'MADRID PRINCIPLES' OF KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ArmInfo
2008-11-17 10:25:00
ArmInfo. 'Madrid Principles' of Karabakh conflict settlement that
were concealed from the Armenian and Azerbaijani public are no longer
a secret.
The presidents of the two states agreed to development peace
process on the basis of these principles. The text is available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5 157&l=3. The text is
entitled: Recommendations to the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan:
1. Agree before the 2008 elections on a document of basic principles
making provision for:
(a) security guarantees and the deployment of international
peacekeepers;
(b) withdrawal of Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces from all
occupied territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, with special
modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin;
(c) return of displaced persons;
(d) Nagorno-Karabakh's final status to be determined eventually by
a vote, with an interim status to be settled on until that time; and
(e) reopening of all transport and trade routes.
2. Failing consensus on a comprehensive document, agree what can be
agreed and clearly identify the points still in dispute.
3. Encourage politicians to make positive references to peace and
the need for compromise in their 2008 election campaigns.
To the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the De Facto Nagorno-
Karabakh Authorities:
4. Respect the 1994 ceasefire, refrain from the use of force, halt
the rise of defence budgets and cease belligerent and provocative
rhetoric directed at the other.
5. Promote track two diplomacy and debate about compromise solutions,
including on the above principles, encourage parliaments to lead
these debates and facilitate contacts between Azeris and Armenians.
6. The de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should end support for
settlement of occupied territories with Armenians, including putting
an end to privatisation, infrastructure development and establishment
of local government structures in those areas;
7. Azerbaijan should allow Karabakh Azeris to elect the head of
their community and make a concerted effort to increase transparency
and reduce corruption so that oil revenues are used to benefit
all citizens, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs). To
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs (France, Russia, the U.S.) and the Wider
International Community:
8. Make a renewed effort to secure agreement on basic principles,
with remaining points of disagreement clearly indicated, in order to
maintain continuity in the process and to provide a starting point
for negotiations between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan
after the 2008 elections.
9. Raise the seniority of the co-chair representatives and make
resolution of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict a key element of bilateral
and multilateral relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
10. Make public more information on the substance of negotiations
and avoid artificially fuelling expectations by overly optimistic
statements.
11. In the case of the European Union:
(a) increase the role of the Special Representative for the South
Caucasus (EUSR), who should observe the Minsk process, support direct
contacts with all parties, travel to Nagorno-Karabakh, visit IDPs in
Azerbaijan and, with the Commission, assess conflict-related funding
needs; and (b) use European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) reviews and
funding to promote confidence building, as well as institution building
and respect for human rights and the rule of law.
ArmInfo
2008-11-17 10:25:00
ArmInfo. 'Madrid Principles' of Karabakh conflict settlement that
were concealed from the Armenian and Azerbaijani public are no longer
a secret.
The presidents of the two states agreed to development peace
process on the basis of these principles. The text is available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5 157&l=3. The text is
entitled: Recommendations to the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan:
1. Agree before the 2008 elections on a document of basic principles
making provision for:
(a) security guarantees and the deployment of international
peacekeepers;
(b) withdrawal of Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces from all
occupied territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, with special
modalities for Kelbajar and Lachin;
(c) return of displaced persons;
(d) Nagorno-Karabakh's final status to be determined eventually by
a vote, with an interim status to be settled on until that time; and
(e) reopening of all transport and trade routes.
2. Failing consensus on a comprehensive document, agree what can be
agreed and clearly identify the points still in dispute.
3. Encourage politicians to make positive references to peace and
the need for compromise in their 2008 election campaigns.
To the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the De Facto Nagorno-
Karabakh Authorities:
4. Respect the 1994 ceasefire, refrain from the use of force, halt
the rise of defence budgets and cease belligerent and provocative
rhetoric directed at the other.
5. Promote track two diplomacy and debate about compromise solutions,
including on the above principles, encourage parliaments to lead
these debates and facilitate contacts between Azeris and Armenians.
6. The de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should end support for
settlement of occupied territories with Armenians, including putting
an end to privatisation, infrastructure development and establishment
of local government structures in those areas;
7. Azerbaijan should allow Karabakh Azeris to elect the head of
their community and make a concerted effort to increase transparency
and reduce corruption so that oil revenues are used to benefit
all citizens, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs). To
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs (France, Russia, the U.S.) and the Wider
International Community:
8. Make a renewed effort to secure agreement on basic principles,
with remaining points of disagreement clearly indicated, in order to
maintain continuity in the process and to provide a starting point
for negotiations between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan
after the 2008 elections.
9. Raise the seniority of the co-chair representatives and make
resolution of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict a key element of bilateral
and multilateral relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
10. Make public more information on the substance of negotiations
and avoid artificially fuelling expectations by overly optimistic
statements.
11. In the case of the European Union:
(a) increase the role of the Special Representative for the South
Caucasus (EUSR), who should observe the Minsk process, support direct
contacts with all parties, travel to Nagorno-Karabakh, visit IDPs in
Azerbaijan and, with the Commission, assess conflict-related funding
needs; and (b) use European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) reviews and
funding to promote confidence building, as well as institution building
and respect for human rights and the rule of law.