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MUJAHIDEEN IN WAR IN KARABAKH
Araks Pashayan
noravank.am/en/?page=analitics&nid=1 735
06 April 2009
The institution of mujahideen1 in its current format had been arranged
in 1980-1990th during the war in Afghanistan and was connected with
the realities of the "cold war". During the whole war in Afghanistan
(1979-1988) the US, particularly through the Saudi and Pakistani
special services, had furnished large-scale financial and military
assistance to the groups fighting against Soviet army. As a result,
after the end of the war and the withdrawal of Soviet troops the
resource of the Afghans and Arab Afghans2 who had a big military
experience was formed and which later attached special significance
to the war in the name of Islam and the idea of "Islamic solidarity"
and was involved in the military actions in Algeria, Central Asia,
the Balkans and Caucuses. That very resource was used while planning
and arranging a number of international terrorist acts.
It is characteristic that in 1991-1994 and most actively in 1993-1994
(till the truce, concluded in 1994) mujanedeen fought on the side of
Azerbaijanis in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
>From the very beginning of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan
had a certain expectations from Islamic circles in the issue of the
settlement of the conflict and the collaboration with those circles
seemed to be promising. After the independence Azerbaijan underlined
its belonging to the Muslim world, trying to make religious accents
in Armenian-Azerbaijani war.
In 1993, when the military forces balance cardinally changed in the
favour of the Armenians Azerbaijan (after the accession to the power of
Heydar Aliyev) made certain steps to include in the military actions
the mercenaries who were enlisted in different Islamic countries,
mainly mujahideen. In 1993 the minister of internal affairs of
Azerbaijan Rovshan Zavadov met the prime-minister of Afghanistan and
the leader of "Hezbe Eslami" ("Islam party") Gulbeddin Hekmatiar and
reached to an accommodation about sending mujanideen to Azerbaijan. And
in several months an Afghani delegation, which included the well-known
Afghani field commander Rashid Dustum, visited Baku to discuss on the
state level the issues concerning approved collaboration. As a result
the air communication was established between Baku and Kabul. Among
the mojahideen sent to Azerbaijan Afghans prevailed (though there were
also Arab Afghans). They were mainly fighters of "Hezbe Eslami" group.
According to the convictions of separate experts the redeployment of
mojahideen to Baku could not be implemented without the assistance
of Pakistani and American special services.
The exact number of the mojahideen who were involved in the military
actions has not been specified till now.
That number varies within the range of 1000-3000. In one of the
publications of "Washington Post" for 1994 it was mentioned that the
mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, The United States, Russia and
Turkey were included in Azerbaijani army, and particularly Turkey
and Iran provided Baku with military instructors. The same source,
referring to the western diplomats, mentioned that in 1993 Azerbaijan
enlisted 1000 Afghan mojahideen.
According to some information mojahideen were mainly placed in the
south-eastern districts of Nagorno-Karabakh front, i.e. in the line
of Fizuli and Zangelan. They did not associate with Azerbaijani
soldiers and this was conditioned by several factors. Azerbaijani
soldiers did not follow the norms of Sharia, used alcohol drinks and
this caused confrontation between the parties. Except this mojahideen
felt repugnance towards Slavonic mercenaries, fighting in Azerbaijani
army. Azerbaijani authorities tried to conceal the participation of
mojahideen in military actions. In order not to publish the issue
they concealed the real number of losses among Afghanis and sent not
all the bodies of killed mojahideen to Afghanistan3.
It is characteristic that during the whole war in Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenia had tried to resist the military assistance from Islamic
circles to Azerbaijan. The letter of the president of Armenia dated
May 1994 to the authorities of Afghanistan, where the concern was
expressed about the involvement of the mojahideen in the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh, may serve as an evidence of that. In the letter of
response the president of Afghanistan condemned the involvement of the
citizens of Afghanistan in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and expressed
the hope that the conflict will be settled by peaceful means, which
can be regarded as a declarative move.
In this connection it is also remarkable that on December 21, 1994
the letter addressed to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights on the question of the use of mercenaries, where
the Authorities of Armenia expressed their complain with the
fact that Azerbaijan used extensively the mercenaries in the war
in Nagorno-Karabakh4. The information about the mercenaries (from
the CIS and other countries: Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan) in the
letter was substantiated by appropriate sources. There was a number
of evidences concerning mojahideen, the spheres where they had served
(860 and 723 motor brigades, air, ground forces, artillery, special
services) and the districts of their dislocation (Jdanov, Shamkhori
regions, the region adjacent to Mingechau, city of Al-Bayrami) were
mentioned and the names of 12 mojahideen enclosed. One of them was
Bakhtiyar Verbollah Baberzain (from the city of Mozari Sharif), who
had been captured by Nagorno-Karabakh forces and with whose help a
number of facts concerning mojanideen were disclosed.
Though the Azerbaijani authorities deny the involvement of mojahideen
in the military actions, it is a proved fact, which is based on the
bodies of mojahideen (in their traditional clothes) killed during
the war and their documents in their traditional languages (Dari
and Pushtu), the religious literature published in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and other material proves found by the defense forces of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Recently there has been an interesting research carried out by
the Michael Taarnby from Real Instituto Elcano Spanish research
centre concerning the involvement of mojahideen in Nagorno-Karabakh
war5. He emphasizes a number of issues in his "The Mujaheddin in
Nagorno-Karabakh" case study, i.e. the issue of the involvement of
mojahideen in Nagorno-Karabakh war and their role in the subsequent
Jihad movements. He divides mujaheddin, who were in Karabakh in three
main groups. The first group includes those who passed from Azerbaijan
to other Caucasian regions and were involved in other conflicts; the
second includes those who settled in Azerbaijan (those who became the
stronghold of militant Islam in Azerbaijan): and in the third group
are deceased Afghanis.
In the opinion of the researcher the majority of the mojahideen who had
passed through the war had returned home, the other part was mostly
involved in anti-Russian struggle. i.e. in the war in Chechnya where
they used the experience from Nagorno-Karabakh war. Among them was
a citizen of Saudi Arabia the well-known field commander of Chechen
descent Hattab, who after the Jihad in Afghanistan was involved in the
anti-governmental Islamic movements in Tajikistan and then in war in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Using the contacts he gained during Karabakh war,
Hattab passed to North Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan) and had been
one of the key persons in Jihad movement until he was killed (in
2002). In his interview dated 2005 the commander of the Azerbaijani
army Azer Rustamov mentioned that hundreds of Chechen volunteers under
the command of field commanders Shamil Basaev and Salman Raduev fought
during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. But due to the heavy casualties
they were obliged to leave.
M. Taarnby makes rather interesting observation. He mentions that war
in Nagorno-Karabakh stayed beyond the vision of international Jihad
movement. There have been almost no manipulations on this issue in
the oratory of militant Islam. Though there were many mojahideen
killed in that war none of the leader of Jihad movement (including
Bin Laden) ever turned to that item. In the opinion of the researcher
this is mainly conditioned by the fact that in Nagorno-Karabakh war
Azerbaijani side was defeated. Except this, as Taarnmy mentions,
mojahideen were engaged in the war mainly as mercenaries.
The involvement of mojahideen in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in a
certain manner encouraged the establishment of radical Islam structures
(including Wahhabi) in Azerbaijan. Since 1990th a number of branches of
international radical Islam organizations ("Hizb Attahrir", "Tablighi
Zamaat", "Al-Jihad Al-Islam", "Jeish Ul-Islam", "Al-Djihad" and others)
have been working in Azerbaijan. The territory of Azerbaijan had been
often used to supply weapons, financial, material and other means
and fighters to Chechnya and Dagestan.
After the 9/11, according to the American media, mainly New York
Associated Press, the Congressing Research Service in its repot,
which was published on September 10, 2001, stated that separate
groups and individuals who was connected with Osama Bin Laden and "Al
Qaeda", used the territory of Azerbaijan as a stronghold of terrorist
network. It was mentioned that in 1998 after the explosions in the
American embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar Es Salami (Tanzania)
the FBI established 60 telephone calls between Bin Laden and his
associates from the branch of "Islam Jihad" ("Al-Islam Al-Jihad") in
Baku. (It is not a mere chance that after the events on September 11
many had spoken about the possible Azerbaijani trace in that terrorist
act). In that period and after 2001 there was a pressure Washington
on Azerbaijan. They demanded to struggle against radical Islamist
organizations and Azerbaijani authorities initiated that struggle. But
even today there is a possible threat of Islam radicalization and
special services of the country always keep it in the field of vision.
In fact, war in Nagorno-Karabakh was the first test mojahideen passed
in post-Soviet space. Armenian defense forces, as a matter of fact,
succeeded in standing against international Jihad structures. The
heavy defeat of Azerbaijan in war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the heavy
casualties of Afghans compelled them to leave Azerbaijan and move to
North Caucasus and the Balkans.
Araks Pashayan
noravank.am/en/?page=analitics&nid=1 735
06 April 2009
The institution of mujahideen1 in its current format had been arranged
in 1980-1990th during the war in Afghanistan and was connected with
the realities of the "cold war". During the whole war in Afghanistan
(1979-1988) the US, particularly through the Saudi and Pakistani
special services, had furnished large-scale financial and military
assistance to the groups fighting against Soviet army. As a result,
after the end of the war and the withdrawal of Soviet troops the
resource of the Afghans and Arab Afghans2 who had a big military
experience was formed and which later attached special significance
to the war in the name of Islam and the idea of "Islamic solidarity"
and was involved in the military actions in Algeria, Central Asia,
the Balkans and Caucuses. That very resource was used while planning
and arranging a number of international terrorist acts.
It is characteristic that in 1991-1994 and most actively in 1993-1994
(till the truce, concluded in 1994) mujanedeen fought on the side of
Azerbaijanis in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
>From the very beginning of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan
had a certain expectations from Islamic circles in the issue of the
settlement of the conflict and the collaboration with those circles
seemed to be promising. After the independence Azerbaijan underlined
its belonging to the Muslim world, trying to make religious accents
in Armenian-Azerbaijani war.
In 1993, when the military forces balance cardinally changed in the
favour of the Armenians Azerbaijan (after the accession to the power of
Heydar Aliyev) made certain steps to include in the military actions
the mercenaries who were enlisted in different Islamic countries,
mainly mujahideen. In 1993 the minister of internal affairs of
Azerbaijan Rovshan Zavadov met the prime-minister of Afghanistan and
the leader of "Hezbe Eslami" ("Islam party") Gulbeddin Hekmatiar and
reached to an accommodation about sending mujanideen to Azerbaijan. And
in several months an Afghani delegation, which included the well-known
Afghani field commander Rashid Dustum, visited Baku to discuss on the
state level the issues concerning approved collaboration. As a result
the air communication was established between Baku and Kabul. Among
the mojahideen sent to Azerbaijan Afghans prevailed (though there were
also Arab Afghans). They were mainly fighters of "Hezbe Eslami" group.
According to the convictions of separate experts the redeployment of
mojahideen to Baku could not be implemented without the assistance
of Pakistani and American special services.
The exact number of the mojahideen who were involved in the military
actions has not been specified till now.
That number varies within the range of 1000-3000. In one of the
publications of "Washington Post" for 1994 it was mentioned that the
mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, The United States, Russia and
Turkey were included in Azerbaijani army, and particularly Turkey
and Iran provided Baku with military instructors. The same source,
referring to the western diplomats, mentioned that in 1993 Azerbaijan
enlisted 1000 Afghan mojahideen.
According to some information mojahideen were mainly placed in the
south-eastern districts of Nagorno-Karabakh front, i.e. in the line
of Fizuli and Zangelan. They did not associate with Azerbaijani
soldiers and this was conditioned by several factors. Azerbaijani
soldiers did not follow the norms of Sharia, used alcohol drinks and
this caused confrontation between the parties. Except this mojahideen
felt repugnance towards Slavonic mercenaries, fighting in Azerbaijani
army. Azerbaijani authorities tried to conceal the participation of
mojahideen in military actions. In order not to publish the issue
they concealed the real number of losses among Afghanis and sent not
all the bodies of killed mojahideen to Afghanistan3.
It is characteristic that during the whole war in Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenia had tried to resist the military assistance from Islamic
circles to Azerbaijan. The letter of the president of Armenia dated
May 1994 to the authorities of Afghanistan, where the concern was
expressed about the involvement of the mojahideen in the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh, may serve as an evidence of that. In the letter of
response the president of Afghanistan condemned the involvement of the
citizens of Afghanistan in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and expressed
the hope that the conflict will be settled by peaceful means, which
can be regarded as a declarative move.
In this connection it is also remarkable that on December 21, 1994
the letter addressed to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights on the question of the use of mercenaries, where
the Authorities of Armenia expressed their complain with the
fact that Azerbaijan used extensively the mercenaries in the war
in Nagorno-Karabakh4. The information about the mercenaries (from
the CIS and other countries: Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan) in the
letter was substantiated by appropriate sources. There was a number
of evidences concerning mojahideen, the spheres where they had served
(860 and 723 motor brigades, air, ground forces, artillery, special
services) and the districts of their dislocation (Jdanov, Shamkhori
regions, the region adjacent to Mingechau, city of Al-Bayrami) were
mentioned and the names of 12 mojahideen enclosed. One of them was
Bakhtiyar Verbollah Baberzain (from the city of Mozari Sharif), who
had been captured by Nagorno-Karabakh forces and with whose help a
number of facts concerning mojanideen were disclosed.
Though the Azerbaijani authorities deny the involvement of mojahideen
in the military actions, it is a proved fact, which is based on the
bodies of mojahideen (in their traditional clothes) killed during
the war and their documents in their traditional languages (Dari
and Pushtu), the religious literature published in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and other material proves found by the defense forces of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Recently there has been an interesting research carried out by
the Michael Taarnby from Real Instituto Elcano Spanish research
centre concerning the involvement of mojahideen in Nagorno-Karabakh
war5. He emphasizes a number of issues in his "The Mujaheddin in
Nagorno-Karabakh" case study, i.e. the issue of the involvement of
mojahideen in Nagorno-Karabakh war and their role in the subsequent
Jihad movements. He divides mujaheddin, who were in Karabakh in three
main groups. The first group includes those who passed from Azerbaijan
to other Caucasian regions and were involved in other conflicts; the
second includes those who settled in Azerbaijan (those who became the
stronghold of militant Islam in Azerbaijan): and in the third group
are deceased Afghanis.
In the opinion of the researcher the majority of the mojahideen who had
passed through the war had returned home, the other part was mostly
involved in anti-Russian struggle. i.e. in the war in Chechnya where
they used the experience from Nagorno-Karabakh war. Among them was
a citizen of Saudi Arabia the well-known field commander of Chechen
descent Hattab, who after the Jihad in Afghanistan was involved in the
anti-governmental Islamic movements in Tajikistan and then in war in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Using the contacts he gained during Karabakh war,
Hattab passed to North Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan) and had been
one of the key persons in Jihad movement until he was killed (in
2002). In his interview dated 2005 the commander of the Azerbaijani
army Azer Rustamov mentioned that hundreds of Chechen volunteers under
the command of field commanders Shamil Basaev and Salman Raduev fought
during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. But due to the heavy casualties
they were obliged to leave.
M. Taarnby makes rather interesting observation. He mentions that war
in Nagorno-Karabakh stayed beyond the vision of international Jihad
movement. There have been almost no manipulations on this issue in
the oratory of militant Islam. Though there were many mojahideen
killed in that war none of the leader of Jihad movement (including
Bin Laden) ever turned to that item. In the opinion of the researcher
this is mainly conditioned by the fact that in Nagorno-Karabakh war
Azerbaijani side was defeated. Except this, as Taarnmy mentions,
mojahideen were engaged in the war mainly as mercenaries.
The involvement of mojahideen in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in a
certain manner encouraged the establishment of radical Islam structures
(including Wahhabi) in Azerbaijan. Since 1990th a number of branches of
international radical Islam organizations ("Hizb Attahrir", "Tablighi
Zamaat", "Al-Jihad Al-Islam", "Jeish Ul-Islam", "Al-Djihad" and others)
have been working in Azerbaijan. The territory of Azerbaijan had been
often used to supply weapons, financial, material and other means
and fighters to Chechnya and Dagestan.
After the 9/11, according to the American media, mainly New York
Associated Press, the Congressing Research Service in its repot,
which was published on September 10, 2001, stated that separate
groups and individuals who was connected with Osama Bin Laden and "Al
Qaeda", used the territory of Azerbaijan as a stronghold of terrorist
network. It was mentioned that in 1998 after the explosions in the
American embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar Es Salami (Tanzania)
the FBI established 60 telephone calls between Bin Laden and his
associates from the branch of "Islam Jihad" ("Al-Islam Al-Jihad") in
Baku. (It is not a mere chance that after the events on September 11
many had spoken about the possible Azerbaijani trace in that terrorist
act). In that period and after 2001 there was a pressure Washington
on Azerbaijan. They demanded to struggle against radical Islamist
organizations and Azerbaijani authorities initiated that struggle. But
even today there is a possible threat of Islam radicalization and
special services of the country always keep it in the field of vision.
In fact, war in Nagorno-Karabakh was the first test mojahideen passed
in post-Soviet space. Armenian defense forces, as a matter of fact,
succeeded in standing against international Jihad structures. The
heavy defeat of Azerbaijan in war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the heavy
casualties of Afghans compelled them to leave Azerbaijan and move to
North Caucasus and the Balkans.