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NEAR-ABROAD BLUES
Economist
Sept 11 2008
UK
The European Union should offer Ukraine and Russia's other neighbours
a clearer path towards membership
RUSSIA'S August war with Georgia was about many things besides the two
enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was about energy, Russia's
place in the world, its relationship with the West--and, above all,
the reassertion of Russian interests in its "near abroad". That means
that it was about Ukraine among others. Yet the European Union, at
its summit with Ukraine on September 9th, foolishly ducked a chance
to throw the country a political and economic lifeline.
Georgia counts in the Caucasus; it also has vital pipelines that
cross its territory. But Ukraine is even more important, to both
Russia and the West. The Ukrainian government, unlike Georgia's,
controls all of its own territory and harbours none of the region's
"frozen conflicts" over disputed enclaves and exclaves. Yet Ukraine
is still vulnerable. Its independence has never been accepted
psychologically by the Russians, whose history starts with medieval
Kievan Rus. Modern Ukraine is split between a pro-European west and
centre, and a more pro-Russian east. Some 8m of the country's 45m
people are ethnic Russians, many of them with Russian passports. And
Crimea, a peninsula handed to Ukraine only in 1954, when both were
parts of the Soviet Union, is not only heavily populated by Russians
but also hosts Russia's Black Sea fleet in Sebastopol, under a lease
due to expire in 2017. The potential flashpoints for a clash with a
resurgent Russia are all too obvious.
Ukraine's splintered politics adds to its troubles. Ever since the
"orange revolution" in 2004 that swept Viktor Yushchenko to the
presidency, the political drama in Kiev has been tragi-comic, as
different factions and their business backers strut and squabble,
Russia interferes and coalitions fall apart. The Georgia crisis has
stirred things up anew, with Mr Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko,
a former orange ally who is prime minister, roundly abusing one
another. Shortly before this week's summit with the EU, the government
collapsed again; there may be another parliamentary election (see
article).
Westward ho!
The national anthem starts, unpromisingly, with the words "The glory of
Ukraine is not dead yet." All is indeed by no means lost. Politics may
be fractious and corruption entrenched, but a culture of democracy
has taken root, with freely competitive media and lively public
debate. The economy has been outgrowing Russia's (from an admittedly
lower base). And although Ukraine's politicians and citizens alike
are divided over joining NATO, the Western security alliance, almost
all strongly favour membership of the EU.
What is the best way to help and encourage an independent, democratic
Ukraine? It is essential to uphold the promise made at NATO's Bucharest
summit in April that both Georgia and Ukraine can one day become
members if they wish, for to back down now would be to hand Russia
a veto. Yet in truth NATO membership is a long way off, not least
because neither country is anywhere near ready. In Ukraine's case,
the necessary political consensus is also lacking. But that is not
a worry over membership of the EU. What is still missing is an EU
commitment giving Ukraine solid hope of joining the club.
Such caution is a big mistake. France's Nicolas Sarkozy, as holder of
the EU presidency, may be preening himself over the new ceasefire deal
he struck with Russia's Dmitry Medvedev on September 8th, but in truth
the war with Georgia has shown up the EU's vacillation. The Russians
earlier made promises they did not keep and have now secured all they
wanted, including the retention of extra troops and even military bases
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (see article), despite EU demands that
troops return to pre-war positions. Russia's neighbours have few places
to turn. Yet even Belarus, previously a reliable Russian ally, has
reacted to the August war by nervously putting out feelers to Brussels.
Over the past three decades enlargement by the EU to take in new
members has proved to be the most effective tool for promoting
economic reform and securing liberal democracy. But it works only if
countries believe they will one day be let in. After the August war,
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the three Caucasus countries of Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, all crave reassurance against an irredentist
Russia. A clear offer of eventual EU membership, if they work hard
to fulfil the necessary criteria, is the least the EU can do.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Economist
Sept 11 2008
UK
The European Union should offer Ukraine and Russia's other neighbours
a clearer path towards membership
RUSSIA'S August war with Georgia was about many things besides the two
enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was about energy, Russia's
place in the world, its relationship with the West--and, above all,
the reassertion of Russian interests in its "near abroad". That means
that it was about Ukraine among others. Yet the European Union, at
its summit with Ukraine on September 9th, foolishly ducked a chance
to throw the country a political and economic lifeline.
Georgia counts in the Caucasus; it also has vital pipelines that
cross its territory. But Ukraine is even more important, to both
Russia and the West. The Ukrainian government, unlike Georgia's,
controls all of its own territory and harbours none of the region's
"frozen conflicts" over disputed enclaves and exclaves. Yet Ukraine
is still vulnerable. Its independence has never been accepted
psychologically by the Russians, whose history starts with medieval
Kievan Rus. Modern Ukraine is split between a pro-European west and
centre, and a more pro-Russian east. Some 8m of the country's 45m
people are ethnic Russians, many of them with Russian passports. And
Crimea, a peninsula handed to Ukraine only in 1954, when both were
parts of the Soviet Union, is not only heavily populated by Russians
but also hosts Russia's Black Sea fleet in Sebastopol, under a lease
due to expire in 2017. The potential flashpoints for a clash with a
resurgent Russia are all too obvious.
Ukraine's splintered politics adds to its troubles. Ever since the
"orange revolution" in 2004 that swept Viktor Yushchenko to the
presidency, the political drama in Kiev has been tragi-comic, as
different factions and their business backers strut and squabble,
Russia interferes and coalitions fall apart. The Georgia crisis has
stirred things up anew, with Mr Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko,
a former orange ally who is prime minister, roundly abusing one
another. Shortly before this week's summit with the EU, the government
collapsed again; there may be another parliamentary election (see
article).
Westward ho!
The national anthem starts, unpromisingly, with the words "The glory of
Ukraine is not dead yet." All is indeed by no means lost. Politics may
be fractious and corruption entrenched, but a culture of democracy
has taken root, with freely competitive media and lively public
debate. The economy has been outgrowing Russia's (from an admittedly
lower base). And although Ukraine's politicians and citizens alike
are divided over joining NATO, the Western security alliance, almost
all strongly favour membership of the EU.
What is the best way to help and encourage an independent, democratic
Ukraine? It is essential to uphold the promise made at NATO's Bucharest
summit in April that both Georgia and Ukraine can one day become
members if they wish, for to back down now would be to hand Russia
a veto. Yet in truth NATO membership is a long way off, not least
because neither country is anywhere near ready. In Ukraine's case,
the necessary political consensus is also lacking. But that is not
a worry over membership of the EU. What is still missing is an EU
commitment giving Ukraine solid hope of joining the club.
Such caution is a big mistake. France's Nicolas Sarkozy, as holder of
the EU presidency, may be preening himself over the new ceasefire deal
he struck with Russia's Dmitry Medvedev on September 8th, but in truth
the war with Georgia has shown up the EU's vacillation. The Russians
earlier made promises they did not keep and have now secured all they
wanted, including the retention of extra troops and even military bases
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (see article), despite EU demands that
troops return to pre-war positions. Russia's neighbours have few places
to turn. Yet even Belarus, previously a reliable Russian ally, has
reacted to the August war by nervously putting out feelers to Brussels.
Over the past three decades enlargement by the EU to take in new
members has proved to be the most effective tool for promoting
economic reform and securing liberal democracy. But it works only if
countries believe they will one day be let in. After the August war,
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the three Caucasus countries of Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, all crave reassurance against an irredentist
Russia. A clear offer of eventual EU membership, if they work hard
to fulfil the necessary criteria, is the least the EU can do.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress