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RUSSIA'S COLONIAL ASPIRATIONS
By Amir Taheri
Asharq Alawsat (The Middle East)
http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2 &id=14002
Sept 9 2008
UK
Russia has just invented a new kind of state: one in which the land
is supposedly independent but the inhabitants are citizens of another
country.
Last week, Russia solemnly recognized the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, two autonomous republics that had been part of
Georgia since the 1920s.
First, Russia tried to justify its military intervention by claiming
it was trying to protect its own citizens there.
Using force to protect one's citizens is nothing new in the history of
nation-states. However, the normal process is to go into the hostile
territory, rescue one's citizens and brig them out- end of the story.
In this case, however, the Russians did not go in to bring their
citizens out. They went in to give "independence" to Abkhazia and
Ossetia.
The problem is that a majority of those living in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia today are Russian citizens.
In Abkhazia, Russian passport holders account for 90 per cent
of the estimated 200,000 inhabitants. Another five per cent are
Georgians while Armenians ad other Caucasian peoples account for
the remainder. In other words, in the newly independent Republic of
Abkhazia there are no Abkhazians!
A similar situation obtains in South Ossetia where Russia passport
holders account for 95 per cent of the 75,000 inhabitants. The
remaining five per cent are Georgians, Chechens, Ingush, Kamlouks
and Charkess. Again, there are no Ossetians!
This situation is a result of an earlier piece of Russian chicanery.
>>From 2000, Moscow has been issuing Russian passports to anyone who
demanded it in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The sole criterion was
that the applicant spoke Russian. That was not difficult because the
Caucasus was part of the Soviet Union until 1991 and russified for
two centuries.
Russia's President Dmitri Medvedev claims that his armies
entered Abkhazia and South Ossetia to support national liberation
struggles. But which nations are we talking about? Since 2002, more
than 90 per cent of the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
have been voting in all Russian elections, including the one that
made Medvedev president.
Why did the Abkhaz and the Osset rush to get Russian passports?
The first reason is that they both hate the Georgians with whom
they have a long history of enmity and violence more than they hate
the Russians.
In 1991, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhourdia abolished Abkhazia's
autonomous status and ordered the destruction of Abkhaz cultural
centres and historic monuments. In the ensuing violence, more than
4000 Abkhaz were killed while tens of thousands fled to Russia.
Gamsakhourdia presided over a similar scenario in South Ossetia in
1990-92. More than 2000 Ossets were killed and many more forced out
of their villages.
In both cases, the Abkhaz and the Ossets regarded Russian passports
as an insurance policy against further massacre.
Nevertheless, it was only after 2006 that the Abkhaz and the Ossets
rushed en masse to obtain Russian passports. The reason was the
European Union's decision to allow Russian passport holders to travel
freely to Europe, a privilege that holders of Georgian passports did
not enjoy.
But why is Russia embarking on a high-risk strategy in order to
snatch two tiny enclaves from Georgia. (Abkhazia covers a territory
of 8600 kilometers, smaller than Lebanon, while South Ossetia is
even smaller with 3900 square kilometers.) The Russian move is all
the more surprisingly because, in the previous 200 years, Russia had
always sided with the Georgians against the Abkahz and the Ossets.
A Turkic People, the Abkhaz were regarded by Russia as pro-Ottoman and
anti-Russian. The Ossets, an Iranic people, were distrusted because
they had sided with Iran in the wars that led to Russia's conquest
of the Caucasus between 1801 and 1830.
There are three key reasons why Russia has acted the way she did.
The first is to signal her return as a major power that regards the
Caucasus as part of its glacis.
The second reason is to punish Georgia because of its quest for a
special relationship with the United States. Georgia, with a population
of around four million, has sent more than 3000 troops to Iraq. It has
applied to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is
host to a huge American military mission. President Mikheil Sakaashvili
has gone further by pressing for membership of the European Union.
Thirdly, Georgia has established itself as the key alternative route
for oil and natural gas pipelines linking the resources of the Caspian
Basin to world markets via the Black Sea.
This is in defiance of Russia's strategy of controlling all pipelines
to Europe.
By de-stabilizing Georgia, Moscow is telling Western investors to
think twice before sinking their money into Georgian pipelines.
Finally, Russia's lease of the port facilities at Sebastopol, in
the Crimean Peninsula, runs out in 2017. There is little chance that
the Ukraine, which owns the peninsula, would renew the lease. This
would leave the Russian Black Sea fleet homeless and with difficult
access to the warm waters, especially since Turkey, a NATO member,
controls the Bosporus, under the Treaty of Montreux (1936).
One alternative to Sebastopol is the Syrian port of Lattaqiya, and
speculation about its lease to the Russian navy has been going on for
years. However, Moscow cannot be sure that the Syrian leadership will
not switch sides, leaving the Black Sea fleet homeless.
By seizing Abkhazia, Russia could develop its deep-water harbors into
a new home for its navy. Without such a base, the Russian navy would
lose its blue-water status, becoming, in effect, a coastguard with
limited reach.
What we have witnessed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a classical
colonial land grab, facilitated by the naivete of the Georgian leaders,
the cowardice of the Western powers, and the weakness of Turkey and
Iran, the two traditional powers that tried to counter-balance Russia
in the Caucasus.
These days, however, colonial land grab is hard to sell. This
is why the Russian operation is presented as a move to support
self-determination in the two enclaves.
By Amir Taheri
Asharq Alawsat (The Middle East)
http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2 &id=14002
Sept 9 2008
UK
Russia has just invented a new kind of state: one in which the land
is supposedly independent but the inhabitants are citizens of another
country.
Last week, Russia solemnly recognized the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, two autonomous republics that had been part of
Georgia since the 1920s.
First, Russia tried to justify its military intervention by claiming
it was trying to protect its own citizens there.
Using force to protect one's citizens is nothing new in the history of
nation-states. However, the normal process is to go into the hostile
territory, rescue one's citizens and brig them out- end of the story.
In this case, however, the Russians did not go in to bring their
citizens out. They went in to give "independence" to Abkhazia and
Ossetia.
The problem is that a majority of those living in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia today are Russian citizens.
In Abkhazia, Russian passport holders account for 90 per cent
of the estimated 200,000 inhabitants. Another five per cent are
Georgians while Armenians ad other Caucasian peoples account for
the remainder. In other words, in the newly independent Republic of
Abkhazia there are no Abkhazians!
A similar situation obtains in South Ossetia where Russia passport
holders account for 95 per cent of the 75,000 inhabitants. The
remaining five per cent are Georgians, Chechens, Ingush, Kamlouks
and Charkess. Again, there are no Ossetians!
This situation is a result of an earlier piece of Russian chicanery.
>>From 2000, Moscow has been issuing Russian passports to anyone who
demanded it in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The sole criterion was
that the applicant spoke Russian. That was not difficult because the
Caucasus was part of the Soviet Union until 1991 and russified for
two centuries.
Russia's President Dmitri Medvedev claims that his armies
entered Abkhazia and South Ossetia to support national liberation
struggles. But which nations are we talking about? Since 2002, more
than 90 per cent of the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
have been voting in all Russian elections, including the one that
made Medvedev president.
Why did the Abkhaz and the Osset rush to get Russian passports?
The first reason is that they both hate the Georgians with whom
they have a long history of enmity and violence more than they hate
the Russians.
In 1991, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhourdia abolished Abkhazia's
autonomous status and ordered the destruction of Abkhaz cultural
centres and historic monuments. In the ensuing violence, more than
4000 Abkhaz were killed while tens of thousands fled to Russia.
Gamsakhourdia presided over a similar scenario in South Ossetia in
1990-92. More than 2000 Ossets were killed and many more forced out
of their villages.
In both cases, the Abkhaz and the Ossets regarded Russian passports
as an insurance policy against further massacre.
Nevertheless, it was only after 2006 that the Abkhaz and the Ossets
rushed en masse to obtain Russian passports. The reason was the
European Union's decision to allow Russian passport holders to travel
freely to Europe, a privilege that holders of Georgian passports did
not enjoy.
But why is Russia embarking on a high-risk strategy in order to
snatch two tiny enclaves from Georgia. (Abkhazia covers a territory
of 8600 kilometers, smaller than Lebanon, while South Ossetia is
even smaller with 3900 square kilometers.) The Russian move is all
the more surprisingly because, in the previous 200 years, Russia had
always sided with the Georgians against the Abkahz and the Ossets.
A Turkic People, the Abkhaz were regarded by Russia as pro-Ottoman and
anti-Russian. The Ossets, an Iranic people, were distrusted because
they had sided with Iran in the wars that led to Russia's conquest
of the Caucasus between 1801 and 1830.
There are three key reasons why Russia has acted the way she did.
The first is to signal her return as a major power that regards the
Caucasus as part of its glacis.
The second reason is to punish Georgia because of its quest for a
special relationship with the United States. Georgia, with a population
of around four million, has sent more than 3000 troops to Iraq. It has
applied to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is
host to a huge American military mission. President Mikheil Sakaashvili
has gone further by pressing for membership of the European Union.
Thirdly, Georgia has established itself as the key alternative route
for oil and natural gas pipelines linking the resources of the Caspian
Basin to world markets via the Black Sea.
This is in defiance of Russia's strategy of controlling all pipelines
to Europe.
By de-stabilizing Georgia, Moscow is telling Western investors to
think twice before sinking their money into Georgian pipelines.
Finally, Russia's lease of the port facilities at Sebastopol, in
the Crimean Peninsula, runs out in 2017. There is little chance that
the Ukraine, which owns the peninsula, would renew the lease. This
would leave the Russian Black Sea fleet homeless and with difficult
access to the warm waters, especially since Turkey, a NATO member,
controls the Bosporus, under the Treaty of Montreux (1936).
One alternative to Sebastopol is the Syrian port of Lattaqiya, and
speculation about its lease to the Russian navy has been going on for
years. However, Moscow cannot be sure that the Syrian leadership will
not switch sides, leaving the Black Sea fleet homeless.
By seizing Abkhazia, Russia could develop its deep-water harbors into
a new home for its navy. Without such a base, the Russian navy would
lose its blue-water status, becoming, in effect, a coastguard with
limited reach.
What we have witnessed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is a classical
colonial land grab, facilitated by the naivete of the Georgian leaders,
the cowardice of the Western powers, and the weakness of Turkey and
Iran, the two traditional powers that tried to counter-balance Russia
in the Caucasus.
These days, however, colonial land grab is hard to sell. This
is why the Russian operation is presented as a move to support
self-determination in the two enclaves.