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TOO SOON TO KISS AND MAKE UP
The Economist
Oct 16th 2008
Russia and Europe
The European Union should not give Russia a new partnership deal
until it genuinely withdraws from Georgia
RUSSIA announced this week that, just as it promised, it had pulled
all its troops in Georgia back to the two disputed territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Many European Union leaders were swift to
praise the Kremlin for meeting the conditions it agreed with France's
Nicolas Sarkozy some six weeks ago--and almost as quick to suggest
a return to business as usual.
A majority now want to start talks in November on a new "partnership
and co-operation agreement". Their none-so-subtle message is:
forget about the pesky Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili,
who was anyway responsible for starting the war on August 7th, and
attend instead to the more urgent task of repairing relations with
our biggest energy supplier.
The West needs to keep talking to Russia about many things, notably
efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and further
reductions in Russia's and America's own nuclear arsenals. Yet it
would be wrong to heed calls from the likes of Germany, Italy and
their allies to start talks now on a new partnership agreement, as if
the Georgian war had never happened. The main reason for this is that
the troop withdrawal is largely bogus. The Russians=2 0have stationed
almost 8,000 troops in the two enclaves. Villages in South Ossetia and
beyond have been brutally cleansed of their Georgian inhabitants. And
Abkhaz forces have retaken the Kodori Gorge, previously controlled by
the Georgians. This does not come close to a pull-back to pre-August
7th positions, which is what the EU originally stipulated before
embarking on a new partnership agreement. Moreover, the Russians
still refuse to allow any of the 200-odd ceasefire monitors deployed
by the EU into the two disputed territories.
Some regard Georgia and the Caucasus as small, faraway and so
unimportant.
They are, on the contrary, a strategically vital region that could play
a critical role in the EU's future energy security (see article). And,
as Mr Saakashvili has often said, if the Russians think they can
escape unpunished for the invasion and occupation of parts of his
country, that could embolden further adventurism. The war was popular
with ordinary Russians: the popularity of President Dmitry Medvedev
and the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has risen even as financial
markets have tanked.
There are plenty of Russian citizens and passport-holders in such
neighbours as Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics whom the Kremlin
might easily find a sudden need to "protect", just as it did in
South Ossetia.
Besides, this is not just about the Caucasus. Both Mr Medvedev and
his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have muttered belligerent things
about Russia's neighbours and the West in general. Its short war with
Georgia seems to have confirmed Russia's prejudice that it can cow its
neighbours--including some members of the EU--by threatening or even
using force. The Russians continue to treat the supply of energy as
another weapon in their armoury. There can be no genuine partnership
with the EU while Russia thinks this way.
Neighbourhood watch The EU should be urgently seeking to put more
substance into the neighbourhood policy that defines its dealings with
Russia's near-abroad. For all his annoying arrogance, Mr Saakashvili
is a democratically elected president who has liberalised Georgia's
economy and cracked down on corruption. Ukraine's democracy may
sometimes resemble a tragicomedy (it is currently preparing for
its third parliamentary election in the space of three years),
but it is vigorous for all that. Even the autocratic Armenia and
Azerbaijan may now look more to the West than they did before the
war in Georgia. Belarus, widely known as Europe's last dictatorship,
is shifting its ground a little--as the EU recognised this week when
it decided to relax its visa ban on the country's leaders.
The EU could help these countries by offering financial aid, more open
trade deals and easier visa conditions. It should also hold out to
them prospect of eventual membership. This is less provocative than the
notion of letting any of them into NATO, which has surely receded into
the future after the Georgian war. But as experience in the Balkans
has shown, the lure of eventual EU membership is a good way to foster
liberal, market-based democracy and to defuse territorial and ethnic
disputes. As for Russia, its help is still needed on some vital global
issues. But for the EU to go ahead with new "partnership" talks now
would send a message of astounding pusillanimity. At the very least,
Russia needs first to live up to its promises to withdraw properly
from Georgia and to let the EU's monitors into the disputed enclaves.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
The Economist
Oct 16th 2008
Russia and Europe
The European Union should not give Russia a new partnership deal
until it genuinely withdraws from Georgia
RUSSIA announced this week that, just as it promised, it had pulled
all its troops in Georgia back to the two disputed territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Many European Union leaders were swift to
praise the Kremlin for meeting the conditions it agreed with France's
Nicolas Sarkozy some six weeks ago--and almost as quick to suggest
a return to business as usual.
A majority now want to start talks in November on a new "partnership
and co-operation agreement". Their none-so-subtle message is:
forget about the pesky Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili,
who was anyway responsible for starting the war on August 7th, and
attend instead to the more urgent task of repairing relations with
our biggest energy supplier.
The West needs to keep talking to Russia about many things, notably
efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and further
reductions in Russia's and America's own nuclear arsenals. Yet it
would be wrong to heed calls from the likes of Germany, Italy and
their allies to start talks now on a new partnership agreement, as if
the Georgian war had never happened. The main reason for this is that
the troop withdrawal is largely bogus. The Russians=2 0have stationed
almost 8,000 troops in the two enclaves. Villages in South Ossetia and
beyond have been brutally cleansed of their Georgian inhabitants. And
Abkhaz forces have retaken the Kodori Gorge, previously controlled by
the Georgians. This does not come close to a pull-back to pre-August
7th positions, which is what the EU originally stipulated before
embarking on a new partnership agreement. Moreover, the Russians
still refuse to allow any of the 200-odd ceasefire monitors deployed
by the EU into the two disputed territories.
Some regard Georgia and the Caucasus as small, faraway and so
unimportant.
They are, on the contrary, a strategically vital region that could play
a critical role in the EU's future energy security (see article). And,
as Mr Saakashvili has often said, if the Russians think they can
escape unpunished for the invasion and occupation of parts of his
country, that could embolden further adventurism. The war was popular
with ordinary Russians: the popularity of President Dmitry Medvedev
and the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, has risen even as financial
markets have tanked.
There are plenty of Russian citizens and passport-holders in such
neighbours as Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics whom the Kremlin
might easily find a sudden need to "protect", just as it did in
South Ossetia.
Besides, this is not just about the Caucasus. Both Mr Medvedev and
his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have muttered belligerent things
about Russia's neighbours and the West in general. Its short war with
Georgia seems to have confirmed Russia's prejudice that it can cow its
neighbours--including some members of the EU--by threatening or even
using force. The Russians continue to treat the supply of energy as
another weapon in their armoury. There can be no genuine partnership
with the EU while Russia thinks this way.
Neighbourhood watch The EU should be urgently seeking to put more
substance into the neighbourhood policy that defines its dealings with
Russia's near-abroad. For all his annoying arrogance, Mr Saakashvili
is a democratically elected president who has liberalised Georgia's
economy and cracked down on corruption. Ukraine's democracy may
sometimes resemble a tragicomedy (it is currently preparing for
its third parliamentary election in the space of three years),
but it is vigorous for all that. Even the autocratic Armenia and
Azerbaijan may now look more to the West than they did before the
war in Georgia. Belarus, widely known as Europe's last dictatorship,
is shifting its ground a little--as the EU recognised this week when
it decided to relax its visa ban on the country's leaders.
The EU could help these countries by offering financial aid, more open
trade deals and easier visa conditions. It should also hold out to
them prospect of eventual membership. This is less provocative than the
notion of letting any of them into NATO, which has surely receded into
the future after the Georgian war. But as experience in the Balkans
has shown, the lure of eventual EU membership is a good way to foster
liberal, market-based democracy and to defuse territorial and ethnic
disputes. As for Russia, its help is still needed on some vital global
issues. But for the EU to go ahead with new "partnership" talks now
would send a message of astounding pusillanimity. At the very least,
Russia needs first to live up to its promises to withdraw properly
from Georgia and to let the EU's monitors into the disputed enclaves.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress