkish government works directly with the KRG, the less likely
the United States will be caught in disputes between the two. Any
convergence of interests arrived at through talks between Turkey
and the KRG is to the benefit of the United States. Further welcome
is Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's recent praise of Turkey's
efforts to build a regional alliance in Central Asia, after a period
of initial resistance to the initiative resulting from its exclusion of
the United States and the EU. Turkey as an EU member would be valuably
cemented to the West, serving as an important bridge to Central Asia
as well as a potential peacemaking force in the Middle East.
Barack Obama's presidential win offers further opportunity to
strengthen relations with Turkey. As a function of his opposition
to the Iraq War and his message of "change," the president-elect
enjoys popularity in Turkey akin to the popularity with which former
President Bill Clinton was met on his visit following the 1999
earthquakes. Obama's promise to restore good relations with Turkey
is eagerly received by many Turks, though not without caveats. Many
Turks are leery of Obama's position on the Armenian massacres of 1915,
and his recognition of them as genocide would badly damage U.S.-Turkey
relations. Also feared are Vice President-Elect Joe Biden's previously
expressed plans for a tripartite division of Iraq, which Turkey
believes would empower the KRG and possibly foment calls for a united
and independent Kurdistan. However, if Obama treads carefully on the
Armenian issue, and supports a regional solution to terrorist efforts
of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), which involves Turkey and
the KRG as well as Baghdad, the next administration has a tremendous
possibility to rebuild relations that the Iraq War badly damaged.
Ragan Updegraff is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, a
freelance writer and observer of Turkish politics. You can find more
of his work in his blog, Turkish Politics in Action.
--Boundary_(ID_WsULQOYwsO7nyVDPelCLlA)--