Tweet
TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS: WILL FOOTBALL DIPLOMACY WORK?
www.worldbulletin.net
http://www.worldbulle tin.net/author_article_detail.php?id=1824
Sept 11 2008
Turkey
The Georgian-Russian crisis, the political and economic alienation
of Armenia in the Caucasus, Turkey's new project to establish
the Caucasus Stability Platform, and the Turkish and Armenian
administrations' willingness to normalize relations have created a
suitable atmosphere in which to put an end to the problems between
Turkey and Armenia. Turkish President Abdullah Gul accepted the
invitation of his counterpart, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian, to
watch the World Cupqualifying football match between Turkey and Armenia
in Yerevan. This visit was considered an important symbolic move. It
will be a matter of time to see whether this 'football diplomacy'
will pave the way for the normalization of relations between Turkey
and Armenia.
In a historic gesture, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian recently
invited Turkish President Abdullah Gul to watch the World Cup
qualifying football match between the national teams of the two
countries. This invitation came amid hopes for a breakthrough in
relations between Turkey and Armenia. And President Gul did in fact
go to Armenia to watch the football match as a goodwill gesture on
6 September 2008. Diplomatic history suggests that détente and the
development of relations between countries may come through sports
events. The most famous form is known 'ping-pong diplomacy' which
paved the way for a détente between the U.S. and China during the
Cold War era, following China's invitation of the U.S. table tennis
team to Beijing for a series of exhibition matches in 1971.
Although Sarkisian's invitation was extended to Gul before the recent
conflict in Georgia, the move was nonetheless regarded as an important
step toward normalizing relations in its aftermath. It would be an
exaggeration to regard the football match as a historical turning
point. However, it will certainly have a symbolic influence on attempts
to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey. Interestingly,
it is a little known fact that Armenian football teams have for
some time organized their preparation camps in Antalya. They have
not encountered any difficulties. The football match and Turkey's
Caucasian initiative have brought Turkish-Armenian relations to the
political agenda of the two countries and created renewed hope for
the normalization of relations both within Turkey and Armenia and in
international circles. Turkish-Armenian relations are shaped by the
wider framework of Turkey's Caucasian policy and the binding impact
of the Armenian Diaspora. Armenia is a landlocked mountainous country
in Southern Caucasus, with a population of 3.3 million and an area
of roughly 30.000 square kilometers. It is bordered on the north and
south east by Georgia and Iran, and on the east and west by Azerbaijan
and Turkey. Ankara's relations with Yerevan have struggled with the
same problem of normalization since its recognition of Armenia. Turkey
seems more active in seeking a solution for the problems between the
two countries while Armenia has historically pursued a consistently
uncooperative attitude in this problematic relationship. Turkey
recognized Armenia earlier than many states, and invited Armenia to
join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a founding
member in 1993 despite the fact that Armenia has no shore on the Black
Sea. Turkey provided energy to Armenia when it faced serious energy
shortages in the 1990s. Turkey also donated one hundred thousand tons
of wheat to Armenia during those years, despite the negative image of
Armenia in Turkey. Yerevan-Istanbul flights are operational despite
the closure of the land borders. Turkey also tolerates thousands of
illegal Armenian workers in Turkey. Moreover, Turkish authorities
have renovated several Armenian cultural and artistic artifacts in
different places in Turkey.
In contrast, Armenia constantly voices allegations of genocide in
every possible international forum and aims to corner Turkey with
genocide blame in international circles. The Armenian parliament
referred to Turkey's eastern provinces as "western Armenia" in its
declaration of independence dated 23 August 1990. This declaration
also calls international society to recognize Armenia's genocide
allegations. The Yerevan administration does not recognize the Gumru
and Kars Agreements that established the Turkish-Armenian border in
1920 and 1921 respectively.
One major factor preventing the normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia is Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan. Armenia
occupies one fifth of Azerbaijani territory and ignores the UN
Security Council decisions against the occupation. Ankara has close
ties to Baku, and benefits from energy cooperation deals; Azerbaijan
thus closely follows developments in relations between Armenia and
Turkey. Azerbaijan is Turkey's major partner in the region and will
continue to be the most important country for Turkey to take into
consideration. For its part, the Armenian state considers Turkey and
Azerbaijan as serious threats to its national security and territorial
integrity. The Armenian administration therefore pursues a balancing
policy through the maintenance of close relations with Russia and
Iran. Russian soldiers provide security for Armenian borders, and
Russia has military bases in Armenia. Russia is a strategic partner
and protector against potential Azerbaijani and Turkish aggression in
the eyes of the Armenian administration. Armenia's balancing policy has
remained a major tenet of its foreign policy in the post-independence
period. A fear of encirclement lurks in the background of Armenia's
domestic politics and foreign policy. The immediate effect of this
fear is an inward-oriented domestic policy and an insecure foreign
policy line. Armenia has problems with all of its neighbors except
Iran. Energy supply lines and new transportation networks have
excluded Armenia while generating considerable amounts of foreign
income for Azerbaijan as an energy-rich country and for Georgia and
Turkey as the hosts of pipelines extending to world markets. Armenia's
difficulties with Georgia stem from the former's close ties to Russia;
its clashes with Azerbaijan stem from the occupation and the Karabakh
question; and its relations with Turkey are uneasy due to territorial
demands and genocide allegations. In addition to this tense regional
situation, Armenia also feels the effects of an instable domestic
political environment, economic difficulties, and a rising level of
unemployment. Armenian foreign trade is overwhelmingly dependent on
Georgian ports; the recent bombing of Georgia's Poti Port by Russia
during the August crisis will worsen the economic situation. Armenia
thus feels an urgent need to reconsider its regional relations;
Armenia's economic and political alienation in the region creates an
impetus to normalize its relations with Turkey.
The Russian-Georgian crisis will likely have a devastating impact on
the already deteriorating Armenian economy. It will also complicate
Armenia's problems with regional countries. From an international
perspective, the geopolitical necessity of normalizing Turkish-Armenian
relations is to loosen the Russian-Armenian-Iran axis, and even,
if possible, to pull Armenia from this axis altogether. Although
improving Turkish-Armenian relations would be certain to decrease
Russian influence in Armenia, the region-wide dialogue among countries
for regional stability and security need not aggravate Russia and
Iran. Turkey's fresh approach of including both Azerbaijan and
Armenia in regional peace efforts may end the Cold War style binary
oppositions in the region. And the Armenian administration recognizes
the need to put an end to the inimical patterns that create cycles
of violence in the region. Although Turkey and Armenia do not have
diplomatic relations, behind-the-scene diplomacy continues between
both sides. Groups within the two states approve or oppose to these
secret talks. Turkey's response to Iran's mediation offer, i.e. that
"we already talk to Armenia," uncovered the hidden diplomacy. In
the wake of the Georgia-Russia crisis, moreover, Ankara treamlined a
multilateral diplomatic initiative, declaring that it wants Armenia
to join the new project: the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation
Platform. Turkey's attitude shows that Ankara has an inclusionary
approach toward Armenia in the regional context. To date, the Armenian
administration has responded positively to the offer, and has indicated
that it considers it a constructive attempt.
However, there is not much change in the Armenian attitude overall. The
only tangible change is the mild tone of President Sarkisian, which
contrasts with the inflexible and harsh attitude of former President
Petrosyan, and Sarkisian's expression of goodwill in regard to several
issues. Time will tell whether this rhetorical change will bring to
bear any positive influence on the normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations. Turkey pursues a multi-dimensional foreign policy toward the
Caucasian region and endeavors to utilize any opportunities that arise
to include Armenia in regional cooperation projects. It is doubtful,
however, whether such an approach alone will solve the direct
problems between Turkey and Armenia. Armenian and Turkish publics
harbor mixed feelings toward President Gul's visit to Armenia and
toward normalization of relations in general. The Armenian opposition
favors normalization, while the Armenian Tasnaksutyun Party opposes any
rapprochement. The latter party has strong economic and political links
with the Armenian Diaspora and acts as a strong anti-Turkish group in
Armenia. In Turkey, the major opposition parties, i.e. the Republican
People's Party and the Nationalist Action Party, both criticized
President Gul's visit to Armenia. Turkey's Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan backed President Gul's visit, considering it a constructive
step toward normalization of relations. The Azerbaijani government
refrains from commenting on Turkish-Armenian relations, although
some weak voices express hope that Turkey's developing relations
with Armenia may serve as a prelude for freeing Azeri territories
under occupation. At the same time, there is strong criticism among
the Azerbaijani opposition against any progress in Turkish-Armenian
relations. Turkey's moves for normalizing relations were faced with
the Armenian responses calling for "talks without any precondition"
and "opening borders."
While the Armenian administration opposed any precondition, it
also called upon Turkey not to emphasize the occupied territories,
to forget about the Karabakh issue and to accept the genocide
allegations. However, it is the Armenian side that desperately needs
the border to open. Now that Armenia has recognized this urgent need
and adopted a milder attitude, there may be chance to build trust,
in particular through economic and societal relations. There will be
substantial benefits on both sides of the long-sealed border in the
event of normalization.
Policy Recommendations
The recent Russia-Georgia crisis has shown regional countries the
importance of peace and stability. The regional status quo should
change, and the new regional order should be based on a novel rhetoric
and practice of economic interdependence, political cooperation,
regional stability and prosperity. Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would
be a necessary step toward this new regional order. The following
points may help to expedite the normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia.
1. The Armenian Diaspora and Armenia should be treated
differently. There is more room to maneuver with Armenia, while
the Diaspora is focused on genocide allegations. Moreover, Armenian
interests differ from the Diaspora's priorities and Armenia needs
to normalize relations with Turkey to prosper economically. Careful
diplomacy is needed in order to limit the Diaspora's influence on
the bilateral relations. It will be wise to postpone resolution
of the genocide issue so that other immediate problems impeding a
rapprochement can be addressed. There is an absolute need to put
history and emotions aside for some time, especially at a time when
Realpolitik forces the two countries to cooperate in the interest of
regional peace and security.
2. Turkey's policy toward Armenia is to a large extent based on
countering the genocide allegations and isolating Yerevan in the
regional context. This defensive line should be replaced with a
proactive one that confidently states what Turkey expects Armenia to
do for normalization. The first demand may be Armenia's recognition
of Turkey's territorial integrity borders, which will prepare the
ground for opening the border.
3. Russia and Iran are key countries with an interest in
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Their indirect support could serve
to accelerate the normalization process. Turkey's ability to follow
an inclusive approach may prevent any concern in Tehran and Moscow
regarding normalization. Turkey and Armenia need to be on the same side
to secure the ground for peace and stability in the Caucasus. Turkish
policymakers should therefore pursue a multidimensional approach
to persuade Iran and Russia that a rapprochement will not threaten
Iranian and Russian interests. Rather, both stand to reap the benefits
of regional peace and stability.
4. The normalization of relations with Armenia would strengthen
Turkey's regional profile in the Caucasus, and could open the way
for new mediator and facilitator positions for Turkey in several
Caucasian conflicts and problems. The Minsk initiative and UN-based
attempts did not produce any result in the quest to solve the
Karabakh question. Such attempts are not likely to solve other
problems either. There is thus a need for initiatives from within
the region. Turkey's Caucasian initiative would be a likely starter.
5. Turkey should strengthen its inclusionary approach toward Armenia in
the regional context. This change of attitude would force Armenia to
drop its preconditions for normalizing relations, while strengthening
Turkey's policy of zero-problems with its neighbors.
6. Turkey's moves toward normalization will generate support from
the European Union, the U.S. and the international community. This
support should also be used to facilitate a change in Armenia to
respect Turkish borders. The U.S. and European administrations
need to re-evaluate the Diaspora's policies, which have the effect
of disengaging Armenia from geopolitical reality in its region,
through utilization of American and European sources. Such a policy
of isolationism only strengthens Russian influence in the region. This
situation may not be exactly what the U.S. and European administrations
envision to see in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis.
7. Turkey should spend more energy on establishing a joint commission
of historians to undertake an objective and scientific study of the
genocide allegations. The Armenian Diaspora and the Tasnaksutyun Party
oppose this idea on the ground that it would amount to questioning
the authenticity of genocide allegations. However, it may be easier
to persuade the Armenian administration for the utility of such
an initiative.
8. Ankara needs to make sure that it pays attention to Azerbaijani
concerns while developing relations with Armenia. The only way to
wield any influence on Armenia is to keep a dialogue channel open. It
would be unfair to urge Turkey to close the doors to Armenia, while
Azerbaijani leaders are pursuing diplomatic activity with the Armenian
government. Turkish policymakers should continue to underline the need
for Armenia to put an end to its occupation of Azerbaijani territories
in the interest of regional peace and stability.
9. There is an urgent need for a region-wide initiative for
civil society dialogue. Inter-governmental measures may fail
without strong support for peace and dialogue from the societal
level. Turkish-Armenian civil society dialogue should be encouraged
and supported. Even a touristic visit to Yerevan may show that
the genocide issue is not central to the lives of Armenians. The
years-long gap between the two neighbors may be bridged through civil
society activities.
â~H- IÅ~_ık University, Ä°stanbul, [email protected] â~H-â~H-
Bilgesam, Ä°stanbul, [email protected]
--Boundary_(ID_9ZxPZm0DHnL4T j3A1/dKfg)--
www.worldbulletin.net
http://www.worldbulle tin.net/author_article_detail.php?id=1824
Sept 11 2008
Turkey
The Georgian-Russian crisis, the political and economic alienation
of Armenia in the Caucasus, Turkey's new project to establish
the Caucasus Stability Platform, and the Turkish and Armenian
administrations' willingness to normalize relations have created a
suitable atmosphere in which to put an end to the problems between
Turkey and Armenia. Turkish President Abdullah Gul accepted the
invitation of his counterpart, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian, to
watch the World Cupqualifying football match between Turkey and Armenia
in Yerevan. This visit was considered an important symbolic move. It
will be a matter of time to see whether this 'football diplomacy'
will pave the way for the normalization of relations between Turkey
and Armenia.
In a historic gesture, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian recently
invited Turkish President Abdullah Gul to watch the World Cup
qualifying football match between the national teams of the two
countries. This invitation came amid hopes for a breakthrough in
relations between Turkey and Armenia. And President Gul did in fact
go to Armenia to watch the football match as a goodwill gesture on
6 September 2008. Diplomatic history suggests that détente and the
development of relations between countries may come through sports
events. The most famous form is known 'ping-pong diplomacy' which
paved the way for a détente between the U.S. and China during the
Cold War era, following China's invitation of the U.S. table tennis
team to Beijing for a series of exhibition matches in 1971.
Although Sarkisian's invitation was extended to Gul before the recent
conflict in Georgia, the move was nonetheless regarded as an important
step toward normalizing relations in its aftermath. It would be an
exaggeration to regard the football match as a historical turning
point. However, it will certainly have a symbolic influence on attempts
to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey. Interestingly,
it is a little known fact that Armenian football teams have for
some time organized their preparation camps in Antalya. They have
not encountered any difficulties. The football match and Turkey's
Caucasian initiative have brought Turkish-Armenian relations to the
political agenda of the two countries and created renewed hope for
the normalization of relations both within Turkey and Armenia and in
international circles. Turkish-Armenian relations are shaped by the
wider framework of Turkey's Caucasian policy and the binding impact
of the Armenian Diaspora. Armenia is a landlocked mountainous country
in Southern Caucasus, with a population of 3.3 million and an area
of roughly 30.000 square kilometers. It is bordered on the north and
south east by Georgia and Iran, and on the east and west by Azerbaijan
and Turkey. Ankara's relations with Yerevan have struggled with the
same problem of normalization since its recognition of Armenia. Turkey
seems more active in seeking a solution for the problems between the
two countries while Armenia has historically pursued a consistently
uncooperative attitude in this problematic relationship. Turkey
recognized Armenia earlier than many states, and invited Armenia to
join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a founding
member in 1993 despite the fact that Armenia has no shore on the Black
Sea. Turkey provided energy to Armenia when it faced serious energy
shortages in the 1990s. Turkey also donated one hundred thousand tons
of wheat to Armenia during those years, despite the negative image of
Armenia in Turkey. Yerevan-Istanbul flights are operational despite
the closure of the land borders. Turkey also tolerates thousands of
illegal Armenian workers in Turkey. Moreover, Turkish authorities
have renovated several Armenian cultural and artistic artifacts in
different places in Turkey.
In contrast, Armenia constantly voices allegations of genocide in
every possible international forum and aims to corner Turkey with
genocide blame in international circles. The Armenian parliament
referred to Turkey's eastern provinces as "western Armenia" in its
declaration of independence dated 23 August 1990. This declaration
also calls international society to recognize Armenia's genocide
allegations. The Yerevan administration does not recognize the Gumru
and Kars Agreements that established the Turkish-Armenian border in
1920 and 1921 respectively.
One major factor preventing the normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia is Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan. Armenia
occupies one fifth of Azerbaijani territory and ignores the UN
Security Council decisions against the occupation. Ankara has close
ties to Baku, and benefits from energy cooperation deals; Azerbaijan
thus closely follows developments in relations between Armenia and
Turkey. Azerbaijan is Turkey's major partner in the region and will
continue to be the most important country for Turkey to take into
consideration. For its part, the Armenian state considers Turkey and
Azerbaijan as serious threats to its national security and territorial
integrity. The Armenian administration therefore pursues a balancing
policy through the maintenance of close relations with Russia and
Iran. Russian soldiers provide security for Armenian borders, and
Russia has military bases in Armenia. Russia is a strategic partner
and protector against potential Azerbaijani and Turkish aggression in
the eyes of the Armenian administration. Armenia's balancing policy has
remained a major tenet of its foreign policy in the post-independence
period. A fear of encirclement lurks in the background of Armenia's
domestic politics and foreign policy. The immediate effect of this
fear is an inward-oriented domestic policy and an insecure foreign
policy line. Armenia has problems with all of its neighbors except
Iran. Energy supply lines and new transportation networks have
excluded Armenia while generating considerable amounts of foreign
income for Azerbaijan as an energy-rich country and for Georgia and
Turkey as the hosts of pipelines extending to world markets. Armenia's
difficulties with Georgia stem from the former's close ties to Russia;
its clashes with Azerbaijan stem from the occupation and the Karabakh
question; and its relations with Turkey are uneasy due to territorial
demands and genocide allegations. In addition to this tense regional
situation, Armenia also feels the effects of an instable domestic
political environment, economic difficulties, and a rising level of
unemployment. Armenian foreign trade is overwhelmingly dependent on
Georgian ports; the recent bombing of Georgia's Poti Port by Russia
during the August crisis will worsen the economic situation. Armenia
thus feels an urgent need to reconsider its regional relations;
Armenia's economic and political alienation in the region creates an
impetus to normalize its relations with Turkey.
The Russian-Georgian crisis will likely have a devastating impact on
the already deteriorating Armenian economy. It will also complicate
Armenia's problems with regional countries. From an international
perspective, the geopolitical necessity of normalizing Turkish-Armenian
relations is to loosen the Russian-Armenian-Iran axis, and even,
if possible, to pull Armenia from this axis altogether. Although
improving Turkish-Armenian relations would be certain to decrease
Russian influence in Armenia, the region-wide dialogue among countries
for regional stability and security need not aggravate Russia and
Iran. Turkey's fresh approach of including both Azerbaijan and
Armenia in regional peace efforts may end the Cold War style binary
oppositions in the region. And the Armenian administration recognizes
the need to put an end to the inimical patterns that create cycles
of violence in the region. Although Turkey and Armenia do not have
diplomatic relations, behind-the-scene diplomacy continues between
both sides. Groups within the two states approve or oppose to these
secret talks. Turkey's response to Iran's mediation offer, i.e. that
"we already talk to Armenia," uncovered the hidden diplomacy. In
the wake of the Georgia-Russia crisis, moreover, Ankara treamlined a
multilateral diplomatic initiative, declaring that it wants Armenia
to join the new project: the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation
Platform. Turkey's attitude shows that Ankara has an inclusionary
approach toward Armenia in the regional context. To date, the Armenian
administration has responded positively to the offer, and has indicated
that it considers it a constructive attempt.
However, there is not much change in the Armenian attitude overall. The
only tangible change is the mild tone of President Sarkisian, which
contrasts with the inflexible and harsh attitude of former President
Petrosyan, and Sarkisian's expression of goodwill in regard to several
issues. Time will tell whether this rhetorical change will bring to
bear any positive influence on the normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations. Turkey pursues a multi-dimensional foreign policy toward the
Caucasian region and endeavors to utilize any opportunities that arise
to include Armenia in regional cooperation projects. It is doubtful,
however, whether such an approach alone will solve the direct
problems between Turkey and Armenia. Armenian and Turkish publics
harbor mixed feelings toward President Gul's visit to Armenia and
toward normalization of relations in general. The Armenian opposition
favors normalization, while the Armenian Tasnaksutyun Party opposes any
rapprochement. The latter party has strong economic and political links
with the Armenian Diaspora and acts as a strong anti-Turkish group in
Armenia. In Turkey, the major opposition parties, i.e. the Republican
People's Party and the Nationalist Action Party, both criticized
President Gul's visit to Armenia. Turkey's Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan backed President Gul's visit, considering it a constructive
step toward normalization of relations. The Azerbaijani government
refrains from commenting on Turkish-Armenian relations, although
some weak voices express hope that Turkey's developing relations
with Armenia may serve as a prelude for freeing Azeri territories
under occupation. At the same time, there is strong criticism among
the Azerbaijani opposition against any progress in Turkish-Armenian
relations. Turkey's moves for normalizing relations were faced with
the Armenian responses calling for "talks without any precondition"
and "opening borders."
While the Armenian administration opposed any precondition, it
also called upon Turkey not to emphasize the occupied territories,
to forget about the Karabakh issue and to accept the genocide
allegations. However, it is the Armenian side that desperately needs
the border to open. Now that Armenia has recognized this urgent need
and adopted a milder attitude, there may be chance to build trust,
in particular through economic and societal relations. There will be
substantial benefits on both sides of the long-sealed border in the
event of normalization.
Policy Recommendations
The recent Russia-Georgia crisis has shown regional countries the
importance of peace and stability. The regional status quo should
change, and the new regional order should be based on a novel rhetoric
and practice of economic interdependence, political cooperation,
regional stability and prosperity. Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would
be a necessary step toward this new regional order. The following
points may help to expedite the normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia.
1. The Armenian Diaspora and Armenia should be treated
differently. There is more room to maneuver with Armenia, while
the Diaspora is focused on genocide allegations. Moreover, Armenian
interests differ from the Diaspora's priorities and Armenia needs
to normalize relations with Turkey to prosper economically. Careful
diplomacy is needed in order to limit the Diaspora's influence on
the bilateral relations. It will be wise to postpone resolution
of the genocide issue so that other immediate problems impeding a
rapprochement can be addressed. There is an absolute need to put
history and emotions aside for some time, especially at a time when
Realpolitik forces the two countries to cooperate in the interest of
regional peace and security.
2. Turkey's policy toward Armenia is to a large extent based on
countering the genocide allegations and isolating Yerevan in the
regional context. This defensive line should be replaced with a
proactive one that confidently states what Turkey expects Armenia to
do for normalization. The first demand may be Armenia's recognition
of Turkey's territorial integrity borders, which will prepare the
ground for opening the border.
3. Russia and Iran are key countries with an interest in
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Their indirect support could serve
to accelerate the normalization process. Turkey's ability to follow
an inclusive approach may prevent any concern in Tehran and Moscow
regarding normalization. Turkey and Armenia need to be on the same side
to secure the ground for peace and stability in the Caucasus. Turkish
policymakers should therefore pursue a multidimensional approach
to persuade Iran and Russia that a rapprochement will not threaten
Iranian and Russian interests. Rather, both stand to reap the benefits
of regional peace and stability.
4. The normalization of relations with Armenia would strengthen
Turkey's regional profile in the Caucasus, and could open the way
for new mediator and facilitator positions for Turkey in several
Caucasian conflicts and problems. The Minsk initiative and UN-based
attempts did not produce any result in the quest to solve the
Karabakh question. Such attempts are not likely to solve other
problems either. There is thus a need for initiatives from within
the region. Turkey's Caucasian initiative would be a likely starter.
5. Turkey should strengthen its inclusionary approach toward Armenia in
the regional context. This change of attitude would force Armenia to
drop its preconditions for normalizing relations, while strengthening
Turkey's policy of zero-problems with its neighbors.
6. Turkey's moves toward normalization will generate support from
the European Union, the U.S. and the international community. This
support should also be used to facilitate a change in Armenia to
respect Turkish borders. The U.S. and European administrations
need to re-evaluate the Diaspora's policies, which have the effect
of disengaging Armenia from geopolitical reality in its region,
through utilization of American and European sources. Such a policy
of isolationism only strengthens Russian influence in the region. This
situation may not be exactly what the U.S. and European administrations
envision to see in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis.
7. Turkey should spend more energy on establishing a joint commission
of historians to undertake an objective and scientific study of the
genocide allegations. The Armenian Diaspora and the Tasnaksutyun Party
oppose this idea on the ground that it would amount to questioning
the authenticity of genocide allegations. However, it may be easier
to persuade the Armenian administration for the utility of such
an initiative.
8. Ankara needs to make sure that it pays attention to Azerbaijani
concerns while developing relations with Armenia. The only way to
wield any influence on Armenia is to keep a dialogue channel open. It
would be unfair to urge Turkey to close the doors to Armenia, while
Azerbaijani leaders are pursuing diplomatic activity with the Armenian
government. Turkish policymakers should continue to underline the need
for Armenia to put an end to its occupation of Azerbaijani territories
in the interest of regional peace and stability.
9. There is an urgent need for a region-wide initiative for
civil society dialogue. Inter-governmental measures may fail
without strong support for peace and dialogue from the societal
level. Turkish-Armenian civil society dialogue should be encouraged
and supported. Even a touristic visit to Yerevan may show that
the genocide issue is not central to the lives of Armenians. The
years-long gap between the two neighbors may be bridged through civil
society activities.
â~H- IÅ~_ık University, Ä°stanbul, [email protected] â~H-â~H-
Bilgesam, Ä°stanbul, [email protected]
--Boundary_(ID_9ZxPZm0DHnL4T j3A1/dKfg)--