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A LOT TO TALK ABOUT WITH SOMEBODY
Kommersant
Nov 18 2008
Russia
The second round of the Geneva talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
give no cause for even cautious optimism at first glance. The basic
differences between Russia and Georgia are too obvious. The situation
is especially difficult because it will not change in its essence,
even if radical changes occur in the highest leadership in Georgia. No
matter who replaces Mikheil Saakashvili as president of Georgia,
he will not choose a course toward reconciliation with Russia, and
Moscow should have no illusions about that. Even Igor Giorgadze's
marionette party is in favor of Georgia's territorial integrity. But
it is also illusory to hope that Moscow will reverse its recognition
of the two former Georgian autonomies.
The question logically arises about the expediency of continuing the
Geneva talks. It should be understood what problems can be solved in
their third, fourth or 25th rounds.
Leaving emotions aside, it is clear that, besides the legal status of
the "rebel" republics, there is a problem with violence to be solved
in two hot spots. I am referring to terrorist and partisan activities
in the Gali District of Abkhazia and the Leningori District of South
Ossetia. And the Moscow declaration on Nagorny Karabakh, made at the
beginning of the month and stating the principle that every conflict
should be settled exclusively through political means, without the
use of violence, will get nowhere without the final determination of
the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
That is what Moscow has been seeking from Tbilisi for the last four
years. The Geneva talks give it the opportunity to attain its goals
with the help of Western intermediaries.
The second issue is the presence of international monitors in and
around the conflict zones. After the August war in the Caucasus,
the internationalization of the two conflicts became a reality. It is
important for Moscow to see to it that the format of the international
presence, even though it is not in Moscow's interests, is in a format
beneficial to it, since it cannot be avoided. Possible benefits for
Moscow from the Geneva talks may be the initiation of strategic talks
not with Georgia, but with the European Union.
Finally, participation by representatives of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in the talks, even if they have the status only of experts,
is already partial international legitimization - if not as separate
states, at least as political units whose participation is necessary
of a settlement is to be reached. Discussion of the status of Kosovo
started similarly. Pristina was not built in a day.
Thus, Moscow has the opportunity to talk tete-a-tete with Europe in
Geneva on a wide range of issues of Caucasian security without engaging
in empty squabbles with Georgia. There is practically nothing to talk
with Tbilisi about today any way.
Kommersant
Nov 18 2008
Russia
The second round of the Geneva talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
give no cause for even cautious optimism at first glance. The basic
differences between Russia and Georgia are too obvious. The situation
is especially difficult because it will not change in its essence,
even if radical changes occur in the highest leadership in Georgia. No
matter who replaces Mikheil Saakashvili as president of Georgia,
he will not choose a course toward reconciliation with Russia, and
Moscow should have no illusions about that. Even Igor Giorgadze's
marionette party is in favor of Georgia's territorial integrity. But
it is also illusory to hope that Moscow will reverse its recognition
of the two former Georgian autonomies.
The question logically arises about the expediency of continuing the
Geneva talks. It should be understood what problems can be solved in
their third, fourth or 25th rounds.
Leaving emotions aside, it is clear that, besides the legal status of
the "rebel" republics, there is a problem with violence to be solved
in two hot spots. I am referring to terrorist and partisan activities
in the Gali District of Abkhazia and the Leningori District of South
Ossetia. And the Moscow declaration on Nagorny Karabakh, made at the
beginning of the month and stating the principle that every conflict
should be settled exclusively through political means, without the
use of violence, will get nowhere without the final determination of
the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
That is what Moscow has been seeking from Tbilisi for the last four
years. The Geneva talks give it the opportunity to attain its goals
with the help of Western intermediaries.
The second issue is the presence of international monitors in and
around the conflict zones. After the August war in the Caucasus,
the internationalization of the two conflicts became a reality. It is
important for Moscow to see to it that the format of the international
presence, even though it is not in Moscow's interests, is in a format
beneficial to it, since it cannot be avoided. Possible benefits for
Moscow from the Geneva talks may be the initiation of strategic talks
not with Georgia, but with the European Union.
Finally, participation by representatives of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in the talks, even if they have the status only of experts,
is already partial international legitimization - if not as separate
states, at least as political units whose participation is necessary
of a settlement is to be reached. Discussion of the status of Kosovo
started similarly. Pristina was not built in a day.
Thus, Moscow has the opportunity to talk tete-a-tete with Europe in
Geneva on a wide range of issues of Caucasian security without engaging
in empty squabbles with Georgia. There is practically nothing to talk
with Tbilisi about today any way.