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RETREAT WITH A SONG
AZG Armenian Daily
14/10/2008
Analysis
Most recent developments in the South Caucasus
In order to prevent various comments, it is first necessary to put
down that this article only aims at outlining the picture that has
been formed by the Armenian foreign policy in the "new" period - from
April 9, 2008 and after the stormy developments in the South Caucasus,
leaving the comparative analysis of the previously carried out policy
for the future.
At first glance, the period that embraces only six months may seem
very short for the analyses, but it is distinguished by unprecedented
activity and saturation that embraces all the basic directions of
the Armenian foreign policy interests - Nagorno Karabakh conflict
settlement, Armenian-Turkish relations including the issue of
recognition of the Armenian Genocide, regional conflicts, geopolitical
alterations, etc. Moreover, in April after the formation of the new
government, Armenia got two new main performers of its foreign policy
- the President of the Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and expectations of new emphases became quite actual.
Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement
More remarkable is President S. Sargsian's speech at the 63rd session
of the UN General Assembly about the issue that is of vital importance
to Armenia. Unfortunately, that part of the speech is not only the
most unsuccessful but also problematic with its three basic principles.
According to the first one, "self-determination right that is one
of the fundamental tenets of the international law is the reason
for banishment of the peoples, ethnic purges and genocides" (this
and following quotations from September 26 issue of "Hayastani
Hanrapetutyun" daily). It is hard to say who prepared the text
of the speech, the Foreign Ministry or the President's Staff, but
it is evident that the reality is turned upside down. The right of
self-determination is not the reason for ethnic purges and genocides
but the actions against recognition and application of it. When
Indonesia was not recognizing East Timor's self-determination
right for a long time and was persecuting the people claiming for
self-determination, the UN not only coerced Indonesia into recognizing
the right of self-determination but also not hindering from applying
it. Otherwise, it threatened to recognize Indonesia as a country
that committed genocide. Therefore, to declare that the right to
self-determination is the reason for ethnic purges and genocides is
quite consonant with the Azerbaijani well-known viewpoints.
According to the second principle of the speech of the Republic's
President, "We are far from the conception that the outcome of every
claim for self-determination should be separation" contradicts directly
both the Armenian party's interests and the Principles of International
Law; the application of self-determination right. Self-determination
right is an international norm that has unreserved and mandatory
erga omnes and jus cogens status. According to the "Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations" the aim of application of that right may be one of
these three cases freely chosen by the self-determined people, a/
creation of a sovereign and independent state, b/ free joining with
an independent state or unification with it, c/ some other political
status". It means that the international norms define that only the
self-determined people can decide which case of self-determination
to chose. No country and international organization is competent to
interfere in it.
The third principle used in the President's speech on settlement
of Nagorno Karabakh issue is the most unsuccessful, "In order to
be efficient and stable the implementation of self-determination
right through separation should get all parties' consent". It
is easy to notice that in essence this approach also contradicts
the above-mentioned principles of international law. Moreover, it
conditions the efficient implementation of self-determination right
by the Azerbaijani consent, and by this logic, implementation of
Nagorno Karabakh's right of separation will never be efficient, as
Azerbaijan will never give its consent to it. Azerbaijan may hardly
dream of more desirable wording by Armenia.
What is the reason of these blunders? Ignorance (of those who
prepared the speech) about the Principles of International Law
and the invulnerable arguments about the independence of Nagorno
Karabakh? Aspiration for inappropriate manifestation of "endurance" and
"broad-mindedness" in front of the international community? Superficial
and careless attitude towards the issues of vital importance to
the country?
Armenian-Turkish relations
Similar questions of the recent developments in Armenian-Turkish
relations arise as well. Turkish President Abdullah Gul a few days
later after visiting Yerevan announced in Baku that after meeting
with President Sargsian he got impression that "Armenians are ready to
return the occupied territories". The Armenian side didn't respond to
it in any way. While, in connection with such important issues, after
the bilateral meetings the sides either comment on the meetings with
similar formulations or if one of the sides has made an inadmissible
comment, the other side refutes it or gives its own viewpoint. In this
case, silence may be perceived not only as consent but also may raise
new questions - Which territories? In return for what? When? etc. If
in case of settlement negotiations reticence is an understandable
and acceptable principle, then after bilateral meetings the comments
of one of the sides should receive adequate response. Probably,
Gul's later statement that "Turkey may improve its relations with
Armenia only if the latter sets free the Azerbaijani territories"
was the answer to the silence.
Of course, Armenia should conduct a policy full of initiative and in
this context, inviting Gul to Armenia may be observed as a successful
step. Though that step was qualified as "football diplomacy", it
shouldn't start and end in football meeting. While the developments
after Gul's visit confirm that there were no preparatory meetings
(it is not about the meetings for fixing of technical problems of
the visit, but for the issues that would be discussed by the two
presidents and possible arrangements) and they will not be, as the
preconditions of the Turkish side remain unchangeable.
Moreover, the Armenian side took one more reverence announcing that
after establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of borders they
may set up a commission to discuss the issues of the Genocide. It's
a pity, but we should admit that Armenia is taking the bait.
Creation of the commission is meaningless in itself, as in scientific
circles there are magazines, seminars, conferences, etc. that
discuss various issues. Scientific discussions don't need creation of
intergovernmental institutions. At the same time, it is evident that
even in case of creation of similar commission it will be fruitless
as the two states will involve scientists to present their viewpoints
that will keep their (their states') positions up to the end. Similar
commission can have only one meaning and aim; during the whole period
of its existence Turkey will gain a strong factor to suspend the
subsequent recognition of the Genocide; to show other states that
"if Armenia is ready to discuss the issues of those "incidents"
then by what logic are you going to recognize the Genocide?"
An example of Armenia's involvement in those fruitless initiatives was
the tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers in New York. Usually
representatives of three states meet when one of them becomes a
mediator in case of strained relations, or if there are complex
issues referring to the three sides equally. Turkish mediation in
the issue of Karabakh conflict settlement may be hardly admitted
seriously not only because of its preconditions but also showing no
less interests in the solution of the conflict than Azerbaijan, which,
according to Azerbaijani official viewpoint, excludes discussion of any
issue with Armenia. What was the topic of those discussions? In what
scopes of principles? What was Armenia's position on the solutions of
the discussed issues? If Karabakh issue was discussed, where was the
representative of the most interested side - Nagorno Karabakh? General,
customary explanations don't give answers to any of these questions.
Similar meetings are not only fruitless but they also devalue Armenia's
announcements of respect for the right of Nagorno Karabakh people to
self-determination. In this connection, the representatives of Nagorno
Karabakh have the exclusive right to declare the position on it. If
Armenian authorities really want to increase the significance of
the National Assembly, they should at least take into consideration
the proposals of the National Assembly April 29 statement for
the process of Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement, including
provision of participation of Nagorno Karabakh representatives in
the process as internationally recognized party. As long as Armenia
does not realize this plain truth and does not take rational steps
to return Nagorno Karabakh to the table of negotiations, Bryzas of
different calibers will continue to talk nonsense that the issue will
be settled in the framework of Azerbaijani territorial integrity,
and the official representatives of Armenia will keep silence with
"broad-mindedness". Turkey will continue collecting parts of its mosaic
picture as a regional leader or at least an important "player". Only
in this scope become meaningful both Gul's visit and tripartite
meeting of the foreign ministers, also Turkish initiative to create
"Stability and Cooperation Platform", which is and will be nothing
than a title, as a country that keeps closed the borders with its
neighbor and makes preconditions for establishment of normal relations
should at least renounce its preconditions in order to affirm its
sincerity. But it could be in a case when as a result of Armenia's
serious and substantial arguments Turkey saw that its efforts were in
vain. The slogans for establishment of good-neighborly relations and
not passing on a painful heritage to future generations cannot win
Turkey over. Quite the reverse, Turkey feels like a fish in water
especially during the review of the borderlines of the areas of
influences in the region. In the beginning of the 20th century when
almost the same processes were taking place in the South Caucasus with
almost the same performers, Turkey crashed down by Antanta was able to
present false "documents" to Russia creating favorable conditions for
itself. Today, when the United States and Russia push one another to
settle down in the South Caucasus, Turkey actively weave its picture
to affirm its important role in the region. A striking illustration
of it is Turkish President's speech at the 63rd session of the UN
General Assembly. But what does Armenia gain from participating in
all of these? Nothing; with the exception of a short-term PR-action
and several "encouraging" announcements of foreign officials.
It is time to understand that any visit, meeting or negotiation is
given a meaning and aim when the scope of issues to be discussed are
worked out beforehand; the preparatory groups come to an agreement with
each other about the solutions (if not final solution then they take
steps toward it ) of the issues. After, all of these are presented
to the public.
Geopolitical alterations and Armenian-Georgian relations
The Russian-Georgian war in August not only gave rise to exposure of
the struggle for the areas of influences in the South Caucasus between
Russia and the United States, but also became a serious geopolitical
issue having a relation to the review of Russia's role in the world
policy, settlement of the conflicts, etc. Though various variants
and comments were made about the motives for starting a war by the
President Saakashvili, it seems more probable that the following
schema was the basis of the initiative - Georgia started the war on
the threshold of the World Olympic Games that could have two ways out:
either the factor of the Games become decisive and under the pressure
of the international community the war stops and Georgia has a symbolic
achievement (Saakashvili keeps his promise of land-gathering), or
what happened in reality - Georgia "got rid of" Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, which were obstacles to being integrated into NATO; Georgia
got real perspectives of voluminous investments. Russia gained the
above-mentioned territories and appealed for a new role in the world
processes. The United States entirely "tore" Georgia from Russia
and gained a real territory in the South Caucasus to settle down
fully. Of course, the people of Georgia need time to "understand"
that it was the best variant for them.
What did Armenia gain and lose? Until now different analysts speak
of only one achievement - Azerbaijan probably understood that it
is impossible to settle the conflicts by military way, though the
history of mankind testifies that the conclusions after the wars have
a short life, at the same time, the conflicts of Georgia in spite of
everything got a military solution in favor of more powerful Russia.
The losses of Armenia - damaged and not fully reconstructed transport
links with Georgia, loss of 670 mln US dollars, leading of a crusade
by the West in favor of the principle of territorial integrity that
will complicate the settlement of Karabakh issue. Of course, we should
take into account the objective difficulties - geopolitical unfavorable
position, the most unfavorable confrontation of the Russian-Georgian
couple, etc. Anyway, Armenia cannot change those factors and the
solutions should be found under those circumstances. Armenia chose
the passive neutrality - silence, in contrast to its neighbor Turkey,
which took a position of active neutrality. Future developments once
again proved that passivity may only decrease the losses at best,
but it cannot provide achievements, all the more in relations like
Armenian-Georgian, where the outward and content differ abruptly. The
statements of the centuries-old friendship of the Armenian and
Georgian people don't even arouse a smile. The relations between the
neighboring states cannot be established on the basis of similar
primitive formulas. Isn't it time to see that Georgia prefers to
deal with not Armenia in case of any alternative? Are the issues of
mutual interests formulated? Which is Georgia's interest that will
induce the latter to cooperate actively with Armenia? When will the
provincial thinking and primitive policy on the issue of Javakhk end?
Development of Armenian-Russian relations after Russian-Georgian war
is a separate issue. New and important stresses are laid on the issue
by Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov in an interview published in
October 7 issue of "Rossiyskaya gazeta". By the way, a perceptible
change is noticeable in the Russian position on Turkey and Azerbaijan.
It is already the second month that Russia takes a pretty cautious
attitude towards Azerbaijan. First, immediately after recognition
of independences of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Mr. Lavrov hurried to
announce that Nagorno Karabakh is a different case as in connection
of the first two one a war, ethnic purges, attempt of genocide took
place. In the interview published in "Rossiyskaya gazeta" Mr. Lavrov
touched upon the settlement of Karabakh conflict in full details
saying almost nothing of Azerbaijan. Of course, after "losing" Georgia
Russia's sensitivity to Azerbaijan is quite comprehensible, as in case
of losing it Russia will not only lose its influence on Azerbaijani
power-bearing substances but also will have to renounce its ideas of
expanding areas of influences in the south of the Caucasus. At present,
it is not even important to Russia that Armenia is a member of CIS
countries in contrary to Azerbaijan. While speaking of the settlement
of Nagorno Karabakh conflict S. Lavrov underlined several times,
"Armenia's colossal difficulties in contacts with the outer world",
underscoring that "there are not many geographical and political
ways out" of that situation. "As soon as Karabakh conflict settlement
becomes a fact, Turkey will be ready to help Armenia in establishing
of normal relations with the outer world", said Russian Foreign
Minister at the same time reminding that only two-three issues remain
unsolved (first` the issue of Lachin) in the issue of Karabakh conflict
settlement. It is easy to take the hint - solve those two-three issues
in the way that is acceptable to your neighbors and you will achieve
the "Turkish way of life". But why does Russian Foreign Minister
direct Armenia towards Turkey? Maybe Lavrov really believes in the
"traditional course of Ankara" (according to it, regional countries
should be given the right to solve the issues of Caucasian and
contiguous countries independently) or the future of the Turkish
"Stability and Cooperation Platform"? Assuredly, no! Russia should see
that it is only a bluff like the program to propagate the Communist
ideology in the East at the beginning of the last century. The main aim
is clear: Turkey has problems with Armenia, which is greatly influenced
by Russia, the latter has expectations of Azerbaijan that is strongly
influenced by Turkey. Solution of Turkish problems does not contradict
the Russian interests and vice versa. Consequently, Russia and Turkey
have an opportunity of agreement driven by their interests and they
try to realize it. The price that Armenia will pay for it will be
not so much the issue of the Armenian Genocide but the schema of
Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement, when each element and detail
is of exceptional and unprecedented importance. Armenia has no right
to be mistaken. Artsakh may not endure a new 70-year temptation. In
this case, it will not be difficult to deal with Armenia.
The situation in the South Caucasus gains new qualities and the
perspectives of further developments change abruptly because of the
United States that settled down irretrievably, the unprecedented
activation of the European Union and Russian-Turkish recurrent
cohabitation. In this case, Armenia needs a foreign policy of a
new quality both on regional developments and the issue of Karabakh
conflict settlement in order not only to record a success but also
to avoid failure.
The results of the last six months testify that the changes in the
foreign policy of Armenia have only advocating and PR nature and it
cannot meet the forthcoming challenges on the basis of it. Even if it
is attractive in a short period of time, it is fraught with serious
consequences for the continuous period of time.
While today the foundation of the long-term developments are being
laid down in the region.
By Tigran Torosian, Doctor of Political Sciences, former Speaker of
the National Assembly, Translated by L.H.
AZG Armenian Daily
14/10/2008
Analysis
Most recent developments in the South Caucasus
In order to prevent various comments, it is first necessary to put
down that this article only aims at outlining the picture that has
been formed by the Armenian foreign policy in the "new" period - from
April 9, 2008 and after the stormy developments in the South Caucasus,
leaving the comparative analysis of the previously carried out policy
for the future.
At first glance, the period that embraces only six months may seem
very short for the analyses, but it is distinguished by unprecedented
activity and saturation that embraces all the basic directions of
the Armenian foreign policy interests - Nagorno Karabakh conflict
settlement, Armenian-Turkish relations including the issue of
recognition of the Armenian Genocide, regional conflicts, geopolitical
alterations, etc. Moreover, in April after the formation of the new
government, Armenia got two new main performers of its foreign policy
- the President of the Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and expectations of new emphases became quite actual.
Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement
More remarkable is President S. Sargsian's speech at the 63rd session
of the UN General Assembly about the issue that is of vital importance
to Armenia. Unfortunately, that part of the speech is not only the
most unsuccessful but also problematic with its three basic principles.
According to the first one, "self-determination right that is one
of the fundamental tenets of the international law is the reason
for banishment of the peoples, ethnic purges and genocides" (this
and following quotations from September 26 issue of "Hayastani
Hanrapetutyun" daily). It is hard to say who prepared the text
of the speech, the Foreign Ministry or the President's Staff, but
it is evident that the reality is turned upside down. The right of
self-determination is not the reason for ethnic purges and genocides
but the actions against recognition and application of it. When
Indonesia was not recognizing East Timor's self-determination
right for a long time and was persecuting the people claiming for
self-determination, the UN not only coerced Indonesia into recognizing
the right of self-determination but also not hindering from applying
it. Otherwise, it threatened to recognize Indonesia as a country
that committed genocide. Therefore, to declare that the right to
self-determination is the reason for ethnic purges and genocides is
quite consonant with the Azerbaijani well-known viewpoints.
According to the second principle of the speech of the Republic's
President, "We are far from the conception that the outcome of every
claim for self-determination should be separation" contradicts directly
both the Armenian party's interests and the Principles of International
Law; the application of self-determination right. Self-determination
right is an international norm that has unreserved and mandatory
erga omnes and jus cogens status. According to the "Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations" the aim of application of that right may be one of
these three cases freely chosen by the self-determined people, a/
creation of a sovereign and independent state, b/ free joining with
an independent state or unification with it, c/ some other political
status". It means that the international norms define that only the
self-determined people can decide which case of self-determination
to chose. No country and international organization is competent to
interfere in it.
The third principle used in the President's speech on settlement
of Nagorno Karabakh issue is the most unsuccessful, "In order to
be efficient and stable the implementation of self-determination
right through separation should get all parties' consent". It
is easy to notice that in essence this approach also contradicts
the above-mentioned principles of international law. Moreover, it
conditions the efficient implementation of self-determination right
by the Azerbaijani consent, and by this logic, implementation of
Nagorno Karabakh's right of separation will never be efficient, as
Azerbaijan will never give its consent to it. Azerbaijan may hardly
dream of more desirable wording by Armenia.
What is the reason of these blunders? Ignorance (of those who
prepared the speech) about the Principles of International Law
and the invulnerable arguments about the independence of Nagorno
Karabakh? Aspiration for inappropriate manifestation of "endurance" and
"broad-mindedness" in front of the international community? Superficial
and careless attitude towards the issues of vital importance to
the country?
Armenian-Turkish relations
Similar questions of the recent developments in Armenian-Turkish
relations arise as well. Turkish President Abdullah Gul a few days
later after visiting Yerevan announced in Baku that after meeting
with President Sargsian he got impression that "Armenians are ready to
return the occupied territories". The Armenian side didn't respond to
it in any way. While, in connection with such important issues, after
the bilateral meetings the sides either comment on the meetings with
similar formulations or if one of the sides has made an inadmissible
comment, the other side refutes it or gives its own viewpoint. In this
case, silence may be perceived not only as consent but also may raise
new questions - Which territories? In return for what? When? etc. If
in case of settlement negotiations reticence is an understandable
and acceptable principle, then after bilateral meetings the comments
of one of the sides should receive adequate response. Probably,
Gul's later statement that "Turkey may improve its relations with
Armenia only if the latter sets free the Azerbaijani territories"
was the answer to the silence.
Of course, Armenia should conduct a policy full of initiative and in
this context, inviting Gul to Armenia may be observed as a successful
step. Though that step was qualified as "football diplomacy", it
shouldn't start and end in football meeting. While the developments
after Gul's visit confirm that there were no preparatory meetings
(it is not about the meetings for fixing of technical problems of
the visit, but for the issues that would be discussed by the two
presidents and possible arrangements) and they will not be, as the
preconditions of the Turkish side remain unchangeable.
Moreover, the Armenian side took one more reverence announcing that
after establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of borders they
may set up a commission to discuss the issues of the Genocide. It's
a pity, but we should admit that Armenia is taking the bait.
Creation of the commission is meaningless in itself, as in scientific
circles there are magazines, seminars, conferences, etc. that
discuss various issues. Scientific discussions don't need creation of
intergovernmental institutions. At the same time, it is evident that
even in case of creation of similar commission it will be fruitless
as the two states will involve scientists to present their viewpoints
that will keep their (their states') positions up to the end. Similar
commission can have only one meaning and aim; during the whole period
of its existence Turkey will gain a strong factor to suspend the
subsequent recognition of the Genocide; to show other states that
"if Armenia is ready to discuss the issues of those "incidents"
then by what logic are you going to recognize the Genocide?"
An example of Armenia's involvement in those fruitless initiatives was
the tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers in New York. Usually
representatives of three states meet when one of them becomes a
mediator in case of strained relations, or if there are complex
issues referring to the three sides equally. Turkish mediation in
the issue of Karabakh conflict settlement may be hardly admitted
seriously not only because of its preconditions but also showing no
less interests in the solution of the conflict than Azerbaijan, which,
according to Azerbaijani official viewpoint, excludes discussion of any
issue with Armenia. What was the topic of those discussions? In what
scopes of principles? What was Armenia's position on the solutions of
the discussed issues? If Karabakh issue was discussed, where was the
representative of the most interested side - Nagorno Karabakh? General,
customary explanations don't give answers to any of these questions.
Similar meetings are not only fruitless but they also devalue Armenia's
announcements of respect for the right of Nagorno Karabakh people to
self-determination. In this connection, the representatives of Nagorno
Karabakh have the exclusive right to declare the position on it. If
Armenian authorities really want to increase the significance of
the National Assembly, they should at least take into consideration
the proposals of the National Assembly April 29 statement for
the process of Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement, including
provision of participation of Nagorno Karabakh representatives in
the process as internationally recognized party. As long as Armenia
does not realize this plain truth and does not take rational steps
to return Nagorno Karabakh to the table of negotiations, Bryzas of
different calibers will continue to talk nonsense that the issue will
be settled in the framework of Azerbaijani territorial integrity,
and the official representatives of Armenia will keep silence with
"broad-mindedness". Turkey will continue collecting parts of its mosaic
picture as a regional leader or at least an important "player". Only
in this scope become meaningful both Gul's visit and tripartite
meeting of the foreign ministers, also Turkish initiative to create
"Stability and Cooperation Platform", which is and will be nothing
than a title, as a country that keeps closed the borders with its
neighbor and makes preconditions for establishment of normal relations
should at least renounce its preconditions in order to affirm its
sincerity. But it could be in a case when as a result of Armenia's
serious and substantial arguments Turkey saw that its efforts were in
vain. The slogans for establishment of good-neighborly relations and
not passing on a painful heritage to future generations cannot win
Turkey over. Quite the reverse, Turkey feels like a fish in water
especially during the review of the borderlines of the areas of
influences in the region. In the beginning of the 20th century when
almost the same processes were taking place in the South Caucasus with
almost the same performers, Turkey crashed down by Antanta was able to
present false "documents" to Russia creating favorable conditions for
itself. Today, when the United States and Russia push one another to
settle down in the South Caucasus, Turkey actively weave its picture
to affirm its important role in the region. A striking illustration
of it is Turkish President's speech at the 63rd session of the UN
General Assembly. But what does Armenia gain from participating in
all of these? Nothing; with the exception of a short-term PR-action
and several "encouraging" announcements of foreign officials.
It is time to understand that any visit, meeting or negotiation is
given a meaning and aim when the scope of issues to be discussed are
worked out beforehand; the preparatory groups come to an agreement with
each other about the solutions (if not final solution then they take
steps toward it ) of the issues. After, all of these are presented
to the public.
Geopolitical alterations and Armenian-Georgian relations
The Russian-Georgian war in August not only gave rise to exposure of
the struggle for the areas of influences in the South Caucasus between
Russia and the United States, but also became a serious geopolitical
issue having a relation to the review of Russia's role in the world
policy, settlement of the conflicts, etc. Though various variants
and comments were made about the motives for starting a war by the
President Saakashvili, it seems more probable that the following
schema was the basis of the initiative - Georgia started the war on
the threshold of the World Olympic Games that could have two ways out:
either the factor of the Games become decisive and under the pressure
of the international community the war stops and Georgia has a symbolic
achievement (Saakashvili keeps his promise of land-gathering), or
what happened in reality - Georgia "got rid of" Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, which were obstacles to being integrated into NATO; Georgia
got real perspectives of voluminous investments. Russia gained the
above-mentioned territories and appealed for a new role in the world
processes. The United States entirely "tore" Georgia from Russia
and gained a real territory in the South Caucasus to settle down
fully. Of course, the people of Georgia need time to "understand"
that it was the best variant for them.
What did Armenia gain and lose? Until now different analysts speak
of only one achievement - Azerbaijan probably understood that it
is impossible to settle the conflicts by military way, though the
history of mankind testifies that the conclusions after the wars have
a short life, at the same time, the conflicts of Georgia in spite of
everything got a military solution in favor of more powerful Russia.
The losses of Armenia - damaged and not fully reconstructed transport
links with Georgia, loss of 670 mln US dollars, leading of a crusade
by the West in favor of the principle of territorial integrity that
will complicate the settlement of Karabakh issue. Of course, we should
take into account the objective difficulties - geopolitical unfavorable
position, the most unfavorable confrontation of the Russian-Georgian
couple, etc. Anyway, Armenia cannot change those factors and the
solutions should be found under those circumstances. Armenia chose
the passive neutrality - silence, in contrast to its neighbor Turkey,
which took a position of active neutrality. Future developments once
again proved that passivity may only decrease the losses at best,
but it cannot provide achievements, all the more in relations like
Armenian-Georgian, where the outward and content differ abruptly. The
statements of the centuries-old friendship of the Armenian and
Georgian people don't even arouse a smile. The relations between the
neighboring states cannot be established on the basis of similar
primitive formulas. Isn't it time to see that Georgia prefers to
deal with not Armenia in case of any alternative? Are the issues of
mutual interests formulated? Which is Georgia's interest that will
induce the latter to cooperate actively with Armenia? When will the
provincial thinking and primitive policy on the issue of Javakhk end?
Development of Armenian-Russian relations after Russian-Georgian war
is a separate issue. New and important stresses are laid on the issue
by Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov in an interview published in
October 7 issue of "Rossiyskaya gazeta". By the way, a perceptible
change is noticeable in the Russian position on Turkey and Azerbaijan.
It is already the second month that Russia takes a pretty cautious
attitude towards Azerbaijan. First, immediately after recognition
of independences of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Mr. Lavrov hurried to
announce that Nagorno Karabakh is a different case as in connection
of the first two one a war, ethnic purges, attempt of genocide took
place. In the interview published in "Rossiyskaya gazeta" Mr. Lavrov
touched upon the settlement of Karabakh conflict in full details
saying almost nothing of Azerbaijan. Of course, after "losing" Georgia
Russia's sensitivity to Azerbaijan is quite comprehensible, as in case
of losing it Russia will not only lose its influence on Azerbaijani
power-bearing substances but also will have to renounce its ideas of
expanding areas of influences in the south of the Caucasus. At present,
it is not even important to Russia that Armenia is a member of CIS
countries in contrary to Azerbaijan. While speaking of the settlement
of Nagorno Karabakh conflict S. Lavrov underlined several times,
"Armenia's colossal difficulties in contacts with the outer world",
underscoring that "there are not many geographical and political
ways out" of that situation. "As soon as Karabakh conflict settlement
becomes a fact, Turkey will be ready to help Armenia in establishing
of normal relations with the outer world", said Russian Foreign
Minister at the same time reminding that only two-three issues remain
unsolved (first` the issue of Lachin) in the issue of Karabakh conflict
settlement. It is easy to take the hint - solve those two-three issues
in the way that is acceptable to your neighbors and you will achieve
the "Turkish way of life". But why does Russian Foreign Minister
direct Armenia towards Turkey? Maybe Lavrov really believes in the
"traditional course of Ankara" (according to it, regional countries
should be given the right to solve the issues of Caucasian and
contiguous countries independently) or the future of the Turkish
"Stability and Cooperation Platform"? Assuredly, no! Russia should see
that it is only a bluff like the program to propagate the Communist
ideology in the East at the beginning of the last century. The main aim
is clear: Turkey has problems with Armenia, which is greatly influenced
by Russia, the latter has expectations of Azerbaijan that is strongly
influenced by Turkey. Solution of Turkish problems does not contradict
the Russian interests and vice versa. Consequently, Russia and Turkey
have an opportunity of agreement driven by their interests and they
try to realize it. The price that Armenia will pay for it will be
not so much the issue of the Armenian Genocide but the schema of
Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement, when each element and detail
is of exceptional and unprecedented importance. Armenia has no right
to be mistaken. Artsakh may not endure a new 70-year temptation. In
this case, it will not be difficult to deal with Armenia.
The situation in the South Caucasus gains new qualities and the
perspectives of further developments change abruptly because of the
United States that settled down irretrievably, the unprecedented
activation of the European Union and Russian-Turkish recurrent
cohabitation. In this case, Armenia needs a foreign policy of a
new quality both on regional developments and the issue of Karabakh
conflict settlement in order not only to record a success but also
to avoid failure.
The results of the last six months testify that the changes in the
foreign policy of Armenia have only advocating and PR nature and it
cannot meet the forthcoming challenges on the basis of it. Even if it
is attractive in a short period of time, it is fraught with serious
consequences for the continuous period of time.
While today the foundation of the long-term developments are being
laid down in the region.
By Tigran Torosian, Doctor of Political Sciences, former Speaker of
the National Assembly, Translated by L.H.