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TURKEY PREVAILS IN ROUND 1; KICKS OFF ROUND 2 OF TRICKS ON ARMENIA
By Harut Sassounian
The California Courier
Apr 14, 2009
Turkey brilliantly accomplished its objectives in the first round of
negotiations ostensibly to open the border with Armenia.
Ever since 1993, when Turkish leaders closed the border, they set
two main preconditions for its reopening. Armenia must: 1) Stop
pursuing international recognition of the Armenian Genocide; and 2)
Return Artsakh (Karabagh) to Azerbaijan.
Despite persistent Turkish attempts to impose such harsh terms on
Armenia, successive Armenian governments have declared that diplomatic
relations should be established and the border reopened without any
preconditions.
Thus, the standstill continues until today.
During the past year, however, a series of unexpected developments
provided new impetus for Armenia and Turkey to repair their contentious
relationship.
Both countries, under pressure from the U.S. and Europe, were now
prodded by a new major actor, Russia, to open the Armenian-Turkish
border. As owner of major businesses in Armenia, Russia sought to
establish cross border trade with Turkey, thereby also diminishing
Georgia's strategic significance as a sole transit route for the
region.
The turmoil in the aftermath of the contested Armenian presidential
election last year rendered the new leaders more sensitive to demands
from the major powers, expecting in return their support to counter
the=2 0 opposition at home. To be fair, the Armenian government
believed that opening the border was also in Armenia's own economic
interest.
Moreover, when Armenia's imports through Georgia were temporarily
blocked during last year's Georgian-Russian war, Armenian officials
realized the strategic value of having an alternate border outlet.
Turkey also stood to gain both economically and politically from an
open border with Armenia because: 1) The population of Turkey's eastern
provinces, living in abject poverty, would significantly benefit from
trading with Armenia; 2) Turkey would fulfill one of the prerequisites
for European Union membership; and 3) Ankara hoped to preempt the
White House and Congress from taking a stand on the Armenian Genocide.
Despite such clear and immediate advantages, Turkish officials
prolonged the negotiations, in order to secure maximum concessions
from Armenia in return for opening the border.
The first glimmer of a breakthrough came on June 23, 2008, when
Armenia's newly-elected President, Serge Sargsyan, unexpectedly
announced, during a Moscow visit, his acceptance of a Turkish proposal
to form a "historical commission." However, the Armenian President
insisted that the commission would be established "only after the
opening of the border." Later, the Armenian side announced that it
would accept the establishment an inter-governmental commission that
would discuss all outstanding issues between th e two countries.
As it became clear in late 2008 that Barack Obama would win the
presidency and probably keep his promise to recognize the Armenian
Genocide, the Turkish government launched a propaganda campaign to
convince the international community that Armenia and Turkey were
engaged in delicate negotiations which would be undermined if third
countries acknowledged the Genocide. Clearly, the Turks were not
sincere in their declared intentions.
Had they been serious, the border could have been opened in a matter
of days, not months or years! At the height of that campaign, the
Presidents of Armenia and Turkey held a summit meeting in Yerevan on
the sidelines of a soccer match between their national teams. Armenians
were encouraged that Turkish officials made no mention of their usual
preconditions for Armenia to desist from genocide recognition and to
make concessions on Artsakh.
Pres. Obama's visit to Turkey last week had a critical impact on
the development of Armenian-Turkish relations. Judging from his
circumspect remarks in Ankara, it became clear that the American
President had adopted the duplicitous Turkish line that third parties
should not comment on the Armenian Genocide while Armenia and Turkey
were engaged in serious negotiations.
This carefully orchestrated Turkish ploy, however, almost fell
apart at the last minute when Pres. Aliyev of Azerbaijan refused
to go to Istanbul and meet with Pres. Obama. Aliyev was upset that
Turkey was considering opening the border with Armenia while ignoring
Baku's interests. To reassure Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
announced that the border would not be opened until Yerevan resolved
its conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia's Foreign Minister Edward
Nalbandian, objecting that Turkey was reviving its old preconditions,
canceled his trip to Istanbul. However, he ended up taking a later
flight, possibly at the urging of American officials. Aliyev,
on the other hand, remained steadfast in his refusal to go to
Turkey. Mr. Nalbandian's presence in Istanbul regrettably gave credence
to Turkish misrepresentations that the two countries were making good
progress in their negotiations.
Thus, Turkey managed to fool Pres. Obama and other world leaders into
thinking that it was seriously trying to resolve its long-strained
relations with Armenia. Consequently, Turkish officials were showered
with many accolades and received priceless publicity. The Economist
magazine aptly pointed out: "Turkey basks in the glory of a two-day
visit by Barack Obama."
To be sure, the Turks managed to get maximal public relations benefits
by simply talking about opening the border and succeeded in convincing
Pres.
Obama that it was not a good idea to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide
while in Ankara. It remains to be seen whether Turkey has also secured
the President's silence on April 24!
Round 2 of t he Turkish ploy is now in full swing, with Azerbaijan
threatening to take all sorts of measures against Turkey should the
latter dare to open the border with Armenia, without linking such
action to territorial concessions on Artsakh. The entire population
of Azerbaijan has been whipped into frenzy over this issue. Opposition
leaders in Turkey are also up in arms, accusing Erdogan of abandoning
"fraternal Azerbaijan's" interests. Pres. Obama, upon his return to
the White House, immediately phoned Pres. Aliyev to assure him of
America's support for the resolution of the Artsakh conflict as well
as normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations.
While the charade goes on, Armenia's leaders continue to make
surprisingly positive statements about their negotiations with Turkey,
despite repeated announcements by Turkish officials that the border
will not be opened until Yerevan makes concessions on Artsakh.
It now appears that Turkey will place the border negotiations on the
back burner until the Minsk Group, composed of the United States,
Russia and France, can come up with some evidence of progress on the
Artsakh negotiations. Only then would Turkey consider opening the
border with Armenia.
To counter these Turkish/Azeri ploys:
1. Armenia's leaders should start playing hardball with Turkey and
Azerbaijan and not get overly concerned with making a good impression
on the major powers in trying to accommo date their demands.
2. Armenia should stick to its long-avowed position of no preconditions
for opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations with
Turkey, and resist pressures from Russia, the U.S., and Europe.
3. Armenia should consider setting October 7 as a deadline for opening
the border. In case of Turkish inaction by that time, Pres. Sargsyan
should refuse to go to Turkey for the return soccer match, thus
exposing Turkey's ploy on improving relations with Armenia.
4. Long in advance of any border accord, the Armenian Parliament should
safeguard Armenia's national security by prohibiting all foreigners
from purchasing land in sensitive border areas and making investments
in certain strategic resources.
5. Armenia and Armenian-Americans should condemn, in the strongest
possible terms, Pres. Gul's blatant denial of the Armenian
Genocide during a joint press conference with Pres. Obama in Ankara
last week, televised live worldwide. To set the record straight,
Armenian-Americans should immediately submit to the U.S. Senate the
counterpart of the House genocide resolution.
After all, it makes more sense to pass such a bill in the Senate,
which has never approved a resolution on the Armenian Genocide, rather
than in the House which has already adopted two such resolutions in
1975 and 1984.
By Harut Sassounian
The California Courier
Apr 14, 2009
Turkey brilliantly accomplished its objectives in the first round of
negotiations ostensibly to open the border with Armenia.
Ever since 1993, when Turkish leaders closed the border, they set
two main preconditions for its reopening. Armenia must: 1) Stop
pursuing international recognition of the Armenian Genocide; and 2)
Return Artsakh (Karabagh) to Azerbaijan.
Despite persistent Turkish attempts to impose such harsh terms on
Armenia, successive Armenian governments have declared that diplomatic
relations should be established and the border reopened without any
preconditions.
Thus, the standstill continues until today.
During the past year, however, a series of unexpected developments
provided new impetus for Armenia and Turkey to repair their contentious
relationship.
Both countries, under pressure from the U.S. and Europe, were now
prodded by a new major actor, Russia, to open the Armenian-Turkish
border. As owner of major businesses in Armenia, Russia sought to
establish cross border trade with Turkey, thereby also diminishing
Georgia's strategic significance as a sole transit route for the
region.
The turmoil in the aftermath of the contested Armenian presidential
election last year rendered the new leaders more sensitive to demands
from the major powers, expecting in return their support to counter
the=2 0 opposition at home. To be fair, the Armenian government
believed that opening the border was also in Armenia's own economic
interest.
Moreover, when Armenia's imports through Georgia were temporarily
blocked during last year's Georgian-Russian war, Armenian officials
realized the strategic value of having an alternate border outlet.
Turkey also stood to gain both economically and politically from an
open border with Armenia because: 1) The population of Turkey's eastern
provinces, living in abject poverty, would significantly benefit from
trading with Armenia; 2) Turkey would fulfill one of the prerequisites
for European Union membership; and 3) Ankara hoped to preempt the
White House and Congress from taking a stand on the Armenian Genocide.
Despite such clear and immediate advantages, Turkish officials
prolonged the negotiations, in order to secure maximum concessions
from Armenia in return for opening the border.
The first glimmer of a breakthrough came on June 23, 2008, when
Armenia's newly-elected President, Serge Sargsyan, unexpectedly
announced, during a Moscow visit, his acceptance of a Turkish proposal
to form a "historical commission." However, the Armenian President
insisted that the commission would be established "only after the
opening of the border." Later, the Armenian side announced that it
would accept the establishment an inter-governmental commission that
would discuss all outstanding issues between th e two countries.
As it became clear in late 2008 that Barack Obama would win the
presidency and probably keep his promise to recognize the Armenian
Genocide, the Turkish government launched a propaganda campaign to
convince the international community that Armenia and Turkey were
engaged in delicate negotiations which would be undermined if third
countries acknowledged the Genocide. Clearly, the Turks were not
sincere in their declared intentions.
Had they been serious, the border could have been opened in a matter
of days, not months or years! At the height of that campaign, the
Presidents of Armenia and Turkey held a summit meeting in Yerevan on
the sidelines of a soccer match between their national teams. Armenians
were encouraged that Turkish officials made no mention of their usual
preconditions for Armenia to desist from genocide recognition and to
make concessions on Artsakh.
Pres. Obama's visit to Turkey last week had a critical impact on
the development of Armenian-Turkish relations. Judging from his
circumspect remarks in Ankara, it became clear that the American
President had adopted the duplicitous Turkish line that third parties
should not comment on the Armenian Genocide while Armenia and Turkey
were engaged in serious negotiations.
This carefully orchestrated Turkish ploy, however, almost fell
apart at the last minute when Pres. Aliyev of Azerbaijan refused
to go to Istanbul and meet with Pres. Obama. Aliyev was upset that
Turkey was considering opening the border with Armenia while ignoring
Baku's interests. To reassure Aliyev, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
announced that the border would not be opened until Yerevan resolved
its conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia's Foreign Minister Edward
Nalbandian, objecting that Turkey was reviving its old preconditions,
canceled his trip to Istanbul. However, he ended up taking a later
flight, possibly at the urging of American officials. Aliyev,
on the other hand, remained steadfast in his refusal to go to
Turkey. Mr. Nalbandian's presence in Istanbul regrettably gave credence
to Turkish misrepresentations that the two countries were making good
progress in their negotiations.
Thus, Turkey managed to fool Pres. Obama and other world leaders into
thinking that it was seriously trying to resolve its long-strained
relations with Armenia. Consequently, Turkish officials were showered
with many accolades and received priceless publicity. The Economist
magazine aptly pointed out: "Turkey basks in the glory of a two-day
visit by Barack Obama."
To be sure, the Turks managed to get maximal public relations benefits
by simply talking about opening the border and succeeded in convincing
Pres.
Obama that it was not a good idea to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide
while in Ankara. It remains to be seen whether Turkey has also secured
the President's silence on April 24!
Round 2 of t he Turkish ploy is now in full swing, with Azerbaijan
threatening to take all sorts of measures against Turkey should the
latter dare to open the border with Armenia, without linking such
action to territorial concessions on Artsakh. The entire population
of Azerbaijan has been whipped into frenzy over this issue. Opposition
leaders in Turkey are also up in arms, accusing Erdogan of abandoning
"fraternal Azerbaijan's" interests. Pres. Obama, upon his return to
the White House, immediately phoned Pres. Aliyev to assure him of
America's support for the resolution of the Artsakh conflict as well
as normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations.
While the charade goes on, Armenia's leaders continue to make
surprisingly positive statements about their negotiations with Turkey,
despite repeated announcements by Turkish officials that the border
will not be opened until Yerevan makes concessions on Artsakh.
It now appears that Turkey will place the border negotiations on the
back burner until the Minsk Group, composed of the United States,
Russia and France, can come up with some evidence of progress on the
Artsakh negotiations. Only then would Turkey consider opening the
border with Armenia.
To counter these Turkish/Azeri ploys:
1. Armenia's leaders should start playing hardball with Turkey and
Azerbaijan and not get overly concerned with making a good impression
on the major powers in trying to accommo date their demands.
2. Armenia should stick to its long-avowed position of no preconditions
for opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations with
Turkey, and resist pressures from Russia, the U.S., and Europe.
3. Armenia should consider setting October 7 as a deadline for opening
the border. In case of Turkish inaction by that time, Pres. Sargsyan
should refuse to go to Turkey for the return soccer match, thus
exposing Turkey's ploy on improving relations with Armenia.
4. Long in advance of any border accord, the Armenian Parliament should
safeguard Armenia's national security by prohibiting all foreigners
from purchasing land in sensitive border areas and making investments
in certain strategic resources.
5. Armenia and Armenian-Americans should condemn, in the strongest
possible terms, Pres. Gul's blatant denial of the Armenian
Genocide during a joint press conference with Pres. Obama in Ankara
last week, televised live worldwide. To set the record straight,
Armenian-Americans should immediately submit to the U.S. Senate the
counterpart of the House genocide resolution.
After all, it makes more sense to pass such a bill in the Senate,
which has never approved a resolution on the Armenian Genocide, rather
than in the House which has already adopted two such resolutions in
1975 and 1984.