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RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST GEORGIA: CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES
William J. Burns
US Department of State
Sept 17 2008
DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the Georgia crisis and its implications,
particularly for our relationship with Russia.
The causes of this conflict - particularly the dispute between
Georgia and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -
are complex, with mistakes and miscalculations on all sides. But
key facts are clear: Russia's intensified pressure and provocations
against Georgia - combined with a serious Georgian miscalculation -
have resulted not only in armed conflict, but in an ongoing Russian
attempt to dismember that country. Russia sent its army across an
internationally recognized boundary, to attempt to change by force
the borders of a country with a democratically-elected government.
With a ceasefire in place, the uncertainty of Russian withdrawal from
Georgia underway and Georgia's own economic recovery moving ahead,
this is a moment to take stock and look ahead. Today I will seek to
explain how we got here, how we're responding and the implications
for our relationship with Russia.
Background to the Conflict
The collapse of the USSR was marked by ethnically-based violence,
especially in the South Caucasus. This involved clashes between Azeris
and Armenians, Ossetians and Ingush, Russians and Chechens, Abkhaz and
Georgians, and others. These clashes deepened into a series of wars in
the early 1990s that ended without lasting solutions. Uneasy truces
followed, and the conflicts in areas outside Russia became known as
"frozen conflicts."
Two of the disputed regions lie within the internationally-recognized
territorial borders of Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In
1992, following two years of armed conflict between Georgians and
South Ossetians, an armistice was signed by Russian, Georgian, and
South Ossetian leaders. The leaders also agreed on the creation of
a tripartite peacekeeping force of 500 soldiers each from Russia,
Georgia, and North Ossetia, a territory which lies within the borders
of Russia. In practice, however, the North Ossetian peacekeeping
contingent ended up being staffed by South Ossetians. Fighting in
Abkhazia was brutal in those years and, as a result, large numbers
of ethnic Georgians were expelled from their homes in Abkhazia;
before the fighting, the ethnic Abkhaz had been a minority - under
20 percent - in Abkhazia.
The next year, 1993, South Ossetia drafted its own constitution,
and three years after that, in 1996, South Ossetia elected its
own "president" in an election in which mainly ethnic Ossetians -
not ethnic Georgians - voted. In 2001, South Ossetia elected Eduard
Kokoity as president, again with most ethnic Georgians boycotting the
election. The following year, in 2002, he asked Moscow to recognize
South Ossetia's independence and absorb it into Russia. Throughout
this period, Russia acted to support the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
leaderships. That support was not only political, but concrete, and
never more so than through the continued presence of Russian military
forces, including those labeled as peacekeepers.
Georgia emerged from these post-Soviet wars in weak condition. While
then-President Shevardnadze deserves credit for helping end the
fighting, Georgia could not find its feet; its economy remained weak
and its government relatively ineffective. In the autumn of 2003,
President Shevardnadze acquiesced in an attempt by a local Georgian
strongman - Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze - to steal Georgia's
parliamentary election. This triggered a popular uprising of hundreds
of thousands of Georgians, leading to the so-called Rose Revolution
and Mikheil Saakashvili's election as president.
Following his 2004 election, Saakashvili and his government moved
swiftly and effectively to improve governance in Georgia, reducing
corruption, pushing through economic reforms, and welcoming foreign
investment. The Georgian economy started to grow rapidly. At the same
time, Saakashvili made clear his intention that Georgia follow the path
of other successful post-communist democracies and draw closer to,
and eventually join NATO and the European Union. Although they have
developed significantly in the past few years, Georgian democratic
institutions remain weak and much work needs to be done to deepen
democratic practices and continue economic reforms; authoritarian
practices still exist alongside more democratic ones. We have made
known, and made clear in public, our concerns with some of these
democratic deficits.
This progress, however, was paralleled by increasing tensions between
Georgia and the Russian-supported breakaway territories. After the
Rose Revolution, more clashes occurred between Georgians and South
Ossetians, and between Georgians and Abkhaz. Then in 2006, South
Ossetians voted for a split from Georgia in a referendum that was,
again, largely boycotted by ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia. Although
there were efforts to resolve the differences through negotiations,
by late 2007 talks had essentially broken down.
As Georgia's ambitions to draw close to Europe and the transatlantic
community became clearer, its relations with Russia deteriorated. In
the summer of 2006, Georgia arrested several Russian military
intelligence officers it accused of conducting bombings in Gori. Moscow
responded by closing Russia's only road crossing with Georgia,
suspending air and mail links, imposing embargoes against Georgian
exports and even rounding up people living in Russia (including school
children) with ethnic Georgian names and deporting them. At least
two Georgians died during the deportation process. In March 2007,
what we believe were Russian attack helicopters launched an aerial
assault, combined with artillery fire, on the Georgian Government's
administrative offices in Abkhazia's Upper Kodori Valley. In
August, Russian fighter jets violated Georgian airspace, and then
unsuccessfully launched a missile toward a Georgian radar station.
This past year, although Moscow lifted some of the economic and
transport embargoes, it further intensified the political pressure by
establishing an administrative relationship with both South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. In March 2008, Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal
from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia,
thus removing the CIS prohibition on providing direct economic and
military assistance. Then in April, following the NATO Summit in
Bucharest where NATO leaders declared that Georgia would one day be
a member of the alliance, then-President Putin issued instructions
calling for closer official ties between Russian ministries and their
counterparts in both of the disputed regions.
Russia also increased military pressure as Russian officials and
military personnel were seconded to serve in both the governments
and the armed forces of the separatist regions. South Ossetia's
"prime minister," "defense minister," and "security minister,"
for example, are all seconded Russian officials. And while Russian
peacekeepers in Abkhazia were specifically mandated to facilitate
the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, we saw no
net return of Georgians to Abkhazia in over a decade. On April 20
a Russian fighter jet shot down an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia. Russia also increased its
military presence in Abkhazia without the required consultation with
the Government of Georgia. In late April, Russia sent highly-trained
airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia, ostensibly as part
of its peacekeeping force. Then in May, Russia dispatched construction
troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.
During this buildup of tension, the United States frequently called
on Moscow to reverse Russian actions and to participate with us
and key European allies in a diplomatic process to resolve these
conflicts. In June and July, for example, the UN Friends of Georgia
group, which included the United States, Germany, the UK, and France,
urged fellow Friend Russia to engage in invigorated negotiations
to advance Georgia's peace plan for Abkhazia. Yet Russia resisted,
in one case even failing to show up for a meeting in mid-June that
President Medvedev promised Russia would attend. In July, Georgia
accepted the Western Friends' request that Russia and Georgia join
the UN Friends and the Abkhaz for discussions to reduce tension and
advance the peace process. But once again Russia's Foreign Ministry
refused to send a representative.
During this time, we urged Georgian officials both publicly and
privately, on many occasions, to resist the temptation of any military
reaction, even in the face of repeated provocations, which they were
clearly facing. President Saakashvili did, to his credit, offer
extensive autonomy to Abkhazia, including a guarantee that a Vice
President of Georgia would be from Abkhazia. In July, Secretary Rice
traveled to Tbilisi to seek to intensify diplomatic efforts to reduce
the growing tensions. Working closely with counterparts from Germany,
France, and the UK, she called for intensified diplomatic efforts
on an urgent basis. While expressing support for Georgia, she also
cautioned President Saakashvili against any temptation to use force
to resolve these conflicts, even in the face of continued provocations.
Unfortunately, Russia resisted these European-American efforts to
intensify diplomatic efforts to stave off a wider conflict. After
Russian military aircraft overflew Georgian airspace in July, in
violation of Georgia's sovereignty, while Secretary Rice was visiting
Tbilisi, President Saakashvili recalled Georgia's ambassador to Moscow.
August began with two bomb explosions in Georgian-controlled territory
in South Ossetia, injuring five Georgian policemen. On August 2, a
firefight broke out in South Ossetia that killed six South Ossetians
and one Georgian policeman. On August 3, Russia declared that South
Ossetia was close to a "large-scale" military conflict, and the
next day, South Ossetia evacuated hundreds of women and children to
Russia. On August 5, Moscow issued a statement saying that it would
defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia. It is important to note that
these were mainly South Ossetians - that is to say, Georgian citizens -
to whom Russia had simply handed out Russian passports. On August 6,
both Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of opening fire on
villages in the region.
The Crisis
Throughout this period, the United States worked with both Georgia
and South Ossetia, and with Russia, seeking to tamp down the growing
conflict. On August 7 Georgia's minister for conflict resolution
traveled to South Ossetia for negotiations, but his South Ossetian
counterpart refused to meet with him and his Russian colleague failed
to show up. On the night of August 7, shooting broke out between
Georgia and South Ossetian armed forces in South Ossetia. Georgia
declared a ceasefire, but it did not hold. The Georgians told us
that South Ossetians had fired on Georgian villages from behind the
position of Russian peacekeepers. The Georgians also told us that
Russian troops and heavy military equipment were entering the Roki
Tunnel border crossing with Russia.
We had warned the Georgians many times in the previous days and weeks
against using force, and on August 7, we warned them repeatedly not
to take such a step. We pointed out that use of military force, even
in the face of provocations, would lead to a disaster. We were blunt
in conveying these points, not subtle. Our message was clear.
Georgia's move into the South Ossetian capital provided Russia a
pretext for a response that quickly grew far out of proportion to
the actions taken by Georgia. There will be a time for assessing
blame for what happened in the early hours of the conflict, but one
fact is clear - there was no justification for Russia's invasion
of Georgia. There was no justification for Russia to seize Georgian
territory, including territory well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
in violation of Georgia's sovereignty, but that is what occurred. On
August 8, the Russians poured across the international border, crossed
the boundaries of South Ossetia past where the conflict was occurring,
and pushed their way into much of the rest of Georgia. Several
thousand Russian forces moved into the city of Gori and other areas
far from the conflict zone, such as Georgia's main port of Poti,
over 200 kilometers from South Ossetia. Russia also seized the last
Georgian-held portion of Abkhazia, where there had been no fighting.
The full story of that invasion and what occurred is still not fully
known. We have received evidence of the burning of Georgian villages
in South Ossetia. Russia's invasion resulted in a large number of
internally displaced ethnic Georgians who fled South Ossetia to
Tbilisi and other Georgian towns. Although Russian forces attempted
to prevent access to the area by humanitarian aid workers, some Human
Rights Watch researchers were able to reach the area and reported that
the Russian military had used "indiscriminate force" and "seemingly
targeted attacks on civilians," including civilian convoys. They
said Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in populated areas and
allowed looting, arson attacks, and abductions in Georgian villages by
militia groups. The researchers also reported that Georgian forces used
"indiscriminate" and "disproportionate" force during their assault on
South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages in South
Ossetia. Senior Russian leaders have sought to support their claims
of Georgian "genocide" against the South Ossetian people by claiming
that 2,000 civilians were killed by Georgian forces in the initial
assault. Human Rights Watch has called this figure of 2,000 dead
"exaggerated" and "suspicious." Other subsequent Russian government and
South Ossetian investigations have suggested much lower numbers. We
are continuing to look at these and other reports while we attempt
to assemble reliable information about who did what in those days.
The Ceasefire, Russia's Failure to Honor it, and Recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia
In the days that followed the Russian invasion, our attention
was focused on halting the violence and bringing about a
ceasefire. President Bush spoke with a number of European leaders
as well as with President Saakashvili, President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin in an effort to halt the fighting. Secretary Rice
dispatched Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza to Tbilisi to
maintain contact with the Georgian leaders, working with Ambassador
John Tefft. She herself worked with the Georgians and Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov, and with key Europeans including the French as the
European Union (EU) President, and Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb, in
Finland's role as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to seek to halt the fighting.
On August 14, Secretary Rice flew to France to consult with President
Sarkozy, and then flew to Georgia to seek - and successfully obtain -
President Saakashvili's signature on a ceasefire agreement. President
Sarkozy had negotiated a six-point agreement which included the
following:
No resort to force.
A definitive halt to hostilities.
Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance.
Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they are usually
stationed.
Russian forces must withdraw to their positions prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian
peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures.
Opening of international discussions on security and stability
modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The U.S. role in this process was central and timely. The Georgians
had questions about the ceasefire agreement, so we worked with the
French who issued a clarifying letter addressing some of Georgia's
concerns. Secretary Rice conveyed the draft Ceasefire Agreement and
the letter to President Saakashvili the next day. Based on these
assurances, some additional assurances from the French, and the
assurances of our support, President Saakashvili signed the ceasefire
agreement on August 15.
The Ceasefire Accord provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces from
Georgia to their positions before the hostilities began, and allows
for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, limited to the numbers allowed
under previous agreements, to conduct patrols a few kilometers from
the conflict zone in South Ossetia, not including any cities and
not in ways that impede freedom of movement. The Ceasefire Accord
does not establish a buffer zone; it does not explicitly grant the
Russians the right to set up checkpoints around Georgia's ports or
along Georgia's main highways and other transportation links; and it
does not explicitly grant the Russians the right to have any forces
whatsoever in places such as Poti, 200 kilometers from South Ossetia.
This agreement was signed - and should have been honored immediately -
by Russian President Medvedev, who had promised to French President
Sarkozy Russia's immediate withdrawal upon President Saakashvili's
signature of the Ceasefire. Yet Russia has still not lived up to the
requirements of the Ceasefire Agreement. In these circumstances,
with Russia's having failed to honor the terms of the Ceasefire
Agreement and its promise to withdraw its forces, Secretary Rice
flew to Brussels for an emergency NATO meeting on August 19 and, with
our Allies, produced a statement in support of Georgia's territorial
integrity and sovereignty - a statement that was stronger than anyone
thought possible.
Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on
August 26. It did so despite numerous United Nations Security Council
resolutions that Russia approved and that explicitly affirmed Georgia's
territorial integrity, and that the underlying separatist conflicts
must be resolved peacefully, through international negotiations. This
irresponsible action was condemned by the EU, NATO's Secretary General,
and key Allies.
Following the EU Summit on September 1, President Sarkozy traveled
to Moscow on September 8 to again seek Russia's compliance with the
Ceasefire. This has been a fast-moving situation, but that is where
we find ourselves today.
Our Strategic Response
In the face of this Russian assault on Georgia, the United States is
pursuing three key objectives.
First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation
on the ground; help the country recover and thrive economically;
preserve Georgia's sovereignty; maintain our support for its
territorial integrity, and democracy. We are active, working with
our European allies, in putting pressure on Russia to adhere to the
Ceasefire. Russia must withdraw its military forces from Georgia,
back to the lines of August 7; Russia is allowed limited patrolling
rights by its recognized peacekeepers in the immediate vicinity of
South Ossetia only until such time as an international mechanism is
developed to take their place. So we are working fast with the EU and
the OSCE to put in place just such a mechanism. We are also preparing
to launch international discussions on South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
again working closely with our European partners.
We have already taken immediate steps to address Georgia's humanitarian
needs. The United States has provided more than $38 million worth of
humanitarian aid and emergency relief, including food, shelter, and
medical supplies, to assist the people of Georgia. U.S. aircraft made a
total of 62 relief flights to Georgia from August 13 through September
4, and on August 24 and 27, 115 tons of emergency relief commodities
arrived in Batumi on the USS McFaul and the USCGC Dallas. In addition,
a third ship, the USS Mount Whitney anchored in Poti on September 5,
unloaded an additional 17 tons of emergency relief commodities that was
delivered by USAID non-governmental organization partners. On September
3, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported
that 90,500 individuals have returned to places of origin, following
the August conflict. However, UNHCR staff note that the number of
returnees may be significantly higher due to the passage of time, as
well as the difficulty of accurate, in-field returnee counts. According
to UNHCR, approximately 30,000 individuals may be displaced in the
long term. We have been working with the Government of Georgia and
seven relief organizations to ensure that our assistance gets to
internally displaced people and other conflict-affected populations.
On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to help meet
Georgia's pressing humanitarian needs, repair infrastructure damaged
by Russia's invasion, sustain commercial confidence, and restore
economic growth. $570 million, the first phase of a $1 billion United
States economic support package, will be made available by the end
of 2008 and will include emergency budget support to the Georgian
Government. We will be working extensively with Congress in the days
to come to fine tune how the assistance will be delivered. We are
hopeful that there will be strong bipartisan backing for a second
phase of support, an additional $430 million of support and other
urgently needed reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to be
provided in future budgets.
Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to
defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Department of
Defense has sent an assessment team to Tbilisi to help us begin to
consider carefully Georgia's legitimate needs and, working with
our Allies, develop our response. For several years, the United
States has played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces
to conduct counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to
help Georgia rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists
and then as part of multinational coalition efforts. NATO's North
Atlantic Council decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-Georgia
Commission aimed at supporting Georgia's relations with NATO. NATO
has also decided to help Georgia assess the damage, including to the
Georgian Armed Forces, and to help restore critical services necessary
for normal public life and economic activity. NATO has already sent an
advisory support team to Georgia and its Special Representative for
the Caucasus and Central Asia. The North Atlantic Council Permanent
Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the near future. Finland's
Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, showed
strong and effective leadership in working with French Foreign Minister
Kouchner to lay the diplomatic foundation for the ceasefire agreement
and activate the OSCE's crisis response mechanisms.
Our second key objective is to work together with our friends in
the region to support their independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, as well as their European and transatlantic aspirations, and
overall stability in the region. Since 1989, the United States - under
the leadership of Presidents George H. W. Bush, President Clinton, and
President George W. Bush - has supported the right of every country
emerging from communism to chose the path of its own development,
and to choose the institutions - such as NATO and the European Union
- that it wants to associate with and join. Each country must show
itself ready to meet the standards of the institutions it seeks to
join. That is its responsibility, and Georgia and Ukraine should be
treated no differently than other European countries seeking to join
European and transatlantic institutions.
Concurrently the United States is committed to redoubling
efforts to ease tensions and resolve conflicts throughout the
region. Recently, the leaders of Turkey and Armenia took an important
step toward reducing their long-standing tensions. We applaud the
initiative of Armenian President Sargsyan to invite his Turkish
counterpart to Yerevan, and President Gul's willingness to accept the
invitation. Their meeting creates a new atmosphere in the relationship,
and gives hope that a long-overdue thaw has begun. The normalization
of relations between Turkey and Armenia could also help open up trade
and transportation routes for the entire South Caucasus.
Closely connected is resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Its
costs can still be counted in terms of refugees and displaced persons -
nearly a million altogether - provinces denuded of populations, lost
economic opportunities, and disrupted trade. The U.S. Government will
do all it can to encourage the parties to show greater flexibility and
creativity in their negotiations. We will do everything possible to
promote a just and lasting settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
that proceeds from the principle of our support for Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity, and ultimately incorporates other elements of
international law and diplomatic practice.
The United States, working closely with our allies, will also look at
ways to emphasize the importance of expanding the Southern Corridor
for energy supply, bringing oil and gas from the Caspian region
to Europe. The development of energy resources and competitively
transporting them to market supports the sovereignty, independence and
economic development of the countries of the region. Diversification
of sources of energy and their routes to market, alternative energy
sources, and energy efficiency efforts, is critical to Europe as well.
Implications for Relations with Russia
Finally, our strategic response must include the longer-term
consequences of the invasion of Georgia for our relationship with
Russia. Since 1991, three U.S. administrations have based policy
toward Russia on the assumption that Russia sought to become a nation
integrated with the international system and its institutions. Since
1991 Russia has asserted its own interest in becoming a part of the
world and a part of international institutions. And Russia has made
progress in this regard, with American and European support. But
with its invasion of Georgia, its continuing refusal to implement
the Ceasefire it has signed, and its claim to a "region of privileged
interests," Russia has put these assumptions and aspirations at risk.
Russia and the Russian people are paying a considerable price for
their country's disproportionate military action. Today's Russia is
an emergent economic power and a net exporter; its interdependency,
which connects it with the rest of the world in very different ways
than in the past has fueled the country's newfound prosperity over
the past eight years. This same interdependency has raised the costs
of military intervention in Georgia. While much is made of Europe's
energy dependence on Russia, the wider truth is that Russia needs
Europe too, as the market for 75 percent of its gas exports and a
critical bridge to a better economic future. Since August 7, investor
confidence has plummeted. At least in part because of the Georgia
crisis, Russian financial markets have lost nearly a third of their
value, with losses in market capitalization of hundreds of billions
of dollars. Serious capital outflows have taken place; the Russian
Finance Minister admitted that $7 billion left the country on August
8; private estimates range as high as $20 billion for capital flight
over the past six weeks. The ruble has depreciated nearly 10 percent
since August 7 and the Russian Central Bank has spent billions of
its reserves to try to halt the slide.
The opportunity costs for Russia are even greater, the most important
of which may be the country's ambitious plans to diversify the economy
and rebuild infrastructure. At a moment of crucial economic choices,
at a moment when Russia can innovate, diversify and develop to the
full its greatest resource - its enormously talented people - it is
in danger of missing an historic chance and stagnating amidst mounting
corruption, cronyism and demographic ills.
A great deal is at stake. Russia's actions in Georgia, particularly its
reckless decisions to invade Georgia and recognize South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, are deplorable. Russia's behavior raises serious questions
about the future of our relations with a resurgent, nuclear-armed
energy-rich Great Power, which has much potential but more than its
share of troubles and complexes - and whom we do not have the luxury
of ignoring.
It is important to reinforce for Russia the consequences of its actions
in Georgia as a means of ensuring compliance with its commitments to
President Sarkozy. We have made clear that there will be no "business
as usual" with Russia while those commitments remain unfulfilled. For
our part, the Administration has withdrawn the 123 agreement on civil
nuclear cooperation with Russia, and suspended U.S.-Russian bilateral
military programs. We continue to review other options.
It is essential to continue to make common cause with our European
allies. Our cohesiveness and collective determination is the key to
affecting Russia's calculus. American actions have far more impact
as part of a chorus than as a solo performance, and unity among
European countries is also crucial. We have worked closely with
President Sarkozy and the EU leadership in recent weeks. We will
continue to do so, as standing together, we press Russia to fulfill
all its commitments under the August 12 and September 8 agreements.
Russia's diplomatic isolation was vividly exposed at the recent
Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, when not one of its partners
joined it in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nicaragua's
solitary support for recognition of those two breakaway regions is
hardly a diplomatic triumph. In a rare step, the G-7 foreign ministers
also issued a statement sharply criticizing the behavior of remaining
member of the G-8.
Our long-term strategy toward Russia needs to be based on a sober
assessment of our own interests and priorities, and of what's
driving Russia today. Flush with petro-dollars and reborn pride,
the Russia we see before us is a muddle of conflicting impulses -
of angry chauvinism and accumulated grievances, alongside some very
21st century connections to the global market and new attachments to
a world in which foreign travel and private property are what animate
much of the next generation and the emerging middle class.
On one hand, some Russian strategists clearly see opportunities in
American difficulties, and see taking us down a notch as the best way
to assert their own prerogatives and expand their role. Another aspect
of that inclination was on full and ugly display in the Georgia crisis,
the very 19th century notion that intimidating small neighbors is what
makes Great Powers great. Those impulses are fed by the increasingly
authoritarian bent in Russian politics over recent years. They are
beguiling and cathartic for a country that a decade ago was about as
far down on its luck as a Great Power can go - but they are not the
same thing as a positive agenda for realizing Russia's potential in
the decades ahead.
On the other hand, there is the Russia about which President Medvedev
spoke eloquently during his election campaign, a Russia that aspires
to become a modern, rules-based, 21st century Great Power with a
diversified, integrated economy and a political system that gradually
opens itself to the rule of law. That vision of Russia has hardly
been on display in recent weeks - indeed it has very nearly receded
from view - but the realities of Russia's circumstances may yet force
it back to the surface.
It's hard to predict which set of impulses will prove strongest in the
years ahead, or whether the costs and consequences already evident
in the Georgia crisis will sink in. The truth is we are likely to
have a relationship with Russia for some time to come which mixes
competition and political conflict with cooperation.
On some critically important issues, like combating nuclear terrorism
and non-proliferation, we have a hard-headed interest in working with
Russia, as we will be doing when my Russian counterpart joins the
rest of our P5+1 colleagues in another round of discussions on Iran
the day after tomorrow in Washington. Nowhere is our cooperation
and our leadership more important than in the whole complex of
nuclear challenges - from setting a good example for the rest of the
work in managing an reducing our own nuclear arsenals, to ensuring
the safety and security of nuclear materials, on the basis of the
visionary programs which Members of this Committee have done so much
to promote. On other issues, like Georgia, we and our partners will
need to push back hard and systematically against Russian behavior.
Dealing with Russia in the years ahead will require equal part
firmness, steadiness and patience. It will require us to put sustained
effort into a common strategy with our European partners. It will
require us to keep a clear sense of priorities. It will require us to
keep the door open to long-term, mutually respectful partnership with
Russia - if Russia chooses to make that possible, and if it chooses
to become a responsible stake holder in the international system --
but to defend our interests resolutely. It will require us to keep
a sense of strategic confidence and initiative, as well as a sense
of the internal weaknesses and growing interdependence with which
Russian leaders must ultimately contend. And it will require us to
continue to focus energy and attention on a relationship with Russia
that may often prove frustrating, and sometimes even dangerous, but
that matters enormously not only to our interests, but to the future
of global order.
Thank you, and I look forward to taking your questions.
William J. Burns
US Department of State
Sept 17 2008
DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the Georgia crisis and its implications,
particularly for our relationship with Russia.
The causes of this conflict - particularly the dispute between
Georgia and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia -
are complex, with mistakes and miscalculations on all sides. But
key facts are clear: Russia's intensified pressure and provocations
against Georgia - combined with a serious Georgian miscalculation -
have resulted not only in armed conflict, but in an ongoing Russian
attempt to dismember that country. Russia sent its army across an
internationally recognized boundary, to attempt to change by force
the borders of a country with a democratically-elected government.
With a ceasefire in place, the uncertainty of Russian withdrawal from
Georgia underway and Georgia's own economic recovery moving ahead,
this is a moment to take stock and look ahead. Today I will seek to
explain how we got here, how we're responding and the implications
for our relationship with Russia.
Background to the Conflict
The collapse of the USSR was marked by ethnically-based violence,
especially in the South Caucasus. This involved clashes between Azeris
and Armenians, Ossetians and Ingush, Russians and Chechens, Abkhaz and
Georgians, and others. These clashes deepened into a series of wars in
the early 1990s that ended without lasting solutions. Uneasy truces
followed, and the conflicts in areas outside Russia became known as
"frozen conflicts."
Two of the disputed regions lie within the internationally-recognized
territorial borders of Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In
1992, following two years of armed conflict between Georgians and
South Ossetians, an armistice was signed by Russian, Georgian, and
South Ossetian leaders. The leaders also agreed on the creation of
a tripartite peacekeeping force of 500 soldiers each from Russia,
Georgia, and North Ossetia, a territory which lies within the borders
of Russia. In practice, however, the North Ossetian peacekeeping
contingent ended up being staffed by South Ossetians. Fighting in
Abkhazia was brutal in those years and, as a result, large numbers
of ethnic Georgians were expelled from their homes in Abkhazia;
before the fighting, the ethnic Abkhaz had been a minority - under
20 percent - in Abkhazia.
The next year, 1993, South Ossetia drafted its own constitution,
and three years after that, in 1996, South Ossetia elected its
own "president" in an election in which mainly ethnic Ossetians -
not ethnic Georgians - voted. In 2001, South Ossetia elected Eduard
Kokoity as president, again with most ethnic Georgians boycotting the
election. The following year, in 2002, he asked Moscow to recognize
South Ossetia's independence and absorb it into Russia. Throughout
this period, Russia acted to support the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
leaderships. That support was not only political, but concrete, and
never more so than through the continued presence of Russian military
forces, including those labeled as peacekeepers.
Georgia emerged from these post-Soviet wars in weak condition. While
then-President Shevardnadze deserves credit for helping end the
fighting, Georgia could not find its feet; its economy remained weak
and its government relatively ineffective. In the autumn of 2003,
President Shevardnadze acquiesced in an attempt by a local Georgian
strongman - Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze - to steal Georgia's
parliamentary election. This triggered a popular uprising of hundreds
of thousands of Georgians, leading to the so-called Rose Revolution
and Mikheil Saakashvili's election as president.
Following his 2004 election, Saakashvili and his government moved
swiftly and effectively to improve governance in Georgia, reducing
corruption, pushing through economic reforms, and welcoming foreign
investment. The Georgian economy started to grow rapidly. At the same
time, Saakashvili made clear his intention that Georgia follow the path
of other successful post-communist democracies and draw closer to,
and eventually join NATO and the European Union. Although they have
developed significantly in the past few years, Georgian democratic
institutions remain weak and much work needs to be done to deepen
democratic practices and continue economic reforms; authoritarian
practices still exist alongside more democratic ones. We have made
known, and made clear in public, our concerns with some of these
democratic deficits.
This progress, however, was paralleled by increasing tensions between
Georgia and the Russian-supported breakaway territories. After the
Rose Revolution, more clashes occurred between Georgians and South
Ossetians, and between Georgians and Abkhaz. Then in 2006, South
Ossetians voted for a split from Georgia in a referendum that was,
again, largely boycotted by ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia. Although
there were efforts to resolve the differences through negotiations,
by late 2007 talks had essentially broken down.
As Georgia's ambitions to draw close to Europe and the transatlantic
community became clearer, its relations with Russia deteriorated. In
the summer of 2006, Georgia arrested several Russian military
intelligence officers it accused of conducting bombings in Gori. Moscow
responded by closing Russia's only road crossing with Georgia,
suspending air and mail links, imposing embargoes against Georgian
exports and even rounding up people living in Russia (including school
children) with ethnic Georgian names and deporting them. At least
two Georgians died during the deportation process. In March 2007,
what we believe were Russian attack helicopters launched an aerial
assault, combined with artillery fire, on the Georgian Government's
administrative offices in Abkhazia's Upper Kodori Valley. In
August, Russian fighter jets violated Georgian airspace, and then
unsuccessfully launched a missile toward a Georgian radar station.
This past year, although Moscow lifted some of the economic and
transport embargoes, it further intensified the political pressure by
establishing an administrative relationship with both South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. In March 2008, Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal
from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia,
thus removing the CIS prohibition on providing direct economic and
military assistance. Then in April, following the NATO Summit in
Bucharest where NATO leaders declared that Georgia would one day be
a member of the alliance, then-President Putin issued instructions
calling for closer official ties between Russian ministries and their
counterparts in both of the disputed regions.
Russia also increased military pressure as Russian officials and
military personnel were seconded to serve in both the governments
and the armed forces of the separatist regions. South Ossetia's
"prime minister," "defense minister," and "security minister,"
for example, are all seconded Russian officials. And while Russian
peacekeepers in Abkhazia were specifically mandated to facilitate
the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, we saw no
net return of Georgians to Abkhazia in over a decade. On April 20
a Russian fighter jet shot down an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia. Russia also increased its
military presence in Abkhazia without the required consultation with
the Government of Georgia. In late April, Russia sent highly-trained
airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia, ostensibly as part
of its peacekeeping force. Then in May, Russia dispatched construction
troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.
During this buildup of tension, the United States frequently called
on Moscow to reverse Russian actions and to participate with us
and key European allies in a diplomatic process to resolve these
conflicts. In June and July, for example, the UN Friends of Georgia
group, which included the United States, Germany, the UK, and France,
urged fellow Friend Russia to engage in invigorated negotiations
to advance Georgia's peace plan for Abkhazia. Yet Russia resisted,
in one case even failing to show up for a meeting in mid-June that
President Medvedev promised Russia would attend. In July, Georgia
accepted the Western Friends' request that Russia and Georgia join
the UN Friends and the Abkhaz for discussions to reduce tension and
advance the peace process. But once again Russia's Foreign Ministry
refused to send a representative.
During this time, we urged Georgian officials both publicly and
privately, on many occasions, to resist the temptation of any military
reaction, even in the face of repeated provocations, which they were
clearly facing. President Saakashvili did, to his credit, offer
extensive autonomy to Abkhazia, including a guarantee that a Vice
President of Georgia would be from Abkhazia. In July, Secretary Rice
traveled to Tbilisi to seek to intensify diplomatic efforts to reduce
the growing tensions. Working closely with counterparts from Germany,
France, and the UK, she called for intensified diplomatic efforts
on an urgent basis. While expressing support for Georgia, she also
cautioned President Saakashvili against any temptation to use force
to resolve these conflicts, even in the face of continued provocations.
Unfortunately, Russia resisted these European-American efforts to
intensify diplomatic efforts to stave off a wider conflict. After
Russian military aircraft overflew Georgian airspace in July, in
violation of Georgia's sovereignty, while Secretary Rice was visiting
Tbilisi, President Saakashvili recalled Georgia's ambassador to Moscow.
August began with two bomb explosions in Georgian-controlled territory
in South Ossetia, injuring five Georgian policemen. On August 2, a
firefight broke out in South Ossetia that killed six South Ossetians
and one Georgian policeman. On August 3, Russia declared that South
Ossetia was close to a "large-scale" military conflict, and the
next day, South Ossetia evacuated hundreds of women and children to
Russia. On August 5, Moscow issued a statement saying that it would
defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia. It is important to note that
these were mainly South Ossetians - that is to say, Georgian citizens -
to whom Russia had simply handed out Russian passports. On August 6,
both Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of opening fire on
villages in the region.
The Crisis
Throughout this period, the United States worked with both Georgia
and South Ossetia, and with Russia, seeking to tamp down the growing
conflict. On August 7 Georgia's minister for conflict resolution
traveled to South Ossetia for negotiations, but his South Ossetian
counterpart refused to meet with him and his Russian colleague failed
to show up. On the night of August 7, shooting broke out between
Georgia and South Ossetian armed forces in South Ossetia. Georgia
declared a ceasefire, but it did not hold. The Georgians told us
that South Ossetians had fired on Georgian villages from behind the
position of Russian peacekeepers. The Georgians also told us that
Russian troops and heavy military equipment were entering the Roki
Tunnel border crossing with Russia.
We had warned the Georgians many times in the previous days and weeks
against using force, and on August 7, we warned them repeatedly not
to take such a step. We pointed out that use of military force, even
in the face of provocations, would lead to a disaster. We were blunt
in conveying these points, not subtle. Our message was clear.
Georgia's move into the South Ossetian capital provided Russia a
pretext for a response that quickly grew far out of proportion to
the actions taken by Georgia. There will be a time for assessing
blame for what happened in the early hours of the conflict, but one
fact is clear - there was no justification for Russia's invasion
of Georgia. There was no justification for Russia to seize Georgian
territory, including territory well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
in violation of Georgia's sovereignty, but that is what occurred. On
August 8, the Russians poured across the international border, crossed
the boundaries of South Ossetia past where the conflict was occurring,
and pushed their way into much of the rest of Georgia. Several
thousand Russian forces moved into the city of Gori and other areas
far from the conflict zone, such as Georgia's main port of Poti,
over 200 kilometers from South Ossetia. Russia also seized the last
Georgian-held portion of Abkhazia, where there had been no fighting.
The full story of that invasion and what occurred is still not fully
known. We have received evidence of the burning of Georgian villages
in South Ossetia. Russia's invasion resulted in a large number of
internally displaced ethnic Georgians who fled South Ossetia to
Tbilisi and other Georgian towns. Although Russian forces attempted
to prevent access to the area by humanitarian aid workers, some Human
Rights Watch researchers were able to reach the area and reported that
the Russian military had used "indiscriminate force" and "seemingly
targeted attacks on civilians," including civilian convoys. They
said Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in populated areas and
allowed looting, arson attacks, and abductions in Georgian villages by
militia groups. The researchers also reported that Georgian forces used
"indiscriminate" and "disproportionate" force during their assault on
South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages in South
Ossetia. Senior Russian leaders have sought to support their claims
of Georgian "genocide" against the South Ossetian people by claiming
that 2,000 civilians were killed by Georgian forces in the initial
assault. Human Rights Watch has called this figure of 2,000 dead
"exaggerated" and "suspicious." Other subsequent Russian government and
South Ossetian investigations have suggested much lower numbers. We
are continuing to look at these and other reports while we attempt
to assemble reliable information about who did what in those days.
The Ceasefire, Russia's Failure to Honor it, and Recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia
In the days that followed the Russian invasion, our attention
was focused on halting the violence and bringing about a
ceasefire. President Bush spoke with a number of European leaders
as well as with President Saakashvili, President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin in an effort to halt the fighting. Secretary Rice
dispatched Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza to Tbilisi to
maintain contact with the Georgian leaders, working with Ambassador
John Tefft. She herself worked with the Georgians and Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov, and with key Europeans including the French as the
European Union (EU) President, and Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb, in
Finland's role as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to seek to halt the fighting.
On August 14, Secretary Rice flew to France to consult with President
Sarkozy, and then flew to Georgia to seek - and successfully obtain -
President Saakashvili's signature on a ceasefire agreement. President
Sarkozy had negotiated a six-point agreement which included the
following:
No resort to force.
A definitive halt to hostilities.
Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance.
Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they are usually
stationed.
Russian forces must withdraw to their positions prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian
peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures.
Opening of international discussions on security and stability
modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The U.S. role in this process was central and timely. The Georgians
had questions about the ceasefire agreement, so we worked with the
French who issued a clarifying letter addressing some of Georgia's
concerns. Secretary Rice conveyed the draft Ceasefire Agreement and
the letter to President Saakashvili the next day. Based on these
assurances, some additional assurances from the French, and the
assurances of our support, President Saakashvili signed the ceasefire
agreement on August 15.
The Ceasefire Accord provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces from
Georgia to their positions before the hostilities began, and allows
for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, limited to the numbers allowed
under previous agreements, to conduct patrols a few kilometers from
the conflict zone in South Ossetia, not including any cities and
not in ways that impede freedom of movement. The Ceasefire Accord
does not establish a buffer zone; it does not explicitly grant the
Russians the right to set up checkpoints around Georgia's ports or
along Georgia's main highways and other transportation links; and it
does not explicitly grant the Russians the right to have any forces
whatsoever in places such as Poti, 200 kilometers from South Ossetia.
This agreement was signed - and should have been honored immediately -
by Russian President Medvedev, who had promised to French President
Sarkozy Russia's immediate withdrawal upon President Saakashvili's
signature of the Ceasefire. Yet Russia has still not lived up to the
requirements of the Ceasefire Agreement. In these circumstances,
with Russia's having failed to honor the terms of the Ceasefire
Agreement and its promise to withdraw its forces, Secretary Rice
flew to Brussels for an emergency NATO meeting on August 19 and, with
our Allies, produced a statement in support of Georgia's territorial
integrity and sovereignty - a statement that was stronger than anyone
thought possible.
Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on
August 26. It did so despite numerous United Nations Security Council
resolutions that Russia approved and that explicitly affirmed Georgia's
territorial integrity, and that the underlying separatist conflicts
must be resolved peacefully, through international negotiations. This
irresponsible action was condemned by the EU, NATO's Secretary General,
and key Allies.
Following the EU Summit on September 1, President Sarkozy traveled
to Moscow on September 8 to again seek Russia's compliance with the
Ceasefire. This has been a fast-moving situation, but that is where
we find ourselves today.
Our Strategic Response
In the face of this Russian assault on Georgia, the United States is
pursuing three key objectives.
First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation
on the ground; help the country recover and thrive economically;
preserve Georgia's sovereignty; maintain our support for its
territorial integrity, and democracy. We are active, working with
our European allies, in putting pressure on Russia to adhere to the
Ceasefire. Russia must withdraw its military forces from Georgia,
back to the lines of August 7; Russia is allowed limited patrolling
rights by its recognized peacekeepers in the immediate vicinity of
South Ossetia only until such time as an international mechanism is
developed to take their place. So we are working fast with the EU and
the OSCE to put in place just such a mechanism. We are also preparing
to launch international discussions on South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
again working closely with our European partners.
We have already taken immediate steps to address Georgia's humanitarian
needs. The United States has provided more than $38 million worth of
humanitarian aid and emergency relief, including food, shelter, and
medical supplies, to assist the people of Georgia. U.S. aircraft made a
total of 62 relief flights to Georgia from August 13 through September
4, and on August 24 and 27, 115 tons of emergency relief commodities
arrived in Batumi on the USS McFaul and the USCGC Dallas. In addition,
a third ship, the USS Mount Whitney anchored in Poti on September 5,
unloaded an additional 17 tons of emergency relief commodities that was
delivered by USAID non-governmental organization partners. On September
3, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported
that 90,500 individuals have returned to places of origin, following
the August conflict. However, UNHCR staff note that the number of
returnees may be significantly higher due to the passage of time, as
well as the difficulty of accurate, in-field returnee counts. According
to UNHCR, approximately 30,000 individuals may be displaced in the
long term. We have been working with the Government of Georgia and
seven relief organizations to ensure that our assistance gets to
internally displaced people and other conflict-affected populations.
On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to help meet
Georgia's pressing humanitarian needs, repair infrastructure damaged
by Russia's invasion, sustain commercial confidence, and restore
economic growth. $570 million, the first phase of a $1 billion United
States economic support package, will be made available by the end
of 2008 and will include emergency budget support to the Georgian
Government. We will be working extensively with Congress in the days
to come to fine tune how the assistance will be delivered. We are
hopeful that there will be strong bipartisan backing for a second
phase of support, an additional $430 million of support and other
urgently needed reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to be
provided in future budgets.
Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to
defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Department of
Defense has sent an assessment team to Tbilisi to help us begin to
consider carefully Georgia's legitimate needs and, working with
our Allies, develop our response. For several years, the United
States has played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces
to conduct counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to
help Georgia rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists
and then as part of multinational coalition efforts. NATO's North
Atlantic Council decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-Georgia
Commission aimed at supporting Georgia's relations with NATO. NATO
has also decided to help Georgia assess the damage, including to the
Georgian Armed Forces, and to help restore critical services necessary
for normal public life and economic activity. NATO has already sent an
advisory support team to Georgia and its Special Representative for
the Caucasus and Central Asia. The North Atlantic Council Permanent
Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the near future. Finland's
Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, showed
strong and effective leadership in working with French Foreign Minister
Kouchner to lay the diplomatic foundation for the ceasefire agreement
and activate the OSCE's crisis response mechanisms.
Our second key objective is to work together with our friends in
the region to support their independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, as well as their European and transatlantic aspirations, and
overall stability in the region. Since 1989, the United States - under
the leadership of Presidents George H. W. Bush, President Clinton, and
President George W. Bush - has supported the right of every country
emerging from communism to chose the path of its own development,
and to choose the institutions - such as NATO and the European Union
- that it wants to associate with and join. Each country must show
itself ready to meet the standards of the institutions it seeks to
join. That is its responsibility, and Georgia and Ukraine should be
treated no differently than other European countries seeking to join
European and transatlantic institutions.
Concurrently the United States is committed to redoubling
efforts to ease tensions and resolve conflicts throughout the
region. Recently, the leaders of Turkey and Armenia took an important
step toward reducing their long-standing tensions. We applaud the
initiative of Armenian President Sargsyan to invite his Turkish
counterpart to Yerevan, and President Gul's willingness to accept the
invitation. Their meeting creates a new atmosphere in the relationship,
and gives hope that a long-overdue thaw has begun. The normalization
of relations between Turkey and Armenia could also help open up trade
and transportation routes for the entire South Caucasus.
Closely connected is resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Its
costs can still be counted in terms of refugees and displaced persons -
nearly a million altogether - provinces denuded of populations, lost
economic opportunities, and disrupted trade. The U.S. Government will
do all it can to encourage the parties to show greater flexibility and
creativity in their negotiations. We will do everything possible to
promote a just and lasting settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
that proceeds from the principle of our support for Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity, and ultimately incorporates other elements of
international law and diplomatic practice.
The United States, working closely with our allies, will also look at
ways to emphasize the importance of expanding the Southern Corridor
for energy supply, bringing oil and gas from the Caspian region
to Europe. The development of energy resources and competitively
transporting them to market supports the sovereignty, independence and
economic development of the countries of the region. Diversification
of sources of energy and their routes to market, alternative energy
sources, and energy efficiency efforts, is critical to Europe as well.
Implications for Relations with Russia
Finally, our strategic response must include the longer-term
consequences of the invasion of Georgia for our relationship with
Russia. Since 1991, three U.S. administrations have based policy
toward Russia on the assumption that Russia sought to become a nation
integrated with the international system and its institutions. Since
1991 Russia has asserted its own interest in becoming a part of the
world and a part of international institutions. And Russia has made
progress in this regard, with American and European support. But
with its invasion of Georgia, its continuing refusal to implement
the Ceasefire it has signed, and its claim to a "region of privileged
interests," Russia has put these assumptions and aspirations at risk.
Russia and the Russian people are paying a considerable price for
their country's disproportionate military action. Today's Russia is
an emergent economic power and a net exporter; its interdependency,
which connects it with the rest of the world in very different ways
than in the past has fueled the country's newfound prosperity over
the past eight years. This same interdependency has raised the costs
of military intervention in Georgia. While much is made of Europe's
energy dependence on Russia, the wider truth is that Russia needs
Europe too, as the market for 75 percent of its gas exports and a
critical bridge to a better economic future. Since August 7, investor
confidence has plummeted. At least in part because of the Georgia
crisis, Russian financial markets have lost nearly a third of their
value, with losses in market capitalization of hundreds of billions
of dollars. Serious capital outflows have taken place; the Russian
Finance Minister admitted that $7 billion left the country on August
8; private estimates range as high as $20 billion for capital flight
over the past six weeks. The ruble has depreciated nearly 10 percent
since August 7 and the Russian Central Bank has spent billions of
its reserves to try to halt the slide.
The opportunity costs for Russia are even greater, the most important
of which may be the country's ambitious plans to diversify the economy
and rebuild infrastructure. At a moment of crucial economic choices,
at a moment when Russia can innovate, diversify and develop to the
full its greatest resource - its enormously talented people - it is
in danger of missing an historic chance and stagnating amidst mounting
corruption, cronyism and demographic ills.
A great deal is at stake. Russia's actions in Georgia, particularly its
reckless decisions to invade Georgia and recognize South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, are deplorable. Russia's behavior raises serious questions
about the future of our relations with a resurgent, nuclear-armed
energy-rich Great Power, which has much potential but more than its
share of troubles and complexes - and whom we do not have the luxury
of ignoring.
It is important to reinforce for Russia the consequences of its actions
in Georgia as a means of ensuring compliance with its commitments to
President Sarkozy. We have made clear that there will be no "business
as usual" with Russia while those commitments remain unfulfilled. For
our part, the Administration has withdrawn the 123 agreement on civil
nuclear cooperation with Russia, and suspended U.S.-Russian bilateral
military programs. We continue to review other options.
It is essential to continue to make common cause with our European
allies. Our cohesiveness and collective determination is the key to
affecting Russia's calculus. American actions have far more impact
as part of a chorus than as a solo performance, and unity among
European countries is also crucial. We have worked closely with
President Sarkozy and the EU leadership in recent weeks. We will
continue to do so, as standing together, we press Russia to fulfill
all its commitments under the August 12 and September 8 agreements.
Russia's diplomatic isolation was vividly exposed at the recent
Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, when not one of its partners
joined it in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nicaragua's
solitary support for recognition of those two breakaway regions is
hardly a diplomatic triumph. In a rare step, the G-7 foreign ministers
also issued a statement sharply criticizing the behavior of remaining
member of the G-8.
Our long-term strategy toward Russia needs to be based on a sober
assessment of our own interests and priorities, and of what's
driving Russia today. Flush with petro-dollars and reborn pride,
the Russia we see before us is a muddle of conflicting impulses -
of angry chauvinism and accumulated grievances, alongside some very
21st century connections to the global market and new attachments to
a world in which foreign travel and private property are what animate
much of the next generation and the emerging middle class.
On one hand, some Russian strategists clearly see opportunities in
American difficulties, and see taking us down a notch as the best way
to assert their own prerogatives and expand their role. Another aspect
of that inclination was on full and ugly display in the Georgia crisis,
the very 19th century notion that intimidating small neighbors is what
makes Great Powers great. Those impulses are fed by the increasingly
authoritarian bent in Russian politics over recent years. They are
beguiling and cathartic for a country that a decade ago was about as
far down on its luck as a Great Power can go - but they are not the
same thing as a positive agenda for realizing Russia's potential in
the decades ahead.
On the other hand, there is the Russia about which President Medvedev
spoke eloquently during his election campaign, a Russia that aspires
to become a modern, rules-based, 21st century Great Power with a
diversified, integrated economy and a political system that gradually
opens itself to the rule of law. That vision of Russia has hardly
been on display in recent weeks - indeed it has very nearly receded
from view - but the realities of Russia's circumstances may yet force
it back to the surface.
It's hard to predict which set of impulses will prove strongest in the
years ahead, or whether the costs and consequences already evident
in the Georgia crisis will sink in. The truth is we are likely to
have a relationship with Russia for some time to come which mixes
competition and political conflict with cooperation.
On some critically important issues, like combating nuclear terrorism
and non-proliferation, we have a hard-headed interest in working with
Russia, as we will be doing when my Russian counterpart joins the
rest of our P5+1 colleagues in another round of discussions on Iran
the day after tomorrow in Washington. Nowhere is our cooperation
and our leadership more important than in the whole complex of
nuclear challenges - from setting a good example for the rest of the
work in managing an reducing our own nuclear arsenals, to ensuring
the safety and security of nuclear materials, on the basis of the
visionary programs which Members of this Committee have done so much
to promote. On other issues, like Georgia, we and our partners will
need to push back hard and systematically against Russian behavior.
Dealing with Russia in the years ahead will require equal part
firmness, steadiness and patience. It will require us to put sustained
effort into a common strategy with our European partners. It will
require us to keep a clear sense of priorities. It will require us to
keep the door open to long-term, mutually respectful partnership with
Russia - if Russia chooses to make that possible, and if it chooses
to become a responsible stake holder in the international system --
but to defend our interests resolutely. It will require us to keep
a sense of strategic confidence and initiative, as well as a sense
of the internal weaknesses and growing interdependence with which
Russian leaders must ultimately contend. And it will require us to
continue to focus energy and attention on a relationship with Russia
that may often prove frustrating, and sometimes even dangerous, but
that matters enormously not only to our interests, but to the future
of global order.
Thank you, and I look forward to taking your questions.