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OP-ED DJEREJIAN: U.S.-Iranian relations
The Washington Times
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
By Edward P. Djerejian
You negotiate peace with your adversaries and enemies, not with your
friends. That is what diplomacy is all about. With current sanctions
and talks under the aegis of the United Nations making little progress
in impeding Iran's nuclear program, concerns are mounting and there is
a steady drumbeat of possible resort to military options. Under these
circumstances, and on the eve of our presidential elections, there
could be no more urgent need than to address the overall United
States-Iranian relationship.
The costs of not talking with our adversaries are clear. This came
home to me when we were engaged in the Iraq Study Group (ISG) in 2006
and met with the Iranian Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. The lack of official and sustained communications between the
United States and Iran not only have led to misperceptions, certainly
on the part of the Iranians as to United States policies, but have
also proved an impediment to our ability to influence Iranian behavior
beyond sanctions and the implied threats of military action. The task
before us is this: How to engage the Iranians in serious discussions
that have the potential to identify whatever common ground may exist
between us on specific issues, and then to try to resolve those issues
in bilateral and multilateral forums, as appropriate.
The Iranians have engaged with us on Iraq, but they do not want a
dialogue on Iraq alone. They seek a broader agenda of discussions
where the major issues, both bilateral and regional, are on the
table. Sustained engagement between the United States and Iran on key
issues (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace, terrorism,
support for Hezbollah and Hamas, human rights, and bilateral
relations) could make real progress possible on the nuclear issue.
We need to put Iran into perspective. Without question, Iran is a
regional power in the Gulf and Middle East, by virtue of its size,
strategic location, rich history and culture, and oil and gas
resources. But Iran is not the Soviet Union, which constituted an
existential strategic threat to the United States.
Iran can threaten its neighbors in the Gulf and the region, including
Israel. However, most of these countries have strong bilateral
relations with the United States. Iran knows that if it threatens or
acts against them, it would seriously risk the active opposition of
the United States and other major powers. The concept of deterrence is
real in this respect from political and economic to military measures.
Given Iran's domestic, economic, and political problems and
challenges, Iran has strong reason not to antagonize the United States
to the point of confrontation. Such a confrontation would be costly
for both sides; for Iran, it would be devastating.
Therefore, as the world's preeminent power, the United States can
afford to take the first step in putting the Iranian regime to the
test by offering a broad strategic dialogue on all the key issues
between us. Our willingness to engage with Iran is not and in no way
should be seen as a lack of United States resolve on the key issues
that affect our national security interests and those of our friends,
especially the issue of nuclear weapons. While pursuing the nuclear
issue actively through multilateral means, a first step in a dialogue
could be an exchange of respective assessments regarding the key
regional issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace,
Lebanon, Gulf security, and terrorism.
The overall subset of these discussions would be the United
States-Iranian bilateral relationship. Here we will have to make clear
that we are not pursuing regime change. Instead, the United States
will look for a change in behavior and policies by Iran. We would
promote our positions on human rights, democracy, the role of civil
society, and the rule of law as structural parts of the bilateral
dialogue.
With regard to the nuclear issue, some analysts have suggested that
there are at least three key schools of thought in Iran. The first
school consists of hardliners who are determined to achieve a nuclear
weapons capability. A second is comprised of those who seek what might
be called the Japanese model. Namely, acquire the means to produce
nuclear weapons - without crossing that threshold, yet retain the
ability to do so. A third school argues that nuclear weapons are not
necessary. For these Iranians a more important goal is to address
pressing socio-economic needs through integration into the global
economy. These different factions should be taken into consideration
by U.S. diplomacy in a sophisticated manner to test the possibilities
for forward movement on the nuclear issue.
The stakes are simply too high in the United States-Iranian
relationship to not adopt a comprehensive, strategic and direct
dialogue at the highest levels. In sum, we should not miss this
opportunity to engage realistically and without illusions one of the
most important and adversarial regimes we face in the region.
Edward P. Djerejian, who served as ambassador to Syria and Israel, is
founding director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public
Policy at Rice University.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/ sep/17/us-iranian-relations/
The Washington Times
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
By Edward P. Djerejian
You negotiate peace with your adversaries and enemies, not with your
friends. That is what diplomacy is all about. With current sanctions
and talks under the aegis of the United Nations making little progress
in impeding Iran's nuclear program, concerns are mounting and there is
a steady drumbeat of possible resort to military options. Under these
circumstances, and on the eve of our presidential elections, there
could be no more urgent need than to address the overall United
States-Iranian relationship.
The costs of not talking with our adversaries are clear. This came
home to me when we were engaged in the Iraq Study Group (ISG) in 2006
and met with the Iranian Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. The lack of official and sustained communications between the
United States and Iran not only have led to misperceptions, certainly
on the part of the Iranians as to United States policies, but have
also proved an impediment to our ability to influence Iranian behavior
beyond sanctions and the implied threats of military action. The task
before us is this: How to engage the Iranians in serious discussions
that have the potential to identify whatever common ground may exist
between us on specific issues, and then to try to resolve those issues
in bilateral and multilateral forums, as appropriate.
The Iranians have engaged with us on Iraq, but they do not want a
dialogue on Iraq alone. They seek a broader agenda of discussions
where the major issues, both bilateral and regional, are on the
table. Sustained engagement between the United States and Iran on key
issues (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace, terrorism,
support for Hezbollah and Hamas, human rights, and bilateral
relations) could make real progress possible on the nuclear issue.
We need to put Iran into perspective. Without question, Iran is a
regional power in the Gulf and Middle East, by virtue of its size,
strategic location, rich history and culture, and oil and gas
resources. But Iran is not the Soviet Union, which constituted an
existential strategic threat to the United States.
Iran can threaten its neighbors in the Gulf and the region, including
Israel. However, most of these countries have strong bilateral
relations with the United States. Iran knows that if it threatens or
acts against them, it would seriously risk the active opposition of
the United States and other major powers. The concept of deterrence is
real in this respect from political and economic to military measures.
Given Iran's domestic, economic, and political problems and
challenges, Iran has strong reason not to antagonize the United States
to the point of confrontation. Such a confrontation would be costly
for both sides; for Iran, it would be devastating.
Therefore, as the world's preeminent power, the United States can
afford to take the first step in putting the Iranian regime to the
test by offering a broad strategic dialogue on all the key issues
between us. Our willingness to engage with Iran is not and in no way
should be seen as a lack of United States resolve on the key issues
that affect our national security interests and those of our friends,
especially the issue of nuclear weapons. While pursuing the nuclear
issue actively through multilateral means, a first step in a dialogue
could be an exchange of respective assessments regarding the key
regional issues such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace,
Lebanon, Gulf security, and terrorism.
The overall subset of these discussions would be the United
States-Iranian bilateral relationship. Here we will have to make clear
that we are not pursuing regime change. Instead, the United States
will look for a change in behavior and policies by Iran. We would
promote our positions on human rights, democracy, the role of civil
society, and the rule of law as structural parts of the bilateral
dialogue.
With regard to the nuclear issue, some analysts have suggested that
there are at least three key schools of thought in Iran. The first
school consists of hardliners who are determined to achieve a nuclear
weapons capability. A second is comprised of those who seek what might
be called the Japanese model. Namely, acquire the means to produce
nuclear weapons - without crossing that threshold, yet retain the
ability to do so. A third school argues that nuclear weapons are not
necessary. For these Iranians a more important goal is to address
pressing socio-economic needs through integration into the global
economy. These different factions should be taken into consideration
by U.S. diplomacy in a sophisticated manner to test the possibilities
for forward movement on the nuclear issue.
The stakes are simply too high in the United States-Iranian
relationship to not adopt a comprehensive, strategic and direct
dialogue at the highest levels. In sum, we should not miss this
opportunity to engage realistically and without illusions one of the
most important and adversarial regimes we face in the region.
Edward P. Djerejian, who served as ambassador to Syria and Israel, is
founding director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public
Policy at Rice University.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/ sep/17/us-iranian-relations/