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OBAMA'S STRATEGY AND THE SUMMITS
By George Friedman
Right Side News
http://www.rightsidenews.com/200904064291/glo bal-terrorism/obama-s-strategy-and-the-summits.htm l
April 7 2009
The weeklong extravaganza of G-20, NATO, EU, U.S. and Turkey meetings
has almost ended. The spin emerging from the meetings, echoed in
most of the media, sought to portray the meetings as a success and
as reflecting a re-emergence of trans-Atlantic unity.
The reality, however, is that the meetings ended in apparent unity
because the United States accepted European unwillingness to compromise
on key issues. U.S. President Barack Obama wanted the week to appear
successful, and therefore backed off on key issues; the Europeans
did the same. Moreover, Obama appears to have set a process in motion
that bypasses Europe to focus on his last stop: Turkey.
Berlin, Washington and the G-20 Let's begin with the G-20 meeting,
which focused on the global financial crisis. As we said last year,
there were many European positions, but the United States was reacting
to Germany's. Not only is Germany the largest economy in Europe,
it is the largest exporter in the world. Any agreement that did not
include Germany would be useless, whereas an agreement excluding the
rest of Europe but including Germany would still be useful.
Two fundamental issues divided the United States and Germany. The first
was whether Germany would match or come close to the U.S. stimulus
package. The United States wanted Germany to stimulate its own domestic
demand. Obama feared that if the United States put a stimulus plan
into place, Germany would use increased demand in the U.S. market
to expand its exports. The United States would wind up with massive
deficits while the Germans took advantage of U.S. spending, thus
letting Berlin enjoy the best of both worlds. Washington felt it
had to stimulate its economy, and that this would inevitably benefit
the rest of the world. But Washington wanted burden sharing. Berlin,
quite rationally, did not. Even before the meetings, the United States
dropped the demand - Germany was not going to cooperate.
The second issue was the financing of the bailout of the Central
European banking system, heavily controlled by eurozone banks and
part of the EU financial system. The Germans did not want an EU
effort to bail out the banks. They wanted the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to bail out a substantial part of the EU financial system
instead. The reason was simple: The IMF receives loans from the United
States, as well as China and Japan, meaning the Europeans would be
joined by others in underwriting the bailout. The United States has
signaled it would be willing to contribute $100 billion to the IMF,
of which a substantial portion would go to Central Europe. (Of the
current loans given by the IMF, roughly 80 percent have gone to the
struggling economies in Central Europe.) The United States therefore
essentially has agreed to the German position.
Later at the NATO meeting, the Europeans - including Germany -
declined to send substantial forces to Afghanistan. Instead, they
designated a token force of 5,000, most of whom are scheduled to be
in Afghanistan only until the August elections there, and few of whom
actually would be engaged in combat operations. This is far below
what Obama had been hoping for when he began his presidency.
Agreement was reached on collaboration in detecting international
tax fraud and on further collaboration in managing the international
crisis, however. But what that means remains extremely vague -
as it was meant to be, since there was no consensus on what was
to be done. In fact, the actual guidelines will still have to be
hashed out at the G-20 finance ministers' meeting in Scotland in
November. Intriguingly, after insisting on the creation of a global
regulatory regime - and with the vague U.S. assent - the European
Union failed to agree on European regulations. In a meeting in Prague
on April 4, the United Kingdom rejected the regulatory regime being
proposed by Germany and France, saying it would leave the British
banking system at a disadvantage.
Overall, the G-20 and the NATO meetings did not produce significant
breakthroughs. Rather than pushing hard on issues or trading
concessions - such as accepting Germany's unwillingness to increase
its stimulus package in return for more troops in Afghanistan - the
United States failed to press or bargain. It preferred to appear as
part of a consensus rather than appear isolated. The United States
systematically avoided any appearance of disagreement.
The reason there was no bargaining was fairly simple: The Germans
were not prepared to bargain. They came to the meetings with prepared
positions, and the United States had no levers with which to move
them. The only option was to withhold funding for the IMF, and that
would have been a political disaster (not to mention economically
rather unwise). The United States would have been seen as unwilling
to participate in multilateral solutions rather than Germany being
seen as trying to foist its economic problems on others. Obama has
positioned himself as a multilateralist and can't afford the political
consequences of deviating from this perception. Contributing to the
IMF, in these days of trillion-dollar bailouts, was the lower-cost
alternative. Thus, the Germans have the U.S. boxed in.
The political aspect of this should not be underestimated. George
W. Bush had extremely bad relations with the Europeans (in large part
because he was prepared to confront them). This was Obama's first major
international foray, and he could not let it end in acrimony or wind
up being seen as unable to move the Europeans after running a campaign
based on his ability to manage the Western coalition. It was important
that he come home having reached consensus with the Europeans. Backing
off on key economic and military demands gave him that "consensus."
Turkey and Obama's Deeper Game But it was not simply a matter of
domestic politics. It is becoming clear that Obama is playing a
deeper game. A couple of weeks before the meetings, when it had
become obvious that the Europeans were not going to bend on the
issues that concerned the United States, Obama scheduled a trip to
Turkey. During the EU meetings in Prague, Obama vigorously supported
the Turkish application for EU membership, which several members are
blocking on grounds of concerns over human rights and the role of the
military in Turkey. But the real reason is that full membership would
open European borders to Turkish migration, and the Europeans do not
want free Turkish migration. The United States directly confronted
the Europeans on this matter.
During the NATO meeting, a key item on the agenda was the selection
of a new alliance secretary-general. The favorite was former Danish
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Turkey opposed his candidacy
because of his defense on grounds of free speech of cartoons depicting
the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. NATO operates on
consensus, so any one member can block just about anything. The Turks
backed off the veto, but won two key positions in NATO, including
that of deputy secretary-general.
So while the Germans won their way at the meetings, it was the Turks
who came back with the most. Not only did they boost their standing
in NATO, they got Obama to come to a vigorous defense of the Turkish
application for membership in the European Union, which of course
the United States does not belong to. Obama then flew to Turkey for
meetings and to attend a key international meeting that will allow
him to further position the United States in relation to Islam.
The Russian Dimension Let's diverge to another dimension of
these talks, which still concerns Turkey, but also concerns the
Russians. While atmospherics after the last week's meetings might have
improved, there was certainly no fundamental shift in U.S.-Russian
relations. The Russians have rejected the idea of pressuring Iran
over its nuclear program in return for the United States abandoning
its planned ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the
Czech Republic. The United States simultaneously downplayed the
importance of a Russian route to Afghanistan. Washington said there
were sufficient supplies in Afghanistan and enough security on the
Pakistani route such that the Russians weren't essential for supplying
Western operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States
reached an agreement with Ukraine for the transshipment of supplies -
a mostly symbolic gesture, but one guaranteed to infuriate the Russians
at both the United States and Ukraine. Moreover, the NATO communique
did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to
NATO, although the German position on unspecified delays to such
membership was there as well. When Obama looks at the chessboard,
the key emerging challenge remains Russia.
The Germans are not going to be joining the United States in blocking
Russia. Between dependence on Russia for energy supplies and little
appetite for confronting a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate
threat to Germany, the Germans are not going to address the Russian
question. At the same time, the United States does not want to push the
Germans toward Russia, particularly in confrontations ultimately of
secondary importance and on which Germany has no give anyway. Obama
is aware that the German left is viscerally anti-American, while
Merkel is only pragmatically anti-American - a small distinction,
but significant enough for Washington not to press Berlin.
At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and
Armenia looks to be on the horizon. Armenians had long held Turkey
responsible for the mass murder of Armenians during and after World War
I, a charge the Turks have denied. The U.S. Congress for several years
has threatened to pass a resolution condemning Turkish genocide against
Armenians. The Turks are extraordinarily sensitive to this charge,
and passage would have meant a break with the United States. Last
week, they publicly began to discuss an agreement with the Armenians,
including diplomatic recognition, which essentially disarms the danger
from any U.S. resolution on genocide. Although an actual agreement
hasn't been signed just yet, anticipation is building on all sides.
The Turkish opening to Armenia has potentially significant
implications for the balance of power in the Caucasus. The August
2008 Russo-Georgian war created an unstable situation in an area of
vital importance to Russia. Russian troops remain deployed, and NATO
has called for their withdrawal from the breakaway Georgian regions
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There are Russian troops in Armenia,
meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded. In addition, there is talk of
an alternative natural gas pipeline network from Azerbaijan to Europe.
Turkey is the key to all of this. If Ankara collaborates with Russia,
Georgia's position is precarious and Azerbaijan's route to Europe is
blocked. If it cooperates with the United States and also manages to
reach a stable treaty with Armenia under U.S. auspices, the Russian
position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for
natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against
Europe.
>From the American point of view, Europe is a lost cause since
internally it cannot find a common position and its heavyweights are
bound by their relationship with Russia. It cannot agree on economic
policy, nor do its economic interests coincide with those of the United
States, at least insofar as Germany is concerned. As far as Russia
is concerned, Germany and Europe are locked in by their dependence
on Russian natural gas. The U.S.-European relationship thus is torn
apart not by personalities, but by fundamental economic and military
realities. No amount of talking will solve that problem.
The key to sustaining the U.S.-German alliance is reducing Germany's
dependence on Russian natural gas and putting Russia on the defensive
rather than the offensive. The key to that now is Turkey, since it
is one of the only routes energy from new sources can cross to get
to Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. If
Turkey - which has deep influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia,
Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans - is prepared to ally
with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and a long-term
solution to Germany's energy problem can be found. On the other hand,
if Turkey decides to take a defensive position and moves to cooperate
with Russia instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is
locked into Russian-controlled energy for a generation. (hyperlinks
for subscribers only, sign up for a Free Trial)
Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans,
Obama chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe
that is out of options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going
to Turkey to discuss what the treaty with Armenia means and to try
to convince the Turks to play for high stakes by challenging Russia
in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia's junior partner.
This is why Obama's most important speech in Europe was his last one,
following Turkey's emergence as a major player in NATO's political
structure. In that speech, he sided with the Turks against Europe,
and extracted some minor concessions from the Europeans on the process
for considering Turkey's accession to the European Union. Why Turkey
wants to be an EU member is not always obvious to us, but they do want
membership. Obama is trying to show the Turks that he can deliver for
them. He reiterated - if not laid it on even more heavily - all of this
in his speech in Ankara. Obama laid out the U.S. position as one that
recognized the tough geopolitical position Turkey is in and the leader
that Turkey is becoming, and also recognized the commonalities between
Washington and Ankara. This was exactly what Turkey wanted to hear.
The Caucasus is far from the only area to discuss. Talks will be held
about blocking Iran in Iraq, U.S. relations with Syria and Syrian talks
with Israel, and Central Asia, where both countries have interests. But
the most important message to the Europeans will be that Europe is
where you go for photo opportunities, but Turkey is where you go to
do the business of geopolitics. It is unlikely that the Germans and
French will get it. Their sense of what is happening in the world is
utterly Eurocentric. But the Central Europeans, on the frontier with
Russia and feeling quite put out by the German position on their banks,
certainly do get it.
Obama gave the Europeans a pass for political reasons, and because
arguing with the Europeans simply won't yield benefits. But the key to
the trip is what he gets out of Turkey - and whether in his speech to
the civilizations, he can draw some of the venom out of the Islamic
world by showing alignment with the largest economy among Muslim
states, Turkey.
By George Friedman
Right Side News
http://www.rightsidenews.com/200904064291/glo bal-terrorism/obama-s-strategy-and-the-summits.htm l
April 7 2009
The weeklong extravaganza of G-20, NATO, EU, U.S. and Turkey meetings
has almost ended. The spin emerging from the meetings, echoed in
most of the media, sought to portray the meetings as a success and
as reflecting a re-emergence of trans-Atlantic unity.
The reality, however, is that the meetings ended in apparent unity
because the United States accepted European unwillingness to compromise
on key issues. U.S. President Barack Obama wanted the week to appear
successful, and therefore backed off on key issues; the Europeans
did the same. Moreover, Obama appears to have set a process in motion
that bypasses Europe to focus on his last stop: Turkey.
Berlin, Washington and the G-20 Let's begin with the G-20 meeting,
which focused on the global financial crisis. As we said last year,
there were many European positions, but the United States was reacting
to Germany's. Not only is Germany the largest economy in Europe,
it is the largest exporter in the world. Any agreement that did not
include Germany would be useless, whereas an agreement excluding the
rest of Europe but including Germany would still be useful.
Two fundamental issues divided the United States and Germany. The first
was whether Germany would match or come close to the U.S. stimulus
package. The United States wanted Germany to stimulate its own domestic
demand. Obama feared that if the United States put a stimulus plan
into place, Germany would use increased demand in the U.S. market
to expand its exports. The United States would wind up with massive
deficits while the Germans took advantage of U.S. spending, thus
letting Berlin enjoy the best of both worlds. Washington felt it
had to stimulate its economy, and that this would inevitably benefit
the rest of the world. But Washington wanted burden sharing. Berlin,
quite rationally, did not. Even before the meetings, the United States
dropped the demand - Germany was not going to cooperate.
The second issue was the financing of the bailout of the Central
European banking system, heavily controlled by eurozone banks and
part of the EU financial system. The Germans did not want an EU
effort to bail out the banks. They wanted the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to bail out a substantial part of the EU financial system
instead. The reason was simple: The IMF receives loans from the United
States, as well as China and Japan, meaning the Europeans would be
joined by others in underwriting the bailout. The United States has
signaled it would be willing to contribute $100 billion to the IMF,
of which a substantial portion would go to Central Europe. (Of the
current loans given by the IMF, roughly 80 percent have gone to the
struggling economies in Central Europe.) The United States therefore
essentially has agreed to the German position.
Later at the NATO meeting, the Europeans - including Germany -
declined to send substantial forces to Afghanistan. Instead, they
designated a token force of 5,000, most of whom are scheduled to be
in Afghanistan only until the August elections there, and few of whom
actually would be engaged in combat operations. This is far below
what Obama had been hoping for when he began his presidency.
Agreement was reached on collaboration in detecting international
tax fraud and on further collaboration in managing the international
crisis, however. But what that means remains extremely vague -
as it was meant to be, since there was no consensus on what was
to be done. In fact, the actual guidelines will still have to be
hashed out at the G-20 finance ministers' meeting in Scotland in
November. Intriguingly, after insisting on the creation of a global
regulatory regime - and with the vague U.S. assent - the European
Union failed to agree on European regulations. In a meeting in Prague
on April 4, the United Kingdom rejected the regulatory regime being
proposed by Germany and France, saying it would leave the British
banking system at a disadvantage.
Overall, the G-20 and the NATO meetings did not produce significant
breakthroughs. Rather than pushing hard on issues or trading
concessions - such as accepting Germany's unwillingness to increase
its stimulus package in return for more troops in Afghanistan - the
United States failed to press or bargain. It preferred to appear as
part of a consensus rather than appear isolated. The United States
systematically avoided any appearance of disagreement.
The reason there was no bargaining was fairly simple: The Germans
were not prepared to bargain. They came to the meetings with prepared
positions, and the United States had no levers with which to move
them. The only option was to withhold funding for the IMF, and that
would have been a political disaster (not to mention economically
rather unwise). The United States would have been seen as unwilling
to participate in multilateral solutions rather than Germany being
seen as trying to foist its economic problems on others. Obama has
positioned himself as a multilateralist and can't afford the political
consequences of deviating from this perception. Contributing to the
IMF, in these days of trillion-dollar bailouts, was the lower-cost
alternative. Thus, the Germans have the U.S. boxed in.
The political aspect of this should not be underestimated. George
W. Bush had extremely bad relations with the Europeans (in large part
because he was prepared to confront them). This was Obama's first major
international foray, and he could not let it end in acrimony or wind
up being seen as unable to move the Europeans after running a campaign
based on his ability to manage the Western coalition. It was important
that he come home having reached consensus with the Europeans. Backing
off on key economic and military demands gave him that "consensus."
Turkey and Obama's Deeper Game But it was not simply a matter of
domestic politics. It is becoming clear that Obama is playing a
deeper game. A couple of weeks before the meetings, when it had
become obvious that the Europeans were not going to bend on the
issues that concerned the United States, Obama scheduled a trip to
Turkey. During the EU meetings in Prague, Obama vigorously supported
the Turkish application for EU membership, which several members are
blocking on grounds of concerns over human rights and the role of the
military in Turkey. But the real reason is that full membership would
open European borders to Turkish migration, and the Europeans do not
want free Turkish migration. The United States directly confronted
the Europeans on this matter.
During the NATO meeting, a key item on the agenda was the selection
of a new alliance secretary-general. The favorite was former Danish
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Turkey opposed his candidacy
because of his defense on grounds of free speech of cartoons depicting
the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish magazine. NATO operates on
consensus, so any one member can block just about anything. The Turks
backed off the veto, but won two key positions in NATO, including
that of deputy secretary-general.
So while the Germans won their way at the meetings, it was the Turks
who came back with the most. Not only did they boost their standing
in NATO, they got Obama to come to a vigorous defense of the Turkish
application for membership in the European Union, which of course
the United States does not belong to. Obama then flew to Turkey for
meetings and to attend a key international meeting that will allow
him to further position the United States in relation to Islam.
The Russian Dimension Let's diverge to another dimension of
these talks, which still concerns Turkey, but also concerns the
Russians. While atmospherics after the last week's meetings might have
improved, there was certainly no fundamental shift in U.S.-Russian
relations. The Russians have rejected the idea of pressuring Iran
over its nuclear program in return for the United States abandoning
its planned ballistic missile defense system in Poland and the
Czech Republic. The United States simultaneously downplayed the
importance of a Russian route to Afghanistan. Washington said there
were sufficient supplies in Afghanistan and enough security on the
Pakistani route such that the Russians weren't essential for supplying
Western operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States
reached an agreement with Ukraine for the transshipment of supplies -
a mostly symbolic gesture, but one guaranteed to infuriate the Russians
at both the United States and Ukraine. Moreover, the NATO communique
did not abandon the idea of Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to
NATO, although the German position on unspecified delays to such
membership was there as well. When Obama looks at the chessboard,
the key emerging challenge remains Russia.
The Germans are not going to be joining the United States in blocking
Russia. Between dependence on Russia for energy supplies and little
appetite for confronting a Russia that Berlin sees as no real immediate
threat to Germany, the Germans are not going to address the Russian
question. At the same time, the United States does not want to push the
Germans toward Russia, particularly in confrontations ultimately of
secondary importance and on which Germany has no give anyway. Obama
is aware that the German left is viscerally anti-American, while
Merkel is only pragmatically anti-American - a small distinction,
but significant enough for Washington not to press Berlin.
At the same time, an extremely important event between Turkey and
Armenia looks to be on the horizon. Armenians had long held Turkey
responsible for the mass murder of Armenians during and after World War
I, a charge the Turks have denied. The U.S. Congress for several years
has threatened to pass a resolution condemning Turkish genocide against
Armenians. The Turks are extraordinarily sensitive to this charge,
and passage would have meant a break with the United States. Last
week, they publicly began to discuss an agreement with the Armenians,
including diplomatic recognition, which essentially disarms the danger
from any U.S. resolution on genocide. Although an actual agreement
hasn't been signed just yet, anticipation is building on all sides.
The Turkish opening to Armenia has potentially significant
implications for the balance of power in the Caucasus. The August
2008 Russo-Georgian war created an unstable situation in an area of
vital importance to Russia. Russian troops remain deployed, and NATO
has called for their withdrawal from the breakaway Georgian regions
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There are Russian troops in Armenia,
meaning Russia has Georgia surrounded. In addition, there is talk of
an alternative natural gas pipeline network from Azerbaijan to Europe.
Turkey is the key to all of this. If Ankara collaborates with Russia,
Georgia's position is precarious and Azerbaijan's route to Europe is
blocked. If it cooperates with the United States and also manages to
reach a stable treaty with Armenia under U.S. auspices, the Russian
position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for
natural gas to Europe opens up, decreasing Russian leverage against
Europe.
>From the American point of view, Europe is a lost cause since
internally it cannot find a common position and its heavyweights are
bound by their relationship with Russia. It cannot agree on economic
policy, nor do its economic interests coincide with those of the United
States, at least insofar as Germany is concerned. As far as Russia
is concerned, Germany and Europe are locked in by their dependence
on Russian natural gas. The U.S.-European relationship thus is torn
apart not by personalities, but by fundamental economic and military
realities. No amount of talking will solve that problem.
The key to sustaining the U.S.-German alliance is reducing Germany's
dependence on Russian natural gas and putting Russia on the defensive
rather than the offensive. The key to that now is Turkey, since it
is one of the only routes energy from new sources can cross to get
to Europe from the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. If
Turkey - which has deep influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia,
Ukraine, the Middle East and the Balkans - is prepared to ally
with the United States, Russia is on the defensive and a long-term
solution to Germany's energy problem can be found. On the other hand,
if Turkey decides to take a defensive position and moves to cooperate
with Russia instead, Russia retains the initiative and Germany is
locked into Russian-controlled energy for a generation. (hyperlinks
for subscribers only, sign up for a Free Trial)
Therefore, having sat through fruitless meetings with the Europeans,
Obama chose not to cause a pointless confrontation with a Europe
that is out of options. Instead, Obama completed his trip by going
to Turkey to discuss what the treaty with Armenia means and to try
to convince the Turks to play for high stakes by challenging Russia
in the Caucasus, rather than playing Russia's junior partner.
This is why Obama's most important speech in Europe was his last one,
following Turkey's emergence as a major player in NATO's political
structure. In that speech, he sided with the Turks against Europe,
and extracted some minor concessions from the Europeans on the process
for considering Turkey's accession to the European Union. Why Turkey
wants to be an EU member is not always obvious to us, but they do want
membership. Obama is trying to show the Turks that he can deliver for
them. He reiterated - if not laid it on even more heavily - all of this
in his speech in Ankara. Obama laid out the U.S. position as one that
recognized the tough geopolitical position Turkey is in and the leader
that Turkey is becoming, and also recognized the commonalities between
Washington and Ankara. This was exactly what Turkey wanted to hear.
The Caucasus is far from the only area to discuss. Talks will be held
about blocking Iran in Iraq, U.S. relations with Syria and Syrian talks
with Israel, and Central Asia, where both countries have interests. But
the most important message to the Europeans will be that Europe is
where you go for photo opportunities, but Turkey is where you go to
do the business of geopolitics. It is unlikely that the Germans and
French will get it. Their sense of what is happening in the world is
utterly Eurocentric. But the Central Europeans, on the frontier with
Russia and feeling quite put out by the German position on their banks,
certainly do get it.
Obama gave the Europeans a pass for political reasons, and because
arguing with the Europeans simply won't yield benefits. But the key to
the trip is what he gets out of Turkey - and whether in his speech to
the civilizations, he can draw some of the venom out of the Islamic
world by showing alignment with the largest economy among Muslim
states, Turkey.