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KARABAKH LESSONS FOR SUB-CARPATHIAN RUS'
Alexander Yegorov
en.fondsk.ru
06.04.2009
Eurasia
History is known to repeat itself, replaying as a farce what initially
was a drama. Under a certain combination of circumstances, however,
it can revert from farce to tragedy.
In the early 2009, there was a general atmosphere of euphoria in
the ranks of Rusin activists in Ukraine's Transcarpathia - as well
as in some countries bordering Ukraine - as they were under the
impression that already this year Russia would recognize the Republic
of Sub-Carpathian Rus'.
Rusins, a small nation inhabiting the Transcarpathian Oblast in
western Ukraine, remained in obscurity throughout the 1990ies and the
early 2000ies, but the situation started to change after the "orange
revolution" propelled the anti-Russian V. Yushchenko to power in Kyiv
in 2004. Since then the public attention increasingly turned to the
Rusin problem.
State-controlled Russian TV channels ran several programs expressing
compassion for Rusins who survived genocide during World War I and
are currently facing the assimilationist aspirations harbored by
the Ukrainian administration and by their notoriously nationalist
Galician neighbors.
In 2008 a series of rallies in Mukachevo culminated in the
declaration of the Rusin autonomy. The Security Service of Ukraine
reacted immediately by opening investigations targeting Rusin
leaders. A conference on Rusin problems convened in December,
2008 in Rostov-on-Don, Russia which - despite avoiding politically
charged issues - instilled far-reaching expectations among its
Rusin participants. Somewhat later the conference "Experience and
Problems of Rusin National Self-Determination" (Budapest, March,
2008) went political and asked the attending parliamentarians
from the regions where Rusin communities resided to hold hearings
on the Rusin nationhood and to submit the Rusin issue to such
international organizations as the UN, the Council of Europe, OCSE,
the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, etc.
The process kept gaining momentum. Information spread shortly that
leaders of the Republic of Sub-Carpathian Rus' were received in
Moscow by influential negotiating partners who allegedly promised
that Russia would recognize the Rusin Republic but indicated that
the political step would have to be synchronized with Mensk and
highlighted the importance of "the gas theme". What the Russian fuel
and energy business might be interested in the context was of course
the Trans-Carpathian segment of the gas pipeline used to supply natural
gas from Russia to Europe (the recent deal between Kyiv and Brussels
on the modernization of Ukraine's gas pipeline network made it rather
difficult to go on positioning Russia as the "energy superpower").
At this point, it makes sense to recall the events that took place
over 20 years ago, in20the late 1987 - early 1988. At that time
delegations from the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region
of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic frequented offices in the
USSR Communist Party headquarters in Moscow attempting to secure the
administration's support for the transfer of Karabakh from Azerbaijan
to Armenia, both being the Republic's of the USSR. Subsequently
the Stepanakert parliament put the issue on its agenda. Armenian
activists were absolutely convinced that they were championing a
worthy cause. They supplied serious historical and legal arguments
supporting their position and ample evidence of the violations of
the Armenian autonomy's rights in Azerbaijan, cited the practice
of implanting the Azerbaijani culture, and referred to the petition
to have Karabakh incorporated into Armenia which had been signed by
practically the entire population of the enclave. In all respects the
situation in Transcarpathia since its incorporation into the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic 1946 has been similar. Two decades ago the
Karabakh envoys seemed to have met with understanding in the high
offices in Moscow. They were advised to raise the issue and told that
the center's support would follow.
Moreover, vague hints were dropped that Gorbachev was on their side...
What happened afterwards is well-known - it transpired after
February 20, 1988 that Moscow had no intention to infringe on the
territorial integrity of the Azerbaij ani Soviet Socialist Republic,
while Karabakh was actually just one of the cards in the games played
between the political factions of the increasingly irresponsible
Communist bureaucracy. Notably, the games eventually resulted in the
demise of the USSR.
By the way, the Karabakh activists' naive conviction that all
the decision-making was in the hands of Moscow was not entirely
groundless. At that time both Armenia and Azerbaijan were Republics of
the USSR and an overhaul of its internal territorial and administrative
divisions should not have presented a major problem 1. Things have
changed, though, and the current belief of the Rusin activists that
now - 18 years after the Soviet Union's collapse and the emergence
of independent Ukraine - it is somehow possible to resolve problems
as serious as the one confronting Transcarpathia by entraining Moscow
can only be explained by the provincial narrowness of vision. Whatever
Russian parliamentarians or other politicians promise these days is
no guarantee that the bold dreams of the Rusin leaders are going to
materialize. The hope that the people of Transcarpathia will get a
chance to decide for themselves if they are vocal enough and draw
the attention to their situation globally is equally naive.
Will the Rusin activists steer a course which can lead not only to a
total rout of the Rusin national movement and an irreversible loss of
any prospects for their truly amazing ho meland, but also to serious
perturbations of Europe's geopolitical architecture? A look at the map
helps to realize that Rusins have nowhere to expect material support
from. They have no "ethnic relative" such as Armenia in the case of
Karabakh, and hopes to avoid bloodshed - or to draw the attention of
the rest of the world to the plight of the victim's of Yushchenko's
nationalist regime - are a perilous illusion. Russia still seems
unsure that its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot
be withdrawn and is, albeit gently, pushing Transdnistria back into
Moldova2, and all that can be expected from Moscow in the case of a
Ukrainian crackdown on Rusins in Transcarpathia is that the Foreign
Ministry will churn out a disapproving statement on the occasion. Kyiv
will easily convince Europe that Rusins are agents of the Russian
imperialism and thus forge a pretext for a NATO "peacekeeping"
intervention, the Ukrainian gas transmission system of course being
the rescue mission's priority. For the Euro-Atlantic community, the
escalation would serve as justification of further efforts aimed at
the long-desired expansion to the east...
It is extremely important that the radical Rusin leaders refrain from
any reckless moves likely to have far-reaching consequences.
It is easy to understand the impatience of the Rusin activists who
regard Ukraine under Yushchenko as Europe's ill part and20worry about
missing their chance in the case of its disintegration (evolution
into federation or confederation). However, such developments -
even if that is indeed what the future holds - are not a matter of
the nearest time. What should be at the top of the agenda at the
moment is the strengthening of the movement, the advancement of
the Rusin identity in the complex settings of Transcapathia (where
the population in many cases has a dual national identity and is
religiously heterogeneous, while Kyiv is trying to undermine the
Rusin movement), and the broadening of the activity of organizations
advocating the rights of Rusins. This work is necessary to unite the
Rusin population in Transcarpathia.
Currently there is no future in radicalism which manifests itself in
calls for an independent Sub-Carpathian Rus'. The more vain hopes
are offered to people today the deeper will be the disappointments
awaiting them.
____________ 1The charting of administrative borders in Central Asia in
the 1920ies, the plans of passing territories from Russia to Belorussia
and Ukraine in the late 1920ies-early 1930ies, and the transfer of
the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine - N. Khrushchev's generous gift
to the latter - are examples of redrawing the administrative borders
within the Soviet Union.
2In contrast to the predominantly agrarian and weakly urbanized
Transcarpathia, Transdnistria is a heavily industrialized region=2
0with well-established administrative bodies.
Alexander Yegorov
en.fondsk.ru
06.04.2009
Eurasia
History is known to repeat itself, replaying as a farce what initially
was a drama. Under a certain combination of circumstances, however,
it can revert from farce to tragedy.
In the early 2009, there was a general atmosphere of euphoria in
the ranks of Rusin activists in Ukraine's Transcarpathia - as well
as in some countries bordering Ukraine - as they were under the
impression that already this year Russia would recognize the Republic
of Sub-Carpathian Rus'.
Rusins, a small nation inhabiting the Transcarpathian Oblast in
western Ukraine, remained in obscurity throughout the 1990ies and the
early 2000ies, but the situation started to change after the "orange
revolution" propelled the anti-Russian V. Yushchenko to power in Kyiv
in 2004. Since then the public attention increasingly turned to the
Rusin problem.
State-controlled Russian TV channels ran several programs expressing
compassion for Rusins who survived genocide during World War I and
are currently facing the assimilationist aspirations harbored by
the Ukrainian administration and by their notoriously nationalist
Galician neighbors.
In 2008 a series of rallies in Mukachevo culminated in the
declaration of the Rusin autonomy. The Security Service of Ukraine
reacted immediately by opening investigations targeting Rusin
leaders. A conference on Rusin problems convened in December,
2008 in Rostov-on-Don, Russia which - despite avoiding politically
charged issues - instilled far-reaching expectations among its
Rusin participants. Somewhat later the conference "Experience and
Problems of Rusin National Self-Determination" (Budapest, March,
2008) went political and asked the attending parliamentarians
from the regions where Rusin communities resided to hold hearings
on the Rusin nationhood and to submit the Rusin issue to such
international organizations as the UN, the Council of Europe, OCSE,
the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, etc.
The process kept gaining momentum. Information spread shortly that
leaders of the Republic of Sub-Carpathian Rus' were received in
Moscow by influential negotiating partners who allegedly promised
that Russia would recognize the Rusin Republic but indicated that
the political step would have to be synchronized with Mensk and
highlighted the importance of "the gas theme". What the Russian fuel
and energy business might be interested in the context was of course
the Trans-Carpathian segment of the gas pipeline used to supply natural
gas from Russia to Europe (the recent deal between Kyiv and Brussels
on the modernization of Ukraine's gas pipeline network made it rather
difficult to go on positioning Russia as the "energy superpower").
At this point, it makes sense to recall the events that took place
over 20 years ago, in20the late 1987 - early 1988. At that time
delegations from the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region
of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic frequented offices in the
USSR Communist Party headquarters in Moscow attempting to secure the
administration's support for the transfer of Karabakh from Azerbaijan
to Armenia, both being the Republic's of the USSR. Subsequently
the Stepanakert parliament put the issue on its agenda. Armenian
activists were absolutely convinced that they were championing a
worthy cause. They supplied serious historical and legal arguments
supporting their position and ample evidence of the violations of
the Armenian autonomy's rights in Azerbaijan, cited the practice
of implanting the Azerbaijani culture, and referred to the petition
to have Karabakh incorporated into Armenia which had been signed by
practically the entire population of the enclave. In all respects the
situation in Transcarpathia since its incorporation into the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic 1946 has been similar. Two decades ago the
Karabakh envoys seemed to have met with understanding in the high
offices in Moscow. They were advised to raise the issue and told that
the center's support would follow.
Moreover, vague hints were dropped that Gorbachev was on their side...
What happened afterwards is well-known - it transpired after
February 20, 1988 that Moscow had no intention to infringe on the
territorial integrity of the Azerbaij ani Soviet Socialist Republic,
while Karabakh was actually just one of the cards in the games played
between the political factions of the increasingly irresponsible
Communist bureaucracy. Notably, the games eventually resulted in the
demise of the USSR.
By the way, the Karabakh activists' naive conviction that all
the decision-making was in the hands of Moscow was not entirely
groundless. At that time both Armenia and Azerbaijan were Republics of
the USSR and an overhaul of its internal territorial and administrative
divisions should not have presented a major problem 1. Things have
changed, though, and the current belief of the Rusin activists that
now - 18 years after the Soviet Union's collapse and the emergence
of independent Ukraine - it is somehow possible to resolve problems
as serious as the one confronting Transcarpathia by entraining Moscow
can only be explained by the provincial narrowness of vision. Whatever
Russian parliamentarians or other politicians promise these days is
no guarantee that the bold dreams of the Rusin leaders are going to
materialize. The hope that the people of Transcarpathia will get a
chance to decide for themselves if they are vocal enough and draw
the attention to their situation globally is equally naive.
Will the Rusin activists steer a course which can lead not only to a
total rout of the Rusin national movement and an irreversible loss of
any prospects for their truly amazing ho meland, but also to serious
perturbations of Europe's geopolitical architecture? A look at the map
helps to realize that Rusins have nowhere to expect material support
from. They have no "ethnic relative" such as Armenia in the case of
Karabakh, and hopes to avoid bloodshed - or to draw the attention of
the rest of the world to the plight of the victim's of Yushchenko's
nationalist regime - are a perilous illusion. Russia still seems
unsure that its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot
be withdrawn and is, albeit gently, pushing Transdnistria back into
Moldova2, and all that can be expected from Moscow in the case of a
Ukrainian crackdown on Rusins in Transcarpathia is that the Foreign
Ministry will churn out a disapproving statement on the occasion. Kyiv
will easily convince Europe that Rusins are agents of the Russian
imperialism and thus forge a pretext for a NATO "peacekeeping"
intervention, the Ukrainian gas transmission system of course being
the rescue mission's priority. For the Euro-Atlantic community, the
escalation would serve as justification of further efforts aimed at
the long-desired expansion to the east...
It is extremely important that the radical Rusin leaders refrain from
any reckless moves likely to have far-reaching consequences.
It is easy to understand the impatience of the Rusin activists who
regard Ukraine under Yushchenko as Europe's ill part and20worry about
missing their chance in the case of its disintegration (evolution
into federation or confederation). However, such developments -
even if that is indeed what the future holds - are not a matter of
the nearest time. What should be at the top of the agenda at the
moment is the strengthening of the movement, the advancement of
the Rusin identity in the complex settings of Transcapathia (where
the population in many cases has a dual national identity and is
religiously heterogeneous, while Kyiv is trying to undermine the
Rusin movement), and the broadening of the activity of organizations
advocating the rights of Rusins. This work is necessary to unite the
Rusin population in Transcarpathia.
Currently there is no future in radicalism which manifests itself in
calls for an independent Sub-Carpathian Rus'. The more vain hopes
are offered to people today the deeper will be the disappointments
awaiting them.
____________ 1The charting of administrative borders in Central Asia in
the 1920ies, the plans of passing territories from Russia to Belorussia
and Ukraine in the late 1920ies-early 1930ies, and the transfer of
the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine - N. Khrushchev's generous gift
to the latter - are examples of redrawing the administrative borders
within the Soviet Union.
2In contrast to the predominantly agrarian and weakly urbanized
Transcarpathia, Transdnistria is a heavily industrialized region=2
0with well-established administrative bodies.