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THE OBAMA VISIT TO TURKEY: THE BROADER CONTEXT
www.noravank.am/en/?page=analitics&ni d=1743
14 April 2009
Richard Giragosian is the director of the Yerevan-based Armenian
Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS).
While Armenia views today's Barack Obama-Abdullah Gul meetings through
the prism of border relations and genocide recognition, from the
broader perspective of US national interests, Turkey is seen to now
hold particular strategic significance, for three main reasons.
First, the Obama Administration recognizes Turkey's more recent role as
a resurgent regional actor, with influence and access in the broader
Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Within this context,
the Obama Administration is now seeking to leverage Turkey as a
mediator or facilitator to deal with Syria and Israel and possibly
even Afghanistan and Pakistan. Washington is also now considering a
new Turkish role in supporting the US approach toward Iran as well.
Secondly, for the US, especially in the wake of the August 2008 war in
Georgia, there is a new need for stability and security in the South
Caucasus region. And for American interests, the possible breakthrough
in Turkish-Armenian relations, and the resulting benefits of open
borders and at least normal diplomatic relations between Ankara and
Yerevan, offers a dynamic opportunity for greater regional stability.
Third, from the American perspective, Turkish cooperation is
an essential requirement for US military needs in Iraq and even
Afghanistan, as Turkey serves as a vital center for logistics and
military operations in both theaters. In light of this broader context,
the issues of the Armenian Genocide, and even Cyprus, are actually
now seen as secondary considerations.
Yet as the aura of the Obama visit will soon start to fade, the
limits of US-Turkish relations will become clearer, and even more
considerable. The inherent limits of Turkey's role in support of the
US strategic agenda are rooted in the reverse of the very same three
factor outlined above.
First, no matter how attractive Turkey's new effort to reassert its
role in the broader regions of the Middle East, Black Sea and the
Caucasus, this is very much a Turkish initiative-based on Turkish
interests and not designed to please or support either the US or the
European Union. In fact, there is now clear evidence to the contrary,
as Turkish leaders have strongly condemned Israel for its actions in
Gaza, imposed strict new limits on NATO activities in the Black Sea
and have even made it clear that the Turkish initiative in the Caucasus
has more in common with Russian interests than with American goals. And
judging by past Turkish efforts, such as inviting the leaders of both
Iran and Sudan to Turkey, it does not seem very likely that Ankara
will be too anxious to support Washington's foreign policy agenda,
no matter how much they may like Obama (or his wife).
Second, Turkey was still the only NATO member to adopt a position of
"neutrality" during the Russia-Georgia war, and actually imposed
limits on US Navy ships attempting to reach Georgia during the
crisis - each move reflecting its now close relationship with Russia,
not Washington. And for the Caucasus, Turkey not only announced its
"Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" without even informing
the US (or NATO) in advance, it even withheld support for the US bid
to obtain "observer" status in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) organization.
And third, in light of the Turkish perception of a threat from the
emergence of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the only real ally for the
Americans in Iraq, it is also unlikely that Turkey will assist or
support US military operations in Iraq in any sincere or meaningful
way. Rather, the Iraq and Kurdish issues only promise to remain
fundamental obstacles in US-Turkish military relations for some time to
come.Although the Obama visit can be seen as an important and symbolic
event, Turkish and US interests seem likely to only diverge even
further, while Turkey and Russia become closer. Such a more realistic
assessment also affirms that the real burden for Turkish-Armenian
relations rests with Ankara, not Yerevan or Washington.
For these reasons, President Obama seems unlikely to offer any clear or
coherent recognition of the Armenian Genocide on this April 24. Beyond
the immediacy of "will he/won't he" speculation of using the g-word,
Turkish-American relations over the coming months may actually serve
to bolster, not weaken, Obama's campaign promises to pursuing a strong
and sincere recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
www.noravank.am/en/?page=analitics&ni d=1743
14 April 2009
Richard Giragosian is the director of the Yerevan-based Armenian
Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS).
While Armenia views today's Barack Obama-Abdullah Gul meetings through
the prism of border relations and genocide recognition, from the
broader perspective of US national interests, Turkey is seen to now
hold particular strategic significance, for three main reasons.
First, the Obama Administration recognizes Turkey's more recent role as
a resurgent regional actor, with influence and access in the broader
Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Within this context,
the Obama Administration is now seeking to leverage Turkey as a
mediator or facilitator to deal with Syria and Israel and possibly
even Afghanistan and Pakistan. Washington is also now considering a
new Turkish role in supporting the US approach toward Iran as well.
Secondly, for the US, especially in the wake of the August 2008 war in
Georgia, there is a new need for stability and security in the South
Caucasus region. And for American interests, the possible breakthrough
in Turkish-Armenian relations, and the resulting benefits of open
borders and at least normal diplomatic relations between Ankara and
Yerevan, offers a dynamic opportunity for greater regional stability.
Third, from the American perspective, Turkish cooperation is
an essential requirement for US military needs in Iraq and even
Afghanistan, as Turkey serves as a vital center for logistics and
military operations in both theaters. In light of this broader context,
the issues of the Armenian Genocide, and even Cyprus, are actually
now seen as secondary considerations.
Yet as the aura of the Obama visit will soon start to fade, the
limits of US-Turkish relations will become clearer, and even more
considerable. The inherent limits of Turkey's role in support of the
US strategic agenda are rooted in the reverse of the very same three
factor outlined above.
First, no matter how attractive Turkey's new effort to reassert its
role in the broader regions of the Middle East, Black Sea and the
Caucasus, this is very much a Turkish initiative-based on Turkish
interests and not designed to please or support either the US or the
European Union. In fact, there is now clear evidence to the contrary,
as Turkish leaders have strongly condemned Israel for its actions in
Gaza, imposed strict new limits on NATO activities in the Black Sea
and have even made it clear that the Turkish initiative in the Caucasus
has more in common with Russian interests than with American goals. And
judging by past Turkish efforts, such as inviting the leaders of both
Iran and Sudan to Turkey, it does not seem very likely that Ankara
will be too anxious to support Washington's foreign policy agenda,
no matter how much they may like Obama (or his wife).
Second, Turkey was still the only NATO member to adopt a position of
"neutrality" during the Russia-Georgia war, and actually imposed
limits on US Navy ships attempting to reach Georgia during the
crisis - each move reflecting its now close relationship with Russia,
not Washington. And for the Caucasus, Turkey not only announced its
"Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" without even informing
the US (or NATO) in advance, it even withheld support for the US bid
to obtain "observer" status in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) organization.
And third, in light of the Turkish perception of a threat from the
emergence of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the only real ally for the
Americans in Iraq, it is also unlikely that Turkey will assist or
support US military operations in Iraq in any sincere or meaningful
way. Rather, the Iraq and Kurdish issues only promise to remain
fundamental obstacles in US-Turkish military relations for some time to
come.Although the Obama visit can be seen as an important and symbolic
event, Turkish and US interests seem likely to only diverge even
further, while Turkey and Russia become closer. Such a more realistic
assessment also affirms that the real burden for Turkish-Armenian
relations rests with Ankara, not Yerevan or Washington.
For these reasons, President Obama seems unlikely to offer any clear or
coherent recognition of the Armenian Genocide on this April 24. Beyond
the immediacy of "will he/won't he" speculation of using the g-word,
Turkish-American relations over the coming months may actually serve
to bolster, not weaken, Obama's campaign promises to pursuing a strong
and sincere recognition of the Armenian Genocide.