Tweet
The Economist, UK
Nov 27 2008
The worrying Tayyip Erdogan
Nov 27th 2008 | ANKARA
The Economist print edition
Turkey's prime minister once promised big reforms to bring his country
closer to the European Union. He seems no longer to be pushing them
WHEN Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his Justice
and Development (AK) Party narrowly escaped banning by the
constitutional court in July, the big question was which Erdogan would
then come to the fore. Would it be the non-ideological pragmatist,
whose bold reforms had helped Turkey to secure the start of membership
talks with the European Union in 2005? Or would it be the dogmatic and
erratic leader who had provoked Turkey's meddlesome generals, always
anxious to undermine the AK Party because of its Islamist roots, by
seeking soon after his election victory in July 2007 to ease the ban
on the Islamic-style headscarf in universities?
The question of which version of Mr Erdogan is in charge has gained
extra urgency because Turkey is grappling with mounting violence in
the mainly Kurdish south-east. It also matters to the financial
markets as the government tries to protect its fragile economy from
the global financial typhoon. Worryingly, the answer seems to be: the
second version. Mr Erdogan appears increasingly autocratic and out of
touch. And because he lacks any credible political opponents, either
within or beyond the AK Party, this is making Turkey look stagnant and
adrift'and further away from EU membership than ever.
Mr Erdogan's odd behaviour was on display during his most recent trip
to America. When asked in Washington for his view about Iran's
nuclear ambitions he retorted that `those who possess nuclear weapons
do not have the right to tell others to not acquire them too.' This
comment did not go down well with American officials, whose memories
are seared by Turkey's refusal in March 2003 to let America use its
soil to launch a second front against Iraq. A recent gas deal struck
by the Turks with Iran has not helped. For all of Turkey's assistance
over Iraq since 2003 (some 70% of non-combat materiel for American
troops goes through Turkey) and in Afghanistan (where Turkey has
1,200 troops), America is asking new questions about Turkish
dependability as a Western ally.
Another thundercloud is gathering over demands by the Armenian
diaspora in America, most of whom strongly supported Barack Obama's
election as president, that he stick to the view he expressed as a
senator that the massacre of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be seen
as `genocide'. Turkey's recent efforts at reconciliation with Armenia,
motivated in part by hopes of staving off a formal recognition of
genocide by the Obama administration, seem to be making little
progress. Some Western diplomats ascribe this to the pressure hawks in
the diaspora have applied to the Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan.
But it is at home that Mr Erdogan is causing the most concern. The
hope was that, with his legal travails behind him, the prime minister
would resume much-delayed political and economic reforms. Instead he
has adopted an increasingly strident nationalist line. There is talk
of his having struck a deal with Turkey's new, hardline chief of
staff, Ilker Basbug, according to which Mr Erdogan has promised to
freeze reforms that dilute the army's power in exchange for his
party's not being attacked in court again.
Mr Erdogan's new approach was most evident in a speech he gave earlier
this month in the predominantly Kurdish town of Hakkari. Responding to
a wave of bloody protests that has racked the Kurdish region, he
invited those who were not happy to `go wherever they please'. Ibrahim
Guclu, an independent Kurdish politician, says that `in other words,
he was telling the Kurds to get out.' This is a far cry from a
ground-breaking speech Mr Erdogan made in Diyarbakir three years ago,
when he admitted that the Turkish state had made mistakes with the
Kurds.
Now he is giving the army much freer rein in its 34-year campaign
against the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). When Taraf, a
liberal Turkish newspaper, exposed army negligence in a recent PKK
attack that killed 17 soldiers at an outpost in Hakkari, he chose not
to order an investigation and attacked the newspaper instead. His
aides are reported to have blamed leaks of the intelligence reports
cited by Taraf on Israel and the CIA.
Meanwhile EU-inspired work on drawing up a new constitution to replace
the current one, drawn up by the generals after a military coup in
1980, has stalled. Reports of police torture and extra-judicial
killings are on the rise. Turkey's liberal intelligentsia, long among
Mr Erdogan's stalwart supporters, is grumbling, as is the European
Commission. Mr Erdogan's response has been to rescind the press
accreditation of several journalists who cover the prime ministry. All
of this is giving more ammunition to those EU members that have never
wanted Turkey to join their club.
Mr Erdogan owes much of his electoral success to the unprecedented
economic stability of his time in office. By sticking firmly to IMF
prescriptions Turkey helped foreign investment to soar, tamed
inflation and narrowed the budget deficit. But the IMF standby
arrangement expired in May. And although Mehmet Simsek, the economy
minister, has repeatedly hinted that it should be extended, a deal
remains elusive. Foreign investors, who hold as much as 70% of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange, have been pulling out, and the lira has
tumbled by more than a third against the dollar this year. Growth of
GDP has dipped sharply, to below 2%. Turkey's huge current-account
deficit makes it more vulnerable than many other emerging
markets. Although it has so far been relatively unaffected by the
world financial malady, it is only a matter of time `before it catches
the bug', says one Istanbul-based banker.
Mr Erdogan's supporters insist that the government's inertia is mainly
to do with municipal elections being held next March. An IMF deal
would preclude a pre-electoral spending spree. Being too nice to the
Kurds might strengthen the nationalist opposition in the face of
spiralling PKK terrorism. `Once the elections are over, you'll see the
old AK,' promises Abdurrahman Kurt, an AK deputy from Diyarbakir.
But such promises are beginning to ring hollow. When Mr Erdogan won
power a second time, with an even bigger share of the vote, in July
2007, he promised to reach out to all Turks `including those of you
who didn't vote for me.' He seems now to be alienating such
voters. And as corruption also starts to infect the AK's ranks, it is
beginning to resemble many of the tired old parties that it buried at
the polls.
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/disp laystory.cfm?story_id=12696853
Nov 27 2008
The worrying Tayyip Erdogan
Nov 27th 2008 | ANKARA
The Economist print edition
Turkey's prime minister once promised big reforms to bring his country
closer to the European Union. He seems no longer to be pushing them
WHEN Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his Justice
and Development (AK) Party narrowly escaped banning by the
constitutional court in July, the big question was which Erdogan would
then come to the fore. Would it be the non-ideological pragmatist,
whose bold reforms had helped Turkey to secure the start of membership
talks with the European Union in 2005? Or would it be the dogmatic and
erratic leader who had provoked Turkey's meddlesome generals, always
anxious to undermine the AK Party because of its Islamist roots, by
seeking soon after his election victory in July 2007 to ease the ban
on the Islamic-style headscarf in universities?
The question of which version of Mr Erdogan is in charge has gained
extra urgency because Turkey is grappling with mounting violence in
the mainly Kurdish south-east. It also matters to the financial
markets as the government tries to protect its fragile economy from
the global financial typhoon. Worryingly, the answer seems to be: the
second version. Mr Erdogan appears increasingly autocratic and out of
touch. And because he lacks any credible political opponents, either
within or beyond the AK Party, this is making Turkey look stagnant and
adrift'and further away from EU membership than ever.
Mr Erdogan's odd behaviour was on display during his most recent trip
to America. When asked in Washington for his view about Iran's
nuclear ambitions he retorted that `those who possess nuclear weapons
do not have the right to tell others to not acquire them too.' This
comment did not go down well with American officials, whose memories
are seared by Turkey's refusal in March 2003 to let America use its
soil to launch a second front against Iraq. A recent gas deal struck
by the Turks with Iran has not helped. For all of Turkey's assistance
over Iraq since 2003 (some 70% of non-combat materiel for American
troops goes through Turkey) and in Afghanistan (where Turkey has
1,200 troops), America is asking new questions about Turkish
dependability as a Western ally.
Another thundercloud is gathering over demands by the Armenian
diaspora in America, most of whom strongly supported Barack Obama's
election as president, that he stick to the view he expressed as a
senator that the massacre of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be seen
as `genocide'. Turkey's recent efforts at reconciliation with Armenia,
motivated in part by hopes of staving off a formal recognition of
genocide by the Obama administration, seem to be making little
progress. Some Western diplomats ascribe this to the pressure hawks in
the diaspora have applied to the Armenian president, Serzh Sargsyan.
But it is at home that Mr Erdogan is causing the most concern. The
hope was that, with his legal travails behind him, the prime minister
would resume much-delayed political and economic reforms. Instead he
has adopted an increasingly strident nationalist line. There is talk
of his having struck a deal with Turkey's new, hardline chief of
staff, Ilker Basbug, according to which Mr Erdogan has promised to
freeze reforms that dilute the army's power in exchange for his
party's not being attacked in court again.
Mr Erdogan's new approach was most evident in a speech he gave earlier
this month in the predominantly Kurdish town of Hakkari. Responding to
a wave of bloody protests that has racked the Kurdish region, he
invited those who were not happy to `go wherever they please'. Ibrahim
Guclu, an independent Kurdish politician, says that `in other words,
he was telling the Kurds to get out.' This is a far cry from a
ground-breaking speech Mr Erdogan made in Diyarbakir three years ago,
when he admitted that the Turkish state had made mistakes with the
Kurds.
Now he is giving the army much freer rein in its 34-year campaign
against the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). When Taraf, a
liberal Turkish newspaper, exposed army negligence in a recent PKK
attack that killed 17 soldiers at an outpost in Hakkari, he chose not
to order an investigation and attacked the newspaper instead. His
aides are reported to have blamed leaks of the intelligence reports
cited by Taraf on Israel and the CIA.
Meanwhile EU-inspired work on drawing up a new constitution to replace
the current one, drawn up by the generals after a military coup in
1980, has stalled. Reports of police torture and extra-judicial
killings are on the rise. Turkey's liberal intelligentsia, long among
Mr Erdogan's stalwart supporters, is grumbling, as is the European
Commission. Mr Erdogan's response has been to rescind the press
accreditation of several journalists who cover the prime ministry. All
of this is giving more ammunition to those EU members that have never
wanted Turkey to join their club.
Mr Erdogan owes much of his electoral success to the unprecedented
economic stability of his time in office. By sticking firmly to IMF
prescriptions Turkey helped foreign investment to soar, tamed
inflation and narrowed the budget deficit. But the IMF standby
arrangement expired in May. And although Mehmet Simsek, the economy
minister, has repeatedly hinted that it should be extended, a deal
remains elusive. Foreign investors, who hold as much as 70% of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange, have been pulling out, and the lira has
tumbled by more than a third against the dollar this year. Growth of
GDP has dipped sharply, to below 2%. Turkey's huge current-account
deficit makes it more vulnerable than many other emerging
markets. Although it has so far been relatively unaffected by the
world financial malady, it is only a matter of time `before it catches
the bug', says one Istanbul-based banker.
Mr Erdogan's supporters insist that the government's inertia is mainly
to do with municipal elections being held next March. An IMF deal
would preclude a pre-electoral spending spree. Being too nice to the
Kurds might strengthen the nationalist opposition in the face of
spiralling PKK terrorism. `Once the elections are over, you'll see the
old AK,' promises Abdurrahman Kurt, an AK deputy from Diyarbakir.
But such promises are beginning to ring hollow. When Mr Erdogan won
power a second time, with an even bigger share of the vote, in July
2007, he promised to reach out to all Turks `including those of you
who didn't vote for me.' He seems now to be alienating such
voters. And as corruption also starts to infect the AK's ranks, it is
beginning to resemble many of the tired old parties that it buried at
the polls.
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/disp laystory.cfm?story_id=12696853