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"AT ANY EVENT, THE "RUSSIAN PHASE" IN THE HISTORY OF ARMENIA IS OVER"
Lragir.am
16:12:59 - 29/10/2008
The renowned political scientist and analyst Igor Muradyan comments
on the results and consequences of the Armenian visit of the Russian
president for the Iravunk de facto newspaper.
Mr. Muradyan, what was special about the visit of the Russian president
to Armenia, and, what are the expectations regarding the Armenian
and Russian relations in the context of future political situation
in the South Caucasus?
New circumstances of Dmitry Medvedev's visit in October are being
revealed, as well as the regional intentions of Russia and other
countries.
Now there is no doubt that Russia determines the relations with
Armenia by the setup of new relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The
intentions of Russia regarding the Karabakh issue are becoming more
obvious, which include the following: complete withdrawal of the
Armenian armed force from Karabakh, return of first five then all
the seven "territories" to Azerbaijan, return of the so-called Azeri
refugees to those territories, deployment of Russian peacekeepers in
the area of the conflict, and actually complete overlooking of the
issue of the status of Karabakh, since it will be protracted for
ten and more years. This is but the recurrent division of Armenia
between the same partners. And in the 1920s and even 1940s Russia has
tried to attract Turkey, tempted by the anti-imperialistic moods in
Anatolia. But instead of better conditions for getting to the Black
Sea straights it got a punch. The same will be now. Not at once,
of course, therefore there is a lot of time for the abovementioned
experience to destroy Armenia once again. Amazingly, like in the
previous times, the Armenians are happy that the Russians are going
to make a decision on their fate. During the visit of Dmitry Medvedev
to Yerevan tens of thousands of Armenians holding Russian flags and
posters pleaded their loyalty to the leader of Russia at the so-called
Square of Russia, who is likely to suffocate their homeland, turning
it into an object of mockery for the world.
You mentioned earlier about the unfavorable approach of Russia toward
Karabakh and Armenia. It is also clear that all this is one way or
another determined by the recent events in Georgia and the aspiration
of the United States to settle in the Black Sea basin. But how does
the political approach of the Russian president foster the fulfillment
of those plans?
The political approach of the leader of Russia has nothing to do
with that.
Russia has long anticipated instrumentalizing the Karabakh resource
for its policy. The leading Russian political scientists who are most
integrated in the public administration say Russia has not benefited
from the cooperation with Armenia in any way, and further unilateral
relations are meaningless.
They tell this plainly to their Armenian colleagues, whom they have
known for years. The leading experts of the Russian Institute of
Strategic Research, the CIS institute who advise directly the president
staff share this opinion. At the same time, Dmitry Medvedev is said
to be the leader of the Azerbaijani lobby in Russia. Evidence to
this is the considerably close relations and interests of President
Medvedev. In Russia, very many high-ranking officials are first of
all identified as Azerbaijani lobbyists and only then as people who
occupy one post or another. There are too many gas and oil people in
the Russian government. Along with the strategic and tactical interests
of Russia in which the plans regarding Karabakh fit, purely commercial
interests of large scale certainly have an important role too. It
is only partly known who is involved in the fulfillment of those
interests, but currently a number of American and British journalists
in Moscow are actively working out this version, and some time later
it will become known, some time.
But what makes the Russians confident that the given project will be
successfully implemented, and Armenia will sign its own death sentence?
It is a most important, perhaps the most important question in all
this game. Surprisingly, in fact, the entire Russian political and
analytical establishment is convinced that the Armenian people and
their government should be grateful to Russia for such a settlement
of the Karabakh issue.
For more than once, at different levels, from experts to Duma
committees, arguments on the impossibility of such decisions are
perceived with great surprise. Obviously, the relevant analytical,
information and research services of Russia have done work and
arrived at conclusions on complete demoralization of Armenians, who
are ready to accept any decision that will ensure a "quiet" life for
them. Perhaps this is the main argument in the operational system
of making decisions on the Karabakh issue. The foreign ministry
is only trying to conduct this policy, which has been worked out
by a group of people from the president administration who believe
in those evaluations. For instance, as a major argument, it is said
that the Dashnaktsutyun party approves the Russian plan, that is the
return of the territories and the deployment of peacekeepers, but no
determination of the status. By the way Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is
not mentioned in the talks as the name of a country in that region. In
other words, not only non-determination of the status is concerned
but also liquidation of NKR.
And this is not accidental. For the Russians, NKR is the reminder
of an element of the new political configuration of the former
Soviet space. NKR is too vivid a notion for the Russian national
consciousness.
To what degree has this plan been worked out, how convinced the
Russian politicians and policy shapers are of the success of their
"Karabakh project"?
In contacts with the Russian experts, the focus is on that besides
the goal of setting up new relations with Turkey, in raising
the Karabakh issue the Azerbaijani lobby in Moscow is important,
which is closely related with a number of officials, and first
of all President Medvedev. The peculiarities of relations between
the Azerbaijani lobbyists and Dmitry Medvedev became known, who is
related to oil and gas projects in one way or another. During the
visit of Dmitry Medvedev to Baku no final decision was made but
the intentions and several obligations were outlined. The Russian
political scientists integrated with the government agencies who
have advocated the opinion that it is in the interests of Russia to
"freeze" the Karabakh conflict are now proposing the following. They
think Armenia may reject this plan, and Russia will have no political
resource to insist on the realization of this project. At the same
time, it is not recommended to automatically turn to the United States
for help and adopt a more rigid stance on Russia. We think this is
not just a situational recommendation but a worked out and intended
technology. It should be noted that considerable confusion and lack
of confidence is observed among the Russian analysts and policy
shapers dealing with the "Karabakh project". A considerable part of
analysts in Russia think this project is not realistic. According to
the Russian analysts, the administration of the president of Russia
has demanded that the special services express their opinion on the
"Karabakh project", what produced inadequate results. The heads of
the Russian special services did not complicate their situation and
did not make negative evaluations. According to the evaluations of
the special services, namely the External Intelligence Service of
Russia, this project "contains new interesting proposals and may
become a starting point for the implementation of the Russian policy
on the South Caucasus." The External Intelligence Service recommends
focusing on the phase of agreements on proposals and stances, as well
as efforts for reaching consensus between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
which will be difficult. Currently, the administration of the Russian
president is not trying to involve experts of research institutes and
centers. The Russian experts who visited NKR will one way or another
continue to think that the "Karabakh project" is actually a political
adventure but they do not express their opinion publicly. Judging
by the work that has been done, the Karabakh project was initiated
to a considerable degree by the Azerbaijan lobby in Moscow, which
is closely related to President Medvedev. It should be noted that
Prime Minister Putin and his people in the president administration,
as well as the foreign minister Lavrov have expressed no enthusiasm
and optimism about the given project yet. There is no confidence
on how the strategic interests of Russia and the objectives of the
lobbyists in Moscow coincide, but both have a role in advocating the
"Karabakh project".
In the meantime, there is a lot of hope and definite plans about
Medvedev's visit in terms of development of economy and infrastructures
in Armenia, including the second nuclear plant. Is this consistent
with your warning of a national catastrophe awaiting Armenia?
In the 1920s, Armenia was divided, its historical provinces were
annexed, and in the territory that was left the economy was developed
because complete destruction of Armenia would have destroyed the
Russian strategy.
The Russians have always considered Karabakh as unjustified lavishness
for the Armenians. Any positive mentioning of Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic, the armed force of Karabakh, the Christian identity of this
region encountered hostility and confusion in any Russian, especially
in politicians and experts. As to Dmitry Medvedev's promises, it would
be worthwhile to ask the question why so many ambitious proposals are
offered especially now. The Russians will hardly build a nuclear plant
in Armenia. Why should the Russians build such a serious facility in
a dying country? They may start producing uranium, they need it. The
Russians would rather build nuclear plants in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
No confirmation has come through the media that Russia links the
Karabakh settlement with the relations with Turkey. Are these
suppositions, confirmed by information or conclusions based on
analyses?
In the analysis of political projection, that is the material which
has not been announced publicly, such notions as "information",
"analysis", "conclusions" are highly relative. Although it is possible
to cite one example of an argument supported by information, and
no Russian diplomat dealing with the Russian and Turkish relations
may reject this. The Turks have proposed the Russians for more than
once to stop the project Kars-Akhalkalaki in case the Russians state
that the "five territories will be returned to Azerbaijan, sometime
in the nearest future if not now". Meanwhile, I again confirm that
Turkey is not interested in the Karabakh issue, and this and other
identical proposals are offered because Turkey would like to get
utmost concessions from Russia to make their relations more significant
and binding.
How did the Russian-Georgian war affect the settlement of the Karabakh
issue, is there a new situation, a source of policy between Russia
and Armenia?
The completion of the action in Chechnya, significant success in
reducing the threat of terrorism in the North Caucasus, the tactical
military success of the Russian in Georgia had an important role,
inspiring the Russian political government to launch another phase
of establishment of new positions in the South Caucasus. The given
circumstance which had an emotional rather than political importance
was nevertheless important in making a decision on the Karabakh
issue. At the same time, the possible occurrence of problems relating
to Abkhazia and South Ossetia may reduce the confidence of Russia in
conducting a policy of pressure in the South Caucasus. So far there
is no confidence in Moscow regarding what happened in the conflict
with Georgia, first of all, regarding the position and role of the
United States. The Russian experts are not ready and would not wish a
continuation since the policy of the United States aimed to involve
Russia in a large-scale armed conflict with Georgia to support the
argumentation for the military presence of the United States in the
Black Sea and the Caucasian region. In Moscow, they would like to
rule out from public debates everything that may ruin the triumphant
propaganda and question not only the military but also the political
success in the Caucasus.
Does Russia have claims to Armenia regarding the events in Ossetia,
what are those claims?
There are such claims, and they are only political. In reality, Russia
would hardly expect more or less significant military assistance from
Armenia. Now Russia is manipulating this issue, especially with regard
to the "condolence" of Armenia to Georgia rather than to Ossetia,
only as a means of pressure on Armenia and for scolding it as an
unreliable partner.
The Russians think after the "great victory" they have the right for
such manipulations.
What will the attitude of other powers having interests in the South
Caucasus toward these intentions of Russia be? Does the West possess
levers for the correction of Russia's policy?
First of all, it is necessary to understand the international
context of the given adventure. In a wider international context,
the Russian-Georgian war is determined by the objectives of the
United States to enhance its military and political presence in the
basin of the Black Sea rather than local regional conflicts. These
plans of the United States had emerged earlier, in the first half
of the 1990s but even by the beginning of the summer 2008 the United
States had made no decision on this presence because first of all the
leading European powers Germany and France who were not interested
in the implementation of these plans did not approve it. Without the
approval of NATO and the EU the United States could not implement
the plan confidently enough, since the Black Sea basin borders with
the European Union. The United States needed sufficient arguments,
and the actions of Russia in Georgia fully corresponded with the
objectives to persuade Europe. In this situation, Russia and Turkey
are opponents to the strengthening of the United States in the
Black Sea since they understand that "alone" they cannot stop the
U.S. expansion in the region, especially after the decision to set
up three American bases in Georgia and thereby turn Georgia into an
avant-garde partner of the United States in the region of the Black
Sea and the Caucasus. Russia and Turkey demonstrate readiness to act
together and make a serious bid for an alliance. For the time being,
the United States is taking care of protecting the format of the Minsk
Group, preventing a "local", a "regional" decision, in the framework
of the Russia-Turkey-Azerbaijan relations. This would be the terrible
result of their policy, practically a strategic loss of the Americans
in the region, and not only in the region. This development, in the
opinion of the Americans, would lead to significant weakening of the
United States in the region, including undermining of the importance of
the Black Sea basin for the American strategy, as well as classifying
Georgia among partners which are not relevant any more. In my opinion,
the United States will be headed for thwarting this Russian project
on the Karabakh issue, in a classic manner. In the beginning, the
United States will try to talk Turkey out of accepting the proposals
of Russia. Identically, the Americans will engage Azerbaijan, offering
a more favorable settlement for it. It should be noted that Turkey
hopes for that, and so does Azerbaijan but obviously Turkey has a plan
of action. The Turks are hoping for a new situation which may emerge
after the U.S. presidential election. The Russians are also hoping
for that but the Russians tried to promote a decision, at least a
short-term one, together with Turkey, concerning the entire region
of the South Caucasus. The Russians have realized that the Turks
were more ingenious than them by temporizing, but they continue to
offer their proposals. Various political circles in Turkey are still
hoping for possible turning points in the U.S.-Turkish relations,
the establishment of new relations, i.e. relations on new conditions,
when Turkey will implement a more independent foreign policy but again
with the assistance of the United States. This is hardly possible,
and the United States will hardly go into such minor issues since the
Americans realize very well that Turkey fears crossing the line beyond
which confrontation with the United States starts. Turkey still needs
the support of the United States, the EU and NATO. Otherwise, Turkey
will have no chance to overcome its economic and social problems, and
will face the prospect of a failure state. In Moscow they certainly
take this into consideration and understand that it is impossible to
build relations with Turkey on such a strategic basis.
Currently, Russia's relations with Turkey are based on innumerable
tactical interests but highly important interests. The policy of
John McCain will indicate real possibilities for the establishment of
U.S. and Turkish relations in new historical conditions. Barack Obama
will not offer short-term solutions, and the U.S. policy on Turkey
will not undergo significant change. Nevertheless, the relations
between the United States and Russia will not acquire a new shade in
any of the possible cases.
Therefore, Turkey will continue its game with Russia, demonstrating the
realistic nature of the alternative foreign political line. However,
it should be taken into account that for the national catastrophe
of Armenia the establishment of strategic relations between Russia
and Turkey is not necessary, three or four years of flirting between
them is enough. In the nearest future, the "triangle" Russia-United
States-Turkey in the South Caucasus will not be unambiguous in
terms of the pattern of forces, and all the three actors understand
this. This means that Turkey will continue to insist on the position
of balance. The current global crisis and prices of energy resources
should not be ignored. This factor will certainly affect Russia's
foreign political ambitions. John McCain would show those "gas and
oil" politicians their place better, but it is not ruled out that
so would do Barack Obama. Generally, the oil politicians have been
unlucky recently, the ground is too shaky. Is it also important that
the United States is ready to approve transportation of gas from Iran
to Europe via the gas pipeline of Turkey. This may be quite real,
since for the United States the supply of the Iranian gas to Europe
is more acceptable than to China and even India. By the way, the
European analytical centers think that the game with Russia is just
an argument in the dialogue with the EU and the United States. All
this means that Armenia still has a chance for a foreign political
maneuver, although only in the sense of potential.
What should the stance of Armenia be to prevent the destruction of
Armenian Karabakh and to avoid a national catastrophe?
I would rather cite the opinion of the leading Russian political
scientists insisting on the idea of "freezing" the Karabakh problem
instead of expressing my opinion. "It would be unreasonable to
demonstrate a nervous reaction and automatic request for help from the
United States. In this situation when the issue that Karabakh belongs
to the Armenian people is questioned, for Armenia it is enough to say
"no", in a determined manner. In that case Russia has no arguments
and possibility to continue to push through his plans. Russia will
not insist more than it has done."
Long before the revelation of these opinions and evaluations, this
approach appeared realistic and possible to me. However, I would
like to refer these evaluations to the opinion and stance of the
given Russian political scientists. Russia understands that its
"great victory" on Georgia is highly ephemeral and would like to
demonstrate to the world that it is ready to make and fulfill other
decisions, i.e. in the framework of the notorious "international
law", and the Karabakh issue, along with the geopolitical aspect,
is suitable for these propaganda aims. At the same time, despite the
confident appearance of Russia, it fears the Americans, but most of
all it fears "recruitment" of countries of the region by the United
States. At any event, the "Russian phase" in the Armenian history is
over, even if the project fails, Russia will be viewed as a dangerous
enemy. I regret to say this.
What if Armenia does not say "no" with determination?
In that case, it is necessary to stop sacrificing the Armenians of
Karabakh like lambs on the altar and try to seek money which would
enable the people of Karabakh to settle in some regions of Armenia,
and better in other countries. Now it is clear that the Armenians fear,
they have reason to fear, and therefore they will lose, disgracefully,
without a single shot.
Lragir.am
16:12:59 - 29/10/2008
The renowned political scientist and analyst Igor Muradyan comments
on the results and consequences of the Armenian visit of the Russian
president for the Iravunk de facto newspaper.
Mr. Muradyan, what was special about the visit of the Russian president
to Armenia, and, what are the expectations regarding the Armenian
and Russian relations in the context of future political situation
in the South Caucasus?
New circumstances of Dmitry Medvedev's visit in October are being
revealed, as well as the regional intentions of Russia and other
countries.
Now there is no doubt that Russia determines the relations with
Armenia by the setup of new relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The
intentions of Russia regarding the Karabakh issue are becoming more
obvious, which include the following: complete withdrawal of the
Armenian armed force from Karabakh, return of first five then all
the seven "territories" to Azerbaijan, return of the so-called Azeri
refugees to those territories, deployment of Russian peacekeepers in
the area of the conflict, and actually complete overlooking of the
issue of the status of Karabakh, since it will be protracted for
ten and more years. This is but the recurrent division of Armenia
between the same partners. And in the 1920s and even 1940s Russia has
tried to attract Turkey, tempted by the anti-imperialistic moods in
Anatolia. But instead of better conditions for getting to the Black
Sea straights it got a punch. The same will be now. Not at once,
of course, therefore there is a lot of time for the abovementioned
experience to destroy Armenia once again. Amazingly, like in the
previous times, the Armenians are happy that the Russians are going
to make a decision on their fate. During the visit of Dmitry Medvedev
to Yerevan tens of thousands of Armenians holding Russian flags and
posters pleaded their loyalty to the leader of Russia at the so-called
Square of Russia, who is likely to suffocate their homeland, turning
it into an object of mockery for the world.
You mentioned earlier about the unfavorable approach of Russia toward
Karabakh and Armenia. It is also clear that all this is one way or
another determined by the recent events in Georgia and the aspiration
of the United States to settle in the Black Sea basin. But how does
the political approach of the Russian president foster the fulfillment
of those plans?
The political approach of the leader of Russia has nothing to do
with that.
Russia has long anticipated instrumentalizing the Karabakh resource
for its policy. The leading Russian political scientists who are most
integrated in the public administration say Russia has not benefited
from the cooperation with Armenia in any way, and further unilateral
relations are meaningless.
They tell this plainly to their Armenian colleagues, whom they have
known for years. The leading experts of the Russian Institute of
Strategic Research, the CIS institute who advise directly the president
staff share this opinion. At the same time, Dmitry Medvedev is said
to be the leader of the Azerbaijani lobby in Russia. Evidence to
this is the considerably close relations and interests of President
Medvedev. In Russia, very many high-ranking officials are first of
all identified as Azerbaijani lobbyists and only then as people who
occupy one post or another. There are too many gas and oil people in
the Russian government. Along with the strategic and tactical interests
of Russia in which the plans regarding Karabakh fit, purely commercial
interests of large scale certainly have an important role too. It
is only partly known who is involved in the fulfillment of those
interests, but currently a number of American and British journalists
in Moscow are actively working out this version, and some time later
it will become known, some time.
But what makes the Russians confident that the given project will be
successfully implemented, and Armenia will sign its own death sentence?
It is a most important, perhaps the most important question in all
this game. Surprisingly, in fact, the entire Russian political and
analytical establishment is convinced that the Armenian people and
their government should be grateful to Russia for such a settlement
of the Karabakh issue.
For more than once, at different levels, from experts to Duma
committees, arguments on the impossibility of such decisions are
perceived with great surprise. Obviously, the relevant analytical,
information and research services of Russia have done work and
arrived at conclusions on complete demoralization of Armenians, who
are ready to accept any decision that will ensure a "quiet" life for
them. Perhaps this is the main argument in the operational system
of making decisions on the Karabakh issue. The foreign ministry
is only trying to conduct this policy, which has been worked out
by a group of people from the president administration who believe
in those evaluations. For instance, as a major argument, it is said
that the Dashnaktsutyun party approves the Russian plan, that is the
return of the territories and the deployment of peacekeepers, but no
determination of the status. By the way Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is
not mentioned in the talks as the name of a country in that region. In
other words, not only non-determination of the status is concerned
but also liquidation of NKR.
And this is not accidental. For the Russians, NKR is the reminder
of an element of the new political configuration of the former
Soviet space. NKR is too vivid a notion for the Russian national
consciousness.
To what degree has this plan been worked out, how convinced the
Russian politicians and policy shapers are of the success of their
"Karabakh project"?
In contacts with the Russian experts, the focus is on that besides
the goal of setting up new relations with Turkey, in raising
the Karabakh issue the Azerbaijani lobby in Moscow is important,
which is closely related with a number of officials, and first
of all President Medvedev. The peculiarities of relations between
the Azerbaijani lobbyists and Dmitry Medvedev became known, who is
related to oil and gas projects in one way or another. During the
visit of Dmitry Medvedev to Baku no final decision was made but
the intentions and several obligations were outlined. The Russian
political scientists integrated with the government agencies who
have advocated the opinion that it is in the interests of Russia to
"freeze" the Karabakh conflict are now proposing the following. They
think Armenia may reject this plan, and Russia will have no political
resource to insist on the realization of this project. At the same
time, it is not recommended to automatically turn to the United States
for help and adopt a more rigid stance on Russia. We think this is
not just a situational recommendation but a worked out and intended
technology. It should be noted that considerable confusion and lack
of confidence is observed among the Russian analysts and policy
shapers dealing with the "Karabakh project". A considerable part of
analysts in Russia think this project is not realistic. According to
the Russian analysts, the administration of the president of Russia
has demanded that the special services express their opinion on the
"Karabakh project", what produced inadequate results. The heads of
the Russian special services did not complicate their situation and
did not make negative evaluations. According to the evaluations of
the special services, namely the External Intelligence Service of
Russia, this project "contains new interesting proposals and may
become a starting point for the implementation of the Russian policy
on the South Caucasus." The External Intelligence Service recommends
focusing on the phase of agreements on proposals and stances, as well
as efforts for reaching consensus between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
which will be difficult. Currently, the administration of the Russian
president is not trying to involve experts of research institutes and
centers. The Russian experts who visited NKR will one way or another
continue to think that the "Karabakh project" is actually a political
adventure but they do not express their opinion publicly. Judging
by the work that has been done, the Karabakh project was initiated
to a considerable degree by the Azerbaijan lobby in Moscow, which
is closely related to President Medvedev. It should be noted that
Prime Minister Putin and his people in the president administration,
as well as the foreign minister Lavrov have expressed no enthusiasm
and optimism about the given project yet. There is no confidence
on how the strategic interests of Russia and the objectives of the
lobbyists in Moscow coincide, but both have a role in advocating the
"Karabakh project".
In the meantime, there is a lot of hope and definite plans about
Medvedev's visit in terms of development of economy and infrastructures
in Armenia, including the second nuclear plant. Is this consistent
with your warning of a national catastrophe awaiting Armenia?
In the 1920s, Armenia was divided, its historical provinces were
annexed, and in the territory that was left the economy was developed
because complete destruction of Armenia would have destroyed the
Russian strategy.
The Russians have always considered Karabakh as unjustified lavishness
for the Armenians. Any positive mentioning of Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic, the armed force of Karabakh, the Christian identity of this
region encountered hostility and confusion in any Russian, especially
in politicians and experts. As to Dmitry Medvedev's promises, it would
be worthwhile to ask the question why so many ambitious proposals are
offered especially now. The Russians will hardly build a nuclear plant
in Armenia. Why should the Russians build such a serious facility in
a dying country? They may start producing uranium, they need it. The
Russians would rather build nuclear plants in Turkey and Azerbaijan.
No confirmation has come through the media that Russia links the
Karabakh settlement with the relations with Turkey. Are these
suppositions, confirmed by information or conclusions based on
analyses?
In the analysis of political projection, that is the material which
has not been announced publicly, such notions as "information",
"analysis", "conclusions" are highly relative. Although it is possible
to cite one example of an argument supported by information, and
no Russian diplomat dealing with the Russian and Turkish relations
may reject this. The Turks have proposed the Russians for more than
once to stop the project Kars-Akhalkalaki in case the Russians state
that the "five territories will be returned to Azerbaijan, sometime
in the nearest future if not now". Meanwhile, I again confirm that
Turkey is not interested in the Karabakh issue, and this and other
identical proposals are offered because Turkey would like to get
utmost concessions from Russia to make their relations more significant
and binding.
How did the Russian-Georgian war affect the settlement of the Karabakh
issue, is there a new situation, a source of policy between Russia
and Armenia?
The completion of the action in Chechnya, significant success in
reducing the threat of terrorism in the North Caucasus, the tactical
military success of the Russian in Georgia had an important role,
inspiring the Russian political government to launch another phase
of establishment of new positions in the South Caucasus. The given
circumstance which had an emotional rather than political importance
was nevertheless important in making a decision on the Karabakh
issue. At the same time, the possible occurrence of problems relating
to Abkhazia and South Ossetia may reduce the confidence of Russia in
conducting a policy of pressure in the South Caucasus. So far there
is no confidence in Moscow regarding what happened in the conflict
with Georgia, first of all, regarding the position and role of the
United States. The Russian experts are not ready and would not wish a
continuation since the policy of the United States aimed to involve
Russia in a large-scale armed conflict with Georgia to support the
argumentation for the military presence of the United States in the
Black Sea and the Caucasian region. In Moscow, they would like to
rule out from public debates everything that may ruin the triumphant
propaganda and question not only the military but also the political
success in the Caucasus.
Does Russia have claims to Armenia regarding the events in Ossetia,
what are those claims?
There are such claims, and they are only political. In reality, Russia
would hardly expect more or less significant military assistance from
Armenia. Now Russia is manipulating this issue, especially with regard
to the "condolence" of Armenia to Georgia rather than to Ossetia,
only as a means of pressure on Armenia and for scolding it as an
unreliable partner.
The Russians think after the "great victory" they have the right for
such manipulations.
What will the attitude of other powers having interests in the South
Caucasus toward these intentions of Russia be? Does the West possess
levers for the correction of Russia's policy?
First of all, it is necessary to understand the international
context of the given adventure. In a wider international context,
the Russian-Georgian war is determined by the objectives of the
United States to enhance its military and political presence in the
basin of the Black Sea rather than local regional conflicts. These
plans of the United States had emerged earlier, in the first half
of the 1990s but even by the beginning of the summer 2008 the United
States had made no decision on this presence because first of all the
leading European powers Germany and France who were not interested
in the implementation of these plans did not approve it. Without the
approval of NATO and the EU the United States could not implement
the plan confidently enough, since the Black Sea basin borders with
the European Union. The United States needed sufficient arguments,
and the actions of Russia in Georgia fully corresponded with the
objectives to persuade Europe. In this situation, Russia and Turkey
are opponents to the strengthening of the United States in the
Black Sea since they understand that "alone" they cannot stop the
U.S. expansion in the region, especially after the decision to set
up three American bases in Georgia and thereby turn Georgia into an
avant-garde partner of the United States in the region of the Black
Sea and the Caucasus. Russia and Turkey demonstrate readiness to act
together and make a serious bid for an alliance. For the time being,
the United States is taking care of protecting the format of the Minsk
Group, preventing a "local", a "regional" decision, in the framework
of the Russia-Turkey-Azerbaijan relations. This would be the terrible
result of their policy, practically a strategic loss of the Americans
in the region, and not only in the region. This development, in the
opinion of the Americans, would lead to significant weakening of the
United States in the region, including undermining of the importance of
the Black Sea basin for the American strategy, as well as classifying
Georgia among partners which are not relevant any more. In my opinion,
the United States will be headed for thwarting this Russian project
on the Karabakh issue, in a classic manner. In the beginning, the
United States will try to talk Turkey out of accepting the proposals
of Russia. Identically, the Americans will engage Azerbaijan, offering
a more favorable settlement for it. It should be noted that Turkey
hopes for that, and so does Azerbaijan but obviously Turkey has a plan
of action. The Turks are hoping for a new situation which may emerge
after the U.S. presidential election. The Russians are also hoping
for that but the Russians tried to promote a decision, at least a
short-term one, together with Turkey, concerning the entire region
of the South Caucasus. The Russians have realized that the Turks
were more ingenious than them by temporizing, but they continue to
offer their proposals. Various political circles in Turkey are still
hoping for possible turning points in the U.S.-Turkish relations,
the establishment of new relations, i.e. relations on new conditions,
when Turkey will implement a more independent foreign policy but again
with the assistance of the United States. This is hardly possible,
and the United States will hardly go into such minor issues since the
Americans realize very well that Turkey fears crossing the line beyond
which confrontation with the United States starts. Turkey still needs
the support of the United States, the EU and NATO. Otherwise, Turkey
will have no chance to overcome its economic and social problems, and
will face the prospect of a failure state. In Moscow they certainly
take this into consideration and understand that it is impossible to
build relations with Turkey on such a strategic basis.
Currently, Russia's relations with Turkey are based on innumerable
tactical interests but highly important interests. The policy of
John McCain will indicate real possibilities for the establishment of
U.S. and Turkish relations in new historical conditions. Barack Obama
will not offer short-term solutions, and the U.S. policy on Turkey
will not undergo significant change. Nevertheless, the relations
between the United States and Russia will not acquire a new shade in
any of the possible cases.
Therefore, Turkey will continue its game with Russia, demonstrating the
realistic nature of the alternative foreign political line. However,
it should be taken into account that for the national catastrophe
of Armenia the establishment of strategic relations between Russia
and Turkey is not necessary, three or four years of flirting between
them is enough. In the nearest future, the "triangle" Russia-United
States-Turkey in the South Caucasus will not be unambiguous in
terms of the pattern of forces, and all the three actors understand
this. This means that Turkey will continue to insist on the position
of balance. The current global crisis and prices of energy resources
should not be ignored. This factor will certainly affect Russia's
foreign political ambitions. John McCain would show those "gas and
oil" politicians their place better, but it is not ruled out that
so would do Barack Obama. Generally, the oil politicians have been
unlucky recently, the ground is too shaky. Is it also important that
the United States is ready to approve transportation of gas from Iran
to Europe via the gas pipeline of Turkey. This may be quite real,
since for the United States the supply of the Iranian gas to Europe
is more acceptable than to China and even India. By the way, the
European analytical centers think that the game with Russia is just
an argument in the dialogue with the EU and the United States. All
this means that Armenia still has a chance for a foreign political
maneuver, although only in the sense of potential.
What should the stance of Armenia be to prevent the destruction of
Armenian Karabakh and to avoid a national catastrophe?
I would rather cite the opinion of the leading Russian political
scientists insisting on the idea of "freezing" the Karabakh problem
instead of expressing my opinion. "It would be unreasonable to
demonstrate a nervous reaction and automatic request for help from the
United States. In this situation when the issue that Karabakh belongs
to the Armenian people is questioned, for Armenia it is enough to say
"no", in a determined manner. In that case Russia has no arguments
and possibility to continue to push through his plans. Russia will
not insist more than it has done."
Long before the revelation of these opinions and evaluations, this
approach appeared realistic and possible to me. However, I would
like to refer these evaluations to the opinion and stance of the
given Russian political scientists. Russia understands that its
"great victory" on Georgia is highly ephemeral and would like to
demonstrate to the world that it is ready to make and fulfill other
decisions, i.e. in the framework of the notorious "international
law", and the Karabakh issue, along with the geopolitical aspect,
is suitable for these propaganda aims. At the same time, despite the
confident appearance of Russia, it fears the Americans, but most of
all it fears "recruitment" of countries of the region by the United
States. At any event, the "Russian phase" in the Armenian history is
over, even if the project fails, Russia will be viewed as a dangerous
enemy. I regret to say this.
What if Armenia does not say "no" with determination?
In that case, it is necessary to stop sacrificing the Armenians of
Karabakh like lambs on the altar and try to seek money which would
enable the people of Karabakh to settle in some regions of Armenia,
and better in other countries. Now it is clear that the Armenians fear,
they have reason to fear, and therefore they will lose, disgracefully,
without a single shot.