Tweet
THE BEAR VERSUS ANACONDA: OUTLINES OF AN ASYMMETRICAL ANSWER
Yuri Baranchik
en.fondsk.ru
14.10.2008
Having analyzed Russia's recent foreign policy moves one can state
that visible in them are outlines of the "asymmetrical" answer the
Russian leadership pledged to make given the deployment of the U.S.
anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic as well as the
continuing US attempts to destabilize the post-Soviet space (first
of all, Georgia and Ukraine).
The US strategy in Eurasia has the systemic long-term character
in line with what is referred to as "the anaconda plan". (See, for
example V.Dergachev's "The Anaconda Loop: New Vistas of US Eurasian
Policies", V.Korovin "Rings of Time and Space", What is meant is
the plan called "Anaconda" the army of the North devised to destroy
the southern adversaries during the Civil war in the United States,
that was fulfilled in full, resulting in the capitulation of the army
led by General Robert Lee. The gist of the plan was the consecutive
cutting off of significant Confederation -controlled territories,
rounding and strangling it to make the adversary stop fighting.
In the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union the United States
chose to opt for a similar strategy regarding new democratic Russia
definitely taking into account the difference of the scale of current
developments. "The Anaconda Loop" gets tighter around Russia: a)
geographically, by the steady edging it out from the sea shores;
b) geopolitically, by steadily narrowing the Eurasian territory
it controls, formation of a chain of adversary states around it,
and the contracting the space of its political manoeuvring in its
relations with the countries in this region; c) economy-wise, by the
deliberate creation of obstacles at the export routes of Russia's
hydrocarbons, destabilisation of transit territories and backing of
competitor projects.
In terms of geography, the break-up of the Soviet Union diminished
Moscow's influence in many regions of the world, primarily in Eastern
Europe. After the Baltic republics departed for NATO, Russia's clout
in the Baltic Sea was seriously reduced. The possible departure for
NATO of Georgia and Ukraine would also do irreparable harm to Russia's
interests and defence potential in Black Sea and the Caucasus.
The narrowing of Moscow's political influence resulted in the fact
that all the Eastern European countries that previously were Warsaw
Pact members are now NATO member-states, guided in their relations
with Russia primarily by directives of Washington and Brussels.
Under the circumstances the territories of the post-Soviet states
becomes the principal direction of the Russia-US geopolitical standoff.
Keeping the countries of the former USSR with in Russia's zone of
interests is one of the most burning issues Russia's foreign policies
have to address. Should these countries join the North Atlantic
alliance that counterpoises Russia, the next US move would be an
attempt to gain control of the territories across from the Russian
frontiers, primarily the Northern Caucasus.
Economy-wise the United States does its best to lobby transport
and energy projects "by-passing Russia" ("Nabucco" and others). The
current degree of Russian presence in the European energy sector is a
serious obstacle to the US determination to completely control European
political and business elites. Simultaneously Washington makes its
best to withstand Moscow's efforts to integrate the single Eurasian
space relying on infrastructure, transport and energy "braces."
No doubt, Georgia's invasion of South Ossetia was one of the elements
of the "anaconda loop." Russia's interference into the conflict on
the side of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was both a military defeat of
the aggressor and a serious blow on the strategy of strangling Russia
by the "anaconda loop." The Georgian-Ossetian conflict was apparently
the last drop that overfilled the cup of Russian leadership's patience.
But which Russia's moves enable us to speak about discerning outlines
of an "asymmetrical" answer to the United States?
Returning to Latin Ameri ca First of all, it is the Russian comeback
to Latin America.
As early as the 19th century "the Monroe doctrine" defined Latin
America as the exclusive area of US interests, a sort of Yankees'
closed national park. Therefore Americans were very bitter about
the establishment by the Soviet Union of its influence zone (Cuba,
Chile and Nicaragua) in the south of the American continent.
After quite a lengthy lull, at long last Russia began to pursue
offensive strategy and interact with Latin American countries. These
relations received a great boost following "the 5-day war "in the
Caucasus.
Russia's stepping stones in Latin America can be Venezuela, Bolivia
and Ecuador. Relations with long-time allies in the region, Cuba and
Nicaragua have risen to a new level. The agreements in the course
of the recent visit to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua of Russia's
vice-premier I.Sechin will enable these countries to implement a number
of energy projects including the Cuban shelf at the Gulf of Mexico.
The Russian return to Latin America also has a military dimension. In
September, two Russian strategic bombers landed in Venezuela, and in
November an entry of a Russian Navy squadron is planned to take place
in Venezuela. This is how Moscow makes Washington understand that if
need be, it could control the main route of oil delivery from Persian
Gulf to the United States.
Fightin g Somalia's Pirates In this connection Moscow's concern over
the rise of pirate activities in Somalia's waters becomes clear,
as that country both controls the entrance to Red Sea from Persian
Gulf and the by-pass around Africa.
Pirates' actions are a threat to the energy security of Europe,
Moscow's chief trade partner.
It should be stressed that a similar strategy of addressing the
problems of its energy resources' delivery have deteriorated of late,
is pursued by China. Relying on its military presence in Pakistani
seaports it plans to both ensure a safer routes of delivery of Middle
Eastern oil to its markets, and to begin rendering continuous pressure
on the United States (given that potential emergence of the Chinese
Navy in the Ormuz Strait is a serious argument).
The Caucasian Pact and Georgia's Break-up The latest reports shed
much light on the covert side of the "Caucasian pact" Turkey came
up with immediately following the active phase of the Georgia-South
Ossetia conflict. In essence what it was all about was the plan of
Georgia's federalisation and its potential follow-up break-up, after
which Azerbaijan (with the campaign of issuing national passports to
the Azeri community in Georgia), Armenia and Turkey, that could also
hope to annex Adzharia.
This way the key ally of the United States could be removed from the
region, making the Caucasian situat ion more stable and providing
grounds for studying the issue of transport of Central Asia's and
Iran's energy resources to Europe via the Caucasus.
Natural Gas and the Railroad: A Route for the Economic Integration of
the Korean Peninsula During the recent visit to Russia of South Korea's
president the parties concluded a $90-billion agreement on the supplies
of Russia's natural gas to South Korea. The gas pipeline is to cross
the territory of North Korea. Besides, the JSC "RZhD" and Deutsche
Bank came up with the idea of building a railroad to tie up all the
tree countries providing an entry to the Trans-Siberian Mainline.
Both projects feature a serious political potential with an eye to
the future reunion of the Korean peninsula. Besides, it is all about
a serious consolidation of North Korea's negotiating position in its
dialogue with the United States. It was not by chance that shortly
before the South Korea's president paid his visit to Moscow, Pyongyang
began to vigorously reinstate its nuclear infrastructure. The "carrot"
of their supplies of fuel oil that Americans held before Koreans at
the negotiations, is no longer a stimulus, provided that in several
years North Korea would be able to meet its demands of natural gas,
and correspondingly, electricity that would have a direct impact on
the entire chain of DPRK's industries.
Finally, by ce menting the Korean peninsula by two serious
infrastructure projects, the transport and energy ones, would allow
Russia to both earn significant profits from its supplies of resources
and cargo transit, channelling it to the development of Siberia and
the Far East, and would have a considerable rise of Russia's political
weight in the entire Asian and Pacific Rim region.
Conclusions Over the period following the August war in the Caucasus
the Russian leadership succeeded in demonstrating to Washington that in
the event of its stake on further confrontation it can create serious
problems on those directions of ensuring US national security where
to date Americans felt secure.
First, Russia can answer to the deployment by the US of elements of
its anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe and American interventionist
policies in the former Soviet republics by installing its continuous
military presence at the routes of petroleum delivery to the United
States. That would cast doubts on the notorious "Monroe doctrine"
in the Western hemisphere.
Second, the needed liquidation of the Georgian swelling makes it
possible that Russia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan can reach a
strategic agreement on having control over "the Caucasian knot". Should
Georgia actively counteract this plan, the issue of mounting pressure
by relevant communities in Georgia on its leadership could be raised
with an eye to achieving the=2 0country's federalisation, and -
as an extreme - even its liquidation as a failed state.
Third, by acting the way it does in the Korean peninsula, Russia shows
a principally different logic of development of present-day states
than does the United States. If Americans aim at inciting conflicts,
creation of "the controlled chaos" and reaching of agreements relying
on the military force and ultimatums Russia's offer to its partners
mutually profitable economic projects upon which to build political
collaboration.
It can be assumed that in the conditions of further escalation by
the US side of tensions with Russia we might soon learn about other
"asymmetrical" answers Moscow can give to the challenges of the
"global superpower" that overestimated its potential.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Yuri Baranchik
en.fondsk.ru
14.10.2008
Having analyzed Russia's recent foreign policy moves one can state
that visible in them are outlines of the "asymmetrical" answer the
Russian leadership pledged to make given the deployment of the U.S.
anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic as well as the
continuing US attempts to destabilize the post-Soviet space (first
of all, Georgia and Ukraine).
The US strategy in Eurasia has the systemic long-term character
in line with what is referred to as "the anaconda plan". (See, for
example V.Dergachev's "The Anaconda Loop: New Vistas of US Eurasian
Policies", V.Korovin "Rings of Time and Space", What is meant is
the plan called "Anaconda" the army of the North devised to destroy
the southern adversaries during the Civil war in the United States,
that was fulfilled in full, resulting in the capitulation of the army
led by General Robert Lee. The gist of the plan was the consecutive
cutting off of significant Confederation -controlled territories,
rounding and strangling it to make the adversary stop fighting.
In the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union the United States
chose to opt for a similar strategy regarding new democratic Russia
definitely taking into account the difference of the scale of current
developments. "The Anaconda Loop" gets tighter around Russia: a)
geographically, by the steady edging it out from the sea shores;
b) geopolitically, by steadily narrowing the Eurasian territory
it controls, formation of a chain of adversary states around it,
and the contracting the space of its political manoeuvring in its
relations with the countries in this region; c) economy-wise, by the
deliberate creation of obstacles at the export routes of Russia's
hydrocarbons, destabilisation of transit territories and backing of
competitor projects.
In terms of geography, the break-up of the Soviet Union diminished
Moscow's influence in many regions of the world, primarily in Eastern
Europe. After the Baltic republics departed for NATO, Russia's clout
in the Baltic Sea was seriously reduced. The possible departure for
NATO of Georgia and Ukraine would also do irreparable harm to Russia's
interests and defence potential in Black Sea and the Caucasus.
The narrowing of Moscow's political influence resulted in the fact
that all the Eastern European countries that previously were Warsaw
Pact members are now NATO member-states, guided in their relations
with Russia primarily by directives of Washington and Brussels.
Under the circumstances the territories of the post-Soviet states
becomes the principal direction of the Russia-US geopolitical standoff.
Keeping the countries of the former USSR with in Russia's zone of
interests is one of the most burning issues Russia's foreign policies
have to address. Should these countries join the North Atlantic
alliance that counterpoises Russia, the next US move would be an
attempt to gain control of the territories across from the Russian
frontiers, primarily the Northern Caucasus.
Economy-wise the United States does its best to lobby transport
and energy projects "by-passing Russia" ("Nabucco" and others). The
current degree of Russian presence in the European energy sector is a
serious obstacle to the US determination to completely control European
political and business elites. Simultaneously Washington makes its
best to withstand Moscow's efforts to integrate the single Eurasian
space relying on infrastructure, transport and energy "braces."
No doubt, Georgia's invasion of South Ossetia was one of the elements
of the "anaconda loop." Russia's interference into the conflict on
the side of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was both a military defeat of
the aggressor and a serious blow on the strategy of strangling Russia
by the "anaconda loop." The Georgian-Ossetian conflict was apparently
the last drop that overfilled the cup of Russian leadership's patience.
But which Russia's moves enable us to speak about discerning outlines
of an "asymmetrical" answer to the United States?
Returning to Latin Ameri ca First of all, it is the Russian comeback
to Latin America.
As early as the 19th century "the Monroe doctrine" defined Latin
America as the exclusive area of US interests, a sort of Yankees'
closed national park. Therefore Americans were very bitter about
the establishment by the Soviet Union of its influence zone (Cuba,
Chile and Nicaragua) in the south of the American continent.
After quite a lengthy lull, at long last Russia began to pursue
offensive strategy and interact with Latin American countries. These
relations received a great boost following "the 5-day war "in the
Caucasus.
Russia's stepping stones in Latin America can be Venezuela, Bolivia
and Ecuador. Relations with long-time allies in the region, Cuba and
Nicaragua have risen to a new level. The agreements in the course
of the recent visit to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua of Russia's
vice-premier I.Sechin will enable these countries to implement a number
of energy projects including the Cuban shelf at the Gulf of Mexico.
The Russian return to Latin America also has a military dimension. In
September, two Russian strategic bombers landed in Venezuela, and in
November an entry of a Russian Navy squadron is planned to take place
in Venezuela. This is how Moscow makes Washington understand that if
need be, it could control the main route of oil delivery from Persian
Gulf to the United States.
Fightin g Somalia's Pirates In this connection Moscow's concern over
the rise of pirate activities in Somalia's waters becomes clear,
as that country both controls the entrance to Red Sea from Persian
Gulf and the by-pass around Africa.
Pirates' actions are a threat to the energy security of Europe,
Moscow's chief trade partner.
It should be stressed that a similar strategy of addressing the
problems of its energy resources' delivery have deteriorated of late,
is pursued by China. Relying on its military presence in Pakistani
seaports it plans to both ensure a safer routes of delivery of Middle
Eastern oil to its markets, and to begin rendering continuous pressure
on the United States (given that potential emergence of the Chinese
Navy in the Ormuz Strait is a serious argument).
The Caucasian Pact and Georgia's Break-up The latest reports shed
much light on the covert side of the "Caucasian pact" Turkey came
up with immediately following the active phase of the Georgia-South
Ossetia conflict. In essence what it was all about was the plan of
Georgia's federalisation and its potential follow-up break-up, after
which Azerbaijan (with the campaign of issuing national passports to
the Azeri community in Georgia), Armenia and Turkey, that could also
hope to annex Adzharia.
This way the key ally of the United States could be removed from the
region, making the Caucasian situat ion more stable and providing
grounds for studying the issue of transport of Central Asia's and
Iran's energy resources to Europe via the Caucasus.
Natural Gas and the Railroad: A Route for the Economic Integration of
the Korean Peninsula During the recent visit to Russia of South Korea's
president the parties concluded a $90-billion agreement on the supplies
of Russia's natural gas to South Korea. The gas pipeline is to cross
the territory of North Korea. Besides, the JSC "RZhD" and Deutsche
Bank came up with the idea of building a railroad to tie up all the
tree countries providing an entry to the Trans-Siberian Mainline.
Both projects feature a serious political potential with an eye to
the future reunion of the Korean peninsula. Besides, it is all about
a serious consolidation of North Korea's negotiating position in its
dialogue with the United States. It was not by chance that shortly
before the South Korea's president paid his visit to Moscow, Pyongyang
began to vigorously reinstate its nuclear infrastructure. The "carrot"
of their supplies of fuel oil that Americans held before Koreans at
the negotiations, is no longer a stimulus, provided that in several
years North Korea would be able to meet its demands of natural gas,
and correspondingly, electricity that would have a direct impact on
the entire chain of DPRK's industries.
Finally, by ce menting the Korean peninsula by two serious
infrastructure projects, the transport and energy ones, would allow
Russia to both earn significant profits from its supplies of resources
and cargo transit, channelling it to the development of Siberia and
the Far East, and would have a considerable rise of Russia's political
weight in the entire Asian and Pacific Rim region.
Conclusions Over the period following the August war in the Caucasus
the Russian leadership succeeded in demonstrating to Washington that in
the event of its stake on further confrontation it can create serious
problems on those directions of ensuring US national security where
to date Americans felt secure.
First, Russia can answer to the deployment by the US of elements of
its anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe and American interventionist
policies in the former Soviet republics by installing its continuous
military presence at the routes of petroleum delivery to the United
States. That would cast doubts on the notorious "Monroe doctrine"
in the Western hemisphere.
Second, the needed liquidation of the Georgian swelling makes it
possible that Russia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan can reach a
strategic agreement on having control over "the Caucasian knot". Should
Georgia actively counteract this plan, the issue of mounting pressure
by relevant communities in Georgia on its leadership could be raised
with an eye to achieving the=2 0country's federalisation, and -
as an extreme - even its liquidation as a failed state.
Third, by acting the way it does in the Korean peninsula, Russia shows
a principally different logic of development of present-day states
than does the United States. If Americans aim at inciting conflicts,
creation of "the controlled chaos" and reaching of agreements relying
on the military force and ultimatums Russia's offer to its partners
mutually profitable economic projects upon which to build political
collaboration.
It can be assumed that in the conditions of further escalation by
the US side of tensions with Russia we might soon learn about other
"asymmetrical" answers Moscow can give to the challenges of the
"global superpower" that overestimated its potential.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress