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EUROPE'S TURKEY PROBLEM
By Katinka Barysch
TIME Magazine
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article /0,9171,1889048,00.html
April 3 2009
Now that Turkey's local elections are out of the way, the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) is free to focus on economic
and political reforms. Progress is needed, and quickly -- not only
to get the country through these turbulent economic times but also
to avert the risk of a breakdown in E.U.-Turkey relations before the
end of the year. The irony is that the relationship is most at risk
at a time when the E.U. and Turkey need each other more than ever.
When Russian tanks trundled into Georgia in August 2008, it
dawned on the European Union that it should have been paying more
attention to the volatile Caucasus and Black Sea regions right at its
doorstep. Turkey -- strategically placed between the Balkans, Black
Sea and Middle East -- is fast becoming a big regional player. It's
no surprise that President Obama is fulfilling his pledge to visit a
Muslim-majority country within 100 days of taking office by dropping
in on Turkey. The new Administration sees Ankara as a key ally in
dealing with many of its biggest noneconomic issues: how to achieve
long-lasting stability in Iraq, how to convince Iran to give up
its nuclear ambitions, and even how to save Afghanistan. And if the
E.U. is serious about defusing some of the conflicts that still simmer
in the Caucasus, like the ones in Trans-Dniestria or Nagorno-Karabakh,
it could do with Turkey's help too.
Turkey is also key to E.U. plans to diversify its energy supplies --
another objective that looks more urgent after the Russia-Ukraine gas
battle in January that left people in some E.U. countries freezing
and factories idle. Currently, the E.U. gets more than 40% of its gas
imports from just one company: Russia's giant Gazprom. In addition,
almost all the gas that comes to Europe from the resource-rich
Caspian flows through Gazprom's pipelines. Yet the long-planned
Nabucco pipeline -- designed to transport Azerbaijani, Turkmen and,
maybe one day, Iranian and Iraqi gas to the E.U. through Turkey --
is stuck at the planning stage.
There's a bigger problem: the relationship between Turkey and the
E.U. is now so testy that even technical talks, like the ones over
energy transit, are becoming politically charged. Turkey started
negotiating E.U. membership in 2005. But progress has been slow for
a number of reasons. There has been obstruction from France, Germany
and a few other E.U. members who are not keen on a predominantly
Muslim country of 70 million joining their club. There has also
been political turmoil in Turkey, where the highest court only last
year threw out a case on the closure of the ruling AKP. And there is
the intractable dispute over the divided island of Cyprus, with the
(Greek) Cypriot government consistently using its membership in the
E.U. to block Turkey's advance.
Later this year, the Europeans will assess whether Turkey complies
with its obligation to extend its customs union with the E.U. (in
place since 1996) to Cyprus. Turkey will not do that unless there is
tangible progress in ongoing talks about a political settlement on
the island. But for this to happen, big E.U. countries will have to
lean more heavily on the recalcitrant Greek Cypriots.
Turkey will have to do its bit to avert a crisis in E.U.-Turkey
relations as well. The European Commission, in a November 2008 update
on accession, told Turkey loud and clear that it no longer wanted to
hear excuses for inaction. The E.U. wants Turkey to stop prosecuting
critical writers and journalists; do more to protect the rights of
women and minorities; improve the functioning of the economy, for
example by getting a grip on industrial subsidies; and much else.
The local election result will come as a wake-up call for the
government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP had expected to exceed
the 46% it gained in the 2007 parliamentary election. But it won just
39% support and fared particularly poorly in the Kurdish areas of
southeastern Turkey, where Erdogan had campaigned most fiercely. The
AKP used to do well in the southeast, but that was when it focused
on delivering real improvements in political and cultural rights
and economic conditions (often driven by the E.U. accession process)
rather than brandishing nationalist slogans.
What both the E.U. and Turkey lack is vision. Accession-skeptics
on both sides tend to take today's E.U. (still digesting the 2004
and 2007 enlargements), add today's Turkey (sometimes prickly as it
struggles to solidify its democracy) and then conclude that this could
never work. But by, say, 2020 both Turkey and Europe will hopefully
have changed in ways that make them a perfect fit. To throw away that
historic opportunity would be a mistake of historic proportions.
Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform,
an independent London-based think tank.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Katinka Barysch
TIME Magazine
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article /0,9171,1889048,00.html
April 3 2009
Now that Turkey's local elections are out of the way, the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) is free to focus on economic
and political reforms. Progress is needed, and quickly -- not only
to get the country through these turbulent economic times but also
to avert the risk of a breakdown in E.U.-Turkey relations before the
end of the year. The irony is that the relationship is most at risk
at a time when the E.U. and Turkey need each other more than ever.
When Russian tanks trundled into Georgia in August 2008, it
dawned on the European Union that it should have been paying more
attention to the volatile Caucasus and Black Sea regions right at its
doorstep. Turkey -- strategically placed between the Balkans, Black
Sea and Middle East -- is fast becoming a big regional player. It's
no surprise that President Obama is fulfilling his pledge to visit a
Muslim-majority country within 100 days of taking office by dropping
in on Turkey. The new Administration sees Ankara as a key ally in
dealing with many of its biggest noneconomic issues: how to achieve
long-lasting stability in Iraq, how to convince Iran to give up
its nuclear ambitions, and even how to save Afghanistan. And if the
E.U. is serious about defusing some of the conflicts that still simmer
in the Caucasus, like the ones in Trans-Dniestria or Nagorno-Karabakh,
it could do with Turkey's help too.
Turkey is also key to E.U. plans to diversify its energy supplies --
another objective that looks more urgent after the Russia-Ukraine gas
battle in January that left people in some E.U. countries freezing
and factories idle. Currently, the E.U. gets more than 40% of its gas
imports from just one company: Russia's giant Gazprom. In addition,
almost all the gas that comes to Europe from the resource-rich
Caspian flows through Gazprom's pipelines. Yet the long-planned
Nabucco pipeline -- designed to transport Azerbaijani, Turkmen and,
maybe one day, Iranian and Iraqi gas to the E.U. through Turkey --
is stuck at the planning stage.
There's a bigger problem: the relationship between Turkey and the
E.U. is now so testy that even technical talks, like the ones over
energy transit, are becoming politically charged. Turkey started
negotiating E.U. membership in 2005. But progress has been slow for
a number of reasons. There has been obstruction from France, Germany
and a few other E.U. members who are not keen on a predominantly
Muslim country of 70 million joining their club. There has also
been political turmoil in Turkey, where the highest court only last
year threw out a case on the closure of the ruling AKP. And there is
the intractable dispute over the divided island of Cyprus, with the
(Greek) Cypriot government consistently using its membership in the
E.U. to block Turkey's advance.
Later this year, the Europeans will assess whether Turkey complies
with its obligation to extend its customs union with the E.U. (in
place since 1996) to Cyprus. Turkey will not do that unless there is
tangible progress in ongoing talks about a political settlement on
the island. But for this to happen, big E.U. countries will have to
lean more heavily on the recalcitrant Greek Cypriots.
Turkey will have to do its bit to avert a crisis in E.U.-Turkey
relations as well. The European Commission, in a November 2008 update
on accession, told Turkey loud and clear that it no longer wanted to
hear excuses for inaction. The E.U. wants Turkey to stop prosecuting
critical writers and journalists; do more to protect the rights of
women and minorities; improve the functioning of the economy, for
example by getting a grip on industrial subsidies; and much else.
The local election result will come as a wake-up call for the
government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP had expected to exceed
the 46% it gained in the 2007 parliamentary election. But it won just
39% support and fared particularly poorly in the Kurdish areas of
southeastern Turkey, where Erdogan had campaigned most fiercely. The
AKP used to do well in the southeast, but that was when it focused
on delivering real improvements in political and cultural rights
and economic conditions (often driven by the E.U. accession process)
rather than brandishing nationalist slogans.
What both the E.U. and Turkey lack is vision. Accession-skeptics
on both sides tend to take today's E.U. (still digesting the 2004
and 2007 enlargements), add today's Turkey (sometimes prickly as it
struggles to solidify its democracy) and then conclude that this could
never work. But by, say, 2020 both Turkey and Europe will hopefully
have changed in ways that make them a perfect fit. To throw away that
historic opportunity would be a mistake of historic proportions.
Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform,
an independent London-based think tank.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress