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APA, Azerbaijan
April 18 2009
Svante Cornell: `Without solving the Nagorno Karabakh problem you
can't solve the broader problems in the Caucasus'
[ 18 Apr 2009 11:35 ]
Washington. Zaur Hasanov ` APA. APA's interview with Research Director
of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Svante E. Cornell
- In your most recent article published by the Silk Road Studies, you
touched upon a proposal which was offered back in 2002 in the Sadarak
meeting of the presidents of Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. Could
you elaborate on the subject and what this had to do with the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan bordering Iran?
- Of course, there were negotiations that are not entirely public. But
what appears is that there was a proposal by the late president Heydar
Aliyev that he would be willing to agree to opening of the rail road
line to Armenia between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the case if Armenia
vacated, liberated the 4 southern occupied territories that are
between Karabakh and the Iranian border. The rational of cause is
being that these are 4 provinces though which the Soviet time the rail
roads used to go and which is to extend to Armenia and all the way to
Nakchivan.
This was very novel approach on the president's part. Because it was
for a first time Azerbaijan removed the linkage between the discussion
of the status of Karabakh and the restoration some type of economic
relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In that sense, you even
can find that many Armenian observers such as Gerard Libaridian who
criticized the Armenian government for refusing without any discussion
this opening. Because the argument that Libaridian and others make is
that this was a positive force for the Armenia side giving to the fact
that it would effectively have been able Armenia to come out of its
regional isolation and still hang on to its control over
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as well Lachin, Kalbacar and even
perhaps Aghdam. I think it was unclear how Aghdam would be affected by
this deal. Still it would be able to improve its economic situation.
Of course, there was an understanding at that point and I think that
Turkish government was making it clear that it would at the same time,
if should this happen, open its border with Armenia. Because, if
Azerbaijan opens its border with Armenia then there will be no
rational reason for Turkey to continue to have border be closed. In
that sense there was a will to solve the problem in the package deal.
Recently, there have been a sign that the Turkish government is
considering de-linking completely the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution issue with its border with Armenia. That seems to be the
premise under which the normalization process is going on for the
several months between Turkey and Armenia. However, in the last couple
of days, we have had pretty clear statements to the fact that Turkey
is backed to the position that it has held for decade.
- None of the previous governments in Turkey de-linked the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the border reopening with Armenia but
AKP did it. What has changed since the time when border was closed
down and what has changed in the Turkish political establishment that
they had an intention to do that?
- I think that there are several things. First, there is a
relationship with Turkish policy and the Armenian genocide issue in
the Congress of the USA. And I think very much at the beginning the
`football diplomacy' in the summer time, there was a feeling that
Turkey should do something in dealing with geopolitical changes in the
region because of the Georgia war. Another reality is the way how
Turkey was looking at the Obama victory was the presidential election
and if you remember how genocide resolution was close to pass last
year, I think that general assumption was that this year it would pass
very easily. Therefore, in the order to prevent that what you could
do. If you have the Congress which is going to pass the resolution, if
you have the president which has a clear position then a rapprochement
with Armenia was correctly understood to be one of ways in which
Turkey could prevent the genocide resolution. I think, in that sense,
they succeeded. After Obama's speech in the Turkish parliament it will
be very difficult for him this year say `G' word.
Second, you have to understand that even in the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs most people are Atlantics, if you want. They are
people who are specialists in Europe, EU issue, the USA and so on, but
not are people specializing in the Eastern issues like the Caucasus
and Central Asia issues. It is still the secondary issue for
Turkey. And also in the AK party government there are no people who
have a close relationship with the Caucasus. Partly it is because they
understand themselves from the Islamic identity rather than Turkic
identity, and you also have to see a lot of people were saying in
Turkey that: `Look, for the 15 years this policy brought nothing. Lets
bring something new'
- How it can be that the country which has three neighbors in its
eastern border doesn't have enough specialists dealing with the
Caucasus?
- One of the explanations is the political one. AKP is a kind of
strange alliance of Islamists and liberals. Islamists mainly
interested in the ties with the Islamic Middle East, not post Soviet
Muslims and where liberals are more focused entirely on the European
relationship of Turkey. Plus, you have a political reality too. If you
look back last five years, EU, US and Cyprus issues where top issues
in the Turkish foreign policy. These are such big issues that it can
take up so much Turkey time and because so less energy left for other
issues.
- As I understood from your article is that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
is a key element of the security and cooperation in the region. Your
other point is that president Obama should appoint a special envoy
dealing with the conflict.
- It is right. What this latest few weeks have shown us that people
are trying to put aside NK conflict because it is such difficult issue
and say that `let do something else'. For example, let start economic
relations. But the realities of the region proved that NK conflict is
the biggest problem for the region. Without solving this problem you
can't solve the broader problems in the Caucasus. Therefore, when
Turks are realizing now implicitly that they can't go forward in the
normalization with Armenia in the way intended to do, a logical
conclusion shouldn't be `let forget about it' but should be `if the
Karabakh issue is really is the central issue let then see if there
way how to utilize the positive momentum in Turkish Armenian
relations'. Take into account that Obama administration interested in
this issue, and getting Obama administration much more actively
interested in resolving the Karabakh conflict are the right path to
walk.
April 18 2009
Svante Cornell: `Without solving the Nagorno Karabakh problem you
can't solve the broader problems in the Caucasus'
[ 18 Apr 2009 11:35 ]
Washington. Zaur Hasanov ` APA. APA's interview with Research Director
of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
Svante E. Cornell
- In your most recent article published by the Silk Road Studies, you
touched upon a proposal which was offered back in 2002 in the Sadarak
meeting of the presidents of Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan. Could
you elaborate on the subject and what this had to do with the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan bordering Iran?
- Of course, there were negotiations that are not entirely public. But
what appears is that there was a proposal by the late president Heydar
Aliyev that he would be willing to agree to opening of the rail road
line to Armenia between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the case if Armenia
vacated, liberated the 4 southern occupied territories that are
between Karabakh and the Iranian border. The rational of cause is
being that these are 4 provinces though which the Soviet time the rail
roads used to go and which is to extend to Armenia and all the way to
Nakchivan.
This was very novel approach on the president's part. Because it was
for a first time Azerbaijan removed the linkage between the discussion
of the status of Karabakh and the restoration some type of economic
relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In that sense, you even
can find that many Armenian observers such as Gerard Libaridian who
criticized the Armenian government for refusing without any discussion
this opening. Because the argument that Libaridian and others make is
that this was a positive force for the Armenia side giving to the fact
that it would effectively have been able Armenia to come out of its
regional isolation and still hang on to its control over
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as well Lachin, Kalbacar and even
perhaps Aghdam. I think it was unclear how Aghdam would be affected by
this deal. Still it would be able to improve its economic situation.
Of course, there was an understanding at that point and I think that
Turkish government was making it clear that it would at the same time,
if should this happen, open its border with Armenia. Because, if
Azerbaijan opens its border with Armenia then there will be no
rational reason for Turkey to continue to have border be closed. In
that sense there was a will to solve the problem in the package deal.
Recently, there have been a sign that the Turkish government is
considering de-linking completely the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution issue with its border with Armenia. That seems to be the
premise under which the normalization process is going on for the
several months between Turkey and Armenia. However, in the last couple
of days, we have had pretty clear statements to the fact that Turkey
is backed to the position that it has held for decade.
- None of the previous governments in Turkey de-linked the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the border reopening with Armenia but
AKP did it. What has changed since the time when border was closed
down and what has changed in the Turkish political establishment that
they had an intention to do that?
- I think that there are several things. First, there is a
relationship with Turkish policy and the Armenian genocide issue in
the Congress of the USA. And I think very much at the beginning the
`football diplomacy' in the summer time, there was a feeling that
Turkey should do something in dealing with geopolitical changes in the
region because of the Georgia war. Another reality is the way how
Turkey was looking at the Obama victory was the presidential election
and if you remember how genocide resolution was close to pass last
year, I think that general assumption was that this year it would pass
very easily. Therefore, in the order to prevent that what you could
do. If you have the Congress which is going to pass the resolution, if
you have the president which has a clear position then a rapprochement
with Armenia was correctly understood to be one of ways in which
Turkey could prevent the genocide resolution. I think, in that sense,
they succeeded. After Obama's speech in the Turkish parliament it will
be very difficult for him this year say `G' word.
Second, you have to understand that even in the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs most people are Atlantics, if you want. They are
people who are specialists in Europe, EU issue, the USA and so on, but
not are people specializing in the Eastern issues like the Caucasus
and Central Asia issues. It is still the secondary issue for
Turkey. And also in the AK party government there are no people who
have a close relationship with the Caucasus. Partly it is because they
understand themselves from the Islamic identity rather than Turkic
identity, and you also have to see a lot of people were saying in
Turkey that: `Look, for the 15 years this policy brought nothing. Lets
bring something new'
- How it can be that the country which has three neighbors in its
eastern border doesn't have enough specialists dealing with the
Caucasus?
- One of the explanations is the political one. AKP is a kind of
strange alliance of Islamists and liberals. Islamists mainly
interested in the ties with the Islamic Middle East, not post Soviet
Muslims and where liberals are more focused entirely on the European
relationship of Turkey. Plus, you have a political reality too. If you
look back last five years, EU, US and Cyprus issues where top issues
in the Turkish foreign policy. These are such big issues that it can
take up so much Turkey time and because so less energy left for other
issues.
- As I understood from your article is that Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
is a key element of the security and cooperation in the region. Your
other point is that president Obama should appoint a special envoy
dealing with the conflict.
- It is right. What this latest few weeks have shown us that people
are trying to put aside NK conflict because it is such difficult issue
and say that `let do something else'. For example, let start economic
relations. But the realities of the region proved that NK conflict is
the biggest problem for the region. Without solving this problem you
can't solve the broader problems in the Caucasus. Therefore, when
Turks are realizing now implicitly that they can't go forward in the
normalization with Armenia in the way intended to do, a logical
conclusion shouldn't be `let forget about it' but should be `if the
Karabakh issue is really is the central issue let then see if there
way how to utilize the positive momentum in Turkish Armenian
relations'. Take into account that Obama administration interested in
this issue, and getting Obama administration much more actively
interested in resolving the Karabakh conflict are the right path to
walk.