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Hürriyet, Turkey
April 12 2009
TEXT: Full transcript of Mark Parris interview
- Let me start from the beginning: Why do you think the decision to
visit Turkey was taken so quickly? It seems even the State Department
was caught unawares and had to be informed by the CIA.
The decision does seem to have been made quickly. But you have to
remember we are only in the opening days of the new Administration.
In periods of transition, when some key people are not even yet in
place, it's not surprising that the decision-making process is
sometimes a little unpredictable. I think what's important is not the
process, but the fact that this was clearly a considered decision, in
the opening months of the Administration, that has to be interpreted
as reflecting its core priorities. That has to be good news for
U.S. ` Turkish relations in the years ahead.
- Whatever the reason, why do you think the visit has been such a big
story? What does it say to the world about U.S. ` Turkish relations
and American priorities? How should it be read by players like the
EU, NATO, Russia, the Islamic world?
It's a big story because we've never seen this before. It took Bill
Clinton 7 years to visit Turkey. It took George W. Bush 3 years, I
think, and even then it was only for a day and to attend a
multilateral event. So this says in a very potent way that the Obama
Administration takes Turkey very seriously. Clearly the world is
paying attention. We've already seen reactions from some Europeans to
the President's strong endorsement of Turkey's EU candidacy. I'd
guess the Russians will be watching closely as the U.S. and Turkey
gear up their cooperation on strategic energy issues. There has been,
as best I can tell, quite a positive reaction in the Muslim world to
the President's words on Islam, and it will not have been lost that
those words were spoken on the floor of Turkey's Parliament. The
bottom line, I suppose, is that the revival of a U.S. ` Turkish
partnership that is more than just rhetorical is an important
development throughout your region and the world.
- Should this be seen as a visit to the land of `Erdogan the conqueror
of Davos'? Should we conclude from the fact that it followed the `one
minute' outburst that the Israel-Turkey crisis has already been
patched up behind closed doors? Or is it simply that the U.S. has
higher prioities than the tension between Israel and Turkey?
I don't think either side looked very good or statesmanlike at Davos.
The Prime Minister's performance ` as conveyed by the media ` made a
strong, basically negative impression on American audiences. As
someone who worries about how Turkey is perceived in America, I
regretted that. But predictions that Davos would destroy
Turkish-Israeli relations or undercut Turkey's regional influence were
clearly exaggerated. My impression is that the damage to
Turkish-Israeli relations has in fact been contained: even if Israeli
confidence in Turkey's impartiality has suffered ` and it probably has
` Israeli leaders value their strategic relationship with Turkey. And
it is important that the Prime Minister resisted calls to take
concrete steps to scale back state-to-state cooperation. Under the
circumstances, I doubt the Davos affair was a major factor in the
decision to propose a visit to Turkey.
- How do you respond to the comment: `Turkey takes the place of
Israel.'
I haven't a clue what it is supposed to mean. If it means we have to
choose between one or the other, it is nonsense. We won't. We
haven't. We value our relationship to both countries and have always
seen good relations between Turkey and Israel as enhancing
U.S. interests in the region. And not, I would add, at the expense of
other parties.
- Before getting to questions regarding Turkey, a few questions on the
NATO summit. First, why Rasmussen? Why has Obama insisted upon such
a name, and one with a style and history very different from Obama?
I'm not privy to the details of the deal to pick Rasmussen. And I
don't know the gentlemen, so I can't comment on his style. He does
have a history with the Muslim world, and I don't think it was
inappropriate for Turkey to raise this as an issue when so many of the
Alliance's challenges are in predominantly Muslim countries or
regions. President Obama clearly had a strong interest in a
harmonious outcome to his first NATO summit. My guess is that
Washington's approach to selecting a new Secretary General was
primarily a function of that. Showing flexibility on what was
obviously a difficult decision for Turkey demonstrated maturity and
responsibility, and, no doubt, helped set the stage for a successful
visit a few days later.
- Would Turkey have had a better chance of getting what it wanted on
this issue if it had delayed the matter until after Obama's visit?
Did Erdogan's Davos outburst lose the case for Rasmussen?
The answer in both cases is, `I doubt it.' In the first case, failure
to pick a new Secretary General would have exploded the NATO summit,
and the Obama visit would then have taken place in a very different
context. I'd be surprised if Davos came up at all in the resolution
of this issue.
- First a Davos crisis and then the Rasmussen crisis¦ Do you agree
with comments by some Western observers that these two crises have
hurt Prime Minister Erdogan's image?
I've already said that I think the Davos incident made a negative
impression on American audiences. Some of those audiences have since
been openly critical of the Prime Minister's behavior. Some have
cited Davos to question his reliability as a partner. I think that is
too radical a conclusion. And so, apparently, does President Obama.
As for the Rasmussen affair, most Americans are probably unaware that
there was one: the only people inclined to draw conclusions about the
Prime Minister from that episode were those who had done so before
Rasmussen became an issue. Clearly, it had no impact on Obama's visit
to Turkey, thanks in part, again, to the skill with which Ankara
ultimately allowed the matter to be resolved.
- Do you think Europe will ever give the U.S. what it wants on
Afghanistan? Is it asking Turkey to do more there than it is asking
others?
There are lots of ways our allies can help deal with what is, after
all, a common threat in Afghanistan and its immediate neighborhood.
In an ideal world, I'm sure President Obama would have liked to take
home commitments for new combat forces in Afghanistan. We don't live
in an ideal world. So we'll take the help we can get, and I suspect
we will keep after our allies to do more as we move forward. In the
world we live in, though, some countries can help more than others.
Turkey can help a lot, and of course already has. I think a major
reason for the visit is an awareness of Turkey's long-standing
influence on both sides of the Afghan/Pak border (as reflected in the
trilateral meeting President Gul convened just before Obama arrived),
of the role Turkey has played in ISAF, of the kind of `soft power'
Turkey can bring to this effort. These are vital inputs as the Obama
Administration gets its Af/Pak strategy underway.
- How do you expect Europe to react to Obama's reemphasis on the
importance of bringing Turkey into the EU? Will his initiative help
or hurt Turkey's chances?
I suspect President Sarkozy's response tells you that he and a lot of
other Europeans will be hard to convince, if their minds are not, in
fact, already made up. But I think the way to look at this is: what
if the U.S. stopped publicly supporting Turkey's candidacy? My guess
is that it would make it that much easier for those in Europe who
oppose letting Turkey in to win the debate. And remember that, during
previous periods of impasse between the EU and Turkey, for example
after the Luxembourg summit of 1997, a strong, expanding U.S. `
Turkish relationship seemed to provide a stimulus to what will always
be, at its core, a Turkish-European conversation. I think, on
balance, we can help.
- Now the visit to Turkey ¦ In fact the central question before,
during and after the visit is: why did Obama come? If you make a list
of reasons, what are your top five?
I think the answer to The Big Question has to lie in the bleak foreign
policy picture the President inherited from his predecessor. It's
hard to think of a recent U.S. President who has faced more ` and more
urgent ` challenges abroad upon taking office. When you face problems
of this magnitude, you look for friends who can help. The fact is
that, since so many of the most serious issues are in places close to
Turkey, or in which Turkey has significant historic or current
influence, Turkey can help Obama more than most. I think it's about
as simple as that. If you want to put it in terms of a list of areas
where Washington will be looking for help, I'd include
Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iran, Russia and strategic energy issues,
Israeli-Arab relations and more generally our relations to the Muslim
world. Armenia is something that requires careful handling, but is a
special case. Of course it can't be a one-way street, but that would
likely be the American short list.
- At Ataturk's Mausoleum and throughout his visit, his emphasis on
Ataturk was very strong. To whom is he sending a message through that
emphasis. The EU? The AKP? The Islamic world? Laicists in Turkey?
Or the TSK (from whom he will perhaps ask for troops in Afghanistan?
Or is he saying, `you can walk with me only if you are a laicist and
democrat?' to underline once more that the project of mild Islam has
ended.
First, it's inconceivable that an American President would visit
Ankara and not stress Ataturk's legacy and our respect for and
admiration of Turkey's secular democracy. It is one of the elements,
combined with Turkey's predominantly Muslim population, that makes
your country so unique and, indeed, so important. So I would caution
against over-reading the emphasis on Ataturk. Second, your question
presupposes that being laic and being democratic go together, and it
implies you can't be democratic if you are not laic. Maybe I
misunderstood the question, but most Americans simply don't look at
the problem that way. I'm pretty sure that was not the message
President Obama was trying to send.
- How do you interpret the messages Obama sent to the Islamic
countries during his speech in the Turkish Parliament and in his
gestures in Istanbul? Was the aim of the whole visit to give a
message to the Islamic countries?
Given his personal background and the foreign policy challenges he's
inherited, it's natural that this President should give a lot of
thought to how and in what terms he engages the Muslim world. The
White House has promised an early major speech on America and Islam;
they also made clear in announcing the visit that the speech in
Parliament was not it. But let's be realistic: what he said about
Islam in Parliament was very important and carefully considered.
Frankly, outside of Turkey those were the words that the media focused
on, not the emphasis on secularism. I'm convinced that Turkey's
Muslim identity was an important factor in the decision to go there so
soon. I'm also convinced, and this is clear both from his speech and
the way he organized the visit, including the Istanbul program, that
he does not see Islam and secular democracy as mutually exclusive.
Indeed, it is Turkey's synthesis of these diverse elements of its
identity that makes it so unique and, arguably, important.
- Obama used a very important expression during his visit to Cankaya:
`Model Partnership.' What is the significance of that choice of
words? Does it reflect a sense that `strategic partnership,' the
phrase used in the past, has deteriorated in recent years? Is the
change in terminology important?
You can't reduce this relationship to slogans, and probably people
shouldn't try. When Bill Clinton used the term `strategic
partnership' it was an accurate description of the way Turkey and
America were cooperating ` and cooperating very successfully -- across
a broad range of functional and regional issues. The thrust of
President Obama's Cankaya remarks, in which he put the formula
explicitly in terms of partnership between `a predominantly Christian
country and a predominantly Muslim country' has a somewhat broader
thrust, but I'm not sure it reflects any change in substantive terms.
Any partnership between America and Turkey will be strategic; we all
hope our partnership can be a model in terms of its results.
`Strategic partnership', the phrase was first and most authoritatively
used by Bill Clinton 9 years ago, not 18. It may have been used
before that, but it was not formal U.S. policy.
- What kinds of actions and positions would you expect from Turkey and
the U.S. under the rubric of `model partnership'?
As I've suggested, I doubt the agenda will change much. I think the
implication of the term `model' is that it be perceived as successful
both by the partners themselves and by third parties. There is
clearly plenty of room for improvement on the record of the past
several years. I think the key to success is exactly what the Obama
team has been doing over the past few weeks: engaging with Turkey
early; establishing sound relationships among leaders on both sides;
making the consultative process a genuine one. Whatever it means, the
partnership is off to a good start.
- In response to a question at the Presidential Palace in Cankaya,
Obama said his views on the Armenian Genocide were a matter of record
and had not changed. In Parliament, he compared the Turkish-Armenian
tragedy to the massacre of aboriginal peoples in America. Have
American President's ever addressed this issue in such strong terms?
I cannot recall an American President's linking the events of 1915
with our own, often shameful, treatment of native Americans. The
President's point, of course, was that ultimately nations are better
off in confronting the dark chapters all have in their pasts, and I
think he should be taken at his word when he says he has not changed
his views on the events in Turkey's Ottoman past that he has called
`genocide.' I was personally heartened by the responsibility he
showed during the visit in avoiding words and deeds that could derail
the sensitive and promising negotiations under way in pursuit of
normalizing Turkey's relations with Armenia. Assuming those
negotiations bear fruit, it would obviously change radically the
context of the American domestic discussion of this matter.
- You were Ambassador in Ankara during Bill Clinton's November 1999
visit to Turkey. One common point in the two visits was that both
Presidents spoke in Parliament for 26 minutes. But if you compare and
contrast the contents, what do you see as the most important
similarities and differences?
What is most strikingly different is the context. Bill Clinton was
speaking as someone whose initial years with Turkey were problematic,
but who by the time he arrived in Ankara had come to appreciate deeply
Turkey's uniqueness and strategic importance. He was able to speak on
the basis of years of very productive, successful cooperation on a
wide range of issues. It was also a time when American influence was
at its peak, prosperity was growing around the world, we were on the
verge of a new millennium, and 9/11 and all that followed it seemed
unimaginable. He thus had the luxury of delivering a more
philosophical, to some degree self-congratulatory speech, which looked
ahead to promising future for both the U.S. and Turkey.
Almost all of that was profoundly different by the time Obama showed
up in Ankara. Obama was establishing a new set of relationships with
a country with whom our relations had been rocky for some time. He
was addressing for the first time before a Muslim audience his and his
Administration's stance toward Islam. He was laying out an agenda for
renewed partnership with a country whose influence had waxed during a
period when a distracted America's had waned. He was navigating
around issues ` like the Armenian question and Turkey's domestic
dynamics ` that were less acute in 1999. The speech reflected all
this: it was more businesslike, less lofty in its rhetoric. But, I
think, it was no less sincere in its assertion of the importance of
U.S. ` Turkish partnership.
- In Turkey some have said `Obama has put fireballs in our palms while
shaking our hands.' What will the U.S. want from Turkey when the
honeymoon is over?
This is, of course, where it will get interesting. The fact is that,
even during the previous U.S. Administration, U.S. and Turkish
strategic objectives broadly overlapped; it was our respective sense
of how to achieve those objectives that were often quite different.
The Obama team has a different, more inclusive style, and they are not
afraid of diplomacy, even with adversaries. So it ought to be easier
to harmonize the U.S. and Turkish approaches. But one can imagine
situations where we will come out in different places. For example,
if Iran doesn't respond to U.S. and multilateral overtures, will
Turkey be prepared to join efforts to make it pay a price? For
example, as we try to revive our cooperation on strategic energy
transportation, will Turkey be prepared to soften its tough-minded
approach on transit of Azeri gas? I fully expect that important
tactical differences will pop up as we define the parameters of our
`model partnership.' And of course this cannot be a one-way street:
Washington will have to prove it can be responsive to Turkish views,
as well. But my experience is that, if the channels of communication
are open, if the top leadership of both sides is engaged, `win-win'
approaches can be found. The Obama visit has basically laid the
foundation for that kind of dynamic.
- Will Turkey be asked for combat troops for Afghanistan; In case
Turkey says `No', will the definition of `model partnership' get hurt?
I don't know whether or not Washington will press Turkey for combat
forces, although they would no doubt welcome such a commitment. If
Turkey is not prepared to do that, I have no doubt that its other
contributions will also be welcome. I see no threat in this to the
potential partnership;
- Mr. Obama said in fact to Turkey: `We have changed, you should also
change'. At least, in Turkey, people have interpreted it in that
manner. What does he want exactly from Turkey to change?
`Change,' this is a President who was elected as an agent of change,
so it's not surprising to find it as a part of his world view. I
think I'll leave it at that rather than speculate on where, precisely,
he would like to see change in Turkey. II just don't have time to get
into it.
- To what extent will the Halki Theological school on Heybeliada
Island be an issue high priority in the relationship? Did Obama talk
about this because it is a tradition for U.S. Presidents to mention it
or will he become a close follower of the issue.
This is of course an issue that is of most importance to Greek
Americans. But Americans who are not of Greek ancestry, when they
learn of this issue, tend to view the seminary's closure as
incompatible with what they know of Turkey as a modern, Western,
tolerant country. And of course Greek Americans are not without
influence in our political system. As long as this issue is not
resolved, it will be an unnecessary and ` to Americans --
unexplainable burden on our bilateral relationship. And I will
guarantee it will continue to be raised by every American President in
every meeting with senior Turkish official as a matter of principle
and conscience.
- According to you, would US not consider to press Armenia concerning
the resolution of the question of Nagorno-Karabakh problem? Would not
US provide its `model partner' with such a support?
I suspect the U.S. would be prepared to encourage Armenia ` and
Azerbaijan as well ` to show the flexibility necessary to make this
breakthrough. That's what `full support' implies.
- As Turkey will not face the risk of losing Azerbaijan, are you
expecting a real opening toward Armenia before the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem is resolved? Would not a Turkish slight to Azerbaijan work
against U.S. plans in the Caucasus?
I'm well aware of the close bonds between Turkey and Azerbaijan. I
consider them, and I suspect any U.S. government would consider them,
as a positive element in our assessment of dynamics in the Caucasus.
I doubt we would press either country to do something that would
seriously damage that relationship.
But I also think it would be inconsistent with the spirit of the
Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship, or with any relationship between close
friends, for one side to stand in the way of the other's pursuit of a
legitimate and important national interest. Turkey has been
exquisitely accommodating over the years to Azerbaijan's interests,
and is clearly seeking in its ongoing dialogue with Armenia not to
jeopardize Baku's position on Nagorno-Karabakh. It does not seem
right for Baku now to try to hold hostage Turkey's manifest interest
in achieving a breakthrough in its relations with Yerevan.
- Do you think the U.S. is preparing to come to Turkey with package
deal similar to the one that worked in Northern Ireland? What should
Turkey expect to hear from the U.S. on the Kurdish question and on the
PKK?
On the PKK, you've already heard Barak Obama say that the organization
will remain on our terrorism list, that we will continue to cooperate
with Turkey to counter PKK terrorism, and that violence is not an
answer to the concerns of Turkey's Kurds. I have no reason to believe
the Obama Administration will seek to inject itself into Turkey's
debate on the Kurdish question, although Obama made clear he will
support and encourage steps to give all Turkish citizens equal
treatment and opportunities.
- While answering the questions of young people in Istanbul, was the
concept `minority' used for the Kurdish people a slip of tongue made
by Obama or does it demonstrate the USA's point of view about the
issue?
I'm pretty sure it was a slip of the tongue. I've seen a lot of
Americans do it; I may even have done it myself in my initial months
in Turkey. Turkey is probably the only country in the world where the
word `minority' carries the political weight that it does in your
country because of the Lausanne Treaty. When foreigners use the word,
Turks almost always assume we understand its historical/political
significance; they are almost always wrong.
- What do you think Jewish, Armenian and Greek pressure groups in the
U.S. derived from this visit?
These are by no means monolithic groups, and I wouldn't dream of
trying to characterize their responses to the visit.
- Who prepares Obama's speeches? Who do you think prepared the
Cankaya remarks? Who is the architect of this visit? Who is the
unseen hero?
I wasn't inside the process, so the short answer to all your questions
is, `I don't know.' These things are group projects. Our embassies,
speech writers, bureaucrats of various ranks and descriptions all play
a role. There are plenty of people in this Administration who know
Turkey and no doubt made a contribution: Hillary Clinton, Dick
Holbrooke, James Jones and Jim Jeffrey come to mind. Ultimately, the
people who contribute to these affairs are selected for their ability
to reflect the basic approach of their boss, the President of the
United States. If they don't, they don't last long. Obama's speech
is Obama's speech.
- Is there a single issue that will keep people awake at night in the
wake of the visit?
Both sides sure as (Washington-Ankara) hell better get the Armenia
piece right.
- Is it significant that Michelle Obama didn't participate in the
visit? Was it a gaffe to invite the leaders of the three opposition
parties to a single session?
I think it's clear now that the reason Mrs. Obama was not there was
that they were leaving directly from Istanbul to Iraq. I'm confident
her absence was not a `message.' It was probably a mistake to invite
the three leaders to a single meeting. Mistakes happen. It had zero
impact on the visit.
- Turkey watched every minute of the Obama visit. How about the U.S.?
Was there much debate over whether he should have gone or what
messages he was sending?
Partly because for most of our common history Turkey has not been a
`problem' country, the number of people in America who follow it
closely is relatively small. That said, people ` and the media ` did
follow the visit in some detail, and it produced a good deal of
editorial comment. Most of that comment focused on Obama's message to
the Islamic world in his Parliament speech. A number of prominent
commentators, notably the New York Times, welcomed the visit but
expressed concern over evidence that the Erdogan government has taken
its success at the polls as license to slow down reforms and
intimidate opposition voices in the media and elsewhere.
- Do you see any sense in which Turkish politics was `normalized' as a
result of the March 29 municipal elections in the same way the
U.S. was `normalized' last November 4?
I think it's an odd question. I'm not sure America was more `normal'
on November 5 than on November 3. I do know that the American people
on November 4 spoke loud and clear on the need for change. I
personally think the message was less clear on March 29. It's up to
Turks to draw conclusions on what happened, but the numbers speak for
themselves, and Prime Minister has himself said he and his party will
study the message.
- How do you see Turkey in the aftermath of March 29? Has Turkey
become more polarized? How do you read the AKP's loss of votes?
My sense is that this was an important milestone in Turkish politics.
As a matter of simple fact, it is the first time AKP has failed to
expand on (or even hold) its percentage of the vote in previous
elections. But the party's plurality remains a solid one and there
seems little question that the U.S. and other governments will be
dealing with Prime Minister Erdogan and an AKP government for the next
few years. Will this inspire the opposition parties to mount a more
effective challenge next time? I don't know. Is the result good for
Turkish democracy? Arguably. In my experience, hegemony is no more
healthy a phenomenon in internal politics than it is in geopolitics.
- Has the AKP's 8-point drop affected U.S. official views of the AKP?
Are there different points of view on this score?
President Obama has not revealed to me whether or not his view of the
AKP has changed since March 29. But my experience is that the
U.S. government rarely questions the authority of elected officials,
and AKP's ability to govern has not been impaired by the municipal
election results. Barring early elections, Mr. Erdogan and his
colleagues are the people President Obama's team will deal with for
the foreseeable future. I don't see evidence of a debate on this
within the Administration.
- The U.S. media has depicted Erdogan as an autocrat. Yet Obama hugs
Erdogan, kisses him and holds his hand. Could we say that Obama
rebutted the U.S. media?
The U.S. media and Barak Obama have different jobs. The point of
Obama's visit, as I read it, was in large part to establish personal
relations with the leadership of a country that, more than most, can
help or hurt his efforts to restore American influence and leadership
abroad. You obviously don't do that by picking a fight with your
hosts or injecting yourself into local politics. You are right that
some of the Prime Minister's actions and attitudes have begun to
become an issue in America's discussion of Turkey. I don't rule out
that at some point, if they continue, they will be addressed in
state-to-state channels: they have already been documented in the
State Department's human rights report. But I would guess the
President and his team hoped that the results of March 29 would speak
louder and more persuasively than anything they would be able to say
to the Prime Minister about his style.
- Do you think the visit is due more to Turkey's power or the AKP's
success?
I've already said I think the visit was about a (correct) perception
that Turkey can help or hurt the new Administration more than most
countries as it seeks to come to terms with the foreign policy mess
left behind by their predecessors. Part of that calculation is a
function of objective and relatively permanent factors like Turkey's
geography, strong economy, and competent military. Part of it is a
function of identity issues like Turkey's secular democracy and
predominantly Muslim population. Part of it is doubtless a function
of the relatively effective governance AKP governments have given
Turkey in recent years, and the foreign policy credibility they have
garnered.
- Have your thoughts changed about the AKP? If so, why?
It's not my job to be for or against the AKP. I want to see Turkey
succeed, because I'm convinced that a successful Turkey is a good
thing for my own country. Analytically, I give credit to AKP for
giving Turkey several years of what, by comparison with its recent
predecessors, has been relatively good governance and growth. More
recently I fault the government for squandering its 2007 mandate in
confrontations that have kept Turkish politics tied up in knots and
sidelined the reform agenda many Turks thought they were voting for in
2003 and 2007. The ruling party has of course had some help in
keeping the political pot boiling: I believe the questionable tactics
used in 2007 and 2008 to check AKP's power would have dealt a serious
setback to Turkey had they succeeded, to say nothing of its reputation
abroad as a modern, Western democracy. I've been disappointed that
the lesson the Prime Minister seems to have drawn from those tests is
that he can or must quash any opposition voices that may arise,
including in the media. There are aspects of AKP foreign policy that
frankly bother me: its stance on Sudan is one. But I'm not as
concerned as some in my country by the government's pursuit of
`strategic depth': the approach has a certain logic, it is not in my
view fundamentally anti-American or anti-Western; and it enjoys, as
best I can tell, broad support in Turkey.
- You have defined Ahmet Davutoglu as the `Kissinger of Turkey.'
Which of his features did you have in mind? Do you see him as the key
player in Turkey's foreign policy?
In an introduction at Brookings Institution last fall, I noted as a
joke that I had recently heard Henry Kissinger described ` also in
jest -- as `the American Davutoglu.' The Turkish press, naturally,
got it just backwards. More seriously, my introduction made the point
that Ambassador Davutoglu and Dr. Kissinger share distinguished
backgrounds as scholars that they had the good fortune to apply in
follow-on careers as diplomatists. I don't think there is any serious
question that Ambassador Davutoglu occupies a position of trust and
importance on Turkey's senior foreign policy team. I wouldn't presume
to define his role or relative influence more precisely.
- There are people who are concerned that Turkish foreign policy is
sliding toward the Middle East. Do you share that concern? Has there
been a break in Turkish foreign policy?
I think there have unquestionably been differences in emphasis, and
that those shifts have given Turkey a bigger `foot print' in the
Middle East and in the Muslim world more generally. I don't think
this necessarily poses a threat to U.S. or Western interests, as long
as we remain engaged with Ankara in a way that, frankly, we have not
always been in recent years. Obama's visit, as I've said, seemed to
me designed precisely to put in place relationships and machinery that
will minimize the possibility of any future drift.
- Everybody has been curious about this. In the last July 17, in your
speech given in CSIS, you said: `The Constitutional Court will make a
decision in mid-August, in a Friday night. For a while, the
opportunities to get out from this situation without harm have
increased'. All Turkish Media had written about this. Yet, all the
time, they wondered: How did you know this?
My point at CSIS was that, while I felt the prospects that the Court
would not close AKP had increased somewhat, one could not rule out the
possibility. I speculated that a decision to close would come in
mid-August on a Friday because (a) it would have less of an impact on
financial markets and (b) it had been my impression that similar steps
(the e-memorandum, the decision to accept the case against AKP) had
come late on a Friday. I had no inside information. I will say
(Bulent Ali Reza is my witness) that when I heard the court was going
to make its decision sooner, I concluded it meant that the party would
not be closed.
- In the last report prepared by the CSIS, there is a severe criticism
toward the Gülen community. Is it a view that is only dear to
CSIS, or is there any change in the USA's perception of the community?
What do you think? In the same report, it recommends USA to seal also
an alliance with the military? Would you support this suggestion, or
did you find it bizarre?
I'm not going to comment on CSIS's report.
April 12 2009
TEXT: Full transcript of Mark Parris interview
- Let me start from the beginning: Why do you think the decision to
visit Turkey was taken so quickly? It seems even the State Department
was caught unawares and had to be informed by the CIA.
The decision does seem to have been made quickly. But you have to
remember we are only in the opening days of the new Administration.
In periods of transition, when some key people are not even yet in
place, it's not surprising that the decision-making process is
sometimes a little unpredictable. I think what's important is not the
process, but the fact that this was clearly a considered decision, in
the opening months of the Administration, that has to be interpreted
as reflecting its core priorities. That has to be good news for
U.S. ` Turkish relations in the years ahead.
- Whatever the reason, why do you think the visit has been such a big
story? What does it say to the world about U.S. ` Turkish relations
and American priorities? How should it be read by players like the
EU, NATO, Russia, the Islamic world?
It's a big story because we've never seen this before. It took Bill
Clinton 7 years to visit Turkey. It took George W. Bush 3 years, I
think, and even then it was only for a day and to attend a
multilateral event. So this says in a very potent way that the Obama
Administration takes Turkey very seriously. Clearly the world is
paying attention. We've already seen reactions from some Europeans to
the President's strong endorsement of Turkey's EU candidacy. I'd
guess the Russians will be watching closely as the U.S. and Turkey
gear up their cooperation on strategic energy issues. There has been,
as best I can tell, quite a positive reaction in the Muslim world to
the President's words on Islam, and it will not have been lost that
those words were spoken on the floor of Turkey's Parliament. The
bottom line, I suppose, is that the revival of a U.S. ` Turkish
partnership that is more than just rhetorical is an important
development throughout your region and the world.
- Should this be seen as a visit to the land of `Erdogan the conqueror
of Davos'? Should we conclude from the fact that it followed the `one
minute' outburst that the Israel-Turkey crisis has already been
patched up behind closed doors? Or is it simply that the U.S. has
higher prioities than the tension between Israel and Turkey?
I don't think either side looked very good or statesmanlike at Davos.
The Prime Minister's performance ` as conveyed by the media ` made a
strong, basically negative impression on American audiences. As
someone who worries about how Turkey is perceived in America, I
regretted that. But predictions that Davos would destroy
Turkish-Israeli relations or undercut Turkey's regional influence were
clearly exaggerated. My impression is that the damage to
Turkish-Israeli relations has in fact been contained: even if Israeli
confidence in Turkey's impartiality has suffered ` and it probably has
` Israeli leaders value their strategic relationship with Turkey. And
it is important that the Prime Minister resisted calls to take
concrete steps to scale back state-to-state cooperation. Under the
circumstances, I doubt the Davos affair was a major factor in the
decision to propose a visit to Turkey.
- How do you respond to the comment: `Turkey takes the place of
Israel.'
I haven't a clue what it is supposed to mean. If it means we have to
choose between one or the other, it is nonsense. We won't. We
haven't. We value our relationship to both countries and have always
seen good relations between Turkey and Israel as enhancing
U.S. interests in the region. And not, I would add, at the expense of
other parties.
- Before getting to questions regarding Turkey, a few questions on the
NATO summit. First, why Rasmussen? Why has Obama insisted upon such
a name, and one with a style and history very different from Obama?
I'm not privy to the details of the deal to pick Rasmussen. And I
don't know the gentlemen, so I can't comment on his style. He does
have a history with the Muslim world, and I don't think it was
inappropriate for Turkey to raise this as an issue when so many of the
Alliance's challenges are in predominantly Muslim countries or
regions. President Obama clearly had a strong interest in a
harmonious outcome to his first NATO summit. My guess is that
Washington's approach to selecting a new Secretary General was
primarily a function of that. Showing flexibility on what was
obviously a difficult decision for Turkey demonstrated maturity and
responsibility, and, no doubt, helped set the stage for a successful
visit a few days later.
- Would Turkey have had a better chance of getting what it wanted on
this issue if it had delayed the matter until after Obama's visit?
Did Erdogan's Davos outburst lose the case for Rasmussen?
The answer in both cases is, `I doubt it.' In the first case, failure
to pick a new Secretary General would have exploded the NATO summit,
and the Obama visit would then have taken place in a very different
context. I'd be surprised if Davos came up at all in the resolution
of this issue.
- First a Davos crisis and then the Rasmussen crisis¦ Do you agree
with comments by some Western observers that these two crises have
hurt Prime Minister Erdogan's image?
I've already said that I think the Davos incident made a negative
impression on American audiences. Some of those audiences have since
been openly critical of the Prime Minister's behavior. Some have
cited Davos to question his reliability as a partner. I think that is
too radical a conclusion. And so, apparently, does President Obama.
As for the Rasmussen affair, most Americans are probably unaware that
there was one: the only people inclined to draw conclusions about the
Prime Minister from that episode were those who had done so before
Rasmussen became an issue. Clearly, it had no impact on Obama's visit
to Turkey, thanks in part, again, to the skill with which Ankara
ultimately allowed the matter to be resolved.
- Do you think Europe will ever give the U.S. what it wants on
Afghanistan? Is it asking Turkey to do more there than it is asking
others?
There are lots of ways our allies can help deal with what is, after
all, a common threat in Afghanistan and its immediate neighborhood.
In an ideal world, I'm sure President Obama would have liked to take
home commitments for new combat forces in Afghanistan. We don't live
in an ideal world. So we'll take the help we can get, and I suspect
we will keep after our allies to do more as we move forward. In the
world we live in, though, some countries can help more than others.
Turkey can help a lot, and of course already has. I think a major
reason for the visit is an awareness of Turkey's long-standing
influence on both sides of the Afghan/Pak border (as reflected in the
trilateral meeting President Gul convened just before Obama arrived),
of the role Turkey has played in ISAF, of the kind of `soft power'
Turkey can bring to this effort. These are vital inputs as the Obama
Administration gets its Af/Pak strategy underway.
- How do you expect Europe to react to Obama's reemphasis on the
importance of bringing Turkey into the EU? Will his initiative help
or hurt Turkey's chances?
I suspect President Sarkozy's response tells you that he and a lot of
other Europeans will be hard to convince, if their minds are not, in
fact, already made up. But I think the way to look at this is: what
if the U.S. stopped publicly supporting Turkey's candidacy? My guess
is that it would make it that much easier for those in Europe who
oppose letting Turkey in to win the debate. And remember that, during
previous periods of impasse between the EU and Turkey, for example
after the Luxembourg summit of 1997, a strong, expanding U.S. `
Turkish relationship seemed to provide a stimulus to what will always
be, at its core, a Turkish-European conversation. I think, on
balance, we can help.
- Now the visit to Turkey ¦ In fact the central question before,
during and after the visit is: why did Obama come? If you make a list
of reasons, what are your top five?
I think the answer to The Big Question has to lie in the bleak foreign
policy picture the President inherited from his predecessor. It's
hard to think of a recent U.S. President who has faced more ` and more
urgent ` challenges abroad upon taking office. When you face problems
of this magnitude, you look for friends who can help. The fact is
that, since so many of the most serious issues are in places close to
Turkey, or in which Turkey has significant historic or current
influence, Turkey can help Obama more than most. I think it's about
as simple as that. If you want to put it in terms of a list of areas
where Washington will be looking for help, I'd include
Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iran, Russia and strategic energy issues,
Israeli-Arab relations and more generally our relations to the Muslim
world. Armenia is something that requires careful handling, but is a
special case. Of course it can't be a one-way street, but that would
likely be the American short list.
- At Ataturk's Mausoleum and throughout his visit, his emphasis on
Ataturk was very strong. To whom is he sending a message through that
emphasis. The EU? The AKP? The Islamic world? Laicists in Turkey?
Or the TSK (from whom he will perhaps ask for troops in Afghanistan?
Or is he saying, `you can walk with me only if you are a laicist and
democrat?' to underline once more that the project of mild Islam has
ended.
First, it's inconceivable that an American President would visit
Ankara and not stress Ataturk's legacy and our respect for and
admiration of Turkey's secular democracy. It is one of the elements,
combined with Turkey's predominantly Muslim population, that makes
your country so unique and, indeed, so important. So I would caution
against over-reading the emphasis on Ataturk. Second, your question
presupposes that being laic and being democratic go together, and it
implies you can't be democratic if you are not laic. Maybe I
misunderstood the question, but most Americans simply don't look at
the problem that way. I'm pretty sure that was not the message
President Obama was trying to send.
- How do you interpret the messages Obama sent to the Islamic
countries during his speech in the Turkish Parliament and in his
gestures in Istanbul? Was the aim of the whole visit to give a
message to the Islamic countries?
Given his personal background and the foreign policy challenges he's
inherited, it's natural that this President should give a lot of
thought to how and in what terms he engages the Muslim world. The
White House has promised an early major speech on America and Islam;
they also made clear in announcing the visit that the speech in
Parliament was not it. But let's be realistic: what he said about
Islam in Parliament was very important and carefully considered.
Frankly, outside of Turkey those were the words that the media focused
on, not the emphasis on secularism. I'm convinced that Turkey's
Muslim identity was an important factor in the decision to go there so
soon. I'm also convinced, and this is clear both from his speech and
the way he organized the visit, including the Istanbul program, that
he does not see Islam and secular democracy as mutually exclusive.
Indeed, it is Turkey's synthesis of these diverse elements of its
identity that makes it so unique and, arguably, important.
- Obama used a very important expression during his visit to Cankaya:
`Model Partnership.' What is the significance of that choice of
words? Does it reflect a sense that `strategic partnership,' the
phrase used in the past, has deteriorated in recent years? Is the
change in terminology important?
You can't reduce this relationship to slogans, and probably people
shouldn't try. When Bill Clinton used the term `strategic
partnership' it was an accurate description of the way Turkey and
America were cooperating ` and cooperating very successfully -- across
a broad range of functional and regional issues. The thrust of
President Obama's Cankaya remarks, in which he put the formula
explicitly in terms of partnership between `a predominantly Christian
country and a predominantly Muslim country' has a somewhat broader
thrust, but I'm not sure it reflects any change in substantive terms.
Any partnership between America and Turkey will be strategic; we all
hope our partnership can be a model in terms of its results.
`Strategic partnership', the phrase was first and most authoritatively
used by Bill Clinton 9 years ago, not 18. It may have been used
before that, but it was not formal U.S. policy.
- What kinds of actions and positions would you expect from Turkey and
the U.S. under the rubric of `model partnership'?
As I've suggested, I doubt the agenda will change much. I think the
implication of the term `model' is that it be perceived as successful
both by the partners themselves and by third parties. There is
clearly plenty of room for improvement on the record of the past
several years. I think the key to success is exactly what the Obama
team has been doing over the past few weeks: engaging with Turkey
early; establishing sound relationships among leaders on both sides;
making the consultative process a genuine one. Whatever it means, the
partnership is off to a good start.
- In response to a question at the Presidential Palace in Cankaya,
Obama said his views on the Armenian Genocide were a matter of record
and had not changed. In Parliament, he compared the Turkish-Armenian
tragedy to the massacre of aboriginal peoples in America. Have
American President's ever addressed this issue in such strong terms?
I cannot recall an American President's linking the events of 1915
with our own, often shameful, treatment of native Americans. The
President's point, of course, was that ultimately nations are better
off in confronting the dark chapters all have in their pasts, and I
think he should be taken at his word when he says he has not changed
his views on the events in Turkey's Ottoman past that he has called
`genocide.' I was personally heartened by the responsibility he
showed during the visit in avoiding words and deeds that could derail
the sensitive and promising negotiations under way in pursuit of
normalizing Turkey's relations with Armenia. Assuming those
negotiations bear fruit, it would obviously change radically the
context of the American domestic discussion of this matter.
- You were Ambassador in Ankara during Bill Clinton's November 1999
visit to Turkey. One common point in the two visits was that both
Presidents spoke in Parliament for 26 minutes. But if you compare and
contrast the contents, what do you see as the most important
similarities and differences?
What is most strikingly different is the context. Bill Clinton was
speaking as someone whose initial years with Turkey were problematic,
but who by the time he arrived in Ankara had come to appreciate deeply
Turkey's uniqueness and strategic importance. He was able to speak on
the basis of years of very productive, successful cooperation on a
wide range of issues. It was also a time when American influence was
at its peak, prosperity was growing around the world, we were on the
verge of a new millennium, and 9/11 and all that followed it seemed
unimaginable. He thus had the luxury of delivering a more
philosophical, to some degree self-congratulatory speech, which looked
ahead to promising future for both the U.S. and Turkey.
Almost all of that was profoundly different by the time Obama showed
up in Ankara. Obama was establishing a new set of relationships with
a country with whom our relations had been rocky for some time. He
was addressing for the first time before a Muslim audience his and his
Administration's stance toward Islam. He was laying out an agenda for
renewed partnership with a country whose influence had waxed during a
period when a distracted America's had waned. He was navigating
around issues ` like the Armenian question and Turkey's domestic
dynamics ` that were less acute in 1999. The speech reflected all
this: it was more businesslike, less lofty in its rhetoric. But, I
think, it was no less sincere in its assertion of the importance of
U.S. ` Turkish partnership.
- In Turkey some have said `Obama has put fireballs in our palms while
shaking our hands.' What will the U.S. want from Turkey when the
honeymoon is over?
This is, of course, where it will get interesting. The fact is that,
even during the previous U.S. Administration, U.S. and Turkish
strategic objectives broadly overlapped; it was our respective sense
of how to achieve those objectives that were often quite different.
The Obama team has a different, more inclusive style, and they are not
afraid of diplomacy, even with adversaries. So it ought to be easier
to harmonize the U.S. and Turkish approaches. But one can imagine
situations where we will come out in different places. For example,
if Iran doesn't respond to U.S. and multilateral overtures, will
Turkey be prepared to join efforts to make it pay a price? For
example, as we try to revive our cooperation on strategic energy
transportation, will Turkey be prepared to soften its tough-minded
approach on transit of Azeri gas? I fully expect that important
tactical differences will pop up as we define the parameters of our
`model partnership.' And of course this cannot be a one-way street:
Washington will have to prove it can be responsive to Turkish views,
as well. But my experience is that, if the channels of communication
are open, if the top leadership of both sides is engaged, `win-win'
approaches can be found. The Obama visit has basically laid the
foundation for that kind of dynamic.
- Will Turkey be asked for combat troops for Afghanistan; In case
Turkey says `No', will the definition of `model partnership' get hurt?
I don't know whether or not Washington will press Turkey for combat
forces, although they would no doubt welcome such a commitment. If
Turkey is not prepared to do that, I have no doubt that its other
contributions will also be welcome. I see no threat in this to the
potential partnership;
- Mr. Obama said in fact to Turkey: `We have changed, you should also
change'. At least, in Turkey, people have interpreted it in that
manner. What does he want exactly from Turkey to change?
`Change,' this is a President who was elected as an agent of change,
so it's not surprising to find it as a part of his world view. I
think I'll leave it at that rather than speculate on where, precisely,
he would like to see change in Turkey. II just don't have time to get
into it.
- To what extent will the Halki Theological school on Heybeliada
Island be an issue high priority in the relationship? Did Obama talk
about this because it is a tradition for U.S. Presidents to mention it
or will he become a close follower of the issue.
This is of course an issue that is of most importance to Greek
Americans. But Americans who are not of Greek ancestry, when they
learn of this issue, tend to view the seminary's closure as
incompatible with what they know of Turkey as a modern, Western,
tolerant country. And of course Greek Americans are not without
influence in our political system. As long as this issue is not
resolved, it will be an unnecessary and ` to Americans --
unexplainable burden on our bilateral relationship. And I will
guarantee it will continue to be raised by every American President in
every meeting with senior Turkish official as a matter of principle
and conscience.
- According to you, would US not consider to press Armenia concerning
the resolution of the question of Nagorno-Karabakh problem? Would not
US provide its `model partner' with such a support?
I suspect the U.S. would be prepared to encourage Armenia ` and
Azerbaijan as well ` to show the flexibility necessary to make this
breakthrough. That's what `full support' implies.
- As Turkey will not face the risk of losing Azerbaijan, are you
expecting a real opening toward Armenia before the Nagorno-Karabakh
problem is resolved? Would not a Turkish slight to Azerbaijan work
against U.S. plans in the Caucasus?
I'm well aware of the close bonds between Turkey and Azerbaijan. I
consider them, and I suspect any U.S. government would consider them,
as a positive element in our assessment of dynamics in the Caucasus.
I doubt we would press either country to do something that would
seriously damage that relationship.
But I also think it would be inconsistent with the spirit of the
Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship, or with any relationship between close
friends, for one side to stand in the way of the other's pursuit of a
legitimate and important national interest. Turkey has been
exquisitely accommodating over the years to Azerbaijan's interests,
and is clearly seeking in its ongoing dialogue with Armenia not to
jeopardize Baku's position on Nagorno-Karabakh. It does not seem
right for Baku now to try to hold hostage Turkey's manifest interest
in achieving a breakthrough in its relations with Yerevan.
- Do you think the U.S. is preparing to come to Turkey with package
deal similar to the one that worked in Northern Ireland? What should
Turkey expect to hear from the U.S. on the Kurdish question and on the
PKK?
On the PKK, you've already heard Barak Obama say that the organization
will remain on our terrorism list, that we will continue to cooperate
with Turkey to counter PKK terrorism, and that violence is not an
answer to the concerns of Turkey's Kurds. I have no reason to believe
the Obama Administration will seek to inject itself into Turkey's
debate on the Kurdish question, although Obama made clear he will
support and encourage steps to give all Turkish citizens equal
treatment and opportunities.
- While answering the questions of young people in Istanbul, was the
concept `minority' used for the Kurdish people a slip of tongue made
by Obama or does it demonstrate the USA's point of view about the
issue?
I'm pretty sure it was a slip of the tongue. I've seen a lot of
Americans do it; I may even have done it myself in my initial months
in Turkey. Turkey is probably the only country in the world where the
word `minority' carries the political weight that it does in your
country because of the Lausanne Treaty. When foreigners use the word,
Turks almost always assume we understand its historical/political
significance; they are almost always wrong.
- What do you think Jewish, Armenian and Greek pressure groups in the
U.S. derived from this visit?
These are by no means monolithic groups, and I wouldn't dream of
trying to characterize their responses to the visit.
- Who prepares Obama's speeches? Who do you think prepared the
Cankaya remarks? Who is the architect of this visit? Who is the
unseen hero?
I wasn't inside the process, so the short answer to all your questions
is, `I don't know.' These things are group projects. Our embassies,
speech writers, bureaucrats of various ranks and descriptions all play
a role. There are plenty of people in this Administration who know
Turkey and no doubt made a contribution: Hillary Clinton, Dick
Holbrooke, James Jones and Jim Jeffrey come to mind. Ultimately, the
people who contribute to these affairs are selected for their ability
to reflect the basic approach of their boss, the President of the
United States. If they don't, they don't last long. Obama's speech
is Obama's speech.
- Is there a single issue that will keep people awake at night in the
wake of the visit?
Both sides sure as (Washington-Ankara) hell better get the Armenia
piece right.
- Is it significant that Michelle Obama didn't participate in the
visit? Was it a gaffe to invite the leaders of the three opposition
parties to a single session?
I think it's clear now that the reason Mrs. Obama was not there was
that they were leaving directly from Istanbul to Iraq. I'm confident
her absence was not a `message.' It was probably a mistake to invite
the three leaders to a single meeting. Mistakes happen. It had zero
impact on the visit.
- Turkey watched every minute of the Obama visit. How about the U.S.?
Was there much debate over whether he should have gone or what
messages he was sending?
Partly because for most of our common history Turkey has not been a
`problem' country, the number of people in America who follow it
closely is relatively small. That said, people ` and the media ` did
follow the visit in some detail, and it produced a good deal of
editorial comment. Most of that comment focused on Obama's message to
the Islamic world in his Parliament speech. A number of prominent
commentators, notably the New York Times, welcomed the visit but
expressed concern over evidence that the Erdogan government has taken
its success at the polls as license to slow down reforms and
intimidate opposition voices in the media and elsewhere.
- Do you see any sense in which Turkish politics was `normalized' as a
result of the March 29 municipal elections in the same way the
U.S. was `normalized' last November 4?
I think it's an odd question. I'm not sure America was more `normal'
on November 5 than on November 3. I do know that the American people
on November 4 spoke loud and clear on the need for change. I
personally think the message was less clear on March 29. It's up to
Turks to draw conclusions on what happened, but the numbers speak for
themselves, and Prime Minister has himself said he and his party will
study the message.
- How do you see Turkey in the aftermath of March 29? Has Turkey
become more polarized? How do you read the AKP's loss of votes?
My sense is that this was an important milestone in Turkish politics.
As a matter of simple fact, it is the first time AKP has failed to
expand on (or even hold) its percentage of the vote in previous
elections. But the party's plurality remains a solid one and there
seems little question that the U.S. and other governments will be
dealing with Prime Minister Erdogan and an AKP government for the next
few years. Will this inspire the opposition parties to mount a more
effective challenge next time? I don't know. Is the result good for
Turkish democracy? Arguably. In my experience, hegemony is no more
healthy a phenomenon in internal politics than it is in geopolitics.
- Has the AKP's 8-point drop affected U.S. official views of the AKP?
Are there different points of view on this score?
President Obama has not revealed to me whether or not his view of the
AKP has changed since March 29. But my experience is that the
U.S. government rarely questions the authority of elected officials,
and AKP's ability to govern has not been impaired by the municipal
election results. Barring early elections, Mr. Erdogan and his
colleagues are the people President Obama's team will deal with for
the foreseeable future. I don't see evidence of a debate on this
within the Administration.
- The U.S. media has depicted Erdogan as an autocrat. Yet Obama hugs
Erdogan, kisses him and holds his hand. Could we say that Obama
rebutted the U.S. media?
The U.S. media and Barak Obama have different jobs. The point of
Obama's visit, as I read it, was in large part to establish personal
relations with the leadership of a country that, more than most, can
help or hurt his efforts to restore American influence and leadership
abroad. You obviously don't do that by picking a fight with your
hosts or injecting yourself into local politics. You are right that
some of the Prime Minister's actions and attitudes have begun to
become an issue in America's discussion of Turkey. I don't rule out
that at some point, if they continue, they will be addressed in
state-to-state channels: they have already been documented in the
State Department's human rights report. But I would guess the
President and his team hoped that the results of March 29 would speak
louder and more persuasively than anything they would be able to say
to the Prime Minister about his style.
- Do you think the visit is due more to Turkey's power or the AKP's
success?
I've already said I think the visit was about a (correct) perception
that Turkey can help or hurt the new Administration more than most
countries as it seeks to come to terms with the foreign policy mess
left behind by their predecessors. Part of that calculation is a
function of objective and relatively permanent factors like Turkey's
geography, strong economy, and competent military. Part of it is a
function of identity issues like Turkey's secular democracy and
predominantly Muslim population. Part of it is doubtless a function
of the relatively effective governance AKP governments have given
Turkey in recent years, and the foreign policy credibility they have
garnered.
- Have your thoughts changed about the AKP? If so, why?
It's not my job to be for or against the AKP. I want to see Turkey
succeed, because I'm convinced that a successful Turkey is a good
thing for my own country. Analytically, I give credit to AKP for
giving Turkey several years of what, by comparison with its recent
predecessors, has been relatively good governance and growth. More
recently I fault the government for squandering its 2007 mandate in
confrontations that have kept Turkish politics tied up in knots and
sidelined the reform agenda many Turks thought they were voting for in
2003 and 2007. The ruling party has of course had some help in
keeping the political pot boiling: I believe the questionable tactics
used in 2007 and 2008 to check AKP's power would have dealt a serious
setback to Turkey had they succeeded, to say nothing of its reputation
abroad as a modern, Western democracy. I've been disappointed that
the lesson the Prime Minister seems to have drawn from those tests is
that he can or must quash any opposition voices that may arise,
including in the media. There are aspects of AKP foreign policy that
frankly bother me: its stance on Sudan is one. But I'm not as
concerned as some in my country by the government's pursuit of
`strategic depth': the approach has a certain logic, it is not in my
view fundamentally anti-American or anti-Western; and it enjoys, as
best I can tell, broad support in Turkey.
- You have defined Ahmet Davutoglu as the `Kissinger of Turkey.'
Which of his features did you have in mind? Do you see him as the key
player in Turkey's foreign policy?
In an introduction at Brookings Institution last fall, I noted as a
joke that I had recently heard Henry Kissinger described ` also in
jest -- as `the American Davutoglu.' The Turkish press, naturally,
got it just backwards. More seriously, my introduction made the point
that Ambassador Davutoglu and Dr. Kissinger share distinguished
backgrounds as scholars that they had the good fortune to apply in
follow-on careers as diplomatists. I don't think there is any serious
question that Ambassador Davutoglu occupies a position of trust and
importance on Turkey's senior foreign policy team. I wouldn't presume
to define his role or relative influence more precisely.
- There are people who are concerned that Turkish foreign policy is
sliding toward the Middle East. Do you share that concern? Has there
been a break in Turkish foreign policy?
I think there have unquestionably been differences in emphasis, and
that those shifts have given Turkey a bigger `foot print' in the
Middle East and in the Muslim world more generally. I don't think
this necessarily poses a threat to U.S. or Western interests, as long
as we remain engaged with Ankara in a way that, frankly, we have not
always been in recent years. Obama's visit, as I've said, seemed to
me designed precisely to put in place relationships and machinery that
will minimize the possibility of any future drift.
- Everybody has been curious about this. In the last July 17, in your
speech given in CSIS, you said: `The Constitutional Court will make a
decision in mid-August, in a Friday night. For a while, the
opportunities to get out from this situation without harm have
increased'. All Turkish Media had written about this. Yet, all the
time, they wondered: How did you know this?
My point at CSIS was that, while I felt the prospects that the Court
would not close AKP had increased somewhat, one could not rule out the
possibility. I speculated that a decision to close would come in
mid-August on a Friday because (a) it would have less of an impact on
financial markets and (b) it had been my impression that similar steps
(the e-memorandum, the decision to accept the case against AKP) had
come late on a Friday. I had no inside information. I will say
(Bulent Ali Reza is my witness) that when I heard the court was going
to make its decision sooner, I concluded it meant that the party would
not be closed.
- In the last report prepared by the CSIS, there is a severe criticism
toward the Gülen community. Is it a view that is only dear to
CSIS, or is there any change in the USA's perception of the community?
What do you think? In the same report, it recommends USA to seal also
an alliance with the military? Would you support this suggestion, or
did you find it bizarre?
I'm not going to comment on CSIS's report.