Tweet
Newsweek
April 5 2009
Talking Turkey
Obama's trip to Ankara promises to be a genuine meeting of minds.
The Bush administration spent years trying to isolate people the
Turkish government thought should be engaged'Iran, Syria, Hizbullah,
Hamas, to name a few. The Obama administration broadly endorses
engagement. Turkish-American relations are therefore about to change
from being good despite fundamental disagreement to being a genuine
meeting of minds. Some people in Washington have been screaming that
Turkey's increasingly good relations with the countries in its
neighborhood means it is "turning away from the West." Apparently they
view international relations as a form of monogamy in which it's
evidently dangerous to go out on a date. In fact, international
relations are like business partnerships. An extensive Rolodex greatly
increases a partner's value.
President Obama's visit this week to Turkey will also be unusual
because, for once, America wants more from Turkey than Turkey wants
from America. Turkey will respond generously because Barack Obama is
likely to be around for a long time, and he will certainly remember
anyone who helped make his first major foreign trip a success.
>From Turkey's perspective, the most important item on the agenda is
what it does not want: official U.S. recognition that what happened to
the Armenians was genocide. I doubt Obama would have accepted an
invitation to visit Turkey now if he was not planning to oppose a
congressional resolution on the subject, or if he intended to use the
G word on April 24, when he will make a statement commemorating the
Armenian massacres of 1915. What this Turkish government will also ask
for is unambiguous American backing for its plans to amend its present
military-dictated Constitution along more democratic lines. They will
not want to hear, once again, the Bush "we don't take sides" approach.
Heading up America's agenda are two items on which there is much
common ground. First, Iran. Obama has indicated he wants to open
wide-ranging negotiations, but he will not rush into them without
first testing the waters. Similarly, Obama is serious about making
progress on Mideast peace. Like Tony Blair and Tayyip Erdogan, Obama
is thought to recognize that Hamas can no longer be ignored, though he
cannot possibly say so publicly. Turkey's leaders (and their advisers)
can provide Obama with valuable insights, and help start the ball
rolling. This would allow Obama to avoid political exposure in
Washington for "talking to terrorists" until he has a sense of the
other side's position. Before setting anything in motion, though, he
likely wants to take the measure of Prime Minister Erdogan and
President Abdullah Gül personally. Both should remember that
the role of matchmaker is transitory, and the principals must soon
talk alone. In the long term, there is also the potential for friction
because America is probably less willing to compromise than Turkey and
may terminate discussions that Turkey would choose to keep
going. Turkey, after all, will suffer much more than the United States
if sanctions against Iran are ratcheted up.
Obama would also like to get more help on Afghanistan, principally
more Turkish soldiers. This is a potential source of friction. Since
Obama managed during his NATO meeting to pry commitments from France
and Britain for a few hundred additional personnel, it will be hard
for Turkey to do nothing.
Another item is Iraq. What needs to be agreed upon is already in place
(except Turkey's relatively uncontroversial agreement that it will act
as a corridor for U.S. withdrawal). Turkey will want intelligence
sharing about the Kuridstan Worker's Party, or PKK, to continue, but
there is no indication it will not. America will want Turkey's
discussions with the Iraqi Kurds to continue. After Gül's
successful Iraq visit, why wouldn't they? Both sides are hoping that
Iraq will remain stable as the United States withdraws, but there are
no major items either might agree to that it is not already doing.
Then there is Cyprus, but the real problem here is between Turkey and
the European Union. Europe wants Turkey to open its ports and airports
to the Greek Cypriots. Turkey wants Europe to ease the commercial
isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in exchange, but
the Greek Cypriots veto this. The United States can offer its support
and its good offices, but it does not have much leverage over either
the European Union or the Greek Cypriots. This is also broadly true of
Turkey's EU entry negotiations.
A final item is the Nabucco pipeline bringing Central Asian gas to
Europe via Turkey. Both America and Turkey would like to see it
built. The question, however, is who will pay for it? Neither America
nor Turkey has much spare cash right now.
And will Obama choose his Turkey visit to give a much anticipated
speech of reconciliation to the world's Muslims? Of course not. Obama
has to speak from the center of the Muslim World. Egypt must be the
favorite, but a speech in Saudi Arabia would carry enormous symbolism,
though I doubt the Saudis would go along. A good outside bet is
Jordan. King Abdullah, remember, is a descendent of the Prophet'and a
U.S. ally.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/192588
April 5 2009
Talking Turkey
Obama's trip to Ankara promises to be a genuine meeting of minds.
The Bush administration spent years trying to isolate people the
Turkish government thought should be engaged'Iran, Syria, Hizbullah,
Hamas, to name a few. The Obama administration broadly endorses
engagement. Turkish-American relations are therefore about to change
from being good despite fundamental disagreement to being a genuine
meeting of minds. Some people in Washington have been screaming that
Turkey's increasingly good relations with the countries in its
neighborhood means it is "turning away from the West." Apparently they
view international relations as a form of monogamy in which it's
evidently dangerous to go out on a date. In fact, international
relations are like business partnerships. An extensive Rolodex greatly
increases a partner's value.
President Obama's visit this week to Turkey will also be unusual
because, for once, America wants more from Turkey than Turkey wants
from America. Turkey will respond generously because Barack Obama is
likely to be around for a long time, and he will certainly remember
anyone who helped make his first major foreign trip a success.
>From Turkey's perspective, the most important item on the agenda is
what it does not want: official U.S. recognition that what happened to
the Armenians was genocide. I doubt Obama would have accepted an
invitation to visit Turkey now if he was not planning to oppose a
congressional resolution on the subject, or if he intended to use the
G word on April 24, when he will make a statement commemorating the
Armenian massacres of 1915. What this Turkish government will also ask
for is unambiguous American backing for its plans to amend its present
military-dictated Constitution along more democratic lines. They will
not want to hear, once again, the Bush "we don't take sides" approach.
Heading up America's agenda are two items on which there is much
common ground. First, Iran. Obama has indicated he wants to open
wide-ranging negotiations, but he will not rush into them without
first testing the waters. Similarly, Obama is serious about making
progress on Mideast peace. Like Tony Blair and Tayyip Erdogan, Obama
is thought to recognize that Hamas can no longer be ignored, though he
cannot possibly say so publicly. Turkey's leaders (and their advisers)
can provide Obama with valuable insights, and help start the ball
rolling. This would allow Obama to avoid political exposure in
Washington for "talking to terrorists" until he has a sense of the
other side's position. Before setting anything in motion, though, he
likely wants to take the measure of Prime Minister Erdogan and
President Abdullah Gül personally. Both should remember that
the role of matchmaker is transitory, and the principals must soon
talk alone. In the long term, there is also the potential for friction
because America is probably less willing to compromise than Turkey and
may terminate discussions that Turkey would choose to keep
going. Turkey, after all, will suffer much more than the United States
if sanctions against Iran are ratcheted up.
Obama would also like to get more help on Afghanistan, principally
more Turkish soldiers. This is a potential source of friction. Since
Obama managed during his NATO meeting to pry commitments from France
and Britain for a few hundred additional personnel, it will be hard
for Turkey to do nothing.
Another item is Iraq. What needs to be agreed upon is already in place
(except Turkey's relatively uncontroversial agreement that it will act
as a corridor for U.S. withdrawal). Turkey will want intelligence
sharing about the Kuridstan Worker's Party, or PKK, to continue, but
there is no indication it will not. America will want Turkey's
discussions with the Iraqi Kurds to continue. After Gül's
successful Iraq visit, why wouldn't they? Both sides are hoping that
Iraq will remain stable as the United States withdraws, but there are
no major items either might agree to that it is not already doing.
Then there is Cyprus, but the real problem here is between Turkey and
the European Union. Europe wants Turkey to open its ports and airports
to the Greek Cypriots. Turkey wants Europe to ease the commercial
isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in exchange, but
the Greek Cypriots veto this. The United States can offer its support
and its good offices, but it does not have much leverage over either
the European Union or the Greek Cypriots. This is also broadly true of
Turkey's EU entry negotiations.
A final item is the Nabucco pipeline bringing Central Asian gas to
Europe via Turkey. Both America and Turkey would like to see it
built. The question, however, is who will pay for it? Neither America
nor Turkey has much spare cash right now.
And will Obama choose his Turkey visit to give a much anticipated
speech of reconciliation to the world's Muslims? Of course not. Obama
has to speak from the center of the Muslim World. Egypt must be the
favorite, but a speech in Saudi Arabia would carry enormous symbolism,
though I doubt the Saudis would go along. A good outside bet is
Jordan. King Abdullah, remember, is a descendent of the Prophet'and a
U.S. ally.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/192588