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N.K.R. BREAKS THE SILENCE AT THE RIGHT MOMENT
Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
12 Nov 08
Armenia
The rapid processes observed in the Karabakh settlement process
following the signature of the Moscow Declaration make the issue of
the clarification of Nagorno Karabakh's political stance inevitable.
As shown by the one-year discussions over the Madrid Principles
(introduced by the mediators on November 29, 2007) and the fact of
achieving an agreement over them, even the signature of the document
cannot remove from the agenda the issue of Karabakh's participation
in the talks. It isn't as though the negotiations were devoted to
the discussion of such issues as the NKR status, the future of the
territories controlled by the Defense Army etc. Whereas the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic, which was recognized as a party to the talks back
in 1994 following the Budapest Summit, is deprived of the opportunity
of supporting its own stance on those issues.
So, the moment of Karabakh's making a choice between reinstating its
rights as a full party to the talks and having to declare that it
doesn't recognize their outcome is drawing near. In the latter case,
the efforts that the mediators, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan
have been making for so many years will fall flat.
Any document to be adopted without the participation of the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic will put an end to the aspirations of its own
people. So, as long as the negotiation process hasn't reached its
final stage, the Nagorno Karabakh Republic has no serious grounds
for being concerned. But not being a party to the Moscow Declaration,
it can no longer tolerate the existing situation.
But it isn't as though the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's participation in
the talks had existed at least since 1998, and every time its solution
was delayed due to the persistent efforts of Azerbaijan. So, are there
any chances that this time Baku will retreat from its previous stance
which distorted the essence and contents of the Karabakh conflict and
changed it into "territorial demands" allegedly imposed on Azerbaijan
by Armenia?
The whole problem is that after the signature of the Moscow
Declaration, each of the superpowers is attempting to speed up the
Karabakh settlement process, and the sharp conflict of their interests
again leads the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations to a deadlock. While
the mediators themselves are making haste, the new document may serve
as a ground for using the scenario that stands in stark contrast to
the "imposition of peace".
The first among them is the Western scenario that threatens to
make Karabakh a reservation controlled by the international forces,
thus securing the availability of the oil and gas of the neighboring
Azerbaijan and Middle Asia. Whereas the negotiations over the issue
of accelerating the NABUKKO program (conducted with Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan by EU Commissioner for Energy Issues Andris Piebalts)
have reached the crucial moment when Russia can no longer "twiddle its
thumbs". In conditions of the fall of the international oil prices,
the attempts of broadening the European gas market may undermine
Moscow's positions on the international energy market.
In such conditions, Moscow has but 2 scenarios. The first is the
implementation of the program "Gas in Return for Karabakh" (which
requires that Azerbaijan make self-sacrifice and become Turkey's
strategic ally) and the neutralization of the Armenian factor. However,
it's obvious that sacrificing the Armenian party in return for the
temporary neutralization of the NABUKKO program (already included in
the agenda by the European Union) will sooner or later oust Russia
from the "big game" and lead to the continuation of the previous
program with new efforts.
Therefore, there's only one scenario left. Its implementation
demands that Russia assume its traditional role of the defender of
the interests of Nagorno Karabakh (the main subject of the Karabakh
conflict) and hence, the guarantor of peace and stability in Eastern
Transcaucasia.
Thus, the rapid processes taking place in the region give Armenia
and the Armenian diplomacy a unique opportunity for advancing and
substantiating the issue of NKR's right to self-determination, because
both for Russia and the West, Karabakh is the only counter-balance
that may impede or contribute to the implementation of the programs
aimed at building a South Caucasian energy corridor.
Vardan Grigoryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
12 Nov 08
Armenia
The rapid processes observed in the Karabakh settlement process
following the signature of the Moscow Declaration make the issue of
the clarification of Nagorno Karabakh's political stance inevitable.
As shown by the one-year discussions over the Madrid Principles
(introduced by the mediators on November 29, 2007) and the fact of
achieving an agreement over them, even the signature of the document
cannot remove from the agenda the issue of Karabakh's participation
in the talks. It isn't as though the negotiations were devoted to
the discussion of such issues as the NKR status, the future of the
territories controlled by the Defense Army etc. Whereas the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic, which was recognized as a party to the talks back
in 1994 following the Budapest Summit, is deprived of the opportunity
of supporting its own stance on those issues.
So, the moment of Karabakh's making a choice between reinstating its
rights as a full party to the talks and having to declare that it
doesn't recognize their outcome is drawing near. In the latter case,
the efforts that the mediators, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan
have been making for so many years will fall flat.
Any document to be adopted without the participation of the Nagorno
Karabakh Republic will put an end to the aspirations of its own
people. So, as long as the negotiation process hasn't reached its
final stage, the Nagorno Karabakh Republic has no serious grounds
for being concerned. But not being a party to the Moscow Declaration,
it can no longer tolerate the existing situation.
But it isn't as though the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's participation in
the talks had existed at least since 1998, and every time its solution
was delayed due to the persistent efforts of Azerbaijan. So, are there
any chances that this time Baku will retreat from its previous stance
which distorted the essence and contents of the Karabakh conflict and
changed it into "territorial demands" allegedly imposed on Azerbaijan
by Armenia?
The whole problem is that after the signature of the Moscow
Declaration, each of the superpowers is attempting to speed up the
Karabakh settlement process, and the sharp conflict of their interests
again leads the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations to a deadlock. While
the mediators themselves are making haste, the new document may serve
as a ground for using the scenario that stands in stark contrast to
the "imposition of peace".
The first among them is the Western scenario that threatens to
make Karabakh a reservation controlled by the international forces,
thus securing the availability of the oil and gas of the neighboring
Azerbaijan and Middle Asia. Whereas the negotiations over the issue
of accelerating the NABUKKO program (conducted with Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan by EU Commissioner for Energy Issues Andris Piebalts)
have reached the crucial moment when Russia can no longer "twiddle its
thumbs". In conditions of the fall of the international oil prices,
the attempts of broadening the European gas market may undermine
Moscow's positions on the international energy market.
In such conditions, Moscow has but 2 scenarios. The first is the
implementation of the program "Gas in Return for Karabakh" (which
requires that Azerbaijan make self-sacrifice and become Turkey's
strategic ally) and the neutralization of the Armenian factor. However,
it's obvious that sacrificing the Armenian party in return for the
temporary neutralization of the NABUKKO program (already included in
the agenda by the European Union) will sooner or later oust Russia
from the "big game" and lead to the continuation of the previous
program with new efforts.
Therefore, there's only one scenario left. Its implementation
demands that Russia assume its traditional role of the defender of
the interests of Nagorno Karabakh (the main subject of the Karabakh
conflict) and hence, the guarantor of peace and stability in Eastern
Transcaucasia.
Thus, the rapid processes taking place in the region give Armenia
and the Armenian diplomacy a unique opportunity for advancing and
substantiating the issue of NKR's right to self-determination, because
both for Russia and the West, Karabakh is the only counter-balance
that may impede or contribute to the implementation of the programs
aimed at building a South Caucasian energy corridor.