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RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN STABILITY
THE KOREA HERALD
September 8, 2008 Monday
KIEV - Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has seemed that
new rules were being established for the conduct of international
relations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The
watchwords were independence and interdependence; sovereignty and
mutual responsibility; cooperation and common interests. They are
good words that need to be defended.
But the Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian
tanks in a neighboring country on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia has shown that the temptations of power
politics remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains
unreconciled to the new map of Europe. Russia's unilateral attempt
to redraw that map by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia marks not just the end of the post-Cold War period;
it is also a moment that requires countries to set out where they
stand on the significant issues of nationhood and international law.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says that he is not afraid of a
new Cold War. We don't want one. He has a big responsibility not to
start one.
Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when a
country takes charge of its own destiny, and seeks alliances with
other countries. Its choices should not be seen as a threat to Russia,
but its independence does demand a new relationship with Russia -
one of equals, not that of master and servant.
Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis:
there can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial
integrity, democratic governance, and international law. It has shown
that it can defeat Georgia's army. But today Russia is more isolated,
less trusted, and less respected than it was a month ago. It has
made short-term military gains, but over time it will feel economic
and political losses. If Russia truly wants respect and influence,
it must change course.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has described the Soviet Union's collapse
as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century. But
most people of the former Soviet bloc don't see it that way. It will
be a tragedy for Russia if it spends the next 20 years believing it
to be the case.
Indeed, since 1991, the West has offered Russia extensive co-operation
with the European Union and NATO, as well as membership of the Council
of Europe and the G8. Summits, mechanisms, and meetings have been
developed not to humiliate or threaten Russia, but to engage it. The
EU and the United States provided critical support for the Russian
economy when it was needed, Western companies have invested heavily,
and Russia has benefited significantly from its reintegration into
the global economy.
But Russia has recently met our efforts with scorn, from suspension of
its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty to harassment
of business people and cyber attacks on neighbors. Now we have Georgia.
Of course, Russia can and should have interests in its neighbors,
but, like everyone else, it must earn that influence. Indeed, these
countries do not make up some "post-Soviet space" to which Putin
often refers. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new reality -
sovereign, independent countries with their own rights and interests.
Russia also needs to clarify its attitude about the use of force to
solve disputes. Some argue that Russia has done nothing not previously
done by NATO in Kosovo in 1999. But this comparison does not bear
serious examination.
NATO's actions in Kosovo followed dramatic and systematic abuse
of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing on a scale not
seen in Europe since World War II. NATO acted only after intensive
negotiations in the United Nations Security Council and determined
efforts at peace talks. Special Envoys were sent to warn then-Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic of the consequences of his actions.
None of this can be said for Russia's use of force in Georgia.
Likewise, the decision to recognize Kosovo's independence came only
after Russia made clear that it would veto the deal proposed by the
U.N. secretary general's special envoy, former Finnish President
Martii Ahtisaari. Even then we agreed to a further four months of
EU-U.S.-Russia negotiations in order to ensure that no stone was left
unturned in the search for a mutually acceptable compromise.
By contrast, in Georgia, Russia moved from support for territorial
integrity to breaking up the country in three weeks and relied entirely
on military force to do so.
Russia must now ask itself about the relationship between short
term military victories and long-term economic prosperity. The
conflict in Georgia has been followed by a sharp decline in investor
confidence. Russia's foreign-exchange reserves fell by $16 billion in
one week, and Gazprom's value fell by the same amount in one day. Risk
premia in Russia have skyrocketed.
Isolating Russia would be counter-productive, because its international
economic integration is the best discipline on its politics. Moreover,
isolation would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels
intolerant Russian nationalism, and it would compromise the world's
interests in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change,
or stabilizing Afghanistan.
But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need
Russian gas, but Gazprom needs European markets and investment. Our
approach must be hard-headed-engagement. That means bolstering allies,
rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the
rules of international institutions, and renewing efforts to tackle
"unresolved conflicts," not only in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but
also in Transdniestria and Nagorno Karabakh. Each has its roots in
longstanding ethnic tensions, exacerbated by economic and political
underdevelopment.
Here, Ukraine, with its eight million ethnic Russians - many of them
in Crimea - is key. Its strong links to Russia are firmly in both
countries' interests. But Ukraine is also a European country, which
gives it the right to apply for EU membership - an aspiration voiced
by Ukraine's leaders. The prospect and reality of EU membership has
been a force for stability, prosperity, and democracy across Eastern
Europe. Once Ukraine fulfills the EU's criteria, it should be accepted
as a full member.
Nor does Ukraine's relationship with NATO pose a threat to Russia. The
strengthening of Ukraine's democratic institutions and independence
that will result from it will benefit Russia in the long term.
Europe also must re-balance its energy relationship with Russia by
investing in gas storage to deal with interruptions, diversifying
supplies, and establishing a properly functioning internal market,
with more interconnections between countries. We must also reduce
our dependence on gas altogether by increasing energy efficiency,
and by investing in carbon capture and storage technology for coal,
and in renewable resources and nuclear power.
In all international institutions, we must review our relations with
Russia. I do not apologize for rejecting knee-jerk calls for Russia's
expulsion from the G8, or for EU-Russia or NATO-Russia relations to
be broken. But we do need to examine the nature, depth, and breadth
of relations with Russia. And we will stand by our commitments to
existing NATO members, while renewing our determination that Russia
will have no veto over its future direction.
The choice today is clear. No one wants a new cold war, but we must
be clear about the foundations of lasting peace.
David Miliband is Britain's foreign minister. - Ed.
THE KOREA HERALD
September 8, 2008 Monday
KIEV - Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has seemed that
new rules were being established for the conduct of international
relations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The
watchwords were independence and interdependence; sovereignty and
mutual responsibility; cooperation and common interests. They are
good words that need to be defended.
But the Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian
tanks in a neighboring country on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia has shown that the temptations of power
politics remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains
unreconciled to the new map of Europe. Russia's unilateral attempt
to redraw that map by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia marks not just the end of the post-Cold War period;
it is also a moment that requires countries to set out where they
stand on the significant issues of nationhood and international law.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev says that he is not afraid of a
new Cold War. We don't want one. He has a big responsibility not to
start one.
Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when a
country takes charge of its own destiny, and seeks alliances with
other countries. Its choices should not be seen as a threat to Russia,
but its independence does demand a new relationship with Russia -
one of equals, not that of master and servant.
Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis:
there can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial
integrity, democratic governance, and international law. It has shown
that it can defeat Georgia's army. But today Russia is more isolated,
less trusted, and less respected than it was a month ago. It has
made short-term military gains, but over time it will feel economic
and political losses. If Russia truly wants respect and influence,
it must change course.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has described the Soviet Union's collapse
as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century. But
most people of the former Soviet bloc don't see it that way. It will
be a tragedy for Russia if it spends the next 20 years believing it
to be the case.
Indeed, since 1991, the West has offered Russia extensive co-operation
with the European Union and NATO, as well as membership of the Council
of Europe and the G8. Summits, mechanisms, and meetings have been
developed not to humiliate or threaten Russia, but to engage it. The
EU and the United States provided critical support for the Russian
economy when it was needed, Western companies have invested heavily,
and Russia has benefited significantly from its reintegration into
the global economy.
But Russia has recently met our efforts with scorn, from suspension of
its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty to harassment
of business people and cyber attacks on neighbors. Now we have Georgia.
Of course, Russia can and should have interests in its neighbors,
but, like everyone else, it must earn that influence. Indeed, these
countries do not make up some "post-Soviet space" to which Putin
often refers. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new reality -
sovereign, independent countries with their own rights and interests.
Russia also needs to clarify its attitude about the use of force to
solve disputes. Some argue that Russia has done nothing not previously
done by NATO in Kosovo in 1999. But this comparison does not bear
serious examination.
NATO's actions in Kosovo followed dramatic and systematic abuse
of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing on a scale not
seen in Europe since World War II. NATO acted only after intensive
negotiations in the United Nations Security Council and determined
efforts at peace talks. Special Envoys were sent to warn then-Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic of the consequences of his actions.
None of this can be said for Russia's use of force in Georgia.
Likewise, the decision to recognize Kosovo's independence came only
after Russia made clear that it would veto the deal proposed by the
U.N. secretary general's special envoy, former Finnish President
Martii Ahtisaari. Even then we agreed to a further four months of
EU-U.S.-Russia negotiations in order to ensure that no stone was left
unturned in the search for a mutually acceptable compromise.
By contrast, in Georgia, Russia moved from support for territorial
integrity to breaking up the country in three weeks and relied entirely
on military force to do so.
Russia must now ask itself about the relationship between short
term military victories and long-term economic prosperity. The
conflict in Georgia has been followed by a sharp decline in investor
confidence. Russia's foreign-exchange reserves fell by $16 billion in
one week, and Gazprom's value fell by the same amount in one day. Risk
premia in Russia have skyrocketed.
Isolating Russia would be counter-productive, because its international
economic integration is the best discipline on its politics. Moreover,
isolation would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels
intolerant Russian nationalism, and it would compromise the world's
interests in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change,
or stabilizing Afghanistan.
But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need
Russian gas, but Gazprom needs European markets and investment. Our
approach must be hard-headed-engagement. That means bolstering allies,
rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the
rules of international institutions, and renewing efforts to tackle
"unresolved conflicts," not only in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but
also in Transdniestria and Nagorno Karabakh. Each has its roots in
longstanding ethnic tensions, exacerbated by economic and political
underdevelopment.
Here, Ukraine, with its eight million ethnic Russians - many of them
in Crimea - is key. Its strong links to Russia are firmly in both
countries' interests. But Ukraine is also a European country, which
gives it the right to apply for EU membership - an aspiration voiced
by Ukraine's leaders. The prospect and reality of EU membership has
been a force for stability, prosperity, and democracy across Eastern
Europe. Once Ukraine fulfills the EU's criteria, it should be accepted
as a full member.
Nor does Ukraine's relationship with NATO pose a threat to Russia. The
strengthening of Ukraine's democratic institutions and independence
that will result from it will benefit Russia in the long term.
Europe also must re-balance its energy relationship with Russia by
investing in gas storage to deal with interruptions, diversifying
supplies, and establishing a properly functioning internal market,
with more interconnections between countries. We must also reduce
our dependence on gas altogether by increasing energy efficiency,
and by investing in carbon capture and storage technology for coal,
and in renewable resources and nuclear power.
In all international institutions, we must review our relations with
Russia. I do not apologize for rejecting knee-jerk calls for Russia's
expulsion from the G8, or for EU-Russia or NATO-Russia relations to
be broken. But we do need to examine the nature, depth, and breadth
of relations with Russia. And we will stand by our commitments to
existing NATO members, while renewing our determination that Russia
will have no veto over its future direction.
The choice today is clear. No one wants a new cold war, but we must
be clear about the foundations of lasting peace.
David Miliband is Britain's foreign minister. - Ed.