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TERRITORIES SHOULD BE ASSESSED PATCH BY PATCH
James Hakobyan
Lragir.am
12:54:59 - 27/10/200
Naturally, the issue of the liberated territories is in the focus
in this intense period of statements about a crucial phase in
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. The point is that in all
the crucial phases of the settlement the proposals began with the
withdrawal of the Armenian force from the territories. Moreover, the
step which the Armenian side is demanded to take has more importance
for Azerbaijan than the status of Karabakh. The point is that by
returning the territories Azerbaijan becomes stronger morally,
psychologically and also physically, in the sense of the strategic
position. In addition, the strategic position should not be perceived
as a military position. The territories increase the possibility
of military, as well as economic and demographic aggression against
Armenia and Karabakh.
The territories strengthen Azerbaijan in the general Caucasian game,
in the relations with Iran which are not so smooth. Naturally, however,
the problem is the price at which Azerbaijan obtains the territories.
At first sight, Azerbaijan seems to buy the territories on credit. The
Armenian force is withdrawn from the territories, and Azerbaijan agrees
that Karabakh holds a referendum on independence in 15 years. In
addition, Azerbaijan does not seem to pay anything regarding the
details of the referendum because the Armenian side seems to agree
to return the territories in return for just the possibility of the
referendum, leaving the details of its organization to discuss in
future. The problem is that the Armenian side does not seem to demand
a higher price for the territories, and whatever price it demands,
it demands from the international community.
In this connection, it is interesting at what price Armenia "sells" the
territories, although maybe the word sells should be written without
inverted commas. In this connection, a very important question was
brought up by not infamous Bruce Tasker, who is known to the Armenian
society for raising the issue of cases of corruption in the World
Bank-financed water supply project in Yerevan. Tasker righteously notes
that the most important thing about the discussions of the return of
territories is what Armenia gains in return for that. And perhaps it is
worthwhile to add what Armenian loses. When we compare the gain and the
loss, it turns out that the optimal answer to the issue of territories
is the following: is the return expedient for the national interest or
nevertheless "not a patch of land" is right? In addition, in this case
"not a patch of land" should not be viewed in the historico-moral or
national scientific pitch which featured in the history textbooks
in the past decade, and in the form of press conferences or Bureau
statements in the past two decades. Neither should the "not a patch
of land" be viewed in the pitch of sounds of the patriotic march.
The problem concerned is cool-headed estimates and judgments. When
the estimate shows that by returning at least one patch or one
hectare of land Armenia underpins its role and importance in the
region, no doubt the historical stereotype of "not a patch of land"
should be crashed to take that step for the sake of the nation. For
this reason, like the diplomats and officials dealing with or taking
interest in international conflicts say in speaking about conflicts,
one may say in speaking about patches that every patch is peculiar,
and the issue of every patch should be viewed separately. Rough
though the example may seem, assume that one hectare of land "given"
near the village of Ghukasyan may not have the same importance as one
patch returned in Horadiz, even if say we are offered one thousand
times more money for that patch than for one hectare near Ghukasyan.
In other words, the problem is not patriotic digressions, from sea
to sea illusions. The problem is how those territories benefit to
the nation in terms of security, strategic strength and regional
importance, and what the nation loses when it returns them to the
Azerbaijanis on some condition, and whether in case of returning the
loss or the benefit will be long-term.
James Hakobyan
Lragir.am
12:54:59 - 27/10/200
Naturally, the issue of the liberated territories is in the focus
in this intense period of statements about a crucial phase in
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. The point is that in all
the crucial phases of the settlement the proposals began with the
withdrawal of the Armenian force from the territories. Moreover, the
step which the Armenian side is demanded to take has more importance
for Azerbaijan than the status of Karabakh. The point is that by
returning the territories Azerbaijan becomes stronger morally,
psychologically and also physically, in the sense of the strategic
position. In addition, the strategic position should not be perceived
as a military position. The territories increase the possibility
of military, as well as economic and demographic aggression against
Armenia and Karabakh.
The territories strengthen Azerbaijan in the general Caucasian game,
in the relations with Iran which are not so smooth. Naturally, however,
the problem is the price at which Azerbaijan obtains the territories.
At first sight, Azerbaijan seems to buy the territories on credit. The
Armenian force is withdrawn from the territories, and Azerbaijan agrees
that Karabakh holds a referendum on independence in 15 years. In
addition, Azerbaijan does not seem to pay anything regarding the
details of the referendum because the Armenian side seems to agree
to return the territories in return for just the possibility of the
referendum, leaving the details of its organization to discuss in
future. The problem is that the Armenian side does not seem to demand
a higher price for the territories, and whatever price it demands,
it demands from the international community.
In this connection, it is interesting at what price Armenia "sells" the
territories, although maybe the word sells should be written without
inverted commas. In this connection, a very important question was
brought up by not infamous Bruce Tasker, who is known to the Armenian
society for raising the issue of cases of corruption in the World
Bank-financed water supply project in Yerevan. Tasker righteously notes
that the most important thing about the discussions of the return of
territories is what Armenia gains in return for that. And perhaps it is
worthwhile to add what Armenian loses. When we compare the gain and the
loss, it turns out that the optimal answer to the issue of territories
is the following: is the return expedient for the national interest or
nevertheless "not a patch of land" is right? In addition, in this case
"not a patch of land" should not be viewed in the historico-moral or
national scientific pitch which featured in the history textbooks
in the past decade, and in the form of press conferences or Bureau
statements in the past two decades. Neither should the "not a patch
of land" be viewed in the pitch of sounds of the patriotic march.
The problem concerned is cool-headed estimates and judgments. When
the estimate shows that by returning at least one patch or one
hectare of land Armenia underpins its role and importance in the
region, no doubt the historical stereotype of "not a patch of land"
should be crashed to take that step for the sake of the nation. For
this reason, like the diplomats and officials dealing with or taking
interest in international conflicts say in speaking about conflicts,
one may say in speaking about patches that every patch is peculiar,
and the issue of every patch should be viewed separately. Rough
though the example may seem, assume that one hectare of land "given"
near the village of Ghukasyan may not have the same importance as one
patch returned in Horadiz, even if say we are offered one thousand
times more money for that patch than for one hectare near Ghukasyan.
In other words, the problem is not patriotic digressions, from sea
to sea illusions. The problem is how those territories benefit to
the nation in terms of security, strategic strength and regional
importance, and what the nation loses when it returns them to the
Azerbaijanis on some condition, and whether in case of returning the
loss or the benefit will be long-term.