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GEORGIA'S NATION-STATE PROJECT FAILS
Sergei Markedonov
en.fondsk.ru
24.09.2008
Eurasia
In his famous essay "What is nation?" (Que est-ce que c`est une
nation?), which was first delivered as a lecture at the Sorbonne in
1882, Ernest Renan declared that the existence of a nation was based
on a "daily plebiscite". The formation of nations (viewed as civil
and political communities rather than ethnic groups)-is an extremely
complicated and delicate process. Any mistake here may result in
a failure of the mere process. Thus, the fact that Georgia failed
to succeed in its "nation-state project" after a 5-day war in the
Caucasus and the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, provides the food for thought. There are certain lessons
to be taught. In 2008 Georgia lost the plebiscite in its two former
autonomous regions forever.
On September, 20, South Ossetia, being partially recognized as a
sovereign state by some members of the international community,
celebrated the 18th anniversary of its independence. A move to
demonstrate to the whole world there is no way back. Until the year
2004 (when the conflict sparked again after a 12-year ceasefire),
Tbilisi still had some chances to win the "insurgent region"
back. Till August of 2008 Mikheil Saakashvili and his allies hoped
for a "blitzkrieg" and expected no reaction from Russia (Georgian
Defense 0AMinister Batu Kutelia confirmed this in one of his
statements). But today Tbilisi has neither military nor civil means
to annex the breakaway republics. On its 18th birthday South Ossetia
finally received the most awaited present-independence and security,
guaranteed by Russia, a nuclear club member with its permanent place
at the UN Security Council.
Experts say there is a fifty-fifty chance that similar plebiscites
will be won at Samtskhe-Dzhavakheti, Kwemo Kartli and Pankisi. On
August, 19, members of the Armenian public organizations from Georgian
Samtskhe-Dzhavakheti district recognized "the formation of a federal
state as the only possible way for Georgia to continue its national
development". The activists demand that "the territories inhabited
by the Armenians should be granted the status of sovereign subjects
within the Federal Georgia".
That is why the success of Georgian nation-state project depends
entirely on the will of the country's authorities (not necessarily the
Saakashvili regime but the intellectual elite and the opposition). They
should critically assess the mistakes of the previous years and revise
their attitude towards South Ossetia.
Unlike Abkhazia, South Ossetia was forced to become a separatist
territory.
I had already called the people of Ossetia "separatists against their
will". In contrast to the intellectual elite of the Abkhazian SSR, in
South Ossetia there were no serious outbreaks of protest over being
a part of Georgia, while the people of Abkhazia (even under Joseph
Stalin, in 1931) expressed their disagreement over the issue, not to
mention the relatively liberal 1950-1970ss. Every 10 years (in 1967,
1977-78, 1989) the activists of Abkhazia held protests (the so-called
petition campaigns). South Ossetia was much better integrated as a
unit within Georgia. The memory of the tragic 1920s revived in late
1980s, when the Georgian radical ethnic nationalism began its rule in
the brotherhood republic of the Soviet Caucasus. Before the tragedy
was viewed primarily as a crime committed by the Georgian Menshevik
government. The majority of the Ossetians lived outside South Ossetia,
with only 63,200 people living in the autonomous region.
Commenting on the inter-ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet Georgia,
as a rule Tbilisi appeals to the problem of refugees from Abkhazia
and keeps silent about the exodus of Ossetians from Georgia in early
1990s. However, in the pre-war Georgia about 100,000 Ossetians lived
outside the South-Ossetian Autonomy. They ranked five among the ethnic
communities of the republic after the Georgians, Armenians, Russians
and Azeri. Their total number exceeded that of the Abkhaz living on the
territory of the Abkhaz SSR. Before the military campaign of the 1990s,
the Ossetians lived mainly in Tbilisi(33,318 people), in Gori (8,222)
and Rustavi (5,613). Nowadays, according to different esti mates, the
number of Ossetians in Georgia is less than 30,000. It is difficult to
say exactly since there is no systematic independent ethnopolitical
monitoring. We have no reasons to rely on the statements made by
the Tbilisi officials concerning the way the rights and freedoms of
the Ossetian citizens of Georgia are being guarded. Despite this,
in Soviet times the number of national schools in South-Ossetian
autonomous region was bigger than in North Ossetia.
After the Soviet Union collapsed and Georgia gained independence,
Tbilisi seemed to have all chances to win the plebiscite on the
future political identity for the citizens of the autonomous
region. But the leaders of Georgia, claiming to be the authors
of the Georgian nation-state project, did their best to lose the
plebiscite. First, they offered a slogan, absolutely inadmissible for
the multi-ethnic Caucasus: Georgia for the Georgians (Merab Kostava
was the author). The issues of "ethnic security" dominated the speeches
of future leaders of the independent Georgia. At a political rally in
1989 in the village of Eredvi, the future first President of Georgia
Zviad Gamsakhurdia described the Ossetian people as "trash that
has to be swept out through the Roksky tunnel". All those statement
sounded amid the continued toponymical war (the initiatives to give
South Ossetia the name of Samachablo, a historical district in Shida
Kartli). There even sounded exotic prop osals to restrict the birth
rate among the Ossetians (Professor Kwinchilashvili`s scandalous
article). This kind of ideological hysteria was coupled with the
forced deportation of Ossetians from their places of living in Gori,
Pankisi, Borjomi, Bakuriani and Rustavi. Then South Ossetia became the
outpost not only for the local but for all Georgian Ossetians. It is
worth mentioning that Ossetian leaders were less radical than their
Abkhazian counterparts.
What happened 18 years ago, on September, 20, 1990?
Then South Ossetia was not proclaimed independent, although now this
day is marked as the Independence Day. On September, 20, 1990 there
was founded the South-Ossetian Soviet Democratic republic, which
could not be treated as a separate sovereign state. On November, 10,
1989, the people`s deputies of the South Ossetian autonomous region
agreed to make their region a sovereign republic within Georgia. It is
worth mentioning that nobody thought about separating from Georgia,
but Tbilisi was outraged at the move. South Ossetia was unilaterally
boosting its status. Instead of working out a draft resolution on
the issue, a few thousands of Georgians took part in a march to
Tskhinvali on November, 23, 1989 (the campaign was initiated by
the Georgian Communist leaders and dissident nationalists). First
victims were reported during that march. Those were future leaders
of the independent Georgia (and not Russian Generals, KGB-agents or
President20 Medvedev), who cast doubt on their country's territorial
integrity.
The process began. In June, 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia
recognized all legislative acts and agreements reached after the year
1921 illegal.
Under the Georgian Constitution of 1921, there were no plans to grant
the South-Ossetian region autonomy of a republic. In August, 1990, the
regional public and political groups were banned from participating
in the elections to the parliament of Georgia. Thus, the Ossetian
"Adamon Nykhas" party was no chances to win a place in Georgian
politics. So, we may say that the Georgian leaders gave an impulse
to the formation of the Ossetian separatism. On December, 11, 1990,
the Supreme Council of Georgia, issued a resolution which cancelled
the autonomous status of South Ossetia. The first blockade of the
"insurgent territory" began. During the next 17 years the Georgian
forces assaulted Tskhinvali four times (in February and March of 1991,
in June, 1992, and August of 2008.
However, after the first war (South Ossetia lived through three armed
conflicts: in January, 1991-June, 1992; in August, 2004 and 2008)
Georgia still had chances to win back its former autonomy. Unlike
Abkhazia, South Ossetia witnessed no deportation of Georgian population
from its territories, and till August of 2008 Georgians and Ossetians
lived together.
In the Constitution of the unrecognized South Ossetia the Geor gian
language was treated as minor. During the ceasefire (until 2004) there
was direct bus transportation between Tbilisi and Tskhinval. Georgians
and Ossetians worked together at the local bazaars. It is interesting
to mention that members of the two opposing nations were also tied
up by shadow economy. During a 12-year period the sides succeeded in
the development of the process of peaceful settlement. Georgian and
Russian troops conducted a peacekeeping mission together. There were
signed some important documents defining the status of the conflict
area- The Memorandum on Measures to Provide Security and Boost
Mutual Confidence between Georgia and South Ossetia (May, 16, 1996)
and the Russian-Georgian Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation
in Economic Restoration (December, 3, 2000).
But when Mikheil Saakashvili took office and announced his plans to
settle the conflict as early as possible, Georgia lost all chances
to win the plebiscite. On July, 20, 2004, Mr. Saakashvili said he
did not rule out that the agreements reached at Dagomys could be
denounced. "If these agreements ban us from raising our flag, I am
ready to withdraw from the agreements", he said. And that was the
beginning of the tragic chain of events. The failure of Georgian
"blitzkrieg in Tskhinval" appeared to be a tragedy not only for the
Ossetians but for the Georgian people as well, who had to pay a big
price for their leader`s 0Aambitions.
Georgia made a mistake as it failed to forget about its "right for
the land due to ethnic reasons". Strange as it might seem, but the
first Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was right to say that
there were Ossetians in Georgia but there was not any Ossetia. Now
that Tskhinval made a historical decision, South Ossetia is no longer
a part of Georgia.
In conclusion, I`d like to cite once again Ernest Renan, who said
that "nations (viewed as state and civil communities and not those
with 'common blood type') are not something eternal. They had their
beginning and they will end". They will, indeed, if they do not learn
by their own mistakes.
Sergei Markedonov
en.fondsk.ru
24.09.2008
Eurasia
In his famous essay "What is nation?" (Que est-ce que c`est une
nation?), which was first delivered as a lecture at the Sorbonne in
1882, Ernest Renan declared that the existence of a nation was based
on a "daily plebiscite". The formation of nations (viewed as civil
and political communities rather than ethnic groups)-is an extremely
complicated and delicate process. Any mistake here may result in
a failure of the mere process. Thus, the fact that Georgia failed
to succeed in its "nation-state project" after a 5-day war in the
Caucasus and the recognition of independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, provides the food for thought. There are certain lessons
to be taught. In 2008 Georgia lost the plebiscite in its two former
autonomous regions forever.
On September, 20, South Ossetia, being partially recognized as a
sovereign state by some members of the international community,
celebrated the 18th anniversary of its independence. A move to
demonstrate to the whole world there is no way back. Until the year
2004 (when the conflict sparked again after a 12-year ceasefire),
Tbilisi still had some chances to win the "insurgent region"
back. Till August of 2008 Mikheil Saakashvili and his allies hoped
for a "blitzkrieg" and expected no reaction from Russia (Georgian
Defense 0AMinister Batu Kutelia confirmed this in one of his
statements). But today Tbilisi has neither military nor civil means
to annex the breakaway republics. On its 18th birthday South Ossetia
finally received the most awaited present-independence and security,
guaranteed by Russia, a nuclear club member with its permanent place
at the UN Security Council.
Experts say there is a fifty-fifty chance that similar plebiscites
will be won at Samtskhe-Dzhavakheti, Kwemo Kartli and Pankisi. On
August, 19, members of the Armenian public organizations from Georgian
Samtskhe-Dzhavakheti district recognized "the formation of a federal
state as the only possible way for Georgia to continue its national
development". The activists demand that "the territories inhabited
by the Armenians should be granted the status of sovereign subjects
within the Federal Georgia".
That is why the success of Georgian nation-state project depends
entirely on the will of the country's authorities (not necessarily the
Saakashvili regime but the intellectual elite and the opposition). They
should critically assess the mistakes of the previous years and revise
their attitude towards South Ossetia.
Unlike Abkhazia, South Ossetia was forced to become a separatist
territory.
I had already called the people of Ossetia "separatists against their
will". In contrast to the intellectual elite of the Abkhazian SSR, in
South Ossetia there were no serious outbreaks of protest over being
a part of Georgia, while the people of Abkhazia (even under Joseph
Stalin, in 1931) expressed their disagreement over the issue, not to
mention the relatively liberal 1950-1970ss. Every 10 years (in 1967,
1977-78, 1989) the activists of Abkhazia held protests (the so-called
petition campaigns). South Ossetia was much better integrated as a
unit within Georgia. The memory of the tragic 1920s revived in late
1980s, when the Georgian radical ethnic nationalism began its rule in
the brotherhood republic of the Soviet Caucasus. Before the tragedy
was viewed primarily as a crime committed by the Georgian Menshevik
government. The majority of the Ossetians lived outside South Ossetia,
with only 63,200 people living in the autonomous region.
Commenting on the inter-ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet Georgia,
as a rule Tbilisi appeals to the problem of refugees from Abkhazia
and keeps silent about the exodus of Ossetians from Georgia in early
1990s. However, in the pre-war Georgia about 100,000 Ossetians lived
outside the South-Ossetian Autonomy. They ranked five among the ethnic
communities of the republic after the Georgians, Armenians, Russians
and Azeri. Their total number exceeded that of the Abkhaz living on the
territory of the Abkhaz SSR. Before the military campaign of the 1990s,
the Ossetians lived mainly in Tbilisi(33,318 people), in Gori (8,222)
and Rustavi (5,613). Nowadays, according to different esti mates, the
number of Ossetians in Georgia is less than 30,000. It is difficult to
say exactly since there is no systematic independent ethnopolitical
monitoring. We have no reasons to rely on the statements made by
the Tbilisi officials concerning the way the rights and freedoms of
the Ossetian citizens of Georgia are being guarded. Despite this,
in Soviet times the number of national schools in South-Ossetian
autonomous region was bigger than in North Ossetia.
After the Soviet Union collapsed and Georgia gained independence,
Tbilisi seemed to have all chances to win the plebiscite on the
future political identity for the citizens of the autonomous
region. But the leaders of Georgia, claiming to be the authors
of the Georgian nation-state project, did their best to lose the
plebiscite. First, they offered a slogan, absolutely inadmissible for
the multi-ethnic Caucasus: Georgia for the Georgians (Merab Kostava
was the author). The issues of "ethnic security" dominated the speeches
of future leaders of the independent Georgia. At a political rally in
1989 in the village of Eredvi, the future first President of Georgia
Zviad Gamsakhurdia described the Ossetian people as "trash that
has to be swept out through the Roksky tunnel". All those statement
sounded amid the continued toponymical war (the initiatives to give
South Ossetia the name of Samachablo, a historical district in Shida
Kartli). There even sounded exotic prop osals to restrict the birth
rate among the Ossetians (Professor Kwinchilashvili`s scandalous
article). This kind of ideological hysteria was coupled with the
forced deportation of Ossetians from their places of living in Gori,
Pankisi, Borjomi, Bakuriani and Rustavi. Then South Ossetia became the
outpost not only for the local but for all Georgian Ossetians. It is
worth mentioning that Ossetian leaders were less radical than their
Abkhazian counterparts.
What happened 18 years ago, on September, 20, 1990?
Then South Ossetia was not proclaimed independent, although now this
day is marked as the Independence Day. On September, 20, 1990 there
was founded the South-Ossetian Soviet Democratic republic, which
could not be treated as a separate sovereign state. On November, 10,
1989, the people`s deputies of the South Ossetian autonomous region
agreed to make their region a sovereign republic within Georgia. It is
worth mentioning that nobody thought about separating from Georgia,
but Tbilisi was outraged at the move. South Ossetia was unilaterally
boosting its status. Instead of working out a draft resolution on
the issue, a few thousands of Georgians took part in a march to
Tskhinvali on November, 23, 1989 (the campaign was initiated by
the Georgian Communist leaders and dissident nationalists). First
victims were reported during that march. Those were future leaders
of the independent Georgia (and not Russian Generals, KGB-agents or
President20 Medvedev), who cast doubt on their country's territorial
integrity.
The process began. In June, 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia
recognized all legislative acts and agreements reached after the year
1921 illegal.
Under the Georgian Constitution of 1921, there were no plans to grant
the South-Ossetian region autonomy of a republic. In August, 1990, the
regional public and political groups were banned from participating
in the elections to the parliament of Georgia. Thus, the Ossetian
"Adamon Nykhas" party was no chances to win a place in Georgian
politics. So, we may say that the Georgian leaders gave an impulse
to the formation of the Ossetian separatism. On December, 11, 1990,
the Supreme Council of Georgia, issued a resolution which cancelled
the autonomous status of South Ossetia. The first blockade of the
"insurgent territory" began. During the next 17 years the Georgian
forces assaulted Tskhinvali four times (in February and March of 1991,
in June, 1992, and August of 2008.
However, after the first war (South Ossetia lived through three armed
conflicts: in January, 1991-June, 1992; in August, 2004 and 2008)
Georgia still had chances to win back its former autonomy. Unlike
Abkhazia, South Ossetia witnessed no deportation of Georgian population
from its territories, and till August of 2008 Georgians and Ossetians
lived together.
In the Constitution of the unrecognized South Ossetia the Geor gian
language was treated as minor. During the ceasefire (until 2004) there
was direct bus transportation between Tbilisi and Tskhinval. Georgians
and Ossetians worked together at the local bazaars. It is interesting
to mention that members of the two opposing nations were also tied
up by shadow economy. During a 12-year period the sides succeeded in
the development of the process of peaceful settlement. Georgian and
Russian troops conducted a peacekeeping mission together. There were
signed some important documents defining the status of the conflict
area- The Memorandum on Measures to Provide Security and Boost
Mutual Confidence between Georgia and South Ossetia (May, 16, 1996)
and the Russian-Georgian Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation
in Economic Restoration (December, 3, 2000).
But when Mikheil Saakashvili took office and announced his plans to
settle the conflict as early as possible, Georgia lost all chances
to win the plebiscite. On July, 20, 2004, Mr. Saakashvili said he
did not rule out that the agreements reached at Dagomys could be
denounced. "If these agreements ban us from raising our flag, I am
ready to withdraw from the agreements", he said. And that was the
beginning of the tragic chain of events. The failure of Georgian
"blitzkrieg in Tskhinval" appeared to be a tragedy not only for the
Ossetians but for the Georgian people as well, who had to pay a big
price for their leader`s 0Aambitions.
Georgia made a mistake as it failed to forget about its "right for
the land due to ethnic reasons". Strange as it might seem, but the
first Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was right to say that
there were Ossetians in Georgia but there was not any Ossetia. Now
that Tskhinval made a historical decision, South Ossetia is no longer
a part of Georgia.
In conclusion, I`d like to cite once again Ernest Renan, who said
that "nations (viewed as state and civil communities and not those
with 'common blood type') are not something eternal. They had their
beginning and they will end". They will, indeed, if they do not learn
by their own mistakes.