Tweet
ARMENIA IN NEED OF AN ALTERNATIVE EXPORT-IMPORT ROUTE
Ashley Corinne Killough
Georgiandaily
October 10, 2008
NY
Although talks of establishing security in the Caucasus had been
underway for months, the crisis in Georgia underscored a sense
of urgency at the September 26 trilateral meeting of the foreign
ministers of Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Eduard Nalbandian, Ali
Babacan, and Elmar Mammadyarov met in New York to further discuss a
resolution to the Karabakh conflict, which has created obstacles to
the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia.
Economically bruised Armenia needs an open-border relationship with
Turkey now more than ever. Georgia's Black Sea ports are Armenia's main
gateways for foreign trade, with 70 percent of its imports and exports
carried through Georgian territory. This dependence on its northern
neighbor became vulnerable when the damaged Georgian infrastructure
caused a cessation of a large share of Armenian trade for more than
week in August. After a rail bridge near Gori was destroyed on August
16, Armenia experienced the country's worst fuel crisis since the
early 1990s (www.armenianow.com, September 5). During a two-week
period at the end of August, hundreds of motorists were stranded,
causing higher gas prices and long lines at filling stations.
Artur Baghdasarian, secretary of Armenia's National Security Council,
said that the damage to Georgia's infrastructure had cost the Armenian
economy $680 million, mainly in delayed imports and exports (RFE/RL
Armenia Report, September 3). After the railway was repaired, about
500 freight cars with 54,000 tons of cargo moved from Georgia to
Armenia on September 2 (ARKA, September 2).
Armenia's economic relationship with Georgia also played an important
part in its foreign policy with regard to the crisis. Moscow,
according to a senior Russian security official, had hoped that
Yerevan would agree to the accession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (RFE/RL Armenia
Report, September 3). The CSTO is a Russian-led military alliance of
six former Soviet republics that agree to abstain both from the use
of force or joining other military alliances. The charter--signed
by Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan--claims that aggression against one signatory would
be perceived as aggression against all. Georgia and Azerbaijan joined
in 1994 but withdrew in 1999.
Despite its CSTO membership, Armenia, realizing the enormous political
and economic risks that acknowledging the breakaway regions would
carry, refrained from recognizing the disputed regions. The
presidential press office released a statement of neutrality
shortly after the crisis broke out, reiterating President Serzh
Sarkisian's position: "The President once again stressed that the
Russian Federation is a strategic ally of the Republic of Armenia
and Georgia a friendly country, and that Armenia is therefore greatly
interested in the conflict's quick, peaceful resolution." In an effort
to maintain regional stability, Sarkisian reached out to Saakashvili,
offering condolences and humanitarian assistance. Sarkisian is also
reported to have presented a comparable message of concern to Medvedev
(RFE/RL Armenia Report, August 14).
Kevork Oskanian, a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics
and Political Science, is currently researching security in the South
Caucasus. "It [neutrality] was, really, the only decision Armenia
could make considering its dependence on Georgia for its commercial
relations with the outside world and its strategic alliance with
Russia," he said. "Yerevan was basically walking a tightrope."
Since the trade route was repaired, Oskanian said, the economy had
largely returned to normal; but the consequences of Armenia's heavy
reliance on Georgia emphasized the need of establishing another
trading corridor to Europe through its western neighbor, Turkey.
The idea of easing tension with Turkey had already been brewing for
months, as Sarkisian had extended an invitation to Turkish President
Abdullah Gul in July to attend the Turkey-Armenia FIFA World Cup
soccer qualifying match on September 6. Gul's symbolic visit was the
first by a Turkish head of state to Armenia and was also in concert
with Turkey's proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Platform. The initiative is of utmost importance to Turkey's Eastern
foreign policy, as a greater involvement in the Caucasus, a tenuous
region with ties to Europe, could augment Turkey's credibility with
the European Union (Hetq, September 8).
While Turkey stands to benefit from improved relations with Armenia
on a political standpoint, Armenia's advantage would primarily be
economic with a more stable trade link to Europe.
"Despite all claims to the contrary, even outside of periods of
acute conflict and instability, the Armenian population is paying
a high price for the current situation," Oskanian said, noting that
costly imports and a low volume exports had resulted in a significant
trade imbalance. An open border would provide Armenia with access
to the Turkish Black Sea port of Trabzon, as well as the prospect of
connecting Armenia's rail network with Europe.
"This would open new markets and opportunities for Armenia's producers
and foreign investors and ease price pressures on consumers through
dramatically reduced transportation costs and a generally more open
and competitive economy," Oskanian said.
Before any borders are opened, however, Turkey wants the disputed
Karabakh conflict resolved, an issue that also influenced Armenia's
decision to remain neutral. Yerevan has yet to recognize the region
formally because of its current diplomatic efforts with Azerbaijan
under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Ashley Corinne Killough
Georgiandaily
October 10, 2008
NY
Although talks of establishing security in the Caucasus had been
underway for months, the crisis in Georgia underscored a sense
of urgency at the September 26 trilateral meeting of the foreign
ministers of Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Eduard Nalbandian, Ali
Babacan, and Elmar Mammadyarov met in New York to further discuss a
resolution to the Karabakh conflict, which has created obstacles to
the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia.
Economically bruised Armenia needs an open-border relationship with
Turkey now more than ever. Georgia's Black Sea ports are Armenia's main
gateways for foreign trade, with 70 percent of its imports and exports
carried through Georgian territory. This dependence on its northern
neighbor became vulnerable when the damaged Georgian infrastructure
caused a cessation of a large share of Armenian trade for more than
week in August. After a rail bridge near Gori was destroyed on August
16, Armenia experienced the country's worst fuel crisis since the
early 1990s (www.armenianow.com, September 5). During a two-week
period at the end of August, hundreds of motorists were stranded,
causing higher gas prices and long lines at filling stations.
Artur Baghdasarian, secretary of Armenia's National Security Council,
said that the damage to Georgia's infrastructure had cost the Armenian
economy $680 million, mainly in delayed imports and exports (RFE/RL
Armenia Report, September 3). After the railway was repaired, about
500 freight cars with 54,000 tons of cargo moved from Georgia to
Armenia on September 2 (ARKA, September 2).
Armenia's economic relationship with Georgia also played an important
part in its foreign policy with regard to the crisis. Moscow,
according to a senior Russian security official, had hoped that
Yerevan would agree to the accession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (RFE/RL Armenia
Report, September 3). The CSTO is a Russian-led military alliance of
six former Soviet republics that agree to abstain both from the use
of force or joining other military alliances. The charter--signed
by Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan--claims that aggression against one signatory would
be perceived as aggression against all. Georgia and Azerbaijan joined
in 1994 but withdrew in 1999.
Despite its CSTO membership, Armenia, realizing the enormous political
and economic risks that acknowledging the breakaway regions would
carry, refrained from recognizing the disputed regions. The
presidential press office released a statement of neutrality
shortly after the crisis broke out, reiterating President Serzh
Sarkisian's position: "The President once again stressed that the
Russian Federation is a strategic ally of the Republic of Armenia
and Georgia a friendly country, and that Armenia is therefore greatly
interested in the conflict's quick, peaceful resolution." In an effort
to maintain regional stability, Sarkisian reached out to Saakashvili,
offering condolences and humanitarian assistance. Sarkisian is also
reported to have presented a comparable message of concern to Medvedev
(RFE/RL Armenia Report, August 14).
Kevork Oskanian, a doctoral candidate at the London School of Economics
and Political Science, is currently researching security in the South
Caucasus. "It [neutrality] was, really, the only decision Armenia
could make considering its dependence on Georgia for its commercial
relations with the outside world and its strategic alliance with
Russia," he said. "Yerevan was basically walking a tightrope."
Since the trade route was repaired, Oskanian said, the economy had
largely returned to normal; but the consequences of Armenia's heavy
reliance on Georgia emphasized the need of establishing another
trading corridor to Europe through its western neighbor, Turkey.
The idea of easing tension with Turkey had already been brewing for
months, as Sarkisian had extended an invitation to Turkish President
Abdullah Gul in July to attend the Turkey-Armenia FIFA World Cup
soccer qualifying match on September 6. Gul's symbolic visit was the
first by a Turkish head of state to Armenia and was also in concert
with Turkey's proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Platform. The initiative is of utmost importance to Turkey's Eastern
foreign policy, as a greater involvement in the Caucasus, a tenuous
region with ties to Europe, could augment Turkey's credibility with
the European Union (Hetq, September 8).
While Turkey stands to benefit from improved relations with Armenia
on a political standpoint, Armenia's advantage would primarily be
economic with a more stable trade link to Europe.
"Despite all claims to the contrary, even outside of periods of
acute conflict and instability, the Armenian population is paying
a high price for the current situation," Oskanian said, noting that
costly imports and a low volume exports had resulted in a significant
trade imbalance. An open border would provide Armenia with access
to the Turkish Black Sea port of Trabzon, as well as the prospect of
connecting Armenia's rail network with Europe.
"This would open new markets and opportunities for Armenia's producers
and foreign investors and ease price pressures on consumers through
dramatically reduced transportation costs and a generally more open
and competitive economy," Oskanian said.
Before any borders are opened, however, Turkey wants the disputed
Karabakh conflict resolved, an issue that also influenced Armenia's
decision to remain neutral. Yerevan has yet to recognize the region
formally because of its current diplomatic efforts with Azerbaijan
under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group.