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  • Reconciliation And Remembrance

    RECONCILIATION AND REMEMBRANCE
    Comment by Sergey Markedonov

    Russia Profile
    http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?page id=International&articleid=a1221154270
    Sept 11 2008
    Russia

    Despite Their Turbulent Past, Armenia and Turkey are Beginning to
    Take Baby Steps Toward Each Other

    On the surface, it appears that Armenia and Turkey, whose trenchant
    relations stand out as the most bitter in the Southern Caucasus,
    are now making gestures of reconciliation toward one another,
    precisely by holding a soccer match between their teams. However,
    the prospects of a brighter future for both nations are inescapably
    viewed - and thus, impeded -- by the ghost of an ever-present past,
    as the issues of the "Armenian genocide" and the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict remain unresolved.

    Professional sport has once again demonstrated that it can be an
    important political factor. The first match of the 2010 FIFA World
    Cup qualifying round, on September 6 was a poignant occasion as the
    Armenian soccer players took on Turkey's national team (the Euro
    2008 bronze medalists, along with Russia). The return game between
    the two sides will also take place in the fall, a year from now.

    This soccer match is wedged within the context of trenchant historical
    and political conflicts between the two nations. Let us remember
    that Armenia and Turkey have no formal diplomatic relations at
    present. Ankara also maintains a land blockade of Armenia (350
    kilometers of the border was closed in 1993), but airplanes do fly
    between the two states (the Yerevan-Istanbul route was launched in
    1996). Turkey supports Azerbaijan's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict, participates in the training of the Azeri officer corps,
    and carries out transportation projects to circumvent Armenia (the
    Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars railroad project); it also officially
    denies the Armenian Genocide of 1915. In Armenia, these events
    are central to the country's historiography, collective memory and
    spiritual culture.

    So, on September 6, an event of great historical importance took
    place in the Armenian-Turkish bilateral relations. Abdullah Gul,
    the president of Turkey, visited the Armenian capital of Yerevan,
    accepting the invitation of his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan
    to attend the World Cup qualifying match. It is reasonable to think,
    however, that no revolutionary changes have emerged in the relationship
    between two states that have accumulated a huge joint list of mutual
    complaints and grievances. However, the mere fact that the leaders of
    Turkey and Armenia were able to put aside the main dishes on their
    political menus and see the normalization of relations as important
    already says a lot.

    At the moment, key issues such as the Armenian Genocide, the occupation
    of Azeri lands beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenian
    armed forces, Turkey's land blockade of Armenia and Ankara's support
    of Azerbaijan have not been discussed. There have been declarations
    made in the spirit of political correctness, emphasizing good
    will. Following the meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Serzh
    Sargsyan said: "We have expressed the hope that we are capable of
    showing good will in order to solve existing problems and not pass them
    on to later generations." Abdullah Gul, in turn, used similar words to
    underline the following: "We expressed the political will to create an
    atmosphere fit to solve the problems that exist between Armenia and
    Turkey. I hope that this visit will open up great possibilities for
    us." As Mikhail Gorbachev would say in such situations, "the process
    has begun."

    Parallels between Sargsyan and the first (and last) president of the
    Soviet Union have already been drawn in Armenia. Many consider the
    decision to receive the head of the Turkish Republic in Yerevan as an
    unjustified political concession. According to some representatives
    of the opposition, Sargsyan has been forced to demonstrate amiability
    toward Ankara because he is an heir of the Robert Kocharyan regime,
    which opted for the use of force in repressing opposition protests
    in March of this year, thus putting Armenia's foreign policy in a
    vulnerable position. Now he has to compensate for domestic failures on
    the foreign stage--rather strange logic if we take into account that
    it was during Kocharyan's two terms that relations between Armenia and
    Turkey were almost completely frozen. It was Kocharyan who announced
    publicly that if he were president of Armenia, he would not allow
    the Turkish leader's visit to Yerevan.

    Even inside the ruling coalition, Gul's visit was met with far
    from universal enthusiasm. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation
    "Dashnaktsutyun" (ARFD), the republic's oldest political force and
    a party to the ruling coalition, spoke out against the visit. The
    party organized mass protests with the slogans "Armenia remembers
    everything" and "Turkey must recognize the Genocide." It seems that
    a certain part of the Armenian government apparatus (which does not
    participate in public polemics) likewise has its own views on the
    question of improving relations with Turkey. And these views are not
    held in the spirit of the "new thinking."

    In Turkey, however, things are also far from idyllic. Gul's decision
    to go to Yerevan provoked an ambiguous reaction from Prime Minister
    Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Turkish premier is worried that the
    president's trip will fuel harsh oppositionist criticism of official
    authorities. Quite naturally, representatives of extreme nationalist
    forces have already labeled Gul a "traitor."

    In truth, Sargsyan was not the first to propose a "thawing"
    of relations with Turkey, and neither was Gul. It emerged in the
    early stages of the development of independent Armenian governance,
    and for very objective reasons. The armed conflict with Azerbaijan
    and complex relations with Georgia (due to the Georgia-Abkhazian
    conflict, into which the Armenian community in Abkhazia was drawn, as
    well as the complicated Armenian-Georgian relations in Djavakheti)
    isolated Armenia. In this light, a confrontation with powerful
    Turkey (whose army is second in NATO to that of the United States,
    while its multilateral ties with Turkic-language Azerbaijan are more
    than obvious) did not present Yerevan with the best scenario. As for
    Turkey, "the formation of new independent states in the Caucasus at
    the end of the Cold War increased Ankara's importance, while at the
    same time creating serious risks," as noted by Mustaf Aydin of the
    Turkish National Security Academy. "The fall of the Soviet Union rid
    Turkey of a century-old Soviet/Russian threat, but at the same time
    it created a power vacuum on its borders."

    This is why, in 1992, Armenia's first president Levon Ter-Petrosyan
    met with Suleiman Demirel (the Prime Minister of Turkey at the
    time). In the course of their meetings, the problem of settling the
    Karabakh conflict was discussed. However, the aggravation of the
    military situation on the Karabakh front in 1993 and, ultimately,
    the military defeat of Azerbaijan led to an estrangement between
    Turkey and Armenia. Ankara accused Armenia of aggression against
    Azerbaijan and of supporting Kurdish terrorist organizations. The
    result was the beginning of Turkey's land blockade of Armenia.

    At the same time, despite any action taken by Turkey, Yerevan did
    not give up hopes of overcoming the mutual rift. In 1995, in a speech
    dedicated to the 80th anniversary of "Yegerna" (the Armenian Genocide
    of 1915, in Armenian historiographic terms), president Ter-Petrosyan
    blamed the genocide on the "Young Turk" regime, not on the Turkish
    people. When Ter-Petrosyan left office, the official Yerevan position
    became much harsher. When speaking at the 53rd UN session, Armenia's
    second president Robert Kocharyan attempted to bring the "Armenian
    issue" back into the field of international politics; the issue was
    expelled in 1923.

    Thus Sargsyan is not a pioneer in this area. He is trying to repeat
    the experience of the early 1990s. At the same time, we should not see
    his "new thinking" as altruism and compassion for mankind. Sargsyan
    operates in the state's national interests. He is keen on opening
    up the borders to minimize Armenia's isolation, and to break up the
    ties between Baku and Ankara. This would make the Nagorno-Karabakh
    conflict a matter of the two countries of Southern Caucasus; therefore,
    Turkey's role would not be that of "Azerbaijan's fan and supporter." It
    would also become a positive background for the West (the criticisms
    addressed at Armenia for its stubbornness and lack of diplomatic
    progress in relations with its neighbors could be hushed up).

    Incidentally, Turkey also has its own reasons for historical
    reconciliation. Firstly, Turkish foreign policy in the last few years
    has taken a very clear European angle. The European Union is always
    very positive about saying goodbye to the past (especially if this
    parting is carried out amicably). Meanwhile, the "Armenian issue"
    greatly complicates Turkey's record in bolstering its candidacy for
    EU membership. Secondly, progress in relation to Armenia will add a
    positive dynamic to the rocky American-Turkish relationship. Thirdly,
    there are economic reasons as well. It should be noted that Turkey's
    regional officials and businessmen have on numerous occasions
    spoken publicly in support of developing economic contacts with
    Armenia. However, there are also serious obstacles on the way toward
    mutual understanding.

    An important issue that unsettles the bilateral relationship is the
    problem of interpreting the events of 1915 by the politicians and
    historians of the two countries. For Armenia, the events of 1915
    are termed as genocide (some of the historical research extends
    the genocide period, adding to it the Armenian-Turkish wars during
    Armenia's first independence in 1918-1920 and the political actions
    at the end of the 19th century). Alexander Iskandaryan, director of
    the Yerevan-based Caucasus Institute, has noted that "a great part of
    the population of today's Armenia is made up of descendants of the
    Armenians who survived the genocide. Mostly it was the people who
    were able to somehow make it across the border to the territory of
    the Russian Empire." Iskandaryan added that as a result of all this,
    "there are verbally preserved histories that live in the families,
    told to children in one form or another." In Turkey, the events of
    1915 are seen either as deportation, or as a "massacre," or as a
    "resettlement of Armenians." In the last few years, the events of the
    early 20th century have also been interpreted as an ethnic conflict
    or a civil war (especially since the Armenians residing within the
    Ottoman Empire were its nationals). Moreover, there have been quite
    a few books published in Turkey that assess the 1915 events precisely
    as genocide. This is something that used to be impossible to imagine.

    The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also puts Armenia and Turkey on
    opposite sides. In the early 1990s, Turkey was able to avoid a
    direct participation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation
    (although the public opinion inside Turkey demanded a greater
    involvement). However, the conflict served to highlight Ankara's
    interests in the Caucasus. This was the conflict that forced Ankara
    to close off its land border with Armenia (which increased Armenia's
    economic and geopolitical isolation). Up until now, Ankara has
    been demanding concessions from Yerevan in Karabakh as an important
    condition for opening up the border. But this is a price Armenia is
    not willing to pay today.

    So far Yerevan is willing to make minimal concessions. Armenia's
    Football Federation changed its logo for the qualifying round
    match, removing the image of Mount Ararat (a place of sacred,
    symbolic importance for all Armenians, despite its location with
    Turkey). However, concessions in soccer are not equal to giving up
    Karabakh or the genocide of 1915.

    And this is how both sides have presently chosen the tactics of "small
    acts." Without daring to make drastic breakthroughs, the two nations,
    immersed in the most complicated context of bilateral relations, are
    trying to simply initiate a normalized dialogue. This is already a
    major breakthrough in itself, considering the overarching historical
    context. Perhaps this model of optimization will become a pattern
    for other states of the Greater Caucasus as well.

    Sergey Markedonov, Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations
    Department at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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