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THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE - PART I
Katinka Barysch
YaleGlobal Online
Oct 4, 2008
CT
The US and Europe increasingly seem at odds over an assertive Russia,
flush with oil money, strong militarily and ambitious with an educated,
nationalistic population. This two-part YaleGlobal series explores
the implications for Europe, the US and the world. In the first of
the series, Katinka Barysch, deputy director of the European Centre
for Reform notes many common interests held by the US, Russia and
Europe. Because of geographical proximity and ample trade relations,
Europe tends to be cautious in its approach with Russia, Europe's
reliance on negotiations and a tough approach from the US complement
each other. Barysch points out that transatlantic unity is essential
in trade, NATO and global governance. Europe is realistic about
aggression in its neighborhood, moving carefully because the costs
of conflict would be immense. - YaleGlobal
Rise of an assertive Russia requires transatlantic alliance to develop
greater cohesion
Hello, George, I'm with Nicolas: Signs of division between the US
and Atlantic allies over Russia is not good for stability
LONDON: The American response to Russia's invasion of Georgia was
swift, tough and coherent. Europe's reaction, on the other hand, seemed
dithering and divided. This general impression left some observers to
predict a transatlantic split between US cold warriors and European
appeasers. Fears of a transatlantic falling-out are exaggerated but
Washington, Brussels and the other European capitals need to align
their strategies how to deal with a more assertive Russia.
It's true that some US officials made more hawkish statements in
the aftermath of the Georgia war. "Today, we are all Georgians,"
proclaimed Senator John McCain in Tbilisi. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rica warned that Russia could be on a "one-way path to
self-imposed isolation and international irrelevance," putting the
country's applications for the World Trade Organization and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on hold. In
Europe, meanwhile, Italian and German political leaders pleaded for
continued engagement with Russia.
But many moderate, or realist, voices emerge in the US. And extremely
critical statements come out of Poland, Estonia, Sweden, the UK and
other European countries. Because the EU consists of 27 sovereign
countries, its internal divisions are much more visible than those
between, say, the US State Department and the White House.
More importantly, those who compare the immediate US reaction with
the European one miss the point. The US administration has openly
backed Tbilisi. The EU has been more reluctant to take sides. After the
August invasion, this caution paid off because the EU - through current
President Nicolas Sarkozy - could offer to serve as mediator. Backed
by an angrily growling America, the EU's mediating role was all the
more effective. The Americans found it easier to be firm and critical
because they could rely on the EU to do the negotiating.
Nevertheless, there's scope for a transatlantic rift over Russia -
especially if Moscow's attempt to tighten its grip on the neighborhood
does not stop at the border of South Ossetia and if the more hawkish
McCain wins the election.
With a relationship so much more intertwined, Europe's approach to
Russia will always differ from the American one. The US does not
trade much with Russia and has limited direct dealings. US-Russia
relations are arms-length and strategic. The EU gets more than 40
percent of its gas and a third of its oil imports from Russia. For
Russia, the EU is by far the biggest and most lucrative market. There
are 2,000 kilometers of common border and a potentially explosive
shared neighborhood. Russia's elite has businesses in Germany, holiday
homes in France and offspring in English schools. The Europe-Russia
relationship is immediate, multi-faceted and messy.
Therefore, if tensions between Russia and the West continue
to deteriorate, the Europeans and the Americans would react
differently. The US response would be fast and focused on its military
strength in Eurasia. The EU would struggle to maintain unity,
although it did a good job at its September 1 emergency summit on
Georgia. Its focus would be on reducing dependence on Russian energy,
drawing Ukraine, Moldova and other eastern neighbors closer to the EU,
and putting the European operations of Gazprom and other state-owned
Russian companies under greater scrutiny.
Nevertheless, there are areas where transatlantic unity is needed in
face of a more aggressive Russia, including trade, NATO and global
governance.
Trade: The EU has not threatened to block Russia's WTO accession. It
has a strong interest in getting Russia to respect international trade
rules and submit to the WTO's dispute settlement procedures. It is
rightly reluctant to use an already weakened WTO to make a political
point. Moreover, blocking the negotiations would have little immediate
consequences: Russia's accession is in any case some time off because
of Moscow's increasingly erratic trade policy, US refusal to repeal
the Jackson-Vanik amendment and vetoes from WTO members Georgia and,
possibly, Ukraine.
Going beyond that, economic sanctions are almost a non-starter for the
Europeans. The EU is in no position to replace Russian energy supplies
in the foreseeable future. Fully aware that this dependence is mutual,
Moscow has been notably careful not to mention energy in its angry
exchanges with the West. The EU could try to limit Russian sales of
non-energy goods or keep Russian investments out. But in the absence
of a UN mandate, such steps would violate the EU's own rules for
openness and non-discrimination. Most Europeans think that the more
integrated Russia is into the international economy, the less likely
it is to turn into an angry and isolated autocracy.
NATO: For numerous Americans, the Georgia war is good reason to get
Georgia and Ukraine into NATO as quickly as possible. Most Europeans
are not so sure. Some fear upsetting Russia. But most point to the
distinct lack of enthusiasm that most Ukrainian voters and politicians
exhibit towards joining the alliance. And they worry about sending
soldiers to defend a country led by someone as hot-headed as Mikhail
Sakaashvili. Central and Eastern European countries have traditionally
been strong supporters of further NATO expansion. Now they worry that
the resolve behind Article 5 may become diluted. Poland and others
already call for "Article 5 plus" guarantees from the US.
Some Europeans are more sympathetic to the idea of a pan-European
security forum - not in the form proposed by Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev, a fairly crude attempt to split Europe from the US. But
some kind of dialogue will be needed, on issues such a new arms
limitation treaties, Eastern Europe's other "frozen" conflicts -
Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, perhaps Crimea - the Balkans and
the Black Sea region, or the risks attached to militarization of the
Caucasus. A strong push for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership
at the December summit would make Russia recoil from any such dialogue.
International organizations: Long before the Georgia war,
Senator McCain advocated throwing Russia out of the G8. The idea
chimes with his plan for a League of Democracies, and it makes
Europeans queasy. They hope that Russia will satisfy its craving
for international respect through membership in global clubs rather
than flexing military muscle. Most Europeans are also convinced that
the world's most pressing problems - climate change, terrorism, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons - must be addressed by all countries
working together, not only those that practice democratic pluralism
and liberal capitalism. Many would therefore support expansion of the
G8 to include China, India, Brazil, South Africa and maybe others. If
the current G7 members pushed for this expansion while at the same
time sidelining Russia, Moscow would take note.
Europeans have no illusions about the nature of the Russian regime. The
share of those worried about Russia's authoritarianism and its use of
the energy weapon is higher in Germany than it is in the US, according
to the latest Transatlantic Trends survey. But the Europeans often
draw different conclusions from the same analysis because the costs
of a breakdown in relations between Russia and the West would be so
much higher.
Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform
in London.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Katinka Barysch
YaleGlobal Online
Oct 4, 2008
CT
The US and Europe increasingly seem at odds over an assertive Russia,
flush with oil money, strong militarily and ambitious with an educated,
nationalistic population. This two-part YaleGlobal series explores
the implications for Europe, the US and the world. In the first of
the series, Katinka Barysch, deputy director of the European Centre
for Reform notes many common interests held by the US, Russia and
Europe. Because of geographical proximity and ample trade relations,
Europe tends to be cautious in its approach with Russia, Europe's
reliance on negotiations and a tough approach from the US complement
each other. Barysch points out that transatlantic unity is essential
in trade, NATO and global governance. Europe is realistic about
aggression in its neighborhood, moving carefully because the costs
of conflict would be immense. - YaleGlobal
Rise of an assertive Russia requires transatlantic alliance to develop
greater cohesion
Hello, George, I'm with Nicolas: Signs of division between the US
and Atlantic allies over Russia is not good for stability
LONDON: The American response to Russia's invasion of Georgia was
swift, tough and coherent. Europe's reaction, on the other hand, seemed
dithering and divided. This general impression left some observers to
predict a transatlantic split between US cold warriors and European
appeasers. Fears of a transatlantic falling-out are exaggerated but
Washington, Brussels and the other European capitals need to align
their strategies how to deal with a more assertive Russia.
It's true that some US officials made more hawkish statements in
the aftermath of the Georgia war. "Today, we are all Georgians,"
proclaimed Senator John McCain in Tbilisi. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rica warned that Russia could be on a "one-way path to
self-imposed isolation and international irrelevance," putting the
country's applications for the World Trade Organization and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on hold. In
Europe, meanwhile, Italian and German political leaders pleaded for
continued engagement with Russia.
But many moderate, or realist, voices emerge in the US. And extremely
critical statements come out of Poland, Estonia, Sweden, the UK and
other European countries. Because the EU consists of 27 sovereign
countries, its internal divisions are much more visible than those
between, say, the US State Department and the White House.
More importantly, those who compare the immediate US reaction with
the European one miss the point. The US administration has openly
backed Tbilisi. The EU has been more reluctant to take sides. After the
August invasion, this caution paid off because the EU - through current
President Nicolas Sarkozy - could offer to serve as mediator. Backed
by an angrily growling America, the EU's mediating role was all the
more effective. The Americans found it easier to be firm and critical
because they could rely on the EU to do the negotiating.
Nevertheless, there's scope for a transatlantic rift over Russia -
especially if Moscow's attempt to tighten its grip on the neighborhood
does not stop at the border of South Ossetia and if the more hawkish
McCain wins the election.
With a relationship so much more intertwined, Europe's approach to
Russia will always differ from the American one. The US does not
trade much with Russia and has limited direct dealings. US-Russia
relations are arms-length and strategic. The EU gets more than 40
percent of its gas and a third of its oil imports from Russia. For
Russia, the EU is by far the biggest and most lucrative market. There
are 2,000 kilometers of common border and a potentially explosive
shared neighborhood. Russia's elite has businesses in Germany, holiday
homes in France and offspring in English schools. The Europe-Russia
relationship is immediate, multi-faceted and messy.
Therefore, if tensions between Russia and the West continue
to deteriorate, the Europeans and the Americans would react
differently. The US response would be fast and focused on its military
strength in Eurasia. The EU would struggle to maintain unity,
although it did a good job at its September 1 emergency summit on
Georgia. Its focus would be on reducing dependence on Russian energy,
drawing Ukraine, Moldova and other eastern neighbors closer to the EU,
and putting the European operations of Gazprom and other state-owned
Russian companies under greater scrutiny.
Nevertheless, there are areas where transatlantic unity is needed in
face of a more aggressive Russia, including trade, NATO and global
governance.
Trade: The EU has not threatened to block Russia's WTO accession. It
has a strong interest in getting Russia to respect international trade
rules and submit to the WTO's dispute settlement procedures. It is
rightly reluctant to use an already weakened WTO to make a political
point. Moreover, blocking the negotiations would have little immediate
consequences: Russia's accession is in any case some time off because
of Moscow's increasingly erratic trade policy, US refusal to repeal
the Jackson-Vanik amendment and vetoes from WTO members Georgia and,
possibly, Ukraine.
Going beyond that, economic sanctions are almost a non-starter for the
Europeans. The EU is in no position to replace Russian energy supplies
in the foreseeable future. Fully aware that this dependence is mutual,
Moscow has been notably careful not to mention energy in its angry
exchanges with the West. The EU could try to limit Russian sales of
non-energy goods or keep Russian investments out. But in the absence
of a UN mandate, such steps would violate the EU's own rules for
openness and non-discrimination. Most Europeans think that the more
integrated Russia is into the international economy, the less likely
it is to turn into an angry and isolated autocracy.
NATO: For numerous Americans, the Georgia war is good reason to get
Georgia and Ukraine into NATO as quickly as possible. Most Europeans
are not so sure. Some fear upsetting Russia. But most point to the
distinct lack of enthusiasm that most Ukrainian voters and politicians
exhibit towards joining the alliance. And they worry about sending
soldiers to defend a country led by someone as hot-headed as Mikhail
Sakaashvili. Central and Eastern European countries have traditionally
been strong supporters of further NATO expansion. Now they worry that
the resolve behind Article 5 may become diluted. Poland and others
already call for "Article 5 plus" guarantees from the US.
Some Europeans are more sympathetic to the idea of a pan-European
security forum - not in the form proposed by Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev, a fairly crude attempt to split Europe from the US. But
some kind of dialogue will be needed, on issues such a new arms
limitation treaties, Eastern Europe's other "frozen" conflicts -
Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, perhaps Crimea - the Balkans and
the Black Sea region, or the risks attached to militarization of the
Caucasus. A strong push for Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership
at the December summit would make Russia recoil from any such dialogue.
International organizations: Long before the Georgia war,
Senator McCain advocated throwing Russia out of the G8. The idea
chimes with his plan for a League of Democracies, and it makes
Europeans queasy. They hope that Russia will satisfy its craving
for international respect through membership in global clubs rather
than flexing military muscle. Most Europeans are also convinced that
the world's most pressing problems - climate change, terrorism, the
proliferation of nuclear weapons - must be addressed by all countries
working together, not only those that practice democratic pluralism
and liberal capitalism. Many would therefore support expansion of the
G8 to include China, India, Brazil, South Africa and maybe others. If
the current G7 members pushed for this expansion while at the same
time sidelining Russia, Moscow would take note.
Europeans have no illusions about the nature of the Russian regime. The
share of those worried about Russia's authoritarianism and its use of
the energy weapon is higher in Germany than it is in the US, according
to the latest Transatlantic Trends survey. But the Europeans often
draw different conclusions from the same analysis because the costs
of a breakdown in relations between Russia and the West would be so
much higher.
Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform
in London.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress