The Washington Times
September 14, 2008 Sunday
U.S.-Russian relations: What should be done -and not done
By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES
On Aug. 8, Russia decided to rewrite the rules of post-World War II
European security. It repudiated the Helsinki Pact of 1975, which
recognized the sanctity of borders in Europe, and violated the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of NATO aspirant Georgia, whose
troops had attacked South Ossetia the day before. In the process,
Russia also tore up its own peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.
Moscow desires to become a hegemonic power in the former Soviet
space. The Georgian war brought Russia back to the Southern Caucasus
in force, outflanking oil-rich Azerbaijan, and affecting control over
the principal energy and rail arteries bringing natural resources from
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the West and consumer and
industrial goods to the East. The Russian military practically
destroyed the Georgian military, which protected the pipelines and the
Georgian port of Poti, the important Black Sea terminal of the
East-West corridor.
The war in the Caucasus, however, surpasses the regional agenda. In
fact, Russia's war aims are far-reaching and include:
* Expulsion of Georgian troops and termination of Georgian sovereignty
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, something that was accomplished.
* "Regime change" by bringing down President Mikheil Saakashvili and
installing a more pro-Russian leadership in Tbilisi.
* Preventing Georgia from joining NATO and sending a strong message to
Ukraine that its insistence on NATO membership may lead to a civil
unrest in the Crimea, where many Russian citizens reside, and
potentially, to the country's dismemberment.
* Shifting control of the Caucasus, and especially over strategic
energy pipelines and the transportation corridor from the Caspian to
the Black Sea, by controlling Georgia.
* Re-creating a 19th-century style sphere of influence in the former
Soviet Union, by the use of force if necessary.
Such anti-status quo revisionism is the stuff of which world wars are
made. Think the Balkan wars that preceded World War I or Adolf
Hitler's invasion of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia in 1938 - with
Europe's acquiescence.
Russia proclaims that it wants to shift the global balance of power
away from the United States; "Finlandize" Europe; revise global
economic institutions; and return to highly competitive and often
confrontational great power politics, reminiscent of the 19th
century. Realists: 1, Fukuyama: 0.
In his recent nationally televised statement, Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev announced as much. He rejected "unipolarity" - the code word
for U.S. global leadership, calling such a world "unstable and
conflict-ridden."
Mr. Medvedev declared that while Russia does not want to isolate
itself, it would defend "the life and dignity of its citizens wherever
they are," as well as its business interests. Most important, the
Russian leader declared that his country has regions of "privileged
interests," which are not limited to Russia's borderlands. One could
include Iran, Syria, Cuba and even Venezuela in such a list.
Beyond that, Russia went into a diplomatic high gear, receiving the
support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes
China and the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) as members, and Iran,
Mongolia, India and Pakistan as associate members. SCO expressed
support for Russian action in Georgia but stopped short of recognizing
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russia also significantly shored up the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) of the Commonwealth of Independent
States. Comprising, besides Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Mr. Medvedev has announced that
CSTO is going to build up its military muscle and its foreign policy
will strongly support Moscow. Russia openly announced that CSTO is
becoming a military bloc, similar to - and opposing - NATO.
The next U.S. administration and its allies need to design a
comprehensive policy countering Moscow's bid to shift the global
balance of power away from liberal democracies and in favor of the
oil-rich Authoritarian International. China and India will be the most
important swing states in this struggle.
At this point, the U.S. and its European allies should not emphasize
military power to confront Russian revanchism. There is too much
unfinished business in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the global war
on terror. Nor are there troop and military hardware levels present
for a massive military buildup along Russia's perimeter. Europe has no
appetite for a new confrontation with the Kremlin, while the
U.S. economy suffers from the record deficit and debt levels.
Yet, the U.S. should take a leadership role in building a global
coalition against Russian revisionist policies, expanding a strategic
dialogue with European capitals, New Delhi and Beijing. Ukrainian and
Georgian membership in NATO and the EU should be given serious
consideration. Washington should communicate to Moscow that Russia has
much to lose, including its unrestricted financial and economic ties
to the advanced market economies.
Russian state-owned energy companies - the cash cows of the Russian
budget - trade their American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in New York
and London. Russia is dependent on Western market and cutting edge
technologies both for its military buildup and for its increasingly
expensive hydrocarbon development.
Russia has also pursued policies of restricting access to its
"strategic" commodities for the West. If it continues to do so, the
U.S. and Europe can reciprocate by cutting access for Russian
state-owned companies to investment in companies vital to our national
security.
Hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, 20
kilometers from the Georgian border may be a non-starter, and so may
be the membership in the Group of Eight. Finally, since the end of the
Cold War, the U.S. has neglected its capabilities to wage the war of
ideas, a key battlefield in which it defeated the Soviets. These
capabilities are also crucial to win the war against radical Islamist
ideology. In this century, the West needs to use its creativity and
technological prowess to reach the post-Soviet and Muslim audiences
despite increasing TV censorship and vitriolic anti-American
brainwashing.
History has not ended, neither did geopolitics. The next
administration has its work cut out for it from the Baltic Sea to the
Pacific.
* Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation and the author of 500 articles and three books, including
"Russian Imperialism and Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence."
September 14, 2008 Sunday
U.S.-Russian relations: What should be done -and not done
By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES
On Aug. 8, Russia decided to rewrite the rules of post-World War II
European security. It repudiated the Helsinki Pact of 1975, which
recognized the sanctity of borders in Europe, and violated the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of NATO aspirant Georgia, whose
troops had attacked South Ossetia the day before. In the process,
Russia also tore up its own peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.
Moscow desires to become a hegemonic power in the former Soviet
space. The Georgian war brought Russia back to the Southern Caucasus
in force, outflanking oil-rich Azerbaijan, and affecting control over
the principal energy and rail arteries bringing natural resources from
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the West and consumer and
industrial goods to the East. The Russian military practically
destroyed the Georgian military, which protected the pipelines and the
Georgian port of Poti, the important Black Sea terminal of the
East-West corridor.
The war in the Caucasus, however, surpasses the regional agenda. In
fact, Russia's war aims are far-reaching and include:
* Expulsion of Georgian troops and termination of Georgian sovereignty
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, something that was accomplished.
* "Regime change" by bringing down President Mikheil Saakashvili and
installing a more pro-Russian leadership in Tbilisi.
* Preventing Georgia from joining NATO and sending a strong message to
Ukraine that its insistence on NATO membership may lead to a civil
unrest in the Crimea, where many Russian citizens reside, and
potentially, to the country's dismemberment.
* Shifting control of the Caucasus, and especially over strategic
energy pipelines and the transportation corridor from the Caspian to
the Black Sea, by controlling Georgia.
* Re-creating a 19th-century style sphere of influence in the former
Soviet Union, by the use of force if necessary.
Such anti-status quo revisionism is the stuff of which world wars are
made. Think the Balkan wars that preceded World War I or Adolf
Hitler's invasion of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia in 1938 - with
Europe's acquiescence.
Russia proclaims that it wants to shift the global balance of power
away from the United States; "Finlandize" Europe; revise global
economic institutions; and return to highly competitive and often
confrontational great power politics, reminiscent of the 19th
century. Realists: 1, Fukuyama: 0.
In his recent nationally televised statement, Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev announced as much. He rejected "unipolarity" - the code word
for U.S. global leadership, calling such a world "unstable and
conflict-ridden."
Mr. Medvedev declared that while Russia does not want to isolate
itself, it would defend "the life and dignity of its citizens wherever
they are," as well as its business interests. Most important, the
Russian leader declared that his country has regions of "privileged
interests," which are not limited to Russia's borderlands. One could
include Iran, Syria, Cuba and even Venezuela in such a list.
Beyond that, Russia went into a diplomatic high gear, receiving the
support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes
China and the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) as members, and Iran,
Mongolia, India and Pakistan as associate members. SCO expressed
support for Russian action in Georgia but stopped short of recognizing
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russia also significantly shored up the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) of the Commonwealth of Independent
States. Comprising, besides Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Mr. Medvedev has announced that
CSTO is going to build up its military muscle and its foreign policy
will strongly support Moscow. Russia openly announced that CSTO is
becoming a military bloc, similar to - and opposing - NATO.
The next U.S. administration and its allies need to design a
comprehensive policy countering Moscow's bid to shift the global
balance of power away from liberal democracies and in favor of the
oil-rich Authoritarian International. China and India will be the most
important swing states in this struggle.
At this point, the U.S. and its European allies should not emphasize
military power to confront Russian revanchism. There is too much
unfinished business in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the global war
on terror. Nor are there troop and military hardware levels present
for a massive military buildup along Russia's perimeter. Europe has no
appetite for a new confrontation with the Kremlin, while the
U.S. economy suffers from the record deficit and debt levels.
Yet, the U.S. should take a leadership role in building a global
coalition against Russian revisionist policies, expanding a strategic
dialogue with European capitals, New Delhi and Beijing. Ukrainian and
Georgian membership in NATO and the EU should be given serious
consideration. Washington should communicate to Moscow that Russia has
much to lose, including its unrestricted financial and economic ties
to the advanced market economies.
Russian state-owned energy companies - the cash cows of the Russian
budget - trade their American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in New York
and London. Russia is dependent on Western market and cutting edge
technologies both for its military buildup and for its increasingly
expensive hydrocarbon development.
Russia has also pursued policies of restricting access to its
"strategic" commodities for the West. If it continues to do so, the
U.S. and Europe can reciprocate by cutting access for Russian
state-owned companies to investment in companies vital to our national
security.
Hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, 20
kilometers from the Georgian border may be a non-starter, and so may
be the membership in the Group of Eight. Finally, since the end of the
Cold War, the U.S. has neglected its capabilities to wage the war of
ideas, a key battlefield in which it defeated the Soviets. These
capabilities are also crucial to win the war against radical Islamist
ideology. In this century, the West needs to use its creativity and
technological prowess to reach the post-Soviet and Muslim audiences
despite increasing TV censorship and vitriolic anti-American
brainwashing.
History has not ended, neither did geopolitics. The next
administration has its work cut out for it from the Baltic Sea to the
Pacific.
* Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is senior research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation and the author of 500 articles and three books, including
"Russian Imperialism and Kazakhstan: The Road to Independence."