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Center for Research on Globalization, Canada
Sept 5 2008
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Is Possible ` and Necessary!
by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach
Global Research, September 5, 2008
The visit by Turkish President Abdullah Gul to Yerevan on September 6
will be remembered as a historic event, even if concrete results are
not to be expected immediately. Accepting the invitation by Armenian
President Serzh Sargysyan, to attend the World Cup qualifying 2010
football match between the two countries' teams, Gul broke a tabu and
opened the way for a process of reconciliation to begin, following
decades of bitter enmity. If a genuine peace process unfolds, it could
not only reestablish normal relations between the two neighbors, but
contribute to stabilizing the Caucasus and far beyond.
Such a development would have been difficult to imagine without the
crisis that erupted with Georgia's military move against South
Ossetia, and the subsequent Russian response. The Russian-Georgian war
effected a kaleidoscopic shift in the geostrategic relations among the
nations in the region, whereby the relatively small Armenia has
acquired a new significance. Several factors have to be taken into
consideration to clarify this new reality.
First and foremost, the Georgian-Russian crisis laid bare the extreme
vulnerability of Georgia as a transit land for oil and gas deliveries
from Azerbaijan to the West. The conflict led to a halt in exports and
an evacuation of some expatriate oil workers. As Michael Chossudovsky
showed in a recent article
(www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=v a&aid=9907) , the war had
everything to do with oil. Georgia's belligerent attack came on the
heels of a U.S.-GUAM summit, which included Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldava, countries seen as appendages of NATO deployed
to militarily protect the U.S.-backed pipelines. U.S. oil policy, as
conceived and implemented by Dick Cheney, has been to promote
pipelines from Azerbaijan westwards, which would by-pass both Russia
and Iran, considered enemy countries. The corollary of this policy has
been to sabotage any pipelines involving Russia or Iran, and thwart
economic cooperation which includes them as well as China and the
Central Asian Republics. As Chossudovsky shows, the Cheney strategy
has not met success, as powerful coalitions stretching from Iran
across Asia have come into being around concrete economic, political
and military cooperation. The Russian response to Mikhail
Saakashvili's foolish adventure has thrown a hefty monkey-wrench into
the entire Cheney approach.
A second consideration involves the role of Turkey. A NATO member and
staunch U.S. ally, Turkey is a key element of the pipeline routes: the
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline carries Azeri oil across Georgia and
to Turkey's Mediterranean port at Ceyhan. A further extension of the
pipeline is envisioned in the Nabucco project across Turkey into
Austria via Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Gas from Turkmenistan is
also being discussed. However, as analyst Andrew Neff from Global
Insight put it, "without Azeri gas, the Nabucco pipeline is dead on
the drawing board." Azerbaijan's state oil company, SOCAR, decided on
August 7 to deliver oil now through the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline.
Turkey could be seriously damaged by the spin-off effects of the
Georgia crisis, not only if the pipeline were blocked, but also if
relations with Russia were to deteriorate. Already on Sept. 2, Turkish
Daily News reported that Russia had stopped Turkish trucks at customs
check-points following the crisis, and some mooted that this was
Moscow's way of punishing Ankara for having allowed U.S. warships to
pass through the Bosphorus with aid for Georgia. Turkey cannot afford
problems with Moscow, as it depends on Russia for 29% of its oil and
63% of its gas. Were these supplies interrupted, Turkey "would be in
the dark," as Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan once said. The two
countries have a significant trade volume of $38 billion for the
current year, and it is growing.
Turkey's Stability Initiative
It may be as a result of such considerations that the Turkish
government of Erdogan launched an intriguing new initiative, known as
the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP), which aims to
bring together Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and
Russia. Speaking to the press at a reception given by the General
Staff command in Ankara for Victory Day on August 30, Erdogan made the
following remarks: "Why did we call this the `Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform'? Why is Armenia included in this, why is Georgia
included in this? Because we chose [them] for inclusion [in the
platform] on a geographic basis. We have to succeed in this so that
the region will become a region of welfare and ease." He added: "We
need to shape the future of the Caucasus together. It is a time when
we need to take brave steps to prevent the regional tension from
turning into global turmoil. Channels of dialogue must be kept open."
The CSCP is to be on the agenda of the talks between the presidents of
Turkey and Armenia, as indicated in a series of important bilateral
meetings among members of the proposed grouping. Turkish Foreign
Minister Ali Babacan, in a press conference with his Georgian
counterpart Eka Tkeshelashvili in Istanbul reported on Sept. 1 by
Today's Zaman, said a Turkish delegation going to Yerevan to prepare
Gul's visit, would discuss the CSCP. Subsequent reports confirmed that
was the case. Erdogan himself discussed the idea on visits to Moscow,
Tblisi and Baku. The foreign minister of Azerbaijan addressed the
matter in Ankara on August 29, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov dealt with it in talks in Istanbul on Sept. 2.
Lavrov expressed outright support for the initiative
(www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.ph p?enewsid=114351). While
denying that Russian controls on Turkish imports had been politically
motivated, Lavrov said his country appreciated Turkey's efforts to
stabilize the region, adding that "This initiative [the CSCP] is based
on common sense."
On the same day, Armenian President Sargsyan met with Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev in Sochi, to discuss new bilateral
cooperation projects, and, of course, the Caucasus crisis. Both the
Armenian and the Azeri governments have said they would discuss the
CSCP proposal.
The Parameters of Cooperation
What the Erdogan government has proposed is ambitious, courageous and
most necessary. But it will not be easy to implement. The countries
invited to participate in the CSCP are not at all thinking on the same
wave length, nor do they share the same self-perceived geostrategic
interests.
Since the "Rose Revolution," Georgia has been functioning as a
plaything of the George Soros-operated networks based in the U.S., and
supported by the Bush-Cheney administration, and has been being used
as an attack-dog against Moscow, as the recent South Ossetia tragedy
showed. Azerbaijan, a Muslim nation, had more or less been in the
pocket of Dick Cheney and his oil magnate friends since
independence. Azerbaijan is technically still in a state of war
against Armenia, since the latter took the Armenian enclave
Nagorno-Karabagh and occupied contiguous Azeri territory in the war
following independence. Turkey, which was the first to recognize
Armenia's independence in 1991, is, however an ally of Turkic
Azerbaijan, and following the Nagorno-Karabagh war, broke off all
relations with Yerevan in 1993. This meant closing the borders to
Armenia, as Azerbaijan had already done. Armenia has had good
relations historically with Georgia, which is also a Christian state,
and has very close relations with Russia. Armenia's economy is deeply
integrated with Russia's: it relies on Russia for oil and gas (though
some comes from Iran), for its nuclear fuel, and for financing of its
nuclear plant. Russia controls its communications and transportation
networks. Russian companies are prospecting for uranium ore in
Armenia, and there are plans afoot for constructing another nuclear
plant. Russian companies are also the largest foreign investors in the
economy, to the tune of $1.3 billion, in energy, banking, mining,
metallurgy, telecommunications, and construction, Historically, Russia
has also functioned as the protector of Christian populations and
nations.
In the current strategic juncture, Russia could exert its influence in
ways that could either help or hurt neighboring countries. Its
intervention in Georgia has made clear what pull it has; it could
exert pressure on Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabagh
issue. Considering the precedent of Russia's recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics, one might entertain the
possibility (albeit remote) that Moscow could hint at possible
recognition of Nagorno-Karabagh. The official Russian position has
embodied the rational approach, that the entire matter must be settled
through bilateral negotiations.
In this extremely complicated combination, there are two alternative
routes that might be taken: either each nation (with its international
sponsor if there is one) seeks to gain its own perceived geostrategic
gain, at the expense of others, thus exacerbating the crisis; or each
comes to terms with the fact that the game being played in the
Caucasus is being manipulated by forces outside the region ` the
Anglo-American oil interests represented by Cheney et al ` whose
ultimate aims collide with those of any of the independent nation
states of the region, if seen as such.
Thus, the Turkish initiative should be taken up and pursued. Some
sources in Turkey have told this author that they are suspicious of
the CSCP, and there have been reports in the Turkish press to the same
effect. This view says that what is really behind the Erdogan
initiative is an operation, coordinated with Washington, aimed at
coopting Armenia, via Turkey, in essence, to wean Armenia away from
its relationship with Russia. Thus, even the football diplomacy of Gul
would be considered a ploy in this game. This author is skeptical of
such a reading; initial reports in the Turkish press indicated that
Washington was not at all pleased with the CSCP, because a) it does
not contemplate the presence of the U.S. or any other nation from the
West, and b) the U.S. had not been informed of the idea. Turkish press
reports now say that Washington has been informed, and that it
reportedly agrees; that may prove to be true, but the fact remains the
grouping envisioned in the initiative includes Russia, but not anyone
in the West.
Be that as it may, there are certain facts that cannot be
denied. First, as a result of its economic interdependence on Russia,
Armenia cannot (and would not like to) be turned into an enemy of
Moscow overnight. Secondly, the Georgian-Russian war has altered the
situation on the ground. It is incumbent upon Turkey at this point to
open its borders with Armenia, and Azerbaijan as well.
The Armenian-Turkish Dispute
If there is to be a rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan, a number
of other important issues are going to have to be dealt with. The two
countries have been at odds, and not only since Turkey closed its
borders in 1993. The enmity goes back to 1915, when the Young Turk
government of the Ottoman Empire carried out an extermination policy
against the Armenian population, leading to the deaths of an estimated
1.5 million. Although the post-war Turkish government in 1919 put the
Young Turk leaders on trial and convicted them; although Ataturk,
father of the modern Turkish nation, was not involved; still, no
Turkish government has acknowledged charges, brought by Armenians in
the diaspora and in Yerevan, that what occurred was a conscious policy
of genocide. The official Turkish view is that, in the course of the
terrible First World War, Armenians were deported because they were
suspected of having been allied with Russia, and that, during the
deportations, unfortunately many (and the figures are greatly reduced)
perished. This issue has been the thorniest in bilateral
relations. The Turkish government proposes that a joint commission of
historians from both sides examine the facts to determine what
actually occurred. Ankara also demands that the Armenian diaspora
cease its international campaigns to recognize the genocide.
Then, there is the issue of Nagorno-Karabagh, which the Russians have
wisely proposed be dealt with through negotiations. Finally, Turkey
demands that Armenia recognize the current borders between the two
nations. Armenia demands recognition of the genocide and calls for
reopening diplomatic relations without conditions.
Westphalia Now!
The challenge (and opportunity) posed to the governments and peoples
of Turkey and Armenia by the current unique situation is of historic
proportions, and, if adequately met, could truly lead to historic
breakthroughs. But this will require that both sides "jump over their
own shadows," as the Germans put it. This means, both sides must
strive to overcome the bitterness, fears, and, yes, hatred, that the
horrendous events of 1915 engendered. As the daughter of orphans of
that genocide, this author can totally agree with those Armenians at
home and in the diaspora who demand justice be done in finally
recognizing the facts of history. At the same time, it must be
stressed that, just as those tragic events were ultimately the results
of geopolitical manipulations of the Great Powers of the time `
unbeknownst to many on the ground `, so today it is circles in the
Anglo-American power elite (including Cheney's oil interests), who are
desperately seeking to manipulate nations in the Caucasus to their
ends. Thus, the question is: can the nations of the region break free
of such geopolitical harnesses, and come together in a regional forum,
as potentially embodied in the Turkish proposal, to establish the
basis for effective regional stability and security through
cooperation?
The approach required for overcoming the Turkish-Armenian conflict is
that first embraced at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. There, following
the religious wars in Europe culminating in the Thirty Years War, the
former adversaries established peace on the basis of two fundamental
principles: "that each Party shall endeavor to procure the Benefit,
Honor and Advantage of the other;" and that on all sides, there should
be "a perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty or Pardon of all that has been
committed," i.e. that all atrocities committed must be consigned to
the past.
The application of such noble principles to overcoming the
Armenian-Turkish conflict today would require acknowledging the
historical facts and seeking reconciliation through forgiveness. On
the concrete economic plane, it means reopening the borders to
Armenia, to allow the flow of goods and persons, to the economic and
social benefit of all parties. Turkey would benefit by gaining access
to markets in nations of the former Soviet Union, and Armenia would
massively increase its trade and GDP, as the Turkish-American Business
Development Council has calculated. In addition, Armenia's rail and
road transportation routes from the Soviet era should be revived and
modernized, and linked up with those of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran,
Central Asia and so forth. A similar approach should be adopted
regarding existing and new gas and oil pipelines.
The solution comes down to a question of political will and
courage. Can the political leaders of Armenia and Turkey attain the
stature of an Adenauer and a DeGaulle, and seek reconciliation in the
interest of the future of their populations? Can they rise above the
notion of collective guilt for acts perpetrated by specific political
forces almost a century ago, and seek to restore the spirit of
cohabitation that existed between the two peoples for centuries before
the First World War? If such a breakthrough were to occur, on the
heels of Gul's football diplomacy in Yerevan, it would not only earn
statesmen on both sides great honor, but serve as a healthy challenge
to so many other, similar conflicts in our troubled world today.
The author can be reached at: [email protected]
Muriel Mirak-Weissbach is a frequent contributor to Global Research.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=v a&aid=10083
Sept 5 2008
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Is Possible ` and Necessary!
by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach
Global Research, September 5, 2008
The visit by Turkish President Abdullah Gul to Yerevan on September 6
will be remembered as a historic event, even if concrete results are
not to be expected immediately. Accepting the invitation by Armenian
President Serzh Sargysyan, to attend the World Cup qualifying 2010
football match between the two countries' teams, Gul broke a tabu and
opened the way for a process of reconciliation to begin, following
decades of bitter enmity. If a genuine peace process unfolds, it could
not only reestablish normal relations between the two neighbors, but
contribute to stabilizing the Caucasus and far beyond.
Such a development would have been difficult to imagine without the
crisis that erupted with Georgia's military move against South
Ossetia, and the subsequent Russian response. The Russian-Georgian war
effected a kaleidoscopic shift in the geostrategic relations among the
nations in the region, whereby the relatively small Armenia has
acquired a new significance. Several factors have to be taken into
consideration to clarify this new reality.
First and foremost, the Georgian-Russian crisis laid bare the extreme
vulnerability of Georgia as a transit land for oil and gas deliveries
from Azerbaijan to the West. The conflict led to a halt in exports and
an evacuation of some expatriate oil workers. As Michael Chossudovsky
showed in a recent article
(www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=v a&aid=9907) , the war had
everything to do with oil. Georgia's belligerent attack came on the
heels of a U.S.-GUAM summit, which included Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldava, countries seen as appendages of NATO deployed
to militarily protect the U.S.-backed pipelines. U.S. oil policy, as
conceived and implemented by Dick Cheney, has been to promote
pipelines from Azerbaijan westwards, which would by-pass both Russia
and Iran, considered enemy countries. The corollary of this policy has
been to sabotage any pipelines involving Russia or Iran, and thwart
economic cooperation which includes them as well as China and the
Central Asian Republics. As Chossudovsky shows, the Cheney strategy
has not met success, as powerful coalitions stretching from Iran
across Asia have come into being around concrete economic, political
and military cooperation. The Russian response to Mikhail
Saakashvili's foolish adventure has thrown a hefty monkey-wrench into
the entire Cheney approach.
A second consideration involves the role of Turkey. A NATO member and
staunch U.S. ally, Turkey is a key element of the pipeline routes: the
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline carries Azeri oil across Georgia and
to Turkey's Mediterranean port at Ceyhan. A further extension of the
pipeline is envisioned in the Nabucco project across Turkey into
Austria via Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Gas from Turkmenistan is
also being discussed. However, as analyst Andrew Neff from Global
Insight put it, "without Azeri gas, the Nabucco pipeline is dead on
the drawing board." Azerbaijan's state oil company, SOCAR, decided on
August 7 to deliver oil now through the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline.
Turkey could be seriously damaged by the spin-off effects of the
Georgia crisis, not only if the pipeline were blocked, but also if
relations with Russia were to deteriorate. Already on Sept. 2, Turkish
Daily News reported that Russia had stopped Turkish trucks at customs
check-points following the crisis, and some mooted that this was
Moscow's way of punishing Ankara for having allowed U.S. warships to
pass through the Bosphorus with aid for Georgia. Turkey cannot afford
problems with Moscow, as it depends on Russia for 29% of its oil and
63% of its gas. Were these supplies interrupted, Turkey "would be in
the dark," as Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan once said. The two
countries have a significant trade volume of $38 billion for the
current year, and it is growing.
Turkey's Stability Initiative
It may be as a result of such considerations that the Turkish
government of Erdogan launched an intriguing new initiative, known as
the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP), which aims to
bring together Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and
Russia. Speaking to the press at a reception given by the General
Staff command in Ankara for Victory Day on August 30, Erdogan made the
following remarks: "Why did we call this the `Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform'? Why is Armenia included in this, why is Georgia
included in this? Because we chose [them] for inclusion [in the
platform] on a geographic basis. We have to succeed in this so that
the region will become a region of welfare and ease." He added: "We
need to shape the future of the Caucasus together. It is a time when
we need to take brave steps to prevent the regional tension from
turning into global turmoil. Channels of dialogue must be kept open."
The CSCP is to be on the agenda of the talks between the presidents of
Turkey and Armenia, as indicated in a series of important bilateral
meetings among members of the proposed grouping. Turkish Foreign
Minister Ali Babacan, in a press conference with his Georgian
counterpart Eka Tkeshelashvili in Istanbul reported on Sept. 1 by
Today's Zaman, said a Turkish delegation going to Yerevan to prepare
Gul's visit, would discuss the CSCP. Subsequent reports confirmed that
was the case. Erdogan himself discussed the idea on visits to Moscow,
Tblisi and Baku. The foreign minister of Azerbaijan addressed the
matter in Ankara on August 29, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov dealt with it in talks in Istanbul on Sept. 2.
Lavrov expressed outright support for the initiative
(www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.ph p?enewsid=114351). While
denying that Russian controls on Turkish imports had been politically
motivated, Lavrov said his country appreciated Turkey's efforts to
stabilize the region, adding that "This initiative [the CSCP] is based
on common sense."
On the same day, Armenian President Sargsyan met with Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev in Sochi, to discuss new bilateral
cooperation projects, and, of course, the Caucasus crisis. Both the
Armenian and the Azeri governments have said they would discuss the
CSCP proposal.
The Parameters of Cooperation
What the Erdogan government has proposed is ambitious, courageous and
most necessary. But it will not be easy to implement. The countries
invited to participate in the CSCP are not at all thinking on the same
wave length, nor do they share the same self-perceived geostrategic
interests.
Since the "Rose Revolution," Georgia has been functioning as a
plaything of the George Soros-operated networks based in the U.S., and
supported by the Bush-Cheney administration, and has been being used
as an attack-dog against Moscow, as the recent South Ossetia tragedy
showed. Azerbaijan, a Muslim nation, had more or less been in the
pocket of Dick Cheney and his oil magnate friends since
independence. Azerbaijan is technically still in a state of war
against Armenia, since the latter took the Armenian enclave
Nagorno-Karabagh and occupied contiguous Azeri territory in the war
following independence. Turkey, which was the first to recognize
Armenia's independence in 1991, is, however an ally of Turkic
Azerbaijan, and following the Nagorno-Karabagh war, broke off all
relations with Yerevan in 1993. This meant closing the borders to
Armenia, as Azerbaijan had already done. Armenia has had good
relations historically with Georgia, which is also a Christian state,
and has very close relations with Russia. Armenia's economy is deeply
integrated with Russia's: it relies on Russia for oil and gas (though
some comes from Iran), for its nuclear fuel, and for financing of its
nuclear plant. Russia controls its communications and transportation
networks. Russian companies are prospecting for uranium ore in
Armenia, and there are plans afoot for constructing another nuclear
plant. Russian companies are also the largest foreign investors in the
economy, to the tune of $1.3 billion, in energy, banking, mining,
metallurgy, telecommunications, and construction, Historically, Russia
has also functioned as the protector of Christian populations and
nations.
In the current strategic juncture, Russia could exert its influence in
ways that could either help or hurt neighboring countries. Its
intervention in Georgia has made clear what pull it has; it could
exert pressure on Azerbaijan regarding the Nagorno-Karabagh
issue. Considering the precedent of Russia's recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics, one might entertain the
possibility (albeit remote) that Moscow could hint at possible
recognition of Nagorno-Karabagh. The official Russian position has
embodied the rational approach, that the entire matter must be settled
through bilateral negotiations.
In this extremely complicated combination, there are two alternative
routes that might be taken: either each nation (with its international
sponsor if there is one) seeks to gain its own perceived geostrategic
gain, at the expense of others, thus exacerbating the crisis; or each
comes to terms with the fact that the game being played in the
Caucasus is being manipulated by forces outside the region ` the
Anglo-American oil interests represented by Cheney et al ` whose
ultimate aims collide with those of any of the independent nation
states of the region, if seen as such.
Thus, the Turkish initiative should be taken up and pursued. Some
sources in Turkey have told this author that they are suspicious of
the CSCP, and there have been reports in the Turkish press to the same
effect. This view says that what is really behind the Erdogan
initiative is an operation, coordinated with Washington, aimed at
coopting Armenia, via Turkey, in essence, to wean Armenia away from
its relationship with Russia. Thus, even the football diplomacy of Gul
would be considered a ploy in this game. This author is skeptical of
such a reading; initial reports in the Turkish press indicated that
Washington was not at all pleased with the CSCP, because a) it does
not contemplate the presence of the U.S. or any other nation from the
West, and b) the U.S. had not been informed of the idea. Turkish press
reports now say that Washington has been informed, and that it
reportedly agrees; that may prove to be true, but the fact remains the
grouping envisioned in the initiative includes Russia, but not anyone
in the West.
Be that as it may, there are certain facts that cannot be
denied. First, as a result of its economic interdependence on Russia,
Armenia cannot (and would not like to) be turned into an enemy of
Moscow overnight. Secondly, the Georgian-Russian war has altered the
situation on the ground. It is incumbent upon Turkey at this point to
open its borders with Armenia, and Azerbaijan as well.
The Armenian-Turkish Dispute
If there is to be a rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan, a number
of other important issues are going to have to be dealt with. The two
countries have been at odds, and not only since Turkey closed its
borders in 1993. The enmity goes back to 1915, when the Young Turk
government of the Ottoman Empire carried out an extermination policy
against the Armenian population, leading to the deaths of an estimated
1.5 million. Although the post-war Turkish government in 1919 put the
Young Turk leaders on trial and convicted them; although Ataturk,
father of the modern Turkish nation, was not involved; still, no
Turkish government has acknowledged charges, brought by Armenians in
the diaspora and in Yerevan, that what occurred was a conscious policy
of genocide. The official Turkish view is that, in the course of the
terrible First World War, Armenians were deported because they were
suspected of having been allied with Russia, and that, during the
deportations, unfortunately many (and the figures are greatly reduced)
perished. This issue has been the thorniest in bilateral
relations. The Turkish government proposes that a joint commission of
historians from both sides examine the facts to determine what
actually occurred. Ankara also demands that the Armenian diaspora
cease its international campaigns to recognize the genocide.
Then, there is the issue of Nagorno-Karabagh, which the Russians have
wisely proposed be dealt with through negotiations. Finally, Turkey
demands that Armenia recognize the current borders between the two
nations. Armenia demands recognition of the genocide and calls for
reopening diplomatic relations without conditions.
Westphalia Now!
The challenge (and opportunity) posed to the governments and peoples
of Turkey and Armenia by the current unique situation is of historic
proportions, and, if adequately met, could truly lead to historic
breakthroughs. But this will require that both sides "jump over their
own shadows," as the Germans put it. This means, both sides must
strive to overcome the bitterness, fears, and, yes, hatred, that the
horrendous events of 1915 engendered. As the daughter of orphans of
that genocide, this author can totally agree with those Armenians at
home and in the diaspora who demand justice be done in finally
recognizing the facts of history. At the same time, it must be
stressed that, just as those tragic events were ultimately the results
of geopolitical manipulations of the Great Powers of the time `
unbeknownst to many on the ground `, so today it is circles in the
Anglo-American power elite (including Cheney's oil interests), who are
desperately seeking to manipulate nations in the Caucasus to their
ends. Thus, the question is: can the nations of the region break free
of such geopolitical harnesses, and come together in a regional forum,
as potentially embodied in the Turkish proposal, to establish the
basis for effective regional stability and security through
cooperation?
The approach required for overcoming the Turkish-Armenian conflict is
that first embraced at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. There, following
the religious wars in Europe culminating in the Thirty Years War, the
former adversaries established peace on the basis of two fundamental
principles: "that each Party shall endeavor to procure the Benefit,
Honor and Advantage of the other;" and that on all sides, there should
be "a perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty or Pardon of all that has been
committed," i.e. that all atrocities committed must be consigned to
the past.
The application of such noble principles to overcoming the
Armenian-Turkish conflict today would require acknowledging the
historical facts and seeking reconciliation through forgiveness. On
the concrete economic plane, it means reopening the borders to
Armenia, to allow the flow of goods and persons, to the economic and
social benefit of all parties. Turkey would benefit by gaining access
to markets in nations of the former Soviet Union, and Armenia would
massively increase its trade and GDP, as the Turkish-American Business
Development Council has calculated. In addition, Armenia's rail and
road transportation routes from the Soviet era should be revived and
modernized, and linked up with those of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran,
Central Asia and so forth. A similar approach should be adopted
regarding existing and new gas and oil pipelines.
The solution comes down to a question of political will and
courage. Can the political leaders of Armenia and Turkey attain the
stature of an Adenauer and a DeGaulle, and seek reconciliation in the
interest of the future of their populations? Can they rise above the
notion of collective guilt for acts perpetrated by specific political
forces almost a century ago, and seek to restore the spirit of
cohabitation that existed between the two peoples for centuries before
the First World War? If such a breakthrough were to occur, on the
heels of Gul's football diplomacy in Yerevan, it would not only earn
statesmen on both sides great honor, but serve as a healthy challenge
to so many other, similar conflicts in our troubled world today.
The author can be reached at: [email protected]
Muriel Mirak-Weissbach is a frequent contributor to Global Research.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=v a&aid=10083