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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Sept 15 2008
Turkey's new diplomatic confidence signifies changing role as regional power
by DENNIS SAMMUT*
The recent crisis in the Caucasus has seen an upsurge of Turkish
diplomatic activity in the region, including an initiative to launch a
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and an opening up to
Armenia.
They are the latest in a series of initiatives by Turkish diplomacy
that many observers perceive to be part of an increasingly
sophisticated and successful foreign policy enhancing the country's
role as a regional and global player. Other examples are the role that
Turkey is playing to broker a deal between Israel and Syria, the
enhanced political dialogue with Iran, and the development of deeper
relations with the Gulf Arab states.
It is true that one needs to put all the flurry of activity in
context. Turkey's foreign policy remains underpinned by two
considerations that define the broader Turkish agenda, namely the
country's embedment within the Atlantic alliance -- of which Turkey is
both a valued and a strategic member -- and Turkey's European Union
membership aspirations. Turkey is, however, keen to promote peace and
stability in its immediate neighborhood as an essential prerequisite
for its own security and prosperity, and the need for regional peace
is now emerging as a third foreign policy consideration.
The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform is an idea that was
long overdue. The demise of the Soviet Union left a lot of unfinished
business in the Caucasus and the international community, busy dealing
with a range of other international crises from the Balkans to Iraq,
had preferred to deal with the problems in the region by containing
them rather than solving them. The danger of this approach was
obvious, but few were ready to take up the challenge of engaging with
a series of complex problems that seemed to have no solution. The war
over South Ossetia was only one of a number of crises ready to happen
in the region and highlighted a need for more structured and
consistent international engagement to help avert a
repetition. Turkey's Caucasus initiative is therefore timely and
praiseworthy.
Turkey may have been mulling the idea of a Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform for some time, and Turkish diplomats may have
preferred to do some more behind-the-scenes preparation before
launching it, but the Georgia crisis offered both a need and an
opportunity, and the Turkish government went public with the
initiative during Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's visit to Moscow at
the height of the Georgian crisis on Aug. 13.
There are few details about the Turkish initiative but this is natural
because the idea is still evolving, and to ensure buy-in from all the
stakeholders one needs to have maximum flexibility. Defining the
stakeholders may be the first challenge. Such an initiative can only
succeed if it is inclusive rather than exclusive. Russia, Turkey,
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been mentioned as the
participating countries, but this list needs to be broadened. Both the
US and the EU now have a strategic interest in the region and need to
be part of the process. Iran, although marginalized because of its
other problems with the international community, has historically been
a player in the region and is better in the tent than outside it.
Even trickier is the issue of how to involve Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno-Karabakh. The first two are now recognized by Russia as
independent states and Russia has already started the process of
insisting on their participation in relevant international
forums. Nagorno-Karabakh is not yet recognized by any state but is an
essential part of the jigsaw when dealing with relations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which technically are still at war with each
other on the issue of the status of the territory. There is in the
Caucasus now an unprecedented situation where we have states -- states
that are recognized only by some and unrecognized states. Discussions
in the preparation of the platform will likely therefore need to be
organized through a series of asymmetrical round tables where the de
facto authorities of the unrecognized or partly recognized states can
be invited on an equal basis in some but not all of the round tables.
The second set of challenges will be related to the content of the
platform. Should this be solely a security mechanism, or should there
also be a political and economic dimension? Should democracy and human
rights be part of its agenda? Views on these issues differ. The
security agenda is complex as it is, yet solutions to the problems of
the region have to be multidimensional, and a broad yet manageable
agenda will need to be worked out.
A third challenge is to define a timetable for working out the
platform. This cannot be a process regulated by artificial
timeframes. Turkey must be ready to engage with this initiative long
term if it is to see it succeed. The Helsinki process in the 1960s and
1970s took a decade to mature and two years of intensive diplomatic
activity to bear fruit. In the end it was worth waiting for because it
gave Europe a security framework that served it well for
decades. Turkey must therefore be ready for the long haul with its
Caucasus initiative.
A second Turkish initiative over the last few weeks saw a historical
opening up to Armenia and the visit of President Abdullah Gül
to that country. It is impossible for Turkey to pursue its Caucasus
Platform initiative without a normalization of its relations with
Armenia. Sooner rather than later Turkey and Armenia must follow
through on the Gül visit by establishing diplomatic
relations. This will not be the end of the process of normalizing
relations between the two countries and dealing with the baggage of
history, but rather the beginning. The process, however, needs to
start and here again Turkey will need to have the stamina to stick
with it through its inevitable ups and downs.
Turkey's new diplomatic confidence and assertiveness has wider
implications, too. Up to now Turkey's role as a regional power was due
mainly to its military strength rather than its political and
diplomatic clout. This has now changed. Turkey, like the European
Union, is now using soft power rather than military power to yield its
influence in its neighborhood. This augurs well for the future and
strengthens Turkey's hand in its European Union membership
aspirations. Europe must also show its appreciation of its development
by engaging positively with Turkey's foreign policy initiatives and to
lend its moral and political support where appropriate.
*Dennis Sammut is the executive director of the British organization
LINKS and a long time commentator on the Caucasus and European
security. [email protected]
15 September 2008, Monday
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Sept 15 2008
Turkey's new diplomatic confidence signifies changing role as regional power
by DENNIS SAMMUT*
The recent crisis in the Caucasus has seen an upsurge of Turkish
diplomatic activity in the region, including an initiative to launch a
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and an opening up to
Armenia.
They are the latest in a series of initiatives by Turkish diplomacy
that many observers perceive to be part of an increasingly
sophisticated and successful foreign policy enhancing the country's
role as a regional and global player. Other examples are the role that
Turkey is playing to broker a deal between Israel and Syria, the
enhanced political dialogue with Iran, and the development of deeper
relations with the Gulf Arab states.
It is true that one needs to put all the flurry of activity in
context. Turkey's foreign policy remains underpinned by two
considerations that define the broader Turkish agenda, namely the
country's embedment within the Atlantic alliance -- of which Turkey is
both a valued and a strategic member -- and Turkey's European Union
membership aspirations. Turkey is, however, keen to promote peace and
stability in its immediate neighborhood as an essential prerequisite
for its own security and prosperity, and the need for regional peace
is now emerging as a third foreign policy consideration.
The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform is an idea that was
long overdue. The demise of the Soviet Union left a lot of unfinished
business in the Caucasus and the international community, busy dealing
with a range of other international crises from the Balkans to Iraq,
had preferred to deal with the problems in the region by containing
them rather than solving them. The danger of this approach was
obvious, but few were ready to take up the challenge of engaging with
a series of complex problems that seemed to have no solution. The war
over South Ossetia was only one of a number of crises ready to happen
in the region and highlighted a need for more structured and
consistent international engagement to help avert a
repetition. Turkey's Caucasus initiative is therefore timely and
praiseworthy.
Turkey may have been mulling the idea of a Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform for some time, and Turkish diplomats may have
preferred to do some more behind-the-scenes preparation before
launching it, but the Georgia crisis offered both a need and an
opportunity, and the Turkish government went public with the
initiative during Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an's visit to Moscow at
the height of the Georgian crisis on Aug. 13.
There are few details about the Turkish initiative but this is natural
because the idea is still evolving, and to ensure buy-in from all the
stakeholders one needs to have maximum flexibility. Defining the
stakeholders may be the first challenge. Such an initiative can only
succeed if it is inclusive rather than exclusive. Russia, Turkey,
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been mentioned as the
participating countries, but this list needs to be broadened. Both the
US and the EU now have a strategic interest in the region and need to
be part of the process. Iran, although marginalized because of its
other problems with the international community, has historically been
a player in the region and is better in the tent than outside it.
Even trickier is the issue of how to involve Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno-Karabakh. The first two are now recognized by Russia as
independent states and Russia has already started the process of
insisting on their participation in relevant international
forums. Nagorno-Karabakh is not yet recognized by any state but is an
essential part of the jigsaw when dealing with relations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which technically are still at war with each
other on the issue of the status of the territory. There is in the
Caucasus now an unprecedented situation where we have states -- states
that are recognized only by some and unrecognized states. Discussions
in the preparation of the platform will likely therefore need to be
organized through a series of asymmetrical round tables where the de
facto authorities of the unrecognized or partly recognized states can
be invited on an equal basis in some but not all of the round tables.
The second set of challenges will be related to the content of the
platform. Should this be solely a security mechanism, or should there
also be a political and economic dimension? Should democracy and human
rights be part of its agenda? Views on these issues differ. The
security agenda is complex as it is, yet solutions to the problems of
the region have to be multidimensional, and a broad yet manageable
agenda will need to be worked out.
A third challenge is to define a timetable for working out the
platform. This cannot be a process regulated by artificial
timeframes. Turkey must be ready to engage with this initiative long
term if it is to see it succeed. The Helsinki process in the 1960s and
1970s took a decade to mature and two years of intensive diplomatic
activity to bear fruit. In the end it was worth waiting for because it
gave Europe a security framework that served it well for
decades. Turkey must therefore be ready for the long haul with its
Caucasus initiative.
A second Turkish initiative over the last few weeks saw a historical
opening up to Armenia and the visit of President Abdullah Gül
to that country. It is impossible for Turkey to pursue its Caucasus
Platform initiative without a normalization of its relations with
Armenia. Sooner rather than later Turkey and Armenia must follow
through on the Gül visit by establishing diplomatic
relations. This will not be the end of the process of normalizing
relations between the two countries and dealing with the baggage of
history, but rather the beginning. The process, however, needs to
start and here again Turkey will need to have the stamina to stick
with it through its inevitable ups and downs.
Turkey's new diplomatic confidence and assertiveness has wider
implications, too. Up to now Turkey's role as a regional power was due
mainly to its military strength rather than its political and
diplomatic clout. This has now changed. Turkey, like the European
Union, is now using soft power rather than military power to yield its
influence in its neighborhood. This augurs well for the future and
strengthens Turkey's hand in its European Union membership
aspirations. Europe must also show its appreciation of its development
by engaging positively with Turkey's foreign policy initiatives and to
lend its moral and political support where appropriate.
*Dennis Sammut is the executive director of the British organization
LINKS and a long time commentator on the Caucasus and European
security. [email protected]
15 September 2008, Monday
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress