WHY U.S. PRESIDENT OBAMA MUST BE A 'CAUTIOUS REALIST'
Guner Ozkan
Journal of Turkish Weekly
April 10 2009
Obama was met like a pop star anywhere he went in Europe and Turkey
in last several days. There are many credible reasons for this:
young, dynamic, kind, black, inspirational, non-unilateralist, and
so on. These credentials and characteristics he has and displays
are very different from those of his predecessor, G.W. Bush. During
his more than two-day visit to Turkey, he said a lot and not much at
the same time, just like he did in London, Strasbourg, and Prague,
about the challenges the world is confronted with. Someone who was
listening to Obama during his visits, and even before during his
election campaign, can easily describe him as an idealist. But Obama
himself says he is not. He expresses that he is well aware of the
difficulties and challenges ahead to resolve piles of problems from
Afghanistan, global terrorism, Iraq, and non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons to environmental issues in a short period of time. He is
right, nobody should expect that all these issues can be and will be
resolved soon, and also nobody should ask the U.S. to resolve them on
its own. He also says that when toughness is required, the U.S. under
his leadership will be tough. So, while impacts of Bush's policies,
and most importantly the long term legacy of U.S. foreign policy
around the world, are still being vividly felt, Obama cannot be a pure
idealist. He has to be a 'cautious realist' at best. Mammoth challenges
in and about Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus
explain why Obama is and has to follow a policy of 'cautious realism'.
Afghanistan
Just take a look at the enormous challenges Afghanistan has faced
for decades: war lords, clan rules, ethnic divisions, religious
extremism, opium cultivation, poverty, illiteracy, displaced persons,
and external influences. The sheer size and diversity of the problems
in Afghanistan are so great that the U.S. has not been and will not
be able to resolve them all on its own. In fact, most Americans know
this fact, and that is why they elected someone like Obama as their
President, an advocate of cooperation and multilateralism for common
challenges. But will Obama get that much needed help from those states
he and previous U.S. governments called as their allies. Hardly likely
so. Everyone knows that Afghanistan needs two things at the same time:
a huge economic, social, and educational development programme and a
well trained military force. It is because the development programme
is needed for long term salvation of the country, and the second is
necessary for the protection of accomplished improvements. These two
necessities must be applied for at least a generation-long period
of time if success is really wanted. The U.S. allies have committed
neither enough financial assistance nor essential military force
to Afghanistan during either the G20 Meeting in London or in the
NATO Summit in Strasbourg. The G20 gathering dealt more with how to
resolve the global financial crisis and the NATO Summit produced just
five thousand more troops from various allies of the U.S. only for
providing security for the upcoming elections in Afghanistan. An
Afghanistan without a substantial development strategy cannot be
stable no matter how many soldiers are deployed in the country and
how many times suspected Al Qaeda houses and members are bombed by
the U.S. in northern Pakistan.
So, the new U.S. government has to increase pressure on its rich
allies to devote more capital, manpower, and energy to the development
and security of Afghanistan. For sure this must include Pakistan,
too, as it has now become a major safe haven for Al Qaeda and its
sympathisers. Other immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, namely China,
Iran, and the Central Asian Republics, have to be convinced that the
U.S. is in Afghanistan just for security and stability there, not for
any other objectives. Just like the U.S. has, they have seen Al-Qaeda
and instability in Afghanistan as one of the most important threats
against their security. Yet, convincing those states to help the U.S.,
at least with the logistic supply or joint operations in development
and security issues, still requires diplomatic and practical, honest
policy applications and changes on the ground in their relationships
with Washington. Without accomplishing any ease of tension between
Washington, Moscow, and Tehran on other bilateral issues, such as
Missile defence systems in Eastern Europe and Iran's nuclear ambitions,
the U.S. cannot get any genuine support for Afghanistan from Iran and
the Central Asian states, which are still in Russia's orbit. Obama
has indeed been trying to realise the abovementioned policies. He
is trying to open up a new chapter with Russia by sorting out the
issue of missile defence shield in Czech Republic and Poland, and
calling for a further reduction in nuclear weapons. In the case of
Iran, apparently the most difficult one, he has again called for
cooperation over Afghanistan. While in an international arena where
mistrust is still rampant, mainly thanks to G.W. Bush, there is no
room for idealism at least for now. Being aware of this, though in
the initial period Obama's appeal to the world on Afghanistan appears
idealistic, it will soon turn into a 'cautious realism' and perhaps
farther on into a pure realism.
Middle East
The Middle East impasse, particularly the Arab-Israel conflict, though
this is, one way or another, connected with Afghanistan, has remained
'the mother of all conflicts' in front of the world and Obama. The
motto of 'unclench your fist' and his visit to Turkey were positive
steps taken in the right direction by Obama. But, these words and
visits should not be left just as mere rhetoric, and so have to be
supported by concrete policy actions on the ground. These steps should
be taken first by the U.S. as it is occupying the strongest and most
influential positions in the developments in the Middle East. Turkey
can and should continue to be an intermediary between Syria and Israel
and Iran and the U.S., but its being an interlocutor cannot produce
any success if the U.S. government continues to remain indifferent to
the plight of Palestinian people. So long as the U.S. policy towards
Israel continues as 'business as usual', and while Palestinians are
still being killed, it is highly unlikely that people in the Middle
East will unclench their fist. Nor will Iran, especially on the
nuclear issue, ever be convinced of the honesty and idealism that
the new U.S. administration has put on display.
Obama's conviction is true that a nuclear Iran will likely lead a
number of Middle Eastern states to rush to obtain nuclear weapons
for their security urge. From Obama's viewpoint such a development is
unacceptable, as it carries the likely danger of using those devices
in a highly unstable Middle East. So, there are not too many options
really. As the sanctions did not work, the option of bombing Iran
was considered by Bush and is still on the table for Israel. The
other and the last and best option is the honest engagement of the
U.S. in the peace process between Israel and the Arab states. This
has to include the establishment of a viable Palestinian state in
the pre-1967 war borders. A Palestinian state falling short of this
requirement will neither provide viability nor appease people in
the Middle East nor end conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
nor root out cells of Al-Qaeda around the world. The appointment of
George Mitchell, the peace-broker in the Northern Ireland conflict,
as the special envoy for the Middle East may be considered a good
start. But one should not forget the fact that the Northern Ireland
issue is different from the Arab-Israeli conflict, for while it is
a more balanced dispute between Catholic and Protestant Irish people
only on religious and territorial grounds, the latter conflict concerns
the continuous territorial expansion of Israel at the expense of Arabs
and Palestinians on an ethnic ground and non-stop humiliation of the
Muslim World on the religious ground. It is now much more difficult to
obtain peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, since Israel is governed
by an unbending and robust new government led by Netanyahu. Thus,
Obama's appeal to the Muslim World during his visit to Turkey is a
kind gesture and was surely warmly welcomed by many in Turkey and the
rest of the Muslim World. Obama's wish to see a peaceful Middle East
and his ideas to bring the conflicting sides together seem to have a
chance of success only if he gets equal warmth from a similar appeal
to be made to the Israeli people and pro-Israeli lobbies in the U.S.
South Caucasus
Regarding the South Caucasus, Obama appears to have mainly urged
the Turkish side to open its border with Armenia. Armenian isolation
and its economic and military dependency on Russia have been partly
contributed to by the Turkish embargo of closing the border and
denying the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yerevan. But
it was Armenia's own choice from the very beginning, in the early
1990s, and even before the dissolution of the USSR, that leaning on
Russia was the most secure policy in the region against not just
Turkey but Azerbaijan, too. Regarding Turkey's regional greatness
in terms of its size, economy, and military power, it may be thought
that Ankara can accommodate unilateral compromises to be made towards
Armenia on the border, diplomatic, and so-called 'Armenian Genocide'
issues. Doing so without any compromise on the Nagorno Karabakh
dispute by the Armenian side will cause huge disappointment in
Azerbaijan with a possible consequence of delaying, if not totally
abrogating, the NABUCCO project. It is also hugely difficult for
the Turkish government to have the Turkish public opinion absorb any
compromise to be given to Armenian side without getting any progress
or guarantees on Armenia's resistance to recognise Turkish borders,
Diaspora Armenians' insistence on the recognition of the so-called
'Armenian Genocide' and the Nagorno Karabakh issue.
The U.S. policy in the South Caucasus, as Obama implied during his
visit, will likely be similar to that of the Clinton Administration,
which was based on including Russia and expecting intra-regional
disputes to be resolved among themselves with some external
encouragements when and if necessary. After Georgia lost the August
2008 war against Russia and during the still ongoing war of words
between Saakashvili and Russian leaders, new energy pipelines via
Tbilisi have become harder to work on. Against the odds, Russia-Turkey
relations have become even stronger following the Georgian crisis. A
solution to the NK problem would then boost the restart of the energy
cooperation in the region, but again, on the condition of satisfaction
of the Azerbaijani side. The participation of Georgia in this new
cooperative effort will possibly be delayed until after the replacement
of Saakashvili with another, but much more balanced and cautious,
pro-Western government. The upcoming demonstration of the united
opposition against Saakashvili will likely decide whether Georgia's
return to regional cooperation is going to be sooner or later.
In the end, challenges of the world are so many and too much
complicated and bigger that even the U.S. cannot sort them out
alone. The Obama government has, in fact, had no such claim of
resolving things on its own as being either a financial and political
supplier or world cop. Obama as the leader of the most powerful
state can, as he himself often stresses, encourages the hesitant ones
and opens the way for others to facilitate further cooperation among
themselves. Obama is and has to be an optimist and obviously appears to
be an idealist for many. But, the legacy of Bush has left such a world
that being an idealist for the U.S. in these days cannot bring any
good for peace, security and prosperity in the world. There are areas
in which the U.S. will have to follow realist policies and other areas
in which it will seem to be pursuing an idealist approach. Overall,
Obama will be a 'cautious realist', and his foreign policy will sooner
or later reflect that. In either case Obama, during his visit, asked
Turkey to be part of it as the U.S.'s 'model partner'. Can Turkey
and the U.S. manage to develop and enrich this new relationship as
a real 'model' for the rest of the Middle East and the world? Yes,
they can, so long as the U.S. pursues a bit of constructive foreign
policy beginning first as an honest peace broker in the Middle East.
* Guner Ozkan is a lecturer at Mugla University and an expert on
the Caucasus at the Ankara-based International Strategic Research
Organization (USAK).
Guner Ozkan
Journal of Turkish Weekly
April 10 2009
Obama was met like a pop star anywhere he went in Europe and Turkey
in last several days. There are many credible reasons for this:
young, dynamic, kind, black, inspirational, non-unilateralist, and
so on. These credentials and characteristics he has and displays
are very different from those of his predecessor, G.W. Bush. During
his more than two-day visit to Turkey, he said a lot and not much at
the same time, just like he did in London, Strasbourg, and Prague,
about the challenges the world is confronted with. Someone who was
listening to Obama during his visits, and even before during his
election campaign, can easily describe him as an idealist. But Obama
himself says he is not. He expresses that he is well aware of the
difficulties and challenges ahead to resolve piles of problems from
Afghanistan, global terrorism, Iraq, and non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons to environmental issues in a short period of time. He is
right, nobody should expect that all these issues can be and will be
resolved soon, and also nobody should ask the U.S. to resolve them on
its own. He also says that when toughness is required, the U.S. under
his leadership will be tough. So, while impacts of Bush's policies,
and most importantly the long term legacy of U.S. foreign policy
around the world, are still being vividly felt, Obama cannot be a pure
idealist. He has to be a 'cautious realist' at best. Mammoth challenges
in and about Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus
explain why Obama is and has to follow a policy of 'cautious realism'.
Afghanistan
Just take a look at the enormous challenges Afghanistan has faced
for decades: war lords, clan rules, ethnic divisions, religious
extremism, opium cultivation, poverty, illiteracy, displaced persons,
and external influences. The sheer size and diversity of the problems
in Afghanistan are so great that the U.S. has not been and will not
be able to resolve them all on its own. In fact, most Americans know
this fact, and that is why they elected someone like Obama as their
President, an advocate of cooperation and multilateralism for common
challenges. But will Obama get that much needed help from those states
he and previous U.S. governments called as their allies. Hardly likely
so. Everyone knows that Afghanistan needs two things at the same time:
a huge economic, social, and educational development programme and a
well trained military force. It is because the development programme
is needed for long term salvation of the country, and the second is
necessary for the protection of accomplished improvements. These two
necessities must be applied for at least a generation-long period
of time if success is really wanted. The U.S. allies have committed
neither enough financial assistance nor essential military force
to Afghanistan during either the G20 Meeting in London or in the
NATO Summit in Strasbourg. The G20 gathering dealt more with how to
resolve the global financial crisis and the NATO Summit produced just
five thousand more troops from various allies of the U.S. only for
providing security for the upcoming elections in Afghanistan. An
Afghanistan without a substantial development strategy cannot be
stable no matter how many soldiers are deployed in the country and
how many times suspected Al Qaeda houses and members are bombed by
the U.S. in northern Pakistan.
So, the new U.S. government has to increase pressure on its rich
allies to devote more capital, manpower, and energy to the development
and security of Afghanistan. For sure this must include Pakistan,
too, as it has now become a major safe haven for Al Qaeda and its
sympathisers. Other immediate neighbours of Afghanistan, namely China,
Iran, and the Central Asian Republics, have to be convinced that the
U.S. is in Afghanistan just for security and stability there, not for
any other objectives. Just like the U.S. has, they have seen Al-Qaeda
and instability in Afghanistan as one of the most important threats
against their security. Yet, convincing those states to help the U.S.,
at least with the logistic supply or joint operations in development
and security issues, still requires diplomatic and practical, honest
policy applications and changes on the ground in their relationships
with Washington. Without accomplishing any ease of tension between
Washington, Moscow, and Tehran on other bilateral issues, such as
Missile defence systems in Eastern Europe and Iran's nuclear ambitions,
the U.S. cannot get any genuine support for Afghanistan from Iran and
the Central Asian states, which are still in Russia's orbit. Obama
has indeed been trying to realise the abovementioned policies. He
is trying to open up a new chapter with Russia by sorting out the
issue of missile defence shield in Czech Republic and Poland, and
calling for a further reduction in nuclear weapons. In the case of
Iran, apparently the most difficult one, he has again called for
cooperation over Afghanistan. While in an international arena where
mistrust is still rampant, mainly thanks to G.W. Bush, there is no
room for idealism at least for now. Being aware of this, though in
the initial period Obama's appeal to the world on Afghanistan appears
idealistic, it will soon turn into a 'cautious realism' and perhaps
farther on into a pure realism.
Middle East
The Middle East impasse, particularly the Arab-Israel conflict, though
this is, one way or another, connected with Afghanistan, has remained
'the mother of all conflicts' in front of the world and Obama. The
motto of 'unclench your fist' and his visit to Turkey were positive
steps taken in the right direction by Obama. But, these words and
visits should not be left just as mere rhetoric, and so have to be
supported by concrete policy actions on the ground. These steps should
be taken first by the U.S. as it is occupying the strongest and most
influential positions in the developments in the Middle East. Turkey
can and should continue to be an intermediary between Syria and Israel
and Iran and the U.S., but its being an interlocutor cannot produce
any success if the U.S. government continues to remain indifferent to
the plight of Palestinian people. So long as the U.S. policy towards
Israel continues as 'business as usual', and while Palestinians are
still being killed, it is highly unlikely that people in the Middle
East will unclench their fist. Nor will Iran, especially on the
nuclear issue, ever be convinced of the honesty and idealism that
the new U.S. administration has put on display.
Obama's conviction is true that a nuclear Iran will likely lead a
number of Middle Eastern states to rush to obtain nuclear weapons
for their security urge. From Obama's viewpoint such a development is
unacceptable, as it carries the likely danger of using those devices
in a highly unstable Middle East. So, there are not too many options
really. As the sanctions did not work, the option of bombing Iran
was considered by Bush and is still on the table for Israel. The
other and the last and best option is the honest engagement of the
U.S. in the peace process between Israel and the Arab states. This
has to include the establishment of a viable Palestinian state in
the pre-1967 war borders. A Palestinian state falling short of this
requirement will neither provide viability nor appease people in
the Middle East nor end conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
nor root out cells of Al-Qaeda around the world. The appointment of
George Mitchell, the peace-broker in the Northern Ireland conflict,
as the special envoy for the Middle East may be considered a good
start. But one should not forget the fact that the Northern Ireland
issue is different from the Arab-Israeli conflict, for while it is
a more balanced dispute between Catholic and Protestant Irish people
only on religious and territorial grounds, the latter conflict concerns
the continuous territorial expansion of Israel at the expense of Arabs
and Palestinians on an ethnic ground and non-stop humiliation of the
Muslim World on the religious ground. It is now much more difficult to
obtain peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, since Israel is governed
by an unbending and robust new government led by Netanyahu. Thus,
Obama's appeal to the Muslim World during his visit to Turkey is a
kind gesture and was surely warmly welcomed by many in Turkey and the
rest of the Muslim World. Obama's wish to see a peaceful Middle East
and his ideas to bring the conflicting sides together seem to have a
chance of success only if he gets equal warmth from a similar appeal
to be made to the Israeli people and pro-Israeli lobbies in the U.S.
South Caucasus
Regarding the South Caucasus, Obama appears to have mainly urged
the Turkish side to open its border with Armenia. Armenian isolation
and its economic and military dependency on Russia have been partly
contributed to by the Turkish embargo of closing the border and
denying the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yerevan. But
it was Armenia's own choice from the very beginning, in the early
1990s, and even before the dissolution of the USSR, that leaning on
Russia was the most secure policy in the region against not just
Turkey but Azerbaijan, too. Regarding Turkey's regional greatness
in terms of its size, economy, and military power, it may be thought
that Ankara can accommodate unilateral compromises to be made towards
Armenia on the border, diplomatic, and so-called 'Armenian Genocide'
issues. Doing so without any compromise on the Nagorno Karabakh
dispute by the Armenian side will cause huge disappointment in
Azerbaijan with a possible consequence of delaying, if not totally
abrogating, the NABUCCO project. It is also hugely difficult for
the Turkish government to have the Turkish public opinion absorb any
compromise to be given to Armenian side without getting any progress
or guarantees on Armenia's resistance to recognise Turkish borders,
Diaspora Armenians' insistence on the recognition of the so-called
'Armenian Genocide' and the Nagorno Karabakh issue.
The U.S. policy in the South Caucasus, as Obama implied during his
visit, will likely be similar to that of the Clinton Administration,
which was based on including Russia and expecting intra-regional
disputes to be resolved among themselves with some external
encouragements when and if necessary. After Georgia lost the August
2008 war against Russia and during the still ongoing war of words
between Saakashvili and Russian leaders, new energy pipelines via
Tbilisi have become harder to work on. Against the odds, Russia-Turkey
relations have become even stronger following the Georgian crisis. A
solution to the NK problem would then boost the restart of the energy
cooperation in the region, but again, on the condition of satisfaction
of the Azerbaijani side. The participation of Georgia in this new
cooperative effort will possibly be delayed until after the replacement
of Saakashvili with another, but much more balanced and cautious,
pro-Western government. The upcoming demonstration of the united
opposition against Saakashvili will likely decide whether Georgia's
return to regional cooperation is going to be sooner or later.
In the end, challenges of the world are so many and too much
complicated and bigger that even the U.S. cannot sort them out
alone. The Obama government has, in fact, had no such claim of
resolving things on its own as being either a financial and political
supplier or world cop. Obama as the leader of the most powerful
state can, as he himself often stresses, encourages the hesitant ones
and opens the way for others to facilitate further cooperation among
themselves. Obama is and has to be an optimist and obviously appears to
be an idealist for many. But, the legacy of Bush has left such a world
that being an idealist for the U.S. in these days cannot bring any
good for peace, security and prosperity in the world. There are areas
in which the U.S. will have to follow realist policies and other areas
in which it will seem to be pursuing an idealist approach. Overall,
Obama will be a 'cautious realist', and his foreign policy will sooner
or later reflect that. In either case Obama, during his visit, asked
Turkey to be part of it as the U.S.'s 'model partner'. Can Turkey
and the U.S. manage to develop and enrich this new relationship as
a real 'model' for the rest of the Middle East and the world? Yes,
they can, so long as the U.S. pursues a bit of constructive foreign
policy beginning first as an honest peace broker in the Middle East.
* Guner Ozkan is a lecturer at Mugla University and an expert on
the Caucasus at the Ankara-based International Strategic Research
Organization (USAK).