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WHY, WHEN AND HOW TURKEY BECOMES A NUCLEAR POWER
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
Today's Zaman
Sept 18 2008
Turkey
The trendy rhetoric regarding Turkish-Iranian relations is that the
two have enjoyed friendly relations ever since the Kasr-i Sirin Treaty
of 1639, which more or less determined today's border between the two
It is also fashionable to wish that the Middle East be cleared of
nuclear weapons. Whether or not it is true about Turkish-Iranian
relations, the real question is whether it is justifiable in terms
of Turkish national security interests to have a nuclear power next
door while Turkey itself does not have the same capabilities? Another
question is what is Ankara's plan B if Iran eventually becomes able
to develop its own nuclear weapons? Wishing for the region to be free
of nuclear weapons is one thing, and failing to counter the shift in
the regional balance of power is another, even if Iran arguably does
not pose a direct military threat to Turkey.
Furthermore, the German Marshall Fund's recent report 2008
Transatlantic Trends signals that whether Turkey becomes a nuclear
power may not necessarily be up to the political leadership in Ankara,
but rather to the Turkish public, which is becoming increasingly
confident and nationalistic. According to the report, 48 percent of
the Turks who participated in the poll want Turkey to act unilaterally
in its international affairs, while only 8 percent view US global
leadership as desirable and only 22 percent the EU's. The numbers of
Turks who view Iran and the EU positively are almost tied, with the
first group at 32 percent and the second at 33 percent. The numbers
are not so favorable for the US and Israel. Only 14 percent of Turks
view the US positively while only 8 percent see Israel in a positive
light. Another poll recently conducted by WorldPublicOpinion.org
indicates that 36 percent of the Turkish respondents believe that
Sept. 11 was an insider job, and 39 percent believes that al-Qaeda
was behind it. While, as some may argue, these two are not necessarily
mutually exclusive possibilities, the evolving trends in Turkish public
opinion suggest that the question of whether Turks would favor the
idea of Turkey having its own nuclear capabilities seems irrelevant.
So the real question is why, when and how Turkey would become a nuclear
power? What are the underlying and governing assumptions? And finally,
what are the possible scenarios that could lead Turkey to become a
nuclear power?
In the retrospect: Turkey acquires nuclear weapons technology
Underlying assumptions
Anchored in the Western hemisphere and encouraged by the recently
improved prospects of Turkey's EU membership, Ankara is unlikely
to proactively adopt a policy toward acquiring nuclear weapon
capabilities. Any signs of such policy would irritate Turkey's Western
allies, most notably the United States and the EU, and put the present
government's political survival at risk. That is, the government
in Ankara with little or no Western support would be vulnerable to
the continuous interference of the Turkish military, though the
military may seem relatively silent at the moment. In addition,
such an orientation would dramatically weaken Ankara's diplomatic
capabilities with regards to its major foreign policy and security
issues, which include EU membership, the Cyprus issue, the so-called
Armenian genocide issue, the Kurdish formation in northern Iraq and
fighting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been launching
attacks on Turkey from northern Iraq. Although all these foreign
policy and security matters seem to have been handled relatively well
and hence lie dormant thanks to the Justice and Development Party
(AK Party) government's diplomatic skills, they can easily be used
against Ankara at any given time. Therefore, Ankara, be it under the
current AK Party government or another one in the near future, would
first be inclined to seek the protection of the security alliances
such as NATO instead of itself becoming a self-reliant military power.
However, Iran's emergence as a nuclear power in the region changes
the regional balance of power, puts Israel's survival at risk and
bolsters the extremists around the Muslim world. Therefore, it
becomes a moral and strategic imperative for Turkey to seek nuclear
weapon capabilities to counterbalance nuclear Iran and offset its
possible radicalizing impact on the Muslim world. Once Iran declares
its nuclear weapon capabilities, the Turkish public will force the
standing government to make Turkey a nuclear power as well. As a matter
of fact, the 2008 Transatlantic Trends report indicates that 48 percent
of Turks already want Turkey to act unilaterally in its international
affairs, which requires it to be fully capable of doing so. Moreover,
in recent years an increasing number of Turks have criticized the AK
Party government for not being as bold as Iran in pursuing a nuclear
program independently from the West.
Governing assumptions
1. The EU accession process is directly related to the political
survival of the current AK Party government and likely to be so for
the following government(s) given the importance attached to Turkey's
Western orientation and secular-democratic regime. Therefore, Ankara
refrains from any move within the realm of nuclear energy that would
harm its EU accession negotiations.
2. Turkey and Iran have been inherent rivals, with both aspiring
to become the regional leader. Turkey aspires to do so via becoming
de-facto leader of the Sunni world, while Iran seeks to do the same
through reviving the Shiite populations not only in Iraq but also
within Saudi Arabia and even in Yemen.
3. Iran is likely to continue its financial and military support of
the Shiites inside Iraq for the duration of the US occupation and
after the number of US troops are substantially reduced. Iran does
so in order to make sure that in Iraq, whether it is governed under
a representative central government or under a federal system, the
Shiites dominate Iraqi politics, especially policies and international
agreements governing the country's energy resources.
4. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria are cautious about Iran's prospects
of acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. They would seek to acquire
the same capabilities in order to counterbalance nuclear Iran. For
Saudi Arabia, it seems also a moral and, as they would put it, divine
imperative to do so because it perceives itself as the natural leader
of the Sunni Muslims vis-a-vis the Shiite Iran.
5. Compared to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, with their authoritarian
regimes and lack of checks and balances, Turkey, with its secular
and democratic regime and modern military closely cooperating with
the US and Israel, would seem more amenable to become a nuclear
counterbalance to nuclear Iran.
*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst and author
of the book titled "A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict:
The Gulen Movement in Southeast Turkey".
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
Today's Zaman
Sept 18 2008
Turkey
The trendy rhetoric regarding Turkish-Iranian relations is that the
two have enjoyed friendly relations ever since the Kasr-i Sirin Treaty
of 1639, which more or less determined today's border between the two
It is also fashionable to wish that the Middle East be cleared of
nuclear weapons. Whether or not it is true about Turkish-Iranian
relations, the real question is whether it is justifiable in terms
of Turkish national security interests to have a nuclear power next
door while Turkey itself does not have the same capabilities? Another
question is what is Ankara's plan B if Iran eventually becomes able
to develop its own nuclear weapons? Wishing for the region to be free
of nuclear weapons is one thing, and failing to counter the shift in
the regional balance of power is another, even if Iran arguably does
not pose a direct military threat to Turkey.
Furthermore, the German Marshall Fund's recent report 2008
Transatlantic Trends signals that whether Turkey becomes a nuclear
power may not necessarily be up to the political leadership in Ankara,
but rather to the Turkish public, which is becoming increasingly
confident and nationalistic. According to the report, 48 percent of
the Turks who participated in the poll want Turkey to act unilaterally
in its international affairs, while only 8 percent view US global
leadership as desirable and only 22 percent the EU's. The numbers of
Turks who view Iran and the EU positively are almost tied, with the
first group at 32 percent and the second at 33 percent. The numbers
are not so favorable for the US and Israel. Only 14 percent of Turks
view the US positively while only 8 percent see Israel in a positive
light. Another poll recently conducted by WorldPublicOpinion.org
indicates that 36 percent of the Turkish respondents believe that
Sept. 11 was an insider job, and 39 percent believes that al-Qaeda
was behind it. While, as some may argue, these two are not necessarily
mutually exclusive possibilities, the evolving trends in Turkish public
opinion suggest that the question of whether Turks would favor the
idea of Turkey having its own nuclear capabilities seems irrelevant.
So the real question is why, when and how Turkey would become a nuclear
power? What are the underlying and governing assumptions? And finally,
what are the possible scenarios that could lead Turkey to become a
nuclear power?
In the retrospect: Turkey acquires nuclear weapons technology
Underlying assumptions
Anchored in the Western hemisphere and encouraged by the recently
improved prospects of Turkey's EU membership, Ankara is unlikely
to proactively adopt a policy toward acquiring nuclear weapon
capabilities. Any signs of such policy would irritate Turkey's Western
allies, most notably the United States and the EU, and put the present
government's political survival at risk. That is, the government
in Ankara with little or no Western support would be vulnerable to
the continuous interference of the Turkish military, though the
military may seem relatively silent at the moment. In addition,
such an orientation would dramatically weaken Ankara's diplomatic
capabilities with regards to its major foreign policy and security
issues, which include EU membership, the Cyprus issue, the so-called
Armenian genocide issue, the Kurdish formation in northern Iraq and
fighting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been launching
attacks on Turkey from northern Iraq. Although all these foreign
policy and security matters seem to have been handled relatively well
and hence lie dormant thanks to the Justice and Development Party
(AK Party) government's diplomatic skills, they can easily be used
against Ankara at any given time. Therefore, Ankara, be it under the
current AK Party government or another one in the near future, would
first be inclined to seek the protection of the security alliances
such as NATO instead of itself becoming a self-reliant military power.
However, Iran's emergence as a nuclear power in the region changes
the regional balance of power, puts Israel's survival at risk and
bolsters the extremists around the Muslim world. Therefore, it
becomes a moral and strategic imperative for Turkey to seek nuclear
weapon capabilities to counterbalance nuclear Iran and offset its
possible radicalizing impact on the Muslim world. Once Iran declares
its nuclear weapon capabilities, the Turkish public will force the
standing government to make Turkey a nuclear power as well. As a matter
of fact, the 2008 Transatlantic Trends report indicates that 48 percent
of Turks already want Turkey to act unilaterally in its international
affairs, which requires it to be fully capable of doing so. Moreover,
in recent years an increasing number of Turks have criticized the AK
Party government for not being as bold as Iran in pursuing a nuclear
program independently from the West.
Governing assumptions
1. The EU accession process is directly related to the political
survival of the current AK Party government and likely to be so for
the following government(s) given the importance attached to Turkey's
Western orientation and secular-democratic regime. Therefore, Ankara
refrains from any move within the realm of nuclear energy that would
harm its EU accession negotiations.
2. Turkey and Iran have been inherent rivals, with both aspiring
to become the regional leader. Turkey aspires to do so via becoming
de-facto leader of the Sunni world, while Iran seeks to do the same
through reviving the Shiite populations not only in Iraq but also
within Saudi Arabia and even in Yemen.
3. Iran is likely to continue its financial and military support of
the Shiites inside Iraq for the duration of the US occupation and
after the number of US troops are substantially reduced. Iran does
so in order to make sure that in Iraq, whether it is governed under
a representative central government or under a federal system, the
Shiites dominate Iraqi politics, especially policies and international
agreements governing the country's energy resources.
4. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria are cautious about Iran's prospects
of acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. They would seek to acquire
the same capabilities in order to counterbalance nuclear Iran. For
Saudi Arabia, it seems also a moral and, as they would put it, divine
imperative to do so because it perceives itself as the natural leader
of the Sunni Muslims vis-a-vis the Shiite Iran.
5. Compared to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, with their authoritarian
regimes and lack of checks and balances, Turkey, with its secular
and democratic regime and modern military closely cooperating with
the US and Israel, would seem more amenable to become a nuclear
counterbalance to nuclear Iran.
*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst and author
of the book titled "A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict:
The Gulen Movement in Southeast Turkey".