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BACK TO THE COLD WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST? MAYBE
By Konstantin Von Eggert
The Daily Star
Sept 12 2008
Lebanon
Although there is seemingly no direct link between the Russia-Georgia
conflict and Russia's policy in the Middle East, the conflict could
well lead to significant shifts in Moscow's posture in the region. If
the current tendencies in the Kremlin's foreign policy prevail, the
Middle East may return to a situation resembling that of the Cold War,
with Moscow trying to make life difficult for Washington by supporting
regimes the United States considers hostile. It is the US that Russia
holds primarily responsible for what it terms the "aggressive policies"
of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, and it is America's
support for Tbilisi - including promises to re-equip Georgia's armed
forces - that rattle Moscow the most.
It is interesting that one of the first politicians to support Russia's
actions was Syria's President Bashar Assad. There have been reports
in the Russian press that Moscow may increase its naval presence in
the Mediterranean through the use of Latakia and Tartus, Syria's two
ports. New arms deliveries to Damascus could well be another response
from Moscow to what it perceives as America's unfriendly policies in
the Caucasus.
Another and potentially more serious step Russia could take is to adopt
a more assertive stance over Iran's nuclear program and international
sanctions against Tehran. It is interesting that in the wake of the
crisis in Georgia, US military action against Iran, which some people
claimed to be imminent before the end of the year, looks less likely as
Washington has to tackle the Caucasus problem first. Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed some support for Russia's actions at the
recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Dushanbe,
though Tehran did not rush to recognize the breakaway republics of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, Moscow got some moral support
but nothing much in terms of real political solidarity from those
it counted on, especially China and Iran. Yet these countries would
appear to be among the few to which Russia will turn to for support
in case its standoff with the West over Georgia continues.
Overtures could also be made to Libya's maverick leader Colonel Moammar
Gadhafi. A high-ranking Russian delegation paid Tripoli a visit
to attend the 39th anniversary of the coup that brought Gadhafi to
power. It was headed by Vladimir Yakunin, the boss of Russia's state
railways and a man trusted by Vladimir Putin. Not much is known about
the contents of the conversations in Tripoli, and it is doubtful that
Gadhafi will take up a confrontational course with regard to US and
Europe, as he cherishes his newly found public acceptance by the West
and even more so the economic benefits such acceptance could bring.
In the wider region, Russia is already taking steps to counter
America's possible moves to secure a pipeline network in Caucasus
and Central Asia. Putin has signed an agreement with Uzbek President
Islam Karimov to build a new pipeline that will carry natural gas
from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan to Russia. Karimov, whose relations
with America are tense over his harsh treatment of the opposition,
was no doubt glad to get this shot in the arm from Moscow, which will
be supplemented by massive Russian arms deliveries, if one believes
what Putin said in Tashkent.
Another country that could get extra attention from Moscow is
Azerbaijan, which has so far managed to maintain a precarious balance
between Russia and the US. President Ilham Aliev had mostly let his
officials support Georgia's territorial integrity (rather than condemn
Russia's actions). However, a more pro-Western tilt in Azeri policies
is becoming visible, as Baku feels that events in Georgia could have a
direct influence on its own frozen conflict with Armenia over Nagorno
Karabakh. At the same time, there is a growing feeling in Washington
that drawing Azerbaijan closer into the US orbit is in Washington's
major interest. This will hardly be to Russia's liking. Iran, with its
Azeri minority, also watches events in the neighboring country closely
and will no doubt be unhappy if Baku strengthens its ties with the US.
It seems that a round of the 21st century version of the "Great Game"
has just begun.
Konstantin von Eggert is the Moscow bureau editor of the
BBC Russian Service. This commentary first appeared at
bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.
By Konstantin Von Eggert
The Daily Star
Sept 12 2008
Lebanon
Although there is seemingly no direct link between the Russia-Georgia
conflict and Russia's policy in the Middle East, the conflict could
well lead to significant shifts in Moscow's posture in the region. If
the current tendencies in the Kremlin's foreign policy prevail, the
Middle East may return to a situation resembling that of the Cold War,
with Moscow trying to make life difficult for Washington by supporting
regimes the United States considers hostile. It is the US that Russia
holds primarily responsible for what it terms the "aggressive policies"
of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, and it is America's
support for Tbilisi - including promises to re-equip Georgia's armed
forces - that rattle Moscow the most.
It is interesting that one of the first politicians to support Russia's
actions was Syria's President Bashar Assad. There have been reports
in the Russian press that Moscow may increase its naval presence in
the Mediterranean through the use of Latakia and Tartus, Syria's two
ports. New arms deliveries to Damascus could well be another response
from Moscow to what it perceives as America's unfriendly policies in
the Caucasus.
Another and potentially more serious step Russia could take is to adopt
a more assertive stance over Iran's nuclear program and international
sanctions against Tehran. It is interesting that in the wake of the
crisis in Georgia, US military action against Iran, which some people
claimed to be imminent before the end of the year, looks less likely as
Washington has to tackle the Caucasus problem first. Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed some support for Russia's actions at the
recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Dushanbe,
though Tehran did not rush to recognize the breakaway republics of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, Moscow got some moral support
but nothing much in terms of real political solidarity from those
it counted on, especially China and Iran. Yet these countries would
appear to be among the few to which Russia will turn to for support
in case its standoff with the West over Georgia continues.
Overtures could also be made to Libya's maverick leader Colonel Moammar
Gadhafi. A high-ranking Russian delegation paid Tripoli a visit
to attend the 39th anniversary of the coup that brought Gadhafi to
power. It was headed by Vladimir Yakunin, the boss of Russia's state
railways and a man trusted by Vladimir Putin. Not much is known about
the contents of the conversations in Tripoli, and it is doubtful that
Gadhafi will take up a confrontational course with regard to US and
Europe, as he cherishes his newly found public acceptance by the West
and even more so the economic benefits such acceptance could bring.
In the wider region, Russia is already taking steps to counter
America's possible moves to secure a pipeline network in Caucasus
and Central Asia. Putin has signed an agreement with Uzbek President
Islam Karimov to build a new pipeline that will carry natural gas
from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan to Russia. Karimov, whose relations
with America are tense over his harsh treatment of the opposition,
was no doubt glad to get this shot in the arm from Moscow, which will
be supplemented by massive Russian arms deliveries, if one believes
what Putin said in Tashkent.
Another country that could get extra attention from Moscow is
Azerbaijan, which has so far managed to maintain a precarious balance
between Russia and the US. President Ilham Aliev had mostly let his
officials support Georgia's territorial integrity (rather than condemn
Russia's actions). However, a more pro-Western tilt in Azeri policies
is becoming visible, as Baku feels that events in Georgia could have a
direct influence on its own frozen conflict with Armenia over Nagorno
Karabakh. At the same time, there is a growing feeling in Washington
that drawing Azerbaijan closer into the US orbit is in Washington's
major interest. This will hardly be to Russia's liking. Iran, with its
Azeri minority, also watches events in the neighboring country closely
and will no doubt be unhappy if Baku strengthens its ties with the US.
It seems that a round of the 21st century version of the "Great Game"
has just begun.
Konstantin von Eggert is the Moscow bureau editor of the
BBC Russian Service. This commentary first appeared at
bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.